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  • SECTION 9 DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT
  • sections 10 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • section 151 of the Code of Civil
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Acts
  • SECTION 9 DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT
  • sections 10 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • section 151 of the Code of Civil
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion — B.C. Misra, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are tenants who paid a contractual rent of Rs. 150 per month. On 31 May 1965 the tenants filed a petition under section 9 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 for fixation of the standard rent; that petition remained pending. On 6 April 1970 the landlords brought a civil suit in the Court of a Subordinate Judge, 1st Class, Delhi, for recovery of Rs. 5,400 as arrears of rent at the contractual rate for the period 1 April 1967 to 31 March 1970.

In their written statement the tenants contended that the suit should be stayed under sections 10 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure pending determination of the standard rent by the Controller. The Subordinate Judge rejected the plea for stay by order dated 22 September 1970, holding that until the Controller fixes a standard or interim rent, tenants must pay the contractual rent. The tenants challenged that order by way of a revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The revision was referred to a Division Bench for decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a suit for recovery of arrears of rent at the contractual rate should be stayed during the pendency of a petition under section 9 of the Delhi Rent Control Act for fixation of standard rent before the Controller.
  2. Whether the trial court could or should exercise its powers under section 10 or section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to stay the civil suit pending fixation of standard rent by the Controller.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners (Tenants) — Arguments

  • The tenants relied principally on the decision in Malik Girdhari Lal v. Parshotam Dass, in which the Single Judge (Tatachari, J.) — following earlier authorities — held that because sections 4 and 5 of the Rent Act bar recovery of amounts in excess of the standard rent and the Civil Court cannot determine the standard rent, a suit for recovery of arrears at the contractual rate should be stayed under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure until the Controller determines the standard rent.
  • They argued that every property has a standard rent in accordance with the Act’s principles (sections 2(k), 6 and 9), so the landlord could recover only that amount; recovery of contractual arrears before determination would risk compelling payment of amounts in excess of the future standard rent.
  • The tenants submitted that the Subordinate Judge should therefore have stayed the suit; they also urged that the Supreme Court decision in M.M. Chawla v. J.S. Sethi, relied on by the Subordinate Judge, was distinguishable on the facts.

