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  • provisions of section 18 sub-clause (b) of the land acquisition act
  • SECTION 18 LAND ACQUISITION ACT
  • provisions of order 37 rule 2 sub-rule (2) of the code
  • provisions of sub-rule 3 of order 37 of the code
  • sub-rule 2 of rule 2 of order 37 of the code
  • provisions of sub-rule 2 rule 2 of order 37
  • provisions of rule 2 sub-rule 2 of order 37
  • section 18 (b) of the land acquisition act
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  • Art. 159 of the Limitation Act,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Acts
  • provisions of section 18 sub-clause (b) of the land acquisition act
  • SECTION 18 LAND ACQUISITION ACT
  • provisions of order 37 rule 2 sub-rule (2) of the code
  • provisions of sub-rule 3 of order 37 of the code
  • sub-rule 2 of rule 2 of order 37 of the code
  • provisions of sub-rule 2 rule 2 of order 37
  • provisions of rule 2 sub-rule 2 of order 37
  • section 18 (b) of the land acquisition act
  • provisions of order 37 rule 2 sub-rule 2
  • provisions of order 37 sub-rule (2)
  • Art. 159 of the Limitation Act,
  • 37 sub-rule (2) of the code
  • section 12 sub-section (2)
  • provisions of sub-rule 2
  • clause of section 18 (b)
  • 37 sub-rule (2)
  • section 18 (b)
  • sub-rule (1)
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff sued the defendant for recovery of Rs. 28,300 under Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), relying on a promissory note dated 1-7-1959. With the plaint the plaintiff applied for attachment before judgment and obtained an interim injunction restraining the defendant from disposing of his properties. After institution of the suit, no summons in the form required by Order 37 Rule 2(2) CPC was served on the defendant. Nevertheless the defendant appeared through his lawyer Mr. Sharma to contest the attachment application and the attachment matter was heard repeatedly, with various adjournments. The suit was ordered to be heard on several dates and, ultimately, on 22-12-1965 the defendant filed an application (with affidavit) seeking leave to defend the suit. The learned Single Judge rejected that application as hopelessly barred by time and decreed the plaintiff's suit. This appeal challenges that order and decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, where no summons in the form prescribed by Order 37 Rule 2(2) CPC was served on the defendant, an application for leave to appear and defend under Order 37 Rule 2(2) can be treated as barred by limitation under Article 159 of the Limitation Act.
  2. Whether appearances by or on behalf of the defendant in the proceedings prior to obtaining leave to appear and defend (i.e., appearances made without the permission required by Order 37 Rule 2(2)) can be treated as effective appearances that give the defendant knowledge for the purpose of starting limitation under Article 159.
  3. Whether the mandatory provisions of Order 37 Rule 2(2) CPC must be strictly complied with so that any unauthorised appearance is to be ignored for all purposes (including the starting point for limitation).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Sehgal)

  • Because no summons in the form required by Order 37 Rule 2(2) CPC was ever served on the defendant, the statutory starting point for limitation under Article 159 (which is service of summons) never arose; consequently, the application for leave to defend was within time and could not be held barred by limitation.
  • A mere receipt of a copy of the plaint by the clerk (Shri Chuni Lal) of the defendant's counsel who was not duly authorised by the client to receive the plaint does not prove that the defendant or his counsel actually received the plaint; therefore the learned Single Judge's factual finding that the defendant had acquired knowledge was contestable.
  • Even if counsel appeared at hearings concerning attachment before judgment, such appearances relate to the attachment application and cannot be treated as a permitted appearance under Order 37 CPC which would start limitation; the Order 37 procedure is distinct and summary in character.

Respondent's Arguments (as advanced by counsel for the plaintiff/respondent and other counsel appearing in the record)

