Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Civil Writ Petition No. 1580 of 1988 with C.W.P Nos 1578, 1579, 1581, 1583, 1584, 1585, 1586, 1587, 1588, 1589, 1601, 1602, 1603, 1604, 1605, 1606, 1607, 1608, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1612, 1613, 1788, 1789, 2024, 1504, 1594, 1648, 1675, 1691, 1738, 1739, 1740, 1741, 1763, 2260, 1659 and 1661 of 1988

Attorney(S)

Mr. Ravinder Seth, Senior Advocate with Deepak Khosla, Mr. S.D Sharma, Mr. S.K Tyagi, Mr. N.S Vashisht, Mr. Arvind Minocha, Mr. Himanshu Upadhyaya, Mr. L.P Dhir, Ms. Jugnu Bagga and Ms. Mona Johns, Advocates for the Petitioners.
Ms. Geeta Luthra, Advocate for the Respondent UOI & L&B Deptt.
Mr. Deepak Bhattacharya with Ms. Seema Sharma, Advocates for DDA in CW. 1789/88.
Mr. Arjun Pant, Advocate for DDA in CW 1585 & 1788/88.
Mr. R.P Gupta, Advocate for DDA in CW 1763/88

Judges

Madan B. Lokur
Anil Dev Singh, JJ.

Acts

SECTION 4 LAND ACQUISITION ACT 1894
Sections 4, 6 and 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
SECTION 4 LAND ACQUISITION ACT
provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)
section 4,6 and 17(1) of Land Acquisition Act
provisions of Section 17, subsection (4)
Sections 4, 6 and 17(i) of the L.A Act
provisions u/s. 17(1) of the L.A Act
provisions of sub-section (1)
4, 6 and 17 (i) of the L.A Act
Section 17, sub-section (4)
4, 6 and 17(i) of L.A Act
4, 6 & 17(1) of L.A Act.

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of Opinion: Madan B. Lokur, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

On 30th June 1988 a Notification No. F. 9 (20)/78-L&B (i) was issued on behalf of the Lieutenant Governor (Lt. Governor), Delhi, under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, notifying 72 bighas of land in Village Mehrauli as “likely to be required” for the planned development of Delhi. The Lt. Governor recorded that he was of the opinion that the provisions of Section 17(1) applied and, under Section 17(4), directed that the provisions of Section 5A of the Act shall not apply — effectively denying the landowners the opportunity to file objections under Section 5A.

The Notification is Annexure P-1 to Civil Writ Petition No. 1580 of 1988. Several other persons also challenged the validity of the Notification; the entire group of 40 writ petitions were heard together in July–August 2001 and judgement was reserved.

During the hearing the petitioners initially challenged the invocation of Section 17(1) (contending absence of urgency) but later confined their challenge to whether the Lt. Governor validly dispensed with the Section 5A enquiry under Section 17(4). The court examined the official file to determine whether the Lt. Governor had applied his mind to the question of dispensing with the Section 5A enquiry.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Lt. Governor validly invoked Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5A (i.e., whether there was a genuine application of mind and satisfaction of urgency to dispense with the Section 5A objection process).
Whether the Notification dated 30.6.1988 (No. F. 9 (20)/78-L&B (i)) could stand insofar as it denied the affected persons the right to file objections under Section 5A of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

Initially contended that there was no urgency to acquire the land so Section 17(1) could not have been invoked; this contention was later not pressed.
Concentrated their challenge on whether the Lt. Governor could lawfully dispense with an enquiry under Section 5A — asserting that the acquiring authority must apply its mind independently before invoking Section 17(4) to dispense with Section 5A.
Relied on precedent (S K Gupta v. Union Of India, ILR (1977) I Delhi 659) to contend absence of urgency; this point was not pursued to the end.

