1. The appellant has been convicted under Section 19-F of the Indian Arms Act, and sentenced to six months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100/- and in default one month's rigorous imprisonment as modified by the Sessions Judge, Jammu. The prosecution case was that on 20-1-1958 the Customs Officer P.W 1 Bakshi Prithvi Raj on getting some Information stopped bus No. 6090 J and K and searched the accused as a result of which is Bore revolver without a license was recovered from his person besides other articles like currency notes and pieces of goods like Shefoon. These articles were seized from his possessoin and a sort of seizure list is said to have been prepared by the officer concerned on that date. As the driver of the bus wanted to proceed to his destination, he was allowed to do so and one of the passengers of the bus Jagu by name was asked to get down from the bus in order to be a witness to the said seizure list on the next day that is 20-1-1958 the Customs Officer sent a better to the police station Rariiirsingh Pura for registering a case against the accused. This letter was received on 21-1-58 and the first information report was drawn up ion the basis of this letter on the same date at about 2-30 P.M The accifsed was also produced at the Police station by the Customs Officer. The alleged seizure list Ex. P1 was not sent to the police station until 17-2-1958. There is no dispute with respect to this fact.

2. The police after holding the usual investigation submitted a charge-sheet against the appellant as a result of which he was tried and convicted as indicated above.

3. The first point taken by Mr. Sharma, appearing for the appellant is that the sanction produced by the prosecution in this case was not a valid sanction and, therefore, the entire proceedings taken against the appellant were without jurisdiction. In my opinion, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is well founded and must prevail. The learned Judge seems to have brushed aside this contention merely on the ground that the sanction produced by the prosecution shows that the necessary materials were placed before the sanctioning authority. I am, however, unable to agree with the view taken by the learned Judge. The sanction produced in this case runs thus:—

“Sanction is hereby accorded for the prosecution of S. Swaran singh son of Dlwan Singh resident of Trewa Tehsil R.S Pura in case F.I.R No. 13 of 1958 under Section 19(f) Indian Arms Act P/S R.S Pura.”

4. A perusal of this sanction clearly shows that it neither mentions the facts constituting the offence nor the circumstances under which the accused was arrested. It also does not mention as what materials or papers were produced before the Sanctioning Authority, it is now well settled that before a sanction can be valid it must be established that all the facts constituting the offence have been placed before the sanctioning authority so that it may be in a position to apply its mind. This can be proved in two ways. Either by producing the sanction which on the face of it shows the materials which were produced before the sanctioning authority or by evidence aliunde to show the materials that were placed before the sanctioning authority. In the instant case, the sanction itself does not show the facts constituting the offence and there is no extraneous evidence to show what were the materials that were placed before the sanctioning authority.

5. The learned Assistant Advocate General, however, drew my attention to a chit of paper which is said to be a copy of a letter from the District Magistrate to the Superintendent of Police from which it appears that the sanction was being forwarded to the Superintendent of Police with the connected papers. This document, however, does not show at all what were the connected papers and throws no light as to whether those connected papers were actually placed before the sanctioning authority, before the District Magistrate could decide to sanction the prosecution of the appellant. In this connection I might point out that an important lacuna in the prosecution case was that the seizure list was not sent to the police station along with the report but was sent more than a month later and if this fact would have been brought to the notice of the sanctioning authority, we do not know to what extent it would have altered the decision of the sanctioning authority. The fact that the facts constituting the offence must be placed before the sanctioning authority is well settled both by the Privy Council and the Supreme Court authorities. In Gokulchand Dwarkadas v. King, AIR 1948 PC 82, their Lordships of the Privy Council observed as follows:—

