AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2000 INSC 365
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 79(b), Section 82(b) of the Act
  • Section 82 of the Representation of the People Act
  • Section 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
  • Section 123(1)(B) of the Act
  • Section 79(b) of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act (not mentioned in the excerpt, but included for completeness)
  • Section 82(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2000 INSC 365
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 79(b), Section 82(b) of the Act
  • Section 82 of the Representation of the People Act
  • Section 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
  • Section 123(1)(B) of the Act
  • Section 79(b) of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act (not mentioned in the excerpt, but included for completeness)
  • Section 82(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant and the respondent were among three duly nominated candidates for the single Rajya Sabha seat from Goa in 1999. The third candidate, Mr Luis Alex Cardozo, withdrew his nomination on 17-07-1999. The election was held on 26-07-1999, and the respondent was declared elected.

The appellant filed an election petition before the High Court challenging the respondent’s election on grounds of corrupt practices, specifically alleging that the respondent, Cardozo (after his withdrawal) and several MLAs agreed to gratification in exchange for votes. Only the successful respondent was impleaded; Cardozo was not joined.

The respondent moved an application under Section 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (“the Act”), contending that the petition was liable to dismissal for non-compliance with Section 82(b), which mandates joinder of “any other candidate against whom allegations of corrupt practice are made.” The High Court upheld this preliminary objection and dismissed the petition. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Section 82(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 requires a candidate who withdraws before polling, but is alleged to have committed corrupt practices thereafter as a voter, to be impleaded as a party-respondent to an election petition.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • After withdrawing, Cardozo ceased to be a “candidate”; any corrupt practice allegedly committed by him was in his capacity as a voter, therefore Section 82(b) did not mandate his joinder.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent’s legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Har Swarup v. Brij Bhushan Saran, AIR 1967 SC 836; (1967) 1 SCR 342 A duly nominated candidate remains a “candidate” for Section 82(b) purposes even after withdrawal; corrupt practices alleged against such a person require their joinder. Cited as binding authority rejecting the appellant’s contention that withdrawal changes the candidate’s status under Section 82(b).
Ram Partap Chandel v. Chaudhary Lajja Ram, (1998) 8 SCC 564 Reiterated that a candidate who withdraws must still be impleaded if charged with corrupt practice. Relied upon to affirm that failure to implead Cardozo was fatal to the petition.
Mohan Raj v. Surendra Kumar Taparia, AIR 1969 SC 677; (1969) 1 SCR 630 Considered but distinguished; does not dilute the mandatory joinder requirement. Used to demonstrate that earlier precedent does not support the appellant’s position; reinforces necessity of joinder.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Section 79(b) defines “candidate” as any person duly nominated; the definition contains no temporal limitation linked to withdrawal.

2. Section 123(1)(B) classifies the receipt or agreement to receive gratification for voting as a corrupt practice. Paragraphs 30-D(ii) and 30-G of the election petition expressly allege that Cardozo agreed to such gratification to vote for the respondent, squarely attracting Section 123(1)(B).

3. Because these allegations constitute a charge of corrupt practice against Cardozo, Section 82(b) compulsorily requires his addition as a respondent.

4. Precedents (Har Swarup; Ram Partap Chandel) conclusively hold that a nominated candidate continues to be a “candidate” for Section 82(b) purposes even after withdrawal. Purity of elections demands that such persons remain subject to the Act’s anti-corruption safeguards.

5. Under Section 86(1), non-compliance with Section 82 mandates dismissal of an election petition. As Cardozo was not impleaded, the High Court correctly dismissed the petition.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s dismissal of the election petition for failure to implead the withdrawn candidate against whom corrupt practice was alleged.

Implications: The decision reinforces that a withdrawn candidate remains a “candidate” until election completion for the limited purpose of Section 82(b). Election petitioners must implead every such person if corrupt practice is alleged, or risk automatic dismissal under Section 86. No new legal doctrine was created; existing precedents were reaffirmed.

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    Gadnis Bhawani Shankar, V. v. Faleiro Eduardo Martinho .

