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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges the judgment and award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Amritsar dated February 26, 1970, which dismissed a claim application. The claimant (Didar Singh) had died on November 2, 1968, after being involved in a collision between his scooter and a truck (No. PNA-6954) allegedly driven rashly and negligently by Garibu (Respondent No. 2). The truck was owned by New Suraj Transport Company (Respondent No. 1) and insured with Concord of India Insurance Company (Respondent No. ?). At the time of death the deceased earned Rs. 900 per month.

The deceased's children (petitioners/appellants) filed a claim application for Rs. 1,00,000 on October 21, 1969. Claimants Nos. 1–4 were adults; claimants Nos. 5–7 were minors. The respondents opposed the claim and pleaded, inter alia, that the claim was barred by limitation. The Tribunal held the application barred by limitation and dismissed it for lack of good grounds to condone the delay. The present appeal followed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appeal is maintainable where a copy of the "award" (distinct from the "judgment") was not separately filed with the memorandum of appeal, in light of Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and the Punjab Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1964 (Rules 19–21).
  2. Whether Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (relating to legal disability/minors) applies to claim applications under the Motor Vehicles Act (i.e., whether such claim applications are within the meaning of "suit" for the purpose of Section 6).
  3. Whether minors who are legal representatives must be joined or whether their independent rights permit separate protection of their limitation position when other claimants (majors) are time-barred.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

  • A preliminary objection: the appeal is not maintainable because a copy of the award (as distinct from the judgment) was not filed with the memorandum of appeal; only the judgment copy was annexed.
  • The claim application was barred by limitation because the accident occurred on November 2, 1968 and the claim was filed on October 21, 1969.
  • Section 6 of the Limitation Act applies to "suits" (in the Code of Civil Procedure sense) and not to claim applications under the Motor Vehicles Act; therefore minors cannot claim extension under Section 6 for such applications.
  • Because one claimant's representative application can suffice, if the representative claim (by major heirs) is time-barred, the minors cannot take advantage of minority—i.e., the representative claim being barred should preclude benefit to other heirs.

Appellants' Arguments

  • Appellants 5–7 (minors) are entitled to the benefit of Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963; their period to institute the claim should run from the date the disability (minority) ceased, not from the accident date.
  • The claim application under the Motor Vehicles Act is in the nature of a suit and therefore Section 6 applies to extend limitation for minors.
  • The minors' claims are independent and cannot be dismissed merely because other co-claimants (adults) filed a time-barred application; minors should not be penalized because another claimant's claim was barred by limitation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shanti Devi v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Ambala (1971 A.C.J. 247) (Full Bench) The word "award" used in Rules may be used synonymously with "decree" and that "award" need not imply arbitration; discussion on whether award must be a separate document from judgment. The Court considered the Full Bench observations but interpreted the Rules and concluded that the Tribunal's judgment and award may be contained in the same document; therefore the preliminary objection that a separate award copy was required was rejected.
N. Sriramamurthi v. N. Sooramma (A.I.R. 1963 A.P. 492) On construction of statutes of limitation and the principle that equitable considerations are out of place in construing limitation statutes. The Court distinguished this authority: its ratio was not applied because it concerned earlier Limitation Act provisions (1908) and different statutory context; the present decision rests on statutory interpretation of the 1963 Act.
Hayatkhan v. Mangilal (1970 A.C.J. 254) (Madhya Pradesh High Court) Held that the word "suit" in Section 6 has a wide connotation and Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was applicable to compensation applications under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act (i.e., such applications are in the nature of a suit). The Court relied on this decision to support its conclusion that Section 6 applies to claim applications under the Motor Vehicles Act and thereby supports extending limitation for minors.
Pijush Kanti Ghosh v. Smt. Maya Rani Chatterjee (1971 A.C.J. 267) An application by one or more heirs is maintainable even if other heirs are not impleaded; Tribunal's power may extend to awarding compensation beyond applicants' shares. The Court noted the decision but observed that it does not support the respondent's contention that minors lose independent rights because another claimant's representative claim is time-barred; the decision illustrates that heir-applications can be maintained even if not all heirs are joined.
Northern India Transporters Insurance Co. Ltd., Jullundur v. Smt. Amra Wati (1966 A.C.J. 13, 165) Observations that claims arising under the Motor Vehicles Act are to be made on behalf of the heirs mentioned therein; comment on late inclusion of daughters not justifying exclusion of compensation. The Court stated these observations are not applicable to the present facts but acknowledged the logic that inclusion of heirs at a later stage does not automatically exclude their compensation; the Tribunal's treatment of minors' limitation position was nonetheless erroneous.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court engaged in two principal lines of analysis: (A) the preliminary maintainability objection about the absence of a separate copy of the "award," and (B) whether minors are entitled to the benefit of Section 6 of the Limitation Act in respect of claim applications under the Motor Vehicles Act.