Respondents (Landlords) / Court below — Arguments

  • The court below relied on the Supreme Court decision in M.M. Chawla v. J.S. Sethi, which held that the prohibitions in sections 4 and 5 of the Rent Act operate only after the Controller has actually determined the standard rent; until then the contractual terms govern and the tenant must pay contractual rent.
  • Implicitly, the landlords maintained that there was no ground for a stay of the civil suit because, in the absence of an order fixing standard rent or an interim order under section 10 of the Rent Act, the tenant’s obligation remained the contractual rent and a civil decree for contractual arrears would be lawful.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Malik Girdhari Lal v. Parshotam Dass (Civil Revision No. 416-D of 1965, Tatachari, J., 28 May 1971) Held (by the Single Judge) that, following earlier authorities, a suit for recovery of arrears of contractual rent should be stayed under section 151 CPC until the Controller determines standard rent, because the Civil Court cannot determine standard rent and sections 4 & 5 bar recovery in excess of standard rent. The Court noted this authority had been relied on by the petitioners but observed that the Supreme Court decision in M.M. Chawla had not been brought to the Single Judge's notice. In view of the Supreme Court authority, the Court did not consider it necessary to examine the correctness of Malik Girdhari Lal and did not follow its approach to grant a stay.
Dulhanmal Rizumal v. Abdul Kadar, A.I.R. 1950 Madhya Bharat 8 Earlier High Court authority relied upon in Malik Girdhari Lal to support staying a suit pending fixation of standard rent. The opinion records that this authority was followed by the Single Judge in Malik Girdhari Lal; the present Court did not apply it, noting the subsequent Supreme Court decision that controlled the issue.
Manji Lal v. Prem Chand, A.I.R. 1951 Madhya Bharat 105 Earlier High Court authority relied upon in Malik Girdhari Lal to support staying a suit pending fixation of standard rent. As with the other earlier authorities, the present Court noted it was relied upon in Malik Girdhari Lal but did not adopt its conclusion because of the Supreme Court ruling in M.M. Chawla.
Vishnu Dass v. Dr. Krishan Kumar, A.I.R. 1953 Hyderabad 144 Earlier High Court authority relied upon in Malik Girdhari Lal to support staying a suit pending fixation of standard rent. Similarly recorded as relied upon in Malik Girdhari Lal; not followed by the present Court in light of the Supreme Court decision.
M.M. Chawla v. J.S. Sethi, (1969) 1 Rent Control Reporter 861 (Supreme Court) Held that sections 4 and 5 of the Rent Act prohibit recovery of rent in excess of standard rent only after the standard rent has been determined by the Controller; until the Controller fixes the standard rent the contractual rent governs. The Controller alone has power to fix standard rent; attempts to determine it out of court are not binding. Section 12 allows retrospective operation up to one year, and the prohibition applies only from the date the determination operates. This Supreme Court decision was treated as the controlling authority. The Court applied M.M. Chawla to hold that the tenants remained liable to pay contractual rent until the Controller fixed the standard rent; therefore there was no ground to stay the civil suit for contractual arrears. The court followed the rule that prohibition against recovery applies only from the date the Controller's order operates.
Krishan Kumar v. Lala Ram Sarup Khanna, 1966 D.L.T. 608 Held that a suit for recovery of arrears of rent may be proceeded with even while an application for fixation of standard rent is pending; such proceedings are not a valid ground for stay of the suit. The Court cited this authority as reaching the same conclusion as itself and as supporting the view that there is no good ground for staying a suit for arrears pending fixation of standard rent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a statutory and precedential analysis focused on the scheme of the Delhi Rent Control Act and the binding Supreme Court authority.

  1. Statutory framework: The Court reviewed the relevant provisions of the Rent Act as they relate to standard rent:
    • Sections 2(k), 6 and 9 define and provide the machinery for fixation of standard rent and specify the factors to be considered.
    • Section 10 empowers the Controller to fix an interim rent pending determination; section 12 permits retrospective effect up to one year; section 13 provides for refund or adjustment of amounts paid in excess; sections 4 and 5 bar recovery of unlawful charges and amounts in excess of standard rent once standard rent is determined; section 50 restricts Civil Court jurisdiction over fixation of standard rent and eviction.
  2. Precedent: The Court observed that the tenants’ reliance on Malik Girdhari Lal (and the earlier authorities it followed) omitted consideration of the later Supreme Court decision in M.M. Chawla. The Court treated M.M. Chawla as the controlling precedent on the point.
  3. Core legal principle applied from M.M. Chawla: The Court accepted the Supreme Court’s rule that the prohibitions in sections 4 and 5 operate only after the Controller has actually determined the standard rent. Until such determination the contractual rent governs the parties’ obligations. The Controller alone has power to fix standard rent; an out-of-court or notional standard rent cannot substitute for a formal order of the Controller.
  4. Application to facts:
    • Because the petition under section 9 was pending and no order fixing an interim rent under section 10 had been obtained by the tenants, the tenants remained legally liable to pay the contractual rent for the period in question.
    • The Civil Court’s decree for contractual arrears (in the absence of an actual order by the Controller fixing standard rent) would be legal and valid.
    • Even if a civil decree for contractual arrears were passed before the Controller’s eventual determination, section 13 and related provisions would protect tenant rights by permitting adjustment or refund of amounts paid in excess of the standard rent once it is fixed; thus the tenant’s substantive rights are safeguarded and there is no necessity to stay the civil suit to prevent prejudice.
  5. On the discretionary stay power under section 151 CPC: The Court acknowledged that a trial court has inherent/discretionary power to stay proceedings in the interests of justice but held that, given the statutory safeguards (interim rent under section 10, refund/adjustment under section 13) and the tenant’s failure to seek interim relief, there was no good ground to exercise that discretion to stay the civil suit in the present circumstances. A stay would unreasonably delay recovery of arrears which the tenant was legally obliged to pay.
  6. Conclusion of analysis: The Court concluded there was no legal basis to stay the suit either under section 10 CPC or under section 151 CPC on the facts of this case, and hence the revision failed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision is dismissed. The Court held that a suit for recovery of arrears of rent at the contractual rate need not be stayed during the pendency of a petition for fixation of standard rent by the Controller where no interim order under section 10 of the Rent Act has been obtained and the standard rent has not yet been determined.