  • The learned Single Judge found as a fact that a copy of the plaint was handed over to Shri Chuni Lal (clerk of Mr. Sharma) on 12-7-1965 and that Mr. Sharma and other counsel for the defendant appeared on several dates thereafter; on that basis the respondent maintained the defendant had knowledge of the suit and thus ought to have applied for leave to defend within 30 days of acquiring knowledge.
  • It was argued (by Mr. Das) that the words "when the summons is served" in Article 159 of the Limitation Act should be construed to include the date when the defendant acquires knowledge of the suit (i.e., that knowledge, rather than formal service, could be the starting point of limitation).
  • Affidavits filed by the plaintiff's counsel alleged the copy was handed to the clerk who in turn gave it to Mr. Sharma; the respondent relied on the fact that this allegation was not controverted by Mr. Sharma before the trial court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
A decision of the Supreme Court reported at AIR 1962 SC 113 and 1694 Supports the proposition that when a statute prescribes a particular mode of doing something, departure from that prescribed mode amounts to disobedience of an express statutory provision (i.e., such mandatory provisions must be complied with). The court invoked this authority to reinforce the view that Order 37 Rule 2(2) CPC is mandatory and that one cannot treat non-compliance (appearance without leave) as valid; this supports rejecting any argument that the statutory mode could be relaxed.
I.L.R. (1956) Calcutta, 197 (Calcutta High Court) Affirmed that the statutory prohibition on appearance in summary suits under the relevant rule precludes such appearances and they must be ignored. The court relied on this decision to support its conclusion that appearances without leave under Order 37 Rule 2(2) are ineffective and must be disregarded for purposes such as computing limitation.
Pestonji Shapurji Narewalla v. Jamshedji Nawroji Gamadia, AIR 1926 Bombay 250 (Bombay High Court) Held that in a summary suit a defendant cannot be allowed to appear while the hearing is proceeding without obtaining the statutory permission; an appearance for ancillary purposes (e.g., praying for instalments) was held impermissible where no leave to appear had been obtained. The court cited and quoted this decision to illustrate and support the principle that unauthorised appearances in summary proceedings under Order 37 have no legal efficacy and should be ignored.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a structured way:

  1. Fact-finding regarding service and knowledge: It was common ground that no summons in the form prescribed by Order 37 Rule 2(2) CPC was ever served. The learned Single Judge had found, and this court found it impossible to disagree, that a copy of the plaint had been handed to the clerk of the defendant's counsel on 12-7-1965 and that counsel for the defendant appeared on several dates thereafter. The lower court therefore concluded the defendant had knowledge of the suit well before filing the leave application.
  2. Statutory scheme of Order 37: The court analysed Order 37 Rule 2(2) CPC, emphasising its mandatory language which prohibits the defendant from appearing or defending the suit unless leave is obtained. The court highlighted the penal consequence in the sub-rule (allegations in the plaint deemed admitted and plaintiff entitled to decree) and characterized Order 37 procedure as summary, harsh, and rigorous, requiring strict construction in favour of the subject.
  3. Application of Article 159 Limitation Act: Article 159 prescribes a 30-day period to apply for leave to appear and defend, and it explicitly fixes its starting point as the date when the summons under Order 37 Rule 2 is served on the defendant. Because no summons had been served in the prescribed form, the court held that the starting point specified in Article 159 never arose in this case; therefore limitation could not bar the defendant's application on that statutory basis.
  4. Rejection of an argument by analogy: The court considered and rejected the submission (based on an analogy to Section 18(b) of the Land Acquisition Act) that the limitation period could run from the date the defendant acquired knowledge of the suit. The court explained that (a) the words and structure of Section 18(b) are different and focus on receipt of notice; (b) the words and context differ such that they cannot be made to govern Article 159; and (c) reading 'knowledge' into Article 159 would amount to importing words not found in the statute.
  5. Mandatory nature of Order 37 appearances: The court concluded that because Order 37 Rule 2(2) forbids both appearing and defending without leave, any appearance in disobedience of that mandatory provision is of no legal effect and must be ignored. The court cited supporting authorities (Supreme Court and High Court decisions) to reinforce this point.
  6. Consequence for limitation computation: Since no valid leave to appear had been granted before 22-12-1965, the earlier appearances by counsel were ineffective and could not be used to impute knowledge or to trigger the limitation period in Article 159. Therefore the trial Judge erred in dismissing the defendant's application for leave on the preliminary ground of limitation rather than considering it on its merits.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed; the order and decree of the learned Single Judge are set aside and the matter is remitted to the trial judge to dispose of the defendant's application for leave to defend the suit on its merits.

Direct consequences and practical implications (as stated in the opinion):

  • The composite order by which the learned Single Judge both rejected the application for leave and decreed the plaintiff's suit is set aside.
  • The case is sent back to the learned Judge to consider the application for leave to defend the suit on merits and then to decide the suit in accordance with law.
  • The court ordered that the court-fees paid by the appellant on the memorandum of appeal be refunded to him.
  • Costs were directed to abide the result.

