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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act (implied, not explicitly stated)
  • Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution
  • Article 19(6) of the Constitution
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act (implied, not explicitly stated)
  • Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution
  • Article 19(6) of the Constitution
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants, wholesale vegetable and fruit vendors, had conducted their businesses at Machkhowa Market, Guwahati since 1995. Pursuant to several interim orders of the Gauhati High Court they were required to vacate the market because the land had been earmarked for construction of an administrative building for the Department of Handloom and Textiles. The State proposed that the wholesalers relocate first to Ganeshguri Market and ultimately to a newly-planned wholesale market at Garchuk, situated on the city’s outskirts. The High Court dismissed the vendors’ writ petition; the present appeals challenge that dismissal before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether compelling wholesale fruit and vegetable vendors to shift their businesses from the inner-city market to a market on the outskirts of Guwahati violates their fundamental right to carry on trade under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, or whether the relocation constitutes a reasonable restriction under Article 19(6).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • The newly suggested municipal market at Ganeshguri lacks sufficient space to accommodate all existing wholesalers.
  • Relocation would cause hardship to individual traders who have operated from Machkhowa for many years.

Respondents’ (State/Authorities) Arguments

  • Machkhowa and other inner-city areas are severely congested; large numbers of heavy vehicles entering daily for wholesale trade exacerbate traffic, pollution, and hygiene issues.
  • The State has initiated construction of an 8-bigha wholesale market at Garchuk near the bypass; development is progressing rapidly.
  • Wholesale markets worldwide are generally located outside city limits; public interest requires relocation despite private inconvenience.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Friends Colony Development Committee v. State of Orissa (2004) 8 SCC 733 Private interest is subordinate to public good. Cited to support relocation as a public-interest measure overriding traders’ inconvenience.
STO v. Shree Durga Oil Mills (1998) 1 SCC 572 Public interest must override private loss or gain. Reinforces that individual hardship cannot defeat a policy serving wider community interests.
Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731 Test of reasonableness of restrictions under Article 19(6). Relocation deemed reasonable when evaluated from the standpoint of general public interest.
State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas (1969) 1 SCC 509 Restriction is not unreasonable merely because it operates harshly in individual cases. Used to rebut claim that hardship to some traders renders the policy unconstitutional.
Laxmi Khandsari v. State of U.P. (1981) 2 SCC 600 Factors for judging reasonableness: nature of right, purpose, urgency, proportionality. Court evaluates relocation policy through these factors and finds it reasonable.
D.K. Trivedi & Sons v. State of Gujarat 1986 Supp SCC 20 Same multi-factor test for reasonableness. Supports the overall analytical framework adopted by the Court.
State of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196 Early exposition of the “reasonableness” standard. Forms part of the jurisprudential lineage relied upon in analysing Article 19 restrictions.
Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. v. RBI (1992) 2 SCC 343 Deference to regulatory measures serving public interest. Cited for the proposition that courts look at social interest rather than private perspective.
Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia v. Union of India (1969) 2 SCC 166 Proportionality and prevailing conditions inform reasonableness. Invoked while weighing city congestion and health concerns against traders’ rights.
Jyoti Pershad v. Union Territory of Delhi, AIR 1961 SC 1602 Standard of reasonableness varies with time and societal needs. Used to justify modern urban planning measures addressing contemporary congestion.
Pathumma v. State of Kerala (1978) 2 SCC 1 Courts must assess restrictions from the standpoint of social interest. Supports giving primacy to community welfare over private business convenience.
P.P. Enterprises v. Union of India (1982) 2 SCC 33 Same social-interest centred inquiry. Forms part of the chain of authorities on reasonable restrictions.
American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 US 538 (1948) Courts should allow legislatures to correct social-economic problems through trial and error. Invoked to caution against judicial interference in policy choices like market relocation.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 US 262 (1931) Government must be free to experiment; courts should not hinder social experiments. Further supports judicial restraint regarding executive action aimed at urban planning.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court held that wholesale markets situated within Guwahati city generate significant traffic congestion, pollution, and health hazards due to daily entry of heavy vehicles and accumulation of waste. Worldwide practice places wholesale markets at city outskirts, and relocating the Guwahati market would not inconvenience ordinary citizens who frequent only retail markets.

Applying the Article 19(6) test, the Court examined the nature of the traders’ right, the purpose of the restriction, extent of relocation, and the societal mischief to be remedied. Citing a long line of precedents, it emphasised that:

  • Public interest surpasses private inconvenience.
  • A restriction is not unreasonable merely because some individuals suffer hardship.
  • Standards of reasonableness evolve with societal needs, and courts should defer to administrative solutions unless patently illegal.

Finding the relocation policy proportionate to the objectives of easing congestion and safeguarding public health, the Court concluded that the measure is a reasonable restriction under Article 19(6). The Court also underscored the limited judicial role in policy matters, referencing U.S. authorities to illustrate the importance of allowing governmental “experimentation” in social and economic regulation.