Respondents' Arguments

Respondents produced the official file and contended that the draft notifications were placed before the Lt. Governor and that the relevant draft notification expressly recited that an enquiry under Section 5A was dispensed with.
On this basis they argued that, at best, the Lt. Governor had committed an irregularity in not explicitly recording consideration of the Section 5A issue, but that this did not invalidate the Notification.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Dora Phalauli v. State of Punjab & Others, (1979) 4 SCC 485	Explained that invocation of urgency provisions (Section 17(1) or (2)) requires two satisfactions: (i) that the land is waste or arable and (ii) that there is urgency so that the right to file objections under Section 5A should not be made available; warned against casual or cavalier denial of Section 5A rights.	Relied upon to emphasise that dispensing with Section 5A must be based on a genuine subjective satisfaction and not done casually; supported the need for application of mind by the acquiring authority.
State of Punjab & Another v. Gurdial Singh & Others, AIR 1980 SC 319	Stated that compulsory taking of property is serious; denial of hearing is anathema except for good reasons; emergency power should be sparingly used and denial of enquiry under Section 5A should be rare.	Used to reinforce that the use of emergency power to bypass Section 5A requires real urgency and that procedural fairness (hearing) is constitutionally important.
Om Prakash & Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, AIR 1998 SC 2504	Held that even where acquisition is for planned development, before dispensing with Section 5A the appropriate government must be satisfied of urgency; lack of material supporting urgency invalidates invocation of Section 17(4).	Adopted to show that dispensing with Section 5A without material demonstrating urgency is impermissible; court relied on paragraph holdings to require genuine satisfaction before invoking Section 17(4).
Deepak Bhardwaj & Others v. Union Of India & Others, C.W. No. 4361 of 1998 (DB, decided 24.7.2001)	Held that Section 5A is the only opportunity under the Act for persons to object; doing away with that safeguard cannot be routine; a strong case is required to invoke Section 17 to dispense with Section 5A.	Relied upon by the court to stress that dispensing with Section 5A is a serious step and requires a considered and strong justification by the acquiring authority.
S K Gupta v. Union Of India, ILR (1977) I Delhi 659	Invoked by petitioners to contend absence of urgency in acquisition (context: Section 17(1)).	Cited by petitioners but not pressed to conclusion; the court observed that because the petitioners abandoned the Section 17(1) challenge, this precedent was not adverted to in detail.
Mansoor Ahmad Khan v. Union of India & Others, Writ Petition No. 1195 of 1987	Recorded that earlier notifications (1973 and 1976) in respect of 40 bighas were challenged and, because no award was made, acquisition proceedings lapsed and the writ was dismissed as infructuous.	Used by the court to note that there was, in any event, no urgency for acquiring at least 40 bighas of the land — a fact that weighed against the claim of present urgency.
Major S.K. Gupta (Full Bench) [referenced]	Noted by the court that the Full Bench observed respondent inertia in not moving to vacate interim orders as evidence that there was no pressing urgency.	Cited by the court when discussing respondent inertia and delay; used to support the impression that the acquisition requirement had not been genuinely urgent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded along these lines, derived from the record and the authorities cited:

The petitioners narrowed the dispute so that the primary question became whether the Lt. Governor validly dispensed with the Section 5A enquiry by invoking Section 17(4) when issuing the Section 4 notification of 30.6.1988.
The court observed established authorities (Dora Phalauli, Gurdial Singh, Om Prakash and the Division Bench decision in Deepak Bhardwaj) which uniformly require that an acquiring authority must independently apply its mind and be genuinely satisfied about urgency before it can dispense with the Section 5A enquiry under Section 17(4). Section 5A is the sole statutory opportunity for affected persons to object and cannot be set aside casually.
The court examined the official file and reproduced notings. The notings and the Lt. Governor's own endorsement confined the exercise of mind to satisfaction that the land was urgently required and ordering issuance of notifications under Sections 4, 6 and 17(1). There was no reference in the Lt. Governor's note to a consideration of whether enquiry under Section 5A should be dispensed with or any advice relating to Section 17(4).
The respondents' contention that the draft notification (placed before the Lt. Governor) recited the dispensation of the Section 5A enquiry was accepted as a factual claim; however, the court held that such an incidental or collateral inference — i.e., that the Lt. Governor was thereby deemed to have applied his mind — does not satisfy the legal requirement for a positive application of mind to dispense with Section 5A. In other words, mere placement of a draft containing such a recital is not a substitute for an explicit or discernible consideration by the Lt. Governor of the Section 5A dispensation.
The court further noted that the Lt. Governor had not been advised about an earlier acquisition attempt in respect of 40 bighas in the same khasra which had lapsed; that fact, the court observed, further undermined any assertion of genuine urgency.
Having concluded on the basis of the official record that the Lt. Governor did not apply his mind to the question of dispensing with a Section 5A enquiry, and applying the legal principles from binding precedent, the court found the impugned notification (to the extent it denied Section 5A rights) unsustainable.
The court also commented on the respondents' prolonged inertia — the batch of cases had been pending since 1988 and no steps had been taken to vacate interim orders or seek early hearing — a factual circumstance that further detracted from any claim of pressing urgency.

Holding and Implications

The impugned Notification No. F. 9 (20)/78-L&B (i) dated 30th June, 1988 is quashed to the extent that it denies the Petitioners their right to file objections under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Consequences and immediate implications (as ordered by the court):

All subsequent proceedings consequent upon the impugned Notification stand quashed.
The Petitioners are granted thirty (30) days, in accordance with law, to file their objections under Section 5A. The thirty-day period will run from the date on which they obtain a certified copy of this decision.
The Petitioners will be entitled to raise all contentions objecting to the acquisition of their land.
All writ petitions are allowed and the Petitioners are awarded costs of Rs. 1,000/- in each writ petition.

The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal principle; it applies and follows extant Supreme Court and Division Bench authorities requiring a genuine application of mind and satisfaction of urgency before an acquiring authority may dispense with the statutory Section 5A objection process.

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Mukesh Hans Etc., Etc v. Union Of India & Others

Madan B. Lokur, J.— A Notification bearing No. F. 9 (20)/78-L&B (i) dated 30th June, 1988 was issued on behalf of the Lieutenant Governor, Delhi stating therein that 72 bighas of land in Village Mehrauli were likely to be required for the planned development of Delhi. The Notification, issued under the provisions of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), accordingly notified the land in question as being likely to be required for the above purpose. The Lt. Governor was of opinion that the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Act are also applicable to this land and was further pleased to direct, under the provisions of Section 17(4) of the Act, that the provisions of section 5a thereof shall not apply. In other words, the land owners were denied their right to object to the proposed acquisition of their land.

The Notification is Annexure P-1 to Civil Writ Petition No. 1580 of 1988 and this reads as follows:—

“DELHI ADMINISTRATION: DELHI

(LAND & BUILDING DEPARTMENT)

NOTIFICATION Dated 30.6.1988

No. F. 9 (20)/78-L&B (i) Whereas it appears to the Lt. Governor, Delhi, that the land is likely to be required to be taken by Govt. at the public expense for a public purpose, namely for “Planned Development of Delhi”, it is hereby notified that the land in the locality described below is likely to be required for the above purpose.

This notification is made under the provisions of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, to all whom it may concern.

In exercise of the powers conferred by the aforesaid section, the Lt. Governor, Delhi, is pleased to authorise the Officer for the time being engaged in the undertaking with their servants and workmen to enter upon and survey any land of the locality and do all other acts required or permitted by that section.

The Lt. Governor, being of the opinion that provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the said Act are applicable to this land, is further pleased under sub-section (4) of the said section to direct that the provisions of section 5a shall not apply.