The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond the strict interpretation and application of the mandatory provisions of Order 37 Rule 2(2) CPC and Article 159 of the Limitation Act as applied to the facts of this case; the court primarily reversed the trial court's procedural conclusion and directed reconsideration on merits.

    Lala Gopal Dass v. Lala Chandra Prakash

    Per Ali J.:-

    This is an appeal against the judgment and decree of a single Judge of this court in a suit brought by the plaintiff for recovery of Rs. 28,300 under order 37 of the code of civil procedure. Along with the plaint, the plaintiff presented an application for attachment before judgment and obtained an interim order of injunction restraining the defendant from disposing his properties. The suit was based on a promissory note dated 1-7-1959 and it is common ground that after the plaint was filed in the court of the learned single Judge, no summons as required by the provisions of order 37 rule 2 sub-rule (2) of the code of civil procedure was ever served on the defendant. The defendant, however, appeared in court through his lawyer Mr. Sharma in order to contest the application given by the plaintiff for attachment before judgment and injunction. The attachment matter was considered by the court from date to date and ultimately the suit was ordered to be heard on 18-11-65 and was then again adjourned to 2-12-1965 and then to 22-12-1565. On this date the defendant filed an application supported by an affidavit praying for leave to defend the suit. The learned Single Judge held that the application filled by the defendant was hopelessly barred by time and he accordingly rejected the application and decreed the plaintiff's suit.

    In support of the appeal Mr. Sehgal has submitted that as no summons was ever served on the defendant as required by the mandatory provisions of order 37 rule 2 sub-rule 2 of the code of civil procedure, the application for leave to defend the suit was within time and the question of limitation did not arise at all. On the other hand, it was submitted by the counsel for the plaintiff respondent that as the learned Judge has found that the defendant had knowledge of the suit filed against him, he ought to have filed the application for leave to defend the suit within 30 days of the knowledge of the suit. There appears to have been serious controversy between the parties on the question as to whether or not a copy of the plaint presented by the plaintiff was given to the defendant or his counsel. The learned Judge has come to a specific finding that the defendant did receive a copy of the plaint through Shri Chuni Lal the clerk of Shri Sharma Advocate on 12-7-65. The court below has further held that since Mr. Sharma appeared for the defendant on various dates after 12-7-1965, it can be safely presumed that the defendant had knowledge of the suit more than 30 days before the date when he filed the application for leave to defend the suit. This finding of the learned Single Judge was seriously disputed before us by Mr. Sehgal and he contended that a mere receipt of Mr. Chuni Lal who was a clerk of Mr. Sharma and not duly authorised by his client to receive the copy of plaint, would not show that the defendant or his counsel had actually received the copy of the plaint. In this connection, the learned counsel has taken us through various interim orders passed by the court below. It was submitted by Mr. Sehgal that even if the defendant had appeared to contest the application for attachment before judgment, such an appearance could not be treated as an appearance in the suit so as to impute the defendant with the knowledge of the allegations made in the plaint I' or to show that the suit was actually instituted | under Order 37 CPC and not under the ordinary I law. In our opinion, however, the learned Judge has given a very cogent finding on the point as to when the defendant came to acquire the knowledge of the suit and it is not possible for us to disagree with the findings given by him. A perusal of the order sheet would clearly show that on several dates Mr. Sehgal and Mr. Sharma appeared for the defendant and a copy of the plaint was in fact handed over to Shri Chuni Lal the clerk of Mr. Sharma on 12-7-1965 which is corroborated by the endorsement on the file of the court. At no stage of the proceedings, before the court below did Mr Sharma or Mr. Sehgal make a categorical statement before the court below that the copy of the plaint which was handed over to Shri Chuni Lal was not given to the counsel for the defendant by Chuni Lal. It is true that on 10-11-1965 counsel for the defendant did make a complaint to the court that they had not been given a copy of the plaint and the court directed the counsel for the plaintiff to deliver the copy of the plaint to the defendant. A similar prayer was made before the court below on 16-12-1965 and on 20-12-1965. Mr. Prakash counsel for the plaintiff filed an affidavit in which he made a clear allegation that the copy was handed over to Chuni Lal clerk of Mr. Sharma and who gave the copy of the plaint to Mr. Sharma. Despite this affidavit, Mr. Sharma did not controvert this allegation and not assert before the court that he had not received any copy of the plaint from his clerk. In these circumstances, therefore, we find, ourselves in complete agreement with the learned single Judge that the defendant must be deemed to have acquired the knowledge of the present suit on or about 1 -7-1965. It is obvious when the counsels for the defendant filed their objections to the application for attachment before judgment, they could not have been in a position to do so, unless they had perused the plaint filed by the plaintiff. Two eminent counsels had been appearing on several dates and it is difficult to believe that on none of these dates any of the counsels for the defendant would not care to peruse the plaint even in court. The question of knowledge, however, in our opinion, is not sufficient to decide this case. The second argument put forward by Mr. Sehgal is that as the mandatory provisions of rule 2 sub-rule 2 of order 37 cpc have not been complied with, the application for leave to defend the suit could not be barred by time. This argument, in our opinion, appears to be well founded and must prevail. sub-rule 2 of rule 2 of order 37 of the code of civil procedure runs as follows :-