    Judgment

    1. Would the provisions of Section 82(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 get attracted to a candidate who allegedly commits a corrupt practice, after the withdrawal of his candidature, as a voter, is the meaningful question requiring our consideration in this appeal.

    2. The appellant was a candidate for the Rajya Sabha elections for one seat from Goa in the year 1999. There were three candidates in the fray. Apart from the appellant and the respondent, there was another candidate — Luis Alex Cardozo. All the three candidates had filed their nomination papers, which were accepted. After the acceptance of his nomination paper, Luis Alex Cardozo withdrew from the contest on 17-7-1999. In the contest held thereafter, the respondent was declared elected. The appellant filed an election petition, challenging the election of the respondent, principally on the ground of commission of corrupt practices. In the election petition, the respondent alone was arrayed as a party-respondent. After service of notice, the respondent raised a preliminary objection by filing an application under Section 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). It was averred that the election petition was liable to be dismissed for non-compliance with the requirements of Section 82 of the Act. The preliminary objection was upheld and the election petition was dismissed. Hence, this appeal.

    3. Section 82(b) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 provides:

    “82. A petitioner shall join as respondents to his petition—
    (a)***
    (b) any other candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practice are made in the petition.”

    4. Section 86, which deals with the trial of election petitions, provides in sub-section (1) as follows:

    “86. (1) The High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117.
    Explanation.—An order of the High Court dismissing an election petition under this sub-section shall be deemed to be an order made under clause (a) of Section 98.”

    5. In the instant case, Luis Alex Cardozo withdrew his nomination on 17-7-1999. Election took place on 26-7-1999. In the election petition, apart from various other allegations against the respondent, two allegations contained in paras 30-D(ii) and 30-G alone are relevant for purposes of our discussion. Those paragraphs read thus:

    “30-D. The corrupt practice committed by the respondent and his agents is as follows:
    (i)***
    (ii) Offering and promising of cabinet berths to some of the 8 dissident MLAs of Congress Party and appointment on other important public offices to the remaining of them as also to one independent MLA who are namely Shri Subash Shirodkar, Shri Somnath Zuwarkar, Shri Sanjay Bandekar, Smt Victoria Fernandes, Shri Luis Alex Cardozo, Shri Jose Philip D'Souza, Shri Mauvino Godinho, Shri Babu Azgaonkar and Shri Isidoro Luis Fernandes (independent).
    30-G. The said 8 dissident Congress MLAs and one independent MLA in agreement to receive the said gratification voted for the respondent at the said election.”

    6. The allegations, in a nutshell, contained in these two paragraphs are to the effect that after withdrawal of his candidature, Cardozo agreed to receive gratification along with some other MLAs as a motive or reward to vote for the respondent. Acceptance of or agreement to receive gratification as a motive or reward to vote at the election is a corrupt practice dealt with in Section 123(1)(B) of the Act which provides:

    “123. Corrupt practices.—The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purposes of this Act—
    (1) ‘Bribery’, that is to say—
    (A)***
    (B) the receipt of, or agreement to receive, any gratification, whether as a motive or a reward—

    (a) by a person for standing or not standing as, or for withdrawing or not withdrawing from being, a candidate; or

    (b) by any person whomsoever for himself or any other person for voting or refraining from voting, or inducing or attempting to induce any elector to vote or refrain from voting, or any candidate to withdraw or not to withdraw his candidature.

    Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause the term ‘gratification’ is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or gratifications estimable in money and it includes all forms of entertainment and all forms of employment for reward but it does not include the payment of any expenses bona fide incurred at, or for the purpose of, any election and duly entered in the account of election expenses referred to in Section 78.”

    7. A plain reading of the above provision shows that the receipt of, or agreement to receive, any gratification, as a motive or reward by any person whomsoever for himself or any other person for voting or refraining from voting, or inducing or attempting to induce any elector to vote or refrain from voting, or any candidate to withdraw or not to withdraw his candidature would amount to commission of a corrupt practice. The averments noticed in paras 30-D(ii) and 30-G of the election petition (supra) contain allegations against Cardozo that he agreed to receive gratification as a motive or reward for voting in favour of the respondent. These averments would amount to allegations of commission of corrupt practice by Cardozo within the meaning of Section 123(1)(B) of the Act.