Holding and Implications

DISPOSED OF. The appeals were dismissed, and the Court directed that all wholesale fruit and vegetable traders shift to markets located on the outskirts or outside Guwahati.

Implications: The Government of Assam, municipal bodies, and other relevant departments must, within one year, constitute a committee to construct (if necessary) and allot adequate space in the new wholesale market at Garchuk or other peripheral sites. Allotments must be made fairly and without discrimination. The decision affirms governmental authority to relocate urban wholesale markets for public welfare but sets no new substantive precedent beyond reinforcing established principles on reasonable restrictions and judicial deference to policy.

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    Mohd. Murtaza And Others v. State Of Assam And Others

    Order

    1. Leave granted. These appeals have been filed against the impugned judgment and order dated 28-4-2008 passed by the Gauhati High Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 8081 of 2005.

    2. The appellants are wholesale vegetable and fruit vendors and were engaged in selling vegetables and fruits at Machkhowa Market, Guwahati in the State of Assam since 1995. However, they had to vacate their respective possession of the premises in pursuance to the orders of the Gauhati High Court. Machkhowa Market is situated close to the railway station and is inside the city and the land thereon has been allotted to the Department of Handloom and Textiles, Government of Assam for the purpose of construction of an administrative building. For this purpose it was proposed to remove the appellants and other wholesale vendors from Machkhowa Market, and instead a new market has been constructed at Ganeshguri. It was submitted by the appellants and others that there is not enough space in the Ganeshguri municipal market for the appellants and others. We are not referring to the various orders issued by the Gauhati High Court from time to time.

    3. In one of the counter-affidavits filed before us it has been stated that all parts of the city of Guwahati, including Machkhowa is very congested and hence the appellants and other wholesalers should not be allowed to do business of wholesale fruits and vegetables inside the city limits as a large number of heavy and medium goods vehicles have to enter the city to go to that wholesale market and consequently the area becomes very congested causing serious traffic problems and also hazards of health and hygiene and pollution. It is stated that the Government of Assam has initiated steps to develop the fruits and vegetables wholesale market at the outskirts of Guwahati at Garchuk near the bypass on an area of 8 bighas of land and the foundation stone of the project market was laid by the Chief Minister on 25-2-2011. It has been further submitted that development work is taking place at a high speed at Garchuk.

    4. We are of the opinion that the wholesale market of fruits and vegetables for supplying of these goods to Guwahati and elsewhere should be at the outskirts or outside the city limits of Guwahati to avoid problems of traffic congestion, health and hygiene, pollution, etc.

    5. Citizens ordinarily do not go to wholesale markets, but they go to retail markets. Hence if the wholesale market is not situated within the city limits it will not cause any inconvenience to the public in general. On the other hand, if such wholesale market is situated within the city limits, there will be everyday hazards of traffic congestion because of hundreds of vehicles entering the city carrying goods for the wholesale markets resulting in traffic congestion, air and noise pollution, etc. apart from posing health and hygiene problems. A large number of these goods will be dumped on the roads causing huge collection of waste and garbage. The rotting goods may spread diseases. They may also attract stray animals.

    6. Ordinarily everywhere in the world wholesale markets are situated at the outskirts or outside the city limits. No doubt, the shifting of the shops of the wholesalers will cause some hardships to some individuals, but it is well settled that public interest prevails over the private interests. Thus, in Friends Colony Development Committee v. State of Orissa (2004) 8 SCC 733, AIR 2005 SC 1 this Court observed:

    “22. … The private interest stands subordinated to the public good.”

    7. Similarly, in STO v. Shree Durga Oil Mills (1998) 1 SCC 572 this Court observed:

    “21. … Public interest must override any consideration of private loss or gain.”

    8. It is true that right to do business is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, but this right is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(6).

    9. It may be mentioned that to test the reasonability of a restriction we have to see the subject-matter, extent of restriction, the mischief which it seeks to check, etc. The reasonableness of the restriction has to be determined in an objective manner and has to be seen from the point of view of the interest of the general public and not merely from the point of view of the persons upon whom the restrictions are imposed (vide Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar AIR 1958 SC 731). Moreover, the impugned action of the authorities cannot be said to be unreasonable merely because in a given case, they may operate harshly [vide State of Gujarat v. Shantilal Mangaldas (1969) 1 SCC 509, AIR 1969 SC 634 (vide para 52)].

    10. As observed by the Supreme Court in Laxmi Khandsari v. State of U.P (1981) 2 SCC 600, AIR 1981 SC 873, D.K Trivedi & Sons v. State of Gujarat 1986 Supp SCC 20, AIR 1986 SC 1323, State of Madras v. V.G Row AIR 1952 SC 196, 1952 Cri LJ 966, 1952 SCR 597, Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. v. RBI (1992) 2 SCC 343, AIR 1992 SC 1033 and Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia v. Union of India (1969) 2 SCC 166, AIR 1970 SC 1453, etc., the nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction imposed and the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, disproportion of the imposition, prevailing conditions at the time, etc. are the relevant considerations for determining whether the restriction is reasonable.