SPECIFICATION

Name of Village Total Area (big. bis) Khasra Nos. Area(big. bis.) Mehrauli 72-00 1151/3 min.(New) (Old No. 1665) 72-00

The site plan of the land may be seen in the office of the Land Acquisition Collector in Room No. 347, Tis Hizari Building: Delhi.

By Order

Mrs. Neeru Singh

Joint Secy (L&B)”

Apart from the Petitioner in Civil Writ Petition No. 1580 of 1988, several other persons have also challenged the validity of this Notification. The entire group of cases (40 in number) were heard together on 30th and 31st July, 2001 and 1st, 6th, 9th and 14th August, 2001 when judgement was reserved.

When lodged counsel for the Petitioners initially addressed arguments, it was sought to be contended that there was really no urgency in acquiring the land and, therefore, the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Act could not have been invoked. Halfway through, this challenge was not seriously pressed and learned counsel for the Petitioners/confined their challenge to the question whether or not the provisions of section 5a of the Act could have been dispensed with by the Lt. Governor.

During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the Respondents were requested to produce the original file so that it could be determined from the record whether there was any application of mind by the Lt. Governor about dispensing with an enquiry under Section 5A of the Act. This was because it became abundantly clear from a plethora of decisions cited by learned counsel for the Petitioners that the acquiring authority has to apply its mind not only to the question whether there is any urgent in acquiring the land and, therefore, invoking Section 17(1) of the Act; but, the acquiring authority has to independently apply its mind to the question whether the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act requires to be dispensed with and, therefore, Section 17(4) of the Act should be invoked.

It has been held by the Supreme Court in Dora Phalauli v. State of Punjab & Others, (1979) 4 SCC 485 in paragraph 2 of the Report as follows:—

“It is to be clearly understood that under sub-section (4), the appropriate Government may direct that the provisions of section 5-a shall not apply where in the opinion of the State Government, the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, otherwise not. For making the provisions of sub-section (1) applicable, two things must be satisfied, firstly that the land in respect of which the urgency provision is being applied is waste or arable and secondly, that there is an urgency to proceed in the matter of taking immediate possession and so the right of the owner of the land for filing an objection under Section 5-A should not be made available to him.”

It has been further held in the same paragraph:—

“It is to be remembered that the right of a person having any interest in the property to file an objection under Section 5-A of the Act should not be interfered with in such a casual or cavalier manner as has been done in the case.”

In the State of Punjab & Another v. Gurdial Singh & Others, AIR 1980 SC 319, the Supreme Court did not think it necessary to refer to case law on the subject and held as follows in paragraph 16 of the Report:—

“The fourth point about the use of emergency power is well taken. Without referring to supportive case-law, it is fundamental the compulsory taking of a man's property is a serious matter and the smaller the man the more serious the matter. Hearing him before depriving him is both reasonable and pre-emptive of arbitrariness and denial of this administrative fairness is constitutional anathema except for good reasons. Save in real urgency where public interest does not brook even the minimum time needed to give a hearing land acquisition authorities should not, having regard to Articles 14 (and 19), burke an enquiry under Section 17 of the Act.”

Finally, in Om Prakash & Another, etc. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, AIR 1998 SC 2504, the Supreme Court dealt with this question and held in paragraph 13 as follows:—

“Thus, this enabling provision was available to the appropriate Government functioning in the State of Uttar Pradesh, if it was satisfied that the situation was so urgent that Section 5-A, inquiry was to be dispensed with in connection with acquisitions of any type of lands for the planned development of any area. However, still one basic requirement remained for being satisfied before such power could be exercised, namely, that there should be case of urgency. Even if the acquisition was for the planned development of any area and there was no material before the appropriate Government for dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A on the touchstone of any urgency as found by the appropriate Government, the provisions of Section 17, subsection (4) as amended by the Amending Act VIII of 1974 could not have been invoked.”