“In their Lordships' view, in order to comply with the provisions of Clause 23, it must be proved that the sanction was given in respect of facts constituting the offence charged. It is plainly desirable that the facts should be referred to on the face of the sanction, but this is not essential since Clause 23 does not require the sanction to be in any particular form nor to be in writing. But if the facts constituting the offence charged are not shown on the face of the sanction, the prosecution must prove by extraneous evidence that those facts were placed before the sanctioning authority. The sanction to prosecute is an important matter; it constitutes a condition precedent to the institution of the prosecution and the government have an absolute discretion to grant or withhold their sanction. They are not, as the High Court seem to have thought concerned merely to see that the evidence discloses a prima facie case against the person sought to be prosecuted. They can refuse sanction on any ground which commends itself to them, for example, that on political or economic grounds they regard a prosecution as inexpedient. Looked at as a matter of substance it is plain that the Government cannot adequately discharge the obligation of deciding whether to give or withhold a sanction without a knowledge of the facts of the case. Nor in their Lordships' view, is a sanction given without reference to the facts constituting the offence a comoliance with the actual terms of Clause 23. Under that clause sanction has to be given to a prosecution for the contravention of any of the provisions of the order. A person could not be charged merely with the breach of a particular provision of the order; he must be charged with the commission of certain acts which constitute a breach, and it is to that prosecution — that is for having done acts which constitute a breach of the order — that the sanction is required. In the present case, there is nothing on the face of the sanction and no extraneous evidence to show that the sanctioning authority knew the facts alleged to constitute a breach of the order, and the sanction is invalid.”

6. These observations were reiterated by the Supreme Court in Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 637.

7. In the instant case, I am satisfied that such a routine and ready made sanction as has been produced in the case and which does not show that the facts constituting an offence were placed before the District Magistrate, is clearly invalid and vitiates the entire trial. On this ground alone the conviction of the appellant cannot be maintained.

8. Moreover, even on merits, I find that the case is not free from suspicion. In the first place, if according to the prosecution the accused was apprehended on 20-1-58, at about 3 P.M by the Customs Officer, and the police station was only 5 miles from the place of occurrence, there was absolutely no justification for the Customs Officer to have detained the accused in his personal custody for more than 24 hours, instead of producing him before the police station. The Customs Officer has not given any explanation whatsoever, for this somewhat unusual conduct on his part. The Customs Officer knew full well that an offence had been committed. In Ills presence and a fire arm without license was recovered from the accused. It was his duty to have produced the accused before the police station within a reasonable time instead of waiting for full one day.

9. The learned Assistant Advocate General tried to afford an ingenious explanation for this lacuna — an explanation which neither the prosecution nor the Customs Officer chose to give at the trial. Mr. Karim suggested that as certain smuggled goods had been found with the accused the Customs Officer wanted to complete his report before handing him over to the police. Even if this be so, it would not have taken the Customs Officer such a long time so as to justify the detention of the accused for full one day. As the recoveries had already been effected the interrogation of the accused would not have taken much time. The report could have been made on 20th and the accused could have been produced towards the evening. The explanation given by Mr. Karim, therefore, does not appeal to me and is not really an explanation which perhaps even the Customs Officer would have thought of.

10. Another suspicious circumstance is that the seizure list although alleged to have been prepared on 20-1-1958 was not despatched to the police station until 17-2-1958. No explanation for this also has been given. Ir these circumstances, the recovery of the revolver from the person of the accused becomes extremely suspicious. It is also alleged that the seizure list is attested by the so called independent witness Jagu but even that witness admits that he was fully known to the Customs authorities and that was the reason why he was asked to attest the seizure list. The witness, however, clearly states in his evidence that he had signed a paper but he did not know the contents thereof nor were the contents read over and explained to the witness. In these circumstances, tee evidence of the witness does not inspire much confidence. A perusal of the seizure list also shows that it is an extremely suspicious document. According to fee evidence of P.W Prithvi Raj, Customs Officer, the copy which has been produced before the Court is a carboncopy the original not having been produced. But a mere look at the seizure list Ex. P1 would convince any body that it could not be a carbon copy but appears to be the original copy in pencil and it contains a number of additions and alterations. In these circumstances, in my opinion, the recovery of the revolver from the person of the accused having regard to these circumstances becomes extremely doubtful and it cannot be said to have been proved against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. For the reasons given above, the appeal is allowed, the conviction and the sentence passed on the appellant are set aside and he is acquitted of the charges framed against him. Fine if paid, shall be refunded to the appellant.

GF/V.S.B

11. Appeal allowed.