    11. Further, as held in Jyoti Pershad v. UT of Delhi AIR 1961 SC 1602 the standard of reasonableness must also vary from age to age and be related to the adjustments necessary to solve the problems which communities face from time to time. In adjudging the validity of the restriction the court has necessarily to approach the question from the point of view of the social interest which the State action intends to promote (vide Pathumma v. State of Kerala (1978) 2 SCC 1, AIR 1978 SC 771, P.P Enterprises v. Union of India (1982) 2 SCC 33, AIR 1982 SC 1016 and Jyoti Pershad v. UT of Delhi AIR 1961 SC 1602, etc.).

    12. Judged by these standards the impugned action of the authorities cannot be faulted on the ground of lack of reasonableness. As stated in the counter-affidavits filed in these cases, the existing wholesale markets have become the cause of immense traffic congestion in the city, apart from causing diseases, pollution, etc. Hence, shifting the wholesale markets to the outskirts of the city or beyond is clearly reasonable.

    13. It must be remembered that certain matters are by their very nature such as had better be left to the administrative authorities instead of courts themselves seeking to substitute their own views and perceptions as to what is the best solution to the problem. The present is clearly an instance where this Court should not interfere with the steps taken by the respondents to resolve a pressing problem. In matters of policy the courts have a limited role and it should only interfere with the same when it is clearly illegal. That clearly is not the case here. The impugned action is a salutary step for undoing a mischief, which was crying out for redress for a long time, and it is not illegal.

    14. As observed by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State of Bihar AIR 1958 SC 731 the Court must presume that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people. The legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm, and may confine its restrictions to those where the need is deemed to be the clearest. In our opinion, the same principle would apply to executive action also, unless there is clear violation of a statute or a constitutional provision.

    15. In our opinion, the State should not be hampered by the court in dealing with evils at their point of pressure. All legislation, including delegated legislation (such as the kind we are examining) and executive action is essentially ad hoc. Since, social problems nowadays are extremely complicated, this inevitably entails special treatment for distinct social phenomena. If legislation or executive action is to deal with realities it must address itself to variations in society. The State must, therefore, be left with wide latitude in devising ways and means of social control and regulation, and the court should not, unless compelled by the law, encroach into this field.

    16. As Frankfurter, J. of the US Supreme Court observed in American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co. 335 US 538 (1948): (L Ed pp. 230-31)

    “Even where the social undesirability of a law may be convincingly urged, invalidation of the law by a court debilitates popular democratic government. Most laws dealing with social and economic problems are matters of trial and error. That which before trial appears to be demonstrably bad may belie prophecy in actual operation. But, even if a law is found wanting on trial, it is better that its defects should be demonstrated and removed by the legislature than that the law should be aborted by judicial fiat. Such, an assertion of judicial power defeats responsibility from those on whom in a democratic society it ultimately rests. Hence, rather than exercise judicial review Courts should ordinarily allow legislatures to correct their own mistakes wherever possible.”

    In our opinion the same principle would apply to executive action too.

    17. Similarly, in his dissenting judgment in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann 285 US 262 (1931), Mr Brandeis, J. the celebrated Judge of the US Supreme Court observed that the Government must be left free to engage in social experiments. Progress in the social sciences, as in the physical sciences, depends on “a process of trial and error” and courts must not interfere with necessary experiments. Brandeis, J. also observed: (New State Ice Co. case 285 US 262 (1931), L Ed p. 771)

    “To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Nation.”

    18. On the facts of the case, we are of the opinion that the appellants and other wholesale traders should shift to the wholesale markets at the outskirts or outside the city limits of Guwahati.

    19. If the markets are not constructed yet, they will be constructed by the Government, the municipalities and other authorities in consultation with the representatives of the wholesale traders of Guwahati and allotments made within a period of one year from today. For this purpose a committee shall be set up under the chairmanship of the Secretary concerned of the Government of Assam and having members from the representatives of the Guwahati Municipality and other authorities, and also representatives of the associations of wholesalers of fruits and vegetables and grains, etc. as well as representatives from the Electricity Department, Water Department, Telephone Department, Police, etc. This Committee shall form a rational plan for allotment of the existing wholesale markets inside Guwahati City to the new wholesale market (which will be constructed, if has not already been constructed).

    20. All the wholesalers inside Guwahati City shall be allowed to apply for allotment for adequate land for the wholesale market at the outskirts of or beyond Guwahati City. If such applications are made the same will be decided in a fair and non-arbitrary manner without any pick and choose. The entire exercise including allotments must be completed within one year from today.

    21. With the observations made above, the appeals stand disposed of. No costs.

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    Comments

    Mohd. Murtaza And Others v. State Of Assam And Others
    (Aug 29, 2011)