    "In any case in which the plaint and summons are in such forms, respectively the defendant shall not appear - or defend the suit unless he obtains leave from a judge as hereinafter provided so to appear and defend ; and, in default of his obtaining such leave or of his appearance and defence in pursuance thereof, the allegations in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted, and the plaintiff shall be entitled to decree."

    A perusal of this clause makes it very clear that the statute prohibits the defendant from appearing or defending the suit without obtaining permission of the court in the manner laid down in this sub-rule. The sub-rule also contains the penalty for non-appearance as a result of which the plaintiff's suit has to be decreed and the allegations of the plaintiff would be deemed to be admitted. Order 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure, makes a serious departure for the trial of the suits from the procedure laid down for the trial of the suit under the other provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. The procedure contemplated by Order 37 CPC is both harsh and rigorous and is in the nature of a summary trial. In such suits the defendant cannot appear or defend the suit as a matter of right but has to obtain the permission of the court within a specified period of time. In view of these circumstances, we have to construe the provisions strictly giving every benefit of doubt to the subject. article 159 of the limitation act, provides a period of 30 days to file an application for leave to appear and defend the suit from the date when the summons under order 37 sub-rule 2 cpc is served on the defendant. This is the only starting point of limitation mentioned in Art. 159 of the Limitation Act. As it is common ground that no summons was ever served on the defendant, the starting point of Limitation in the present case, did not reach at all and therefore, the question of application for leave to defend the suit being barred by time does not arise. Mr. Das argued that the words "when the summons is served" should be construed to include also the date when the defendant acquires knowledge that a suit under Order 37 CPC had been filed against him. Learned counsel has drawn our attention to the provisions of section 18 sub-clause (b) of the land acquisition act which runs as follows :-

    "In other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12 sub-section (2) or within 6 months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire."