Finally, in paragraph 25 of the Report, it was held:—

“In the light of the aforesaid discussion, therefore, the conclusion becomes inevitable that the action of dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act in the present cases was not based on any real and genuine subjective satisfaction depending upon any relevant data available to the State authorities at the time when they issued the impugned notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and dispensed with Section 5-A inquiry by resorting to Section 17, sub-section (4) thereof.”

These and other decisions of the Supreme Court were very recently considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Deepak Bhardwaj & Others. v. Union Of India & Others., C.W. No. 4361 of 1998 decided on 24th July, 2001. After a review of the entire case law, the Division Bench concluded as follows:—

“Section 5A provides the only opportunity under the Act to the persons whose lands are sought to be compulsorily acquired to object to the proposed acquisition of land. This is the only safeguard available under the Act for the affected parties. Doing away with this only safeguard is a very serious matter and cannot be treated as a matter of mere routine. It is a basic principle of law that a man should not be condemned unheard. It is in consonance with this basic principle of law that Section 5A opportunity is not denied to affected parties. If the acquiring authority is to dispense with the observance of this basic principle of law i.e which as already said is the only safeguard contained in the Act for the person whose land is sought to be compulsorily acquired, the matter cannot be allowed to be treated lightly or in a casual manner. A strong case for invocation of Section 17 and dispensing with Section 5A has to be made out.”

There is, therefore, no manner of doubt that if the Respondents want to turbocharge the process of acquisition by resorting to Section 17(4) of the Act, there has to be an application of mind with regard to dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act. It is for this reason - that a perusal of the official file becomes necessary.

Before dealing with the official file, it may be worthwhile to mention that learned counsel for the Petitioners had sought to rely upon S K Gupta V. Union Of India, ILR (1977) I Delhi 659 to contend that there was no urgency in acquiring the land in question. This decision was relied upon in the context of the argument under Section 17(1) of the Act which, as noted earlier, was subsequently given up by learned counsel for the Petitioners. Consequently, this decision need not be adverted to in any great detail.

There is one extremely significant fact that was brought out by learned counsel for the Petitioners. This is that in respect of 40 bighas of land in the same khasra, the Respondents had issued a notification No. F. 9 (35)/72- L & B dated 24th July, 1973 under Section 4 of the Act. This was followed by a notification No. F. 9 (21)/76-L & B (LAP) dated 11th May, 1976 under Section 6 of the Act.

Both the above notifications challenged in this Court in a writ petition bearing No. 1195 of 1987 (Mansoor Ahmad Khan v. Union of India Others). Notice was issued in this case and when the matter came up for hearing on 20th January, 1988, a Division Bench of this Court passed the following order:—

“It is submitted on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 that no Award has been made covering the land in dispute. Since no Award has been made, the proceedings for acquisition automatically lapse. The petition which was filed for quashing the acquisition proceedings has, therefore, become infructuous and is dismissed as such.”

The above order clearly shows that there was, in any case, absolutely no urgency for acquiring at least 40 bighas of the land in question if not the entire land in question. However, it is not necessary to go into this, as this connection was also not pressed before us in view of the principal contention.

Be that as it may, the relevant notings from the official file clearly bring out the fact that there was no application of mind by the Lt. Governor to the question whether or not an enquiry under the provisions of section 5a of the Act ought to be dispensed with. Indeed, the notings show that there is not even a mention of the provisions of section 5a and 17(4) of the Act. These notings are reproduced below:

“25. May kindly see the letter dated 9.6.1988 from L.A.C (M.W), Delhi forwarding the draft notifications under Sections 4, 6 and 17(i) of the L.A Act in respect of land comprising of Kh. No. 1151/3 Min. (New) and 1665 (Old) of Village Mehrauli measuring 72 bighas. As regards the requisite certificates to be furnished by the D.D.A, it has been mentioned that the Director (L.M), DDA is being requested to forward the same to this office and copy has been endorsed to them for necessary action.

26. If approved, we may request Director (L.M), DDA to furnish the requisite certificates to this office urgently. Draft letter is added for approval please.