    8. The argument of Mr Krishnamani, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, however, is that since Cardozo had withdrawn from the contest, he could not be treated as a “candidate”, who was necessarily required to be impleaded as a party-respondent under Section 82(b) of the Act and if the corrupt practice was committed by him as a voter only, he was not required to be impleaded as a party-respondent in the election petition. This argument does not appeal to us. Section 79(b) of the Act defines a “candidate” to mean a person who has been or claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate at any election. There is no dispute that Cardozo had been duly nominated as a candidate at the election in question. A similar argument as raised by Mr Krishnamani came up for consideration in Har Swarup v. Brij Bhushan Saran AIR 1967 SC 836, (1967) 1 SCR 342.

    9. Wanchoo, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench opined:

    “But the argument is that as the alleged corrupt practice was committed after the date of his withdrawal he would not be a candidate within the meaning of Section 82(b). We are of opinion that if the effect of withdrawal is said to be that a person nominated can no longer be considered to be a candidate only after his withdrawal, the date of withdrawal cannot be a dividing line as to the time up to which he can be treated as a candidate and the time after which he cannot be treated as a candidate. If purity of elections has to be maintained a person who is a candidate as defined in Section 79(b) of the Act will remain a candidate even after he withdraws till the election is over, and if he commits a corrupt practice whether before or after his withdrawal he would be a necessary party under Section 82(b) of the Act.”
    (emphasis ours)

    10. In Ram Partap Chandel v. Chaudhary Lajja Ram (1998) 8 SCC 564 the requirements of Section 82 of the Representation of the People Act were dealt with and the Bench held that a candidate against whom a charge of corrupt practice had been made in the election petition, was required to be joined as a party to the election petition, irrespective of the fact whether he had withdrawn his candidature and not contested the election as such and had committed the corrupt practice after his withdrawal.

    11. The Bench in Ram Partap Chandel case (1998) 8 SCC 564 considered the judgment in Mohan Raj v. Surendra Kumar Taparia AIR 1969 SC 677, (1969) 1 SCR 630 which has been pressed into aid by Mr Krishnamani before us and distinguished it in the following words:

    “ ‘Lastly, it is submitted that Periwal was being charged in his character as an election agent and not as a candidate. This submission runs counter to the amendment petition which says that he was not an election agent and therefore he was really charged in his capacity as an individual and as he was a duly nominated candidate he had to be joined. The argument really contradicts the last amendment petition and cannot be entertained.’
    He submitted that the allegations of corrupt practice made against a person who, though he had been a candidate, had withdrawn in his capacity as the election agent of another candidate, did not necessitate his impleadment and this question had been left open in the aforesaid judgment. It is difficult to agree. By reason of the contradiction, the argument was not entertained. But it is clear from what was stated thereinabove that a candidate who is duly nominated continues to be a candidate for the purposes of Section 82(b) in spite of his withdrawal and, if allegations of corrupt practice are made against him, he must be impleaded as a party to the election petition or the election petition must fail.”
    (emphasis ours)

    12. We are in complete agreement with the exposition of law, as made above.

    13. In our opinion, the allegations which have been made in the election petition are allegations of corrupt practice against Cardozo besides some others. Since Cardozo was a nominated candidate, it was necessary to implead him as a party-respondent under Section 82(b) of the Act, irrespective of the fact that before the actual date of election, he had withdrawn his candidature and allegedly committed the corrupt practice after his withdrawal from the election. Thus, the answer to the question posed in the earlier part of the judgment is in the affirmative.

    14. The learned Single Judge of the High Court committed no error in dismissing the election petition for non-compliance with the provisions of Section 82(b) of the Act. The appeal has no merits. It fails and is dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs.

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    Comments

    Gadnis Bhawani Shankar, V. v. Faleiro Eduardo Martinho .
    (Aug 1, 2000)