    It has been contended that the second clause of sub-section (b) lays down the period of six months from the date of the Collector's award but it has been held by various courts in India including the Supreme Court that the period would run not from the actual date of the award but from the date when the concerned party gets knowledge of the award having been made On a parity of reasoning, therefore, it was submitted that a similar interpretation should be put on article 159 of the limitation act. We are, however, unable to agree with this contention. The analogy of section 18 (b) of the land acquisition act cannot be applied to article 159 of the limitation act for several reasons. In the first place, the plain language of the first part of clause (b) lays stress on the fact of the receipt of the notice from the Collector. Thus the statute clearly intends that the starting point of limitation would be the date of the knowledge of the award either when the party knows about it by virtue of a notice being served or it or otherwise. Similarly section 18 clause (a) provides a lesser period of limitation where an award is announced in presence of the party of its agent. Here also the Legislature intends that the knowledge of the award should be the test to determine the starting point. Secondly, the words used in the second clause of section 18 (b) have to be read together with the words in the first clause because the last words are "which ever period shall first expire' and it is. therefore, manifest that when the statute used the words "from the date of Collector's award" these words have to be read ejusdem generis with the words used in the first part of section 18 (b) which gives six ' weeks time from the receipt of the notice from the Collector. Thirdly, the language of the provisions of section 18 of the land acquisition act and that of art. 159 of the limitation act are essentially and absolutely different and it is not possible for us to adept a common criterion for interpreting the two provisions of two separate Acts. Finally, when Art. 159 of the Limitation Act, provides that the starting point of limitation would run from one and one contingency alone, namely, the date of the service of the summons on the defendant it will amount to importing additional words in the statute, if we were to hold that the starting point may arise also from the date when the defendant acquires the knowledge of the suit and not only from the date when summons are served on him under the provisions of order 37 sub-rule (2) cpc. Mr. Sehgal rightly pointed out that the language of order 37 sub-rule (2) cpc was mandatory and since a penal clause was provided for default of appearance, it cannot be held that the provisions are merely directory. Moreover, it is well settled that when a statute provides a particular mode of doing something in a particular manner, any departure from the manner prescribed by the statute would amount to disobedience of the express provisions of law. We are supported in this view by a decision of the Sup. Court reported in AIR 1962 SC, 113 and 1694. Moreover on an interpretation of the plain language of order 37 sub-rule (2) of the code of civil procedure, it would appear that the statute lays down in express words that the defendant shall be prohibited both from appearing and defending the suit unless he obtains permission of the court as laid down in that sub-rule. The words "appear" and "defend" are separated by the disjunctive 'or' and, therefore, the disability imposed by this rule attaches separately both to appearance and to defending. In other words, neither the defendant can appear in the suit, nor can he defend the suit without complying with the provisions of sub-rule 2 rule 2 of order 37 c.p c. The bar for appearance by the defendant is categorical and the provisions of sub-rule 2 debar the defendant from appearing at any stage of the suit either before or after the service of the summons and for any purpose whatsoever without obtaining the leave of the court. We are fortified in our view by a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in I. L. R. (1956) Calcutta, 197 A similar view was also taken by the Bombay High Court in Pestonji Shapurji Narewalla v. Jamshedji Nawroji. Gamadia, AIR 1926 Bombay, 250. In this case the defendant appeared before the District Judge for the limited purpose of praying to the court that in the event of decree being passed against him, the said decree may be allowed to be paid by instalments. A division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that as no permission from the court had been taken by the defendants to appear to defend the suit, the defendant was not entitled to appear in the suit, even for the purpose of praying that a decree by instalments be granted. In this connection, their Lordships of the Bombay High Court observed as follows :-

    "The important point to notice is that a defendant in a summary suit cannot be allowed to appear while the hearing is proceeding, and in this case, in my opinion the Judge was wrong in allowing the defendants' attorney to appear before a decree had been passed in accordance with the plaint."

    It follows, therefore, that if the statute prohibits the defendant from either appearing before the court or defending the suit, then any appearance made in express disobedience to the mandatory provisions of order 37 rule 2 sub-rule 2 cpc will be destitute of my legal effect and would have to be completely ignored. It is common ground that in the present case, right from the date when the suit was instituted till 22-12-1965, when the defendant filed an application for leave to defend the suit, no permission by the court to appear or defend the suit was granted in accordance with the provisions of sub-rule 3 of order 37 of the code of civil procedure. Thus the appearance of the defendant upto 22-12-1965 would have to be ignored and cannot be interpreted to be an appearance in the suit. It is common ground that no summons had been served in the form prescribed by the sub-rule (1) to the defendant upto the date of the decree.

    In these circumstances, therefore, the application filed by the defendant for leave to defend the suit could not be rejected as being barred by limitation but had to be considered by the trial Judge on merits. The learned Judge, however, has not considered the application on merits but dismissed the same on the preliminary ground that it was barred by limitation. For the reasons, that we have already given, we are clearly of the opinion that the view taken by the learned Judge is legally erroneous. As the learned Judge has rejected the application, of the defendant for leave to appear and defend the suit, and has passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff by a composite order, the entire order as also the decree are liable to be set aside.

    We would, therefore allow this appeal, set aside the order and decree of the trial Judge and send this case back to the learned Judge who will dispose of the application for leave to defend the suit on merits and then decide the suit in accordance with law. Let the Court fees paid by the appellant on the memo of appeal be refunded to him.

    Costs will abide the result.

    I agree (Sd.) J. N. Wazir.

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    Comments

    Lala Gopal Dass v. Lala Chandra Prakash
    (Apr 14, 1966)