(on 15.6.1988)

27. May kindly see the PUC letter dated 9.6.1988 from the L.A.C (M.W), Delhi forwarding the draft notifications u/ss. 4, 6 and 17 of the L.A Act in respect of land comprising of Kh. No. 1151/3 Min. (New) and 1665 (Old) of village Mehrauli measuring 72 bighas. The Director (L.M), D.D.A vide their letter dated 12.4.1988 has mentioned about the unathorised occupation and requirement of the land for Phool-Wallon-Ki-Sair. It has been mentioned that the land near around Phool-Wallon-Ki-Sair be acquired by issuing notifications u/ss. 4, 6 and 17(i) of L.A Act and the area will be developed as per provisions of Master Plan/Zonal Development Plan. The Director (L.M), DDA vide letter dt. 21.4.1988 has intimated that the total area as per the sketch plan already submitted is 15.00 acres. It has also been mentioned that 80% cost of acquisition will be remitted as and when required.

28. If approved, the approval of the Hon'ble Lt. Governor, Delhi to issue the notification u/ss. 4, 6 and 17 (i) of the L.A Act for the land measuring 72 bighas of Village Mehrauli may kindly be obtained.

Submitted please.

(on 17.6.1988)

29. The Director (Lands), DDA vide letter dated 12.4.88 has send a proposal to notify the land near around Phool-Wallon-Ki-Sair in Mehrauli u/ss. 4, 6 & 17(1) of L.A Act. This land is required by them for development as per the provisions of the Master Plan/Zonal Development Plan. The total area as per the sketch plan has been given as 15.00 acres vide their

30. Letter dated 21.4.88 The D.D.A has requested to issue the notification by invoking provisions u/s. 17(1) of the L.A Act as there is problem of unauthorised occupation of the land.

31. The LAC (MW) has forwarded the draft-notification of the above land measuring 72 bigha comprising of Kh. No. 1151/3 (Min.) (New) and 1665 (Old) of village Mehrauli which is placed in the file. The 80% of the compensation will be remitted by the D.D.A to the revolving fund.

32. In view of the urgency involved, we may notify the land measuring 72 bighas of village Mehrauli as per the draft-notifications u/ss. 4,6 and 17(1) of the L.A Act.

33. It is requested that the Lt. Governor, Delhi may kindly accord his approval to notify the land measuring 72 bighas of village Mehrauli under section 4,6 and 17(1) of Land Acquisition Act as per the draft placed in the file.

sd/- 20.6.88

(B.R Dewan)

ASSTT. HOUSING COMMISSIONER (LA)

Jt. Secretary (L&B)

34. The land measuring 72 bighas (Khasra No. 1151/3 (Min.) (New) and 1665 (Old) is to be acquired to be developed as per the Master Plan for Delhi. This land is adjoining the area where the annual Phool-Wallon-Ki-Sair function takes place and it is necessary to keep it free from encroachments.

35. Approval of the Hon'ble LG may kindly be obtained for notifying the above mentioned land u/ss. 4, 6 and 17(1) of the LA Act.

sd/- 20/6

Secy (L&B)

sd/- 21/6

36. I have gone through the records and requirements of the Delhi Development Authority as also the draft notifications. I am fully satisfied that the land in question is urgently required for a valid purpose viz Planned Development of Delhi. I order that in view of the urgency of the scheme, notifications under Sections 4, 6 and 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 be issued immediately.

(H.L KAPUR)

Lt. G., Delhi

23rd June. 1988”

From these notings, it is not possible to hold that the Lt. Governor independently applied his mind to the question of dispensing with an enquiry under the provisions of section 5a of the Act. This is because if the Lt. Governor had applied his mind to this question, he would have surely adverted to it however briefly. There is nothing to suggest from the note of the Lt. Governor that he was even aware that the relevant draft notification dispensed with an enquiry under Section 5A of the Act. On the contrary, the application of mind by the Lt. Governor was limited to the issuance of a notification under Section 17(1) of the Act, which he apparently seems to believe results in the automatic issuance of a notification under Section 6 of the Act. This is not so, inasmuch as prior to the issuance of a notification under Section 6 of the Act either an enquiry should be held under Section 5A of the Act, or it should be consciously dispensed with. Neither of these two postulates are reflected in or discernible from the note of the Lt. Governor.