Implications and consequences:

  • The tenants remain liable to pay rent at the contractual rate until the Controller actually fixes the standard rent pursuant to the Rent Act; a civil decree for contractual arrears in such circumstances is lawful and valid.
  • Tenants who wish to avoid paying contractual rent pending determination of standard rent must seek an interim rent order from the Controller under section 10 of the Rent Act; absent such an order, stay of the civil suit is not warranted.
  • If the Controller subsequently fixes a standard rent effective retrospectively or otherwise, section 13 (and related statutory provisions) enables refund or adjustment of any amounts paid in excess of the standard rent — providing a statutory safeguard to tenants and reducing the need for a civil stay.
  • The Court relied on the Supreme Court's ruling (M.M. Chawla) as the controlling authority and therefore did not follow the earlier Single Judge decision (Malik Girdhari Lal) or the Madhya Bharat/Hyderabad authorities on the point. The opinion did not purport to set a novel principle apart from applying the Supreme Court decision; the direct effect is dismissal of the revision and an order that parties bear their own costs.

Disposition: Revision dismissed; parties to bear their respective costs.

    M/S. Beopari Benefit Chit Fund Co. Petitioners v. Ganpat Rai And Others S

    B.C Misra, J.:— The question involved in this revision is whether a suit for recovery of arrears of rent at the contractual rate should be stayed during the pendency of a petition for fixation of standard rent filed by the tenant before the Controller. The revision came up for hearing before one of us who, in view of an authority of this Court in Malik Girdhari Lal v. Parshotam Dass, Civil Revision No. 416-D of 1965 decided by Tatachari, J. on 28th of May, 1971 (1) has referred it to a Division Bench.

    The material facts of the case are that the petitioners in this revision are tenants of the respondents on a rent of Rs. 150/- per month and on 31st May, 1965, they filed a petition under section 9 of the Delhi Rent Control Act 59 of 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for fixation of standard rent of the premises which is still pending for decision. On 6th April, 1970, the landlords (respondents herein) instituted a suit for recovery of Rs. 5,400/- on account of arrears of rent at the contractual rate for the period from 1st April, 1967 to 31st March, 1970. The suit is pending in the Court of a Subordinate Judge 1st Class, Delhi. The defendants in their written statement raised the plea that the suit was liable to be stayed under sections 10 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure till the determination of the standard rent by the Controller. This plea was opposed and failed before the Subordinate Judge who by order dated 22nd September, 1970 held that unless and until the standard rent or interim rent had been fixed by the Controller, the tenants were bound to pay the contractual rent and there was, therefore, no ground for stay of the suit. Aggrieved by this order, the tenants, who were defendants in the suit, filed a revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
    In support of the revision, the learned counsel for the petitioners has mainly relied on the decision of Tatachari, J. in Malik Girdhari Lal's case (1) where his lordship, following two authorities of the High Court of Madhya Bharat and one of the High Court of Hyderabad, namely, Dulhanmal Rizumal v. Abdul Kadar, A.I.R 1950 Madhya Bharat 8 (2), Manji Lal v. Prem Chand, A.I.R 1951 Madhya Bharat 105 (3) and Vishnu Dass v. Dr. Krishan Kumar, A.I.R 1953 Hyderabad 144 (4), held that in view of sections 4 and 5 of the Act, the landlord was not entitled to recover any amount in excess of the standard rent of the premises and since the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to determine the standard rent, which could be determined only by the Controller being the special Tribunal created under the Act, the suit for recovery of arrears of rent should be stayed under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure till the determination of the standard rent. The learned counsel has submitted that under the circumstances of the case, the suit ought to have been stayed by the Subordinate Judge and the decision of the Supreme Court in M.M Chawla v. J.S Sethi., (1969) 1 Rent Control Reporter 861 (5), relied upon by the Court below, was distinguishable on the facts and circumstances of the case.
    The Rent Act is a piece of ameliorative legislation, the object of which is to restrict the increase of rent and protect the tenants against the harassment by eviction consequent on the shortage of accommodation. The scheme of the Act is that section 14 thereof prohibits eviction except on the grounds specified in the provisos to the section. So far as standard rent is concerned, section 6 of the Act prescribes the definition of and section 9 provides the machinery for fixation of standard rent and it specifies the factors to be taken into consideration in determining it. Section 10 of the Act gives jurisdiction to the Controller to fix an interim rent. Section 12 provides the limitation for moving applications for fixation of standard rent, whether by the tenant or the landlord and section 13 makes a provision for refund of the amounts paid in excess of the standard rent or payments of those amounts like premium which are prohibited by the statute. Section 5 bars the recovery of unlawful charges and section 4 provides that no tenant shall, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary be liable to pay to his landlord any amount in excess of the standard rent of the premises and that any agreement for payment of rent in excess of standard rent shall be construed as if it were an agreement for payment of the standard rent only. Section 50 of the Act inter alia provides that the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction in respect of eviction of tenants and fixation of standard rent which the Controllers have been empowered to decide under the Act.
    The argument advanced on behalf of the tenant-petitioners is that every property will be deemed to have a standard rent in accordance with the principles mentioned in sections 2 (k), 6 and 9 of the Act and, therefore, every tenant would be required to pay, and the landlord would be entitled to recover, only the said amount of standard rent and payment in excess of it has been declared to be unlawful and since the Civil Court cannot determine the standard rent, it should be required to stay the suit for recovery of arrears of rent at the contractual rate, otherwise the result of the decree would be to compel payment of amount in excess of the standard rent which has been or may be fixed by the Controller.
    The Supreme Court in M.M Chawla's case (supra) (5) had an occasion to consider the problem and the argument pressed before the Court that the standard rent had been defined by sections 2 (k) and 6 of the Act and sections 4 and 5 had the effect of reforming the contract of tenancy for payment of rent and substitute the standard rent for the contractual Vent and so the landlord was not entitled to recover the contractual rent. The Court negatived the contention and observed as follows:—
    “Counsel says that by virtue of the provisions of sections 4 and 5 recovery of rent by a landlord in excess of the standard rent is prohibited. But in our judgment the prohibition in sections 4 and 5 operates only after the standard rent of premises is determined and not till then. So long as the standard rent is not determined by the Controller, the tenant must pay the contractual rent: after the standard rent is determined the landlord becomes disentitled to recover an amount in excess of the standard rent from the date on which the determination operates.