Learned counsel for the Respondents contended that the file containing the draft notifications were placed before the Lt. Governor, and that the relevant draft notification did recite that an enquiry under Section 5A of the Act was dispensed with. This is, no doubt, factually correct. However, this does not meet the requirement of law which mandates a positive application of mind by the acquiring authority that he is satisfied that an enquiry under the provisions of Sec. 5A of the Act ought to be dispensed with. An inference based on a collateral fact is not a valid substitute for a legal necessity.

According to learned counsel for the Respondents the Lt. Governor has, at best, committed an irregularity in not applying his mind to the question of dispensing with an enquiry under Section 5A of the Act. This argument is based on the forensic foible of the acquiring authority and is merely stated to be rejected. We are concerned with the rights of a citizen to hold and retain his property. The matter is of considerable importance so far as a citizen is concerned and, as stated by the Supreme Court in Dora Phalauli, the rights of a citizen in this regard cannot be sought to be curtailed in such a casual or cavalier manner. We, therefore, reject this contention.

The necessary result of our discussion is that we hold (on the basis of the record before us) that the Lt. Governor did not apply his mind to the issue of dispensing with an enquiry under the provisions of section 5a of the Act. The Lt. Governor was also not advised that a part of this land measuring 40 bighas had earlier been sought to be acquired and that that acquisition had lapsed by efflux of time.

Consequently, the impugned Notification No. F 9(20)/78-L&B(i) dated 30th June, 1988 is required to be quashed to the extent that it denies to the Petitioners their right to file objections under the provisions of section 5a of the Act. It is so ordered. All subsequent proceedings will, quite naturally, stand quashed. The Petitioners are granted thirty days time, in accordance with law, for filing their objections to the proposed acquisition. The period of thirty days will begin to count from the date on which they obtain a certified copy of this decision. The Petitioners will be entitled to raise all contentions objecting to the acquisition of their land.

It may be mentioned, en passant, that a Full Bench of this Court in Major S.K Gupta had taken note of the fact that in that case even though the writ petition had remained pending for about three years, no application for vacating the interim order restraining dispossession of the Petitioner therein had been moved by the Respondent. It was stated that if the requirement of the land had been urgent, the Respondents would have made some attempt to secure possession of the land and that their inertia proves that there was no pressing need or any urgency in acquiring the land (paragraph 51 of the Report).

Insofar as the present cases are concerned, the position is worse. This batch of cases has remained pending from 1988 onwards. Even though thirteen years have gone by, the Respondents have not taken any steps whatsoever either to have the interim orders of dispossession vacated or even to apply for early hearing of the writ petitions. Their inertia is inexplicable. On the other hand, if the Respondents had, in the first instance, accepted the legal position expounded by the Supreme Court, the entire acquisition proceedings would have come to an end by now. The Respondents, for some reason, steadfastly refused to recognise the law laid down by the Supreme Court and hereby contributed to the delay in the acquisition. While this may or may not have any impact on the urgency exhibited in the acquisition of the land in question, it certainly does indicate that the requirement of the Respondents was not so urgent as to completely dispense with an enquiry under the provisions of section 5a of the Act.

For all these reasons, all the writ petitions are allowed. The Petitioners will be entitled to costs of Rs. 1,000/- in each writ petition.

Mukesh Hans Etc., Etc v. Union Of India & Others

Structured Summary of Opinion: Madan B. Lokur, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

Respondents' Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Mukesh Hans Etc., Etc v. Union Of India & Others

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