    We are unable to agree that standard rent of a given tenement is by the virtue of section 6 of the Act a fixed quantity, and the liability for payment of a tenent is circumscribed thereby even if the standard rent is not fixed by order of the Controller. Under the scheme of the Act standard rent of a given tenement is that amount only which the Controller determines. Until the standard rent is fixed by the Controller contract between the landlord and the tenant determines the liability of the tenant to payment. That is clear from the terms of section 9 of the Act. That section clearly indicates that the Controller alone has the power to fix the standard rent, and it cannot be determined out of Court. An attempt by the parties to determine by agreement the standard rent out of Court is not binding. By section 12 in an application for fixation of standard of premises the Controller may give retrospective operation to his adjudication for a period not exceeding one year before the date of the application. The scheme of the Act is entirely inconsistent with standard rent being determined otherwise than by order of the Controller. In our view, the prohibition against recovery of rent in excess of the standard rent applies only from the date on which the standard rent is determined by order of the Controller and not before that date.”
    It is, therefore, obvious that the rule of law laid down by the Supreme Court is that the rights of the parties remain governed by the terms of the contract and the tenant remains liable to pay the rent at the contractual rate unless and until the standard rent is in fact determined by the Controller according to the provisions of law. There is, therefore, no scope for any conception of a notional rent being substituted by the parties in place of the contractual rent and then invite the prohibition contained in section 4. The Supreme Court has very clearly laid down that the prohibition does not apply unless and until the standard rent has been fixed by an order of the Controller and it becomes effective from the date it operates and not earlier.
    This judgment of the Supreme Court had not been brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge who decided the case of Malik Girdhari Lal (supra). (1) In view of the decision of the Supreme Court, it is not necessary to consider the correctness of the authorities relied upon the learned Single Judge. As a result, the petitioner-tenants would be legally liable to pay all arrears of rent at the contractual rate and the decree of the civil Court would, in the absence of an order of the Controller in fact fixing the standard rent, be legal and valid and the contractual rent cannot be said to be fluid or contingent.
    The learned counsel for the petitioners has lastly submitted that assuming that the decree of the civil Court would be lawful and binding, there was a good and sufficient ground for stay of the suit when proceedings for fixation of standard rent, which had been initiated earlier, were pending. In our opinion, this contention has no force. It was open to the party who had filed a petition under section 9 of the Act for fixation of standard rent to obtain from the Controller an order under section 10 of the Act fixing an interim rent of the premises pending determination of the standard rent which could be passed after the filing of the petition as expeditiously as possible. This order for interim rent would be binding on the parties and would reform their payable rate of rent unless and until the application was finally disposed of by the Controller under section 9. It is admitted that the petitioners did not obtain any order fixing the interim rent in this case. Again, after the standard rent has been finally fixed by an order under section 9, the Controller is required to fix a date with effect from which the standard rent would be effective which would be not more than one year earlier than the date of filing of the petition and section 13 of the Act contains a provision for refund of the amount of rent and premium etc. by adjustment from the rent or otherwise, which may be in excess of the standard rent or be not recoverable under the Act. This provision provides ample protection to the tenants against any excessive or unlawful recovery of the rent. Consequently, the passing of the decree by the civil Court against the tenant will not prejudice his rights or interests and if and when the standard rent is determined and comes into operation, section 13 and other provisions of law would safeguard the interests of the tenant and would ensure the refund of the amount realised by the landlord in excess of the standard rent fixed according to law. As a result, we do not find any cogent reason for not proceeding with the suit for recovery of arrears of rent as the two proceedings run an independent course in separate jurisdictions.
    The provisions for stay of the suit is contained in section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but the same is not applicable to such circumstance as has been held by this Court in Malik Girdhari Lal's case. (1) So far as section 151 is concerned, the trial Court undoubtedly possesses a jurisdiction to stay the suit in the interests of justice on good and sufficient cause. That is a matter for the discretion of the Court of first instance and the same is to be exercised in accordance with well established principles of law, but in a circumstance like the facts of the present case, there can be no good ground for exercise of such discretion in favour of stay. The reason is that the law provides ample safeguards for working out the rights of the parties following upon the order of the Controller determining the standard rent, but if the suit be stayed, the amount of arrears of rent which, it is under section 26 the legal duty of the tenant to pay month by month, may accumulate and the landlord would be deprived of the same at least for a considerable time without any valid reason. In Krishan Kumar v. Lala Ram Sarup Khanna, 1966 Delhi Law Times 608 (6), Justice S.B Capoor came to the same conclusion as we have done and he held that a suit for recovery of arrears of rent can be proceeded with even during the pendency of an application for fixation of standard rent, which proceedings will not be a valid ground for stay of a suit for recovery of rent in civil Court. Our conclusion therefore, is that we do not subscribe to view that a suit for recovery of arrears of rent should be stayed during the pendency of a petition for fixation of standard rent either under section 10 or under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
    As a result, the revision fails and is dismissed, but under the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their respective costs.
    Revision Dismissed.
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    Comments

    M/S. Beopari Benefit Chit Fund Co. Petitioners v. Ganpat Rai And Others S
    (Jan 31, 1972)