A. Maintainability — "Award" versus "Judgment"

  • The Court began by identifying the statutory framework: Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act authorizes appeals to the High Court against Tribunal awards; Section 111-A empowers the State Government to make rules about the form and manner of appeals. The Punjab Rules (1964) (Rule 19–21) prescribe that the Tribunal record findings and make an award and that an appeal be accompanied by a copy of the judgment and the award.
  • The respondents contended that "award" is distinct from "judgment" and that a separate document had to be filed. The Court noted the word "award" was not defined in the Act or Rules and examined the ordinary dictionary meanings and legal usage of "award" (Shorter Oxford, Webster, Black's Law Dictionary).
  • Based on the textual reading of Rule 19 and dictionary definitions, the Court concluded the term "award" denotes the Tribunal's decision regarding amount and beneficiaries and need not be a separate physical document from the judgment. The memo of costs was held not to be an "award."
  • Because the Tribunal's order dated February 26, 1970 incorporated both judgment and award in the same document, the absence of a separately filed award copy did not defeat the appeal's maintainability; the preliminary objection was rejected.

B. Applicability of Section 6 of the Limitation Act to MACT Claims and Minors

  • The Court accepted the appellants' submission that minors (appellants 5–7) should receive the benefit of Section 6(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963, which permits a person under legal disability (e.g., a minor) to institute a suit within the same period after the disability ceases as would have been allowed otherwise.
  • The Court analyzed Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 which makes provisions of Sections 4–24 (as applicable) operative in relation to enactments prescribing different periods of limitation; thus limitation provisions in special enactments are to be read with Sections 4–24 where not expressly excluded.
  • The pivotal interpretive question was whether a "claim application" under the Motor Vehicles Act falls within the ambit of the word "suit" for Section 6. The Court surveyed dictionary meanings of "suit" and concluded that an application for recovery on account of injury or death under the Motor Vehicles Act is in the nature of a suit and therefore Section 6 applies.
  • The Court emphasized that the Limitation Act provisions are to be construed strictly and in favor of the right to proceed; this constructive approach supported applying Section 6 to extend the limitation period for minors in MACT proceedings.
  • The Court distinguished N. Sriramamurthi v. N. Sooramma on factual and statutory grounds (earlier Limitation Act 1908 provisions and omitted Code provisions), and found support instead in Hayatkhan v. Mangilal where a Division Bench held Section 6 applicable to applications under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act.

C. Representative Claims and the Position of Minors

  • The respondents argued that a single claimant's representative application is sufficient and that if such a representative claim is time-barred the minors cannot benefit. The Court rejected this contention.
  • The Court observed that while some applicants may act as representatives, that does not deprive other legal representatives (including minors) of independent rights to file claims. The Tribunal erred in treating the minors as barred because other adult claimants' claims were held time-barred.
  • The Tribunal had found appellants 5–7 to be minors (on evidence in Exhibits A-1 to A-3) but required an explanation of each day's delay and dismissed their claims as barred. The Court held this was an improper application of the law regarding minors and limitation: minors are entitled to the benefit under Section 6 and their claims could not be dismissed on that ground.
  • The Court noted it did not need to decide whether condonation under the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 110-A applied in the present facts.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court delivered a divided result. It found merit in some appellant contentions and error in the Tribunal's treatment of the minors' limitation position. The ultimate disposition was:

APPEAL PARTLY ALLOWED

Direct consequences:

  • The preliminary objection regarding non-filing of a separate "award" was rejected; the appeal was held maintainable because the Tribunal's judgment and award were contained in the same document dated February 26, 1970.
  • The Court held that Section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to claim applications under the Motor Vehicles Act (such applications are in the nature of a "suit" for the purpose of Section 6). Minors (appellants 5–7) are therefore entitled to have limitation computed from the cessation of their disability and cannot be dismissed on the ground relied upon by the Tribunal.
  • The claims of appellants 5–7 were remanded to the Tribunal for decision on merits consistent with this legal conclusion.
  • The Court left the findings regarding appellants 1–4 (the majors) as they stood; the appellants’ partial success resulted in each party bearing their own costs.

Broader implications: The Court interpreted the Limitation Act and the procedural Rules to permit application of Section 6 to MACT claim applications and clarified that a Tribunal's judgment and award may be contained in the same document for appeal purposes. The opinion did not purport to create a binding new precedent beyond the case-specific holdings and distinguished earlier authorities where statutory contexts differed.

Result recorded in the opinion: "Appeal partly allowed." Parties to bear their own costs. The case of appellants 5–7 is remanded to the Tribunal for decision on merits.

    Pritpal Singh And Others v. New Suraj Transport Co. (P.) Ltd., Amritsar And Others

    R.N Mittal, J.:— This appeal has been filed against the judgment and award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Amritsar (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’), dated February 26, 1970, by which the claim application was dismissed.

    2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are that Didar Singh aged about 50 years, working as Deputy Superintendent of Police, was going from Amritsar to Ajnala on a Scooter on November 2, 1968. When he had travelled a distance of one kilometre from Adda Kugranwala, a truck bearing No. PNA-6954 collided against him. It was being driven rashly and negligently by Page: 279Garibu (Respondent No. 2) at that time. Didar Singh received serious injuries on account of the accident on chest, head, face and skull and became unconscious. He was first removed to Ajnala Dispensary from where he was advised to be taken to V.J Hospital. When he was being taken to the hospital, he passed away on the way. New Suraj Transport Company (Respondent No. 1) was the owner of the truck and it was insured with Concord of India Insurance Company (Respondent No. ?). At the time of his death, the deceased was drawing salary at the rate of Rs. 900/- per mensum.

    3. The petitioners who are sons and daughters of the deceased filed the claim for recovery of Rs. 1,00,000/- on October 21, 1969. The claimants Nos. 1 to 4 are majors where as claimant Nos. 5 to 7 are the minor children of the deceased. The claim application was opposed by the respondents. They inter alia pleaded that as the occurrence took place on November 2, 1968 and the claim application was filed on October 21, 1969, therefore it was barred by limitation. The Tribunal held that the claim application was barred by limitation and there were no good grounds to condone the delay. Consequenty, it dismissed the claim. The claimants have felt aggrieved against the judgement and award of the Tribunal have come up in appeal to the Court.

    4. A preliminary objection has been raised by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 that the appeal is not maintainable in the present case as a copy of the award has not been filed. He submits that it was necessary for the appellants to have filed a copy of the award along with the copy of the judgments. He also submits that the copy which has been filed with the memorandum of appeal is of the judgment and not that of the award. I have heard the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent and find no force in it. The appeal is maintainable under section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to us ‘the Act’) where in it is provided that subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) any person aggrieved by the award of a Tribunal may within 90 days from the date of the award prefer an appeal to the High Court. Section 111-A of the Act confers powers on the State Government to make rules which inter alia provides that the State Government may make rules regarding the form and manner in which the appeal should be preferred against an award of the Tribnnal. The state of Punjab framed rules under the aforesaid section in 1964 which are known as the Punjab Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), Rule 19 says that the Tribunal, in passing orders shall record concisely in a judgment the findings on each of the issues framed and the reasons for such findings and make an award specifying the amount of compensation to be paid by the nsurer and also the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. In Rule 20, provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure that are applicable to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal have been given. By the aforesaid Rule, Order XX and Order XLI have not been made applicable. From and manner of appeals against the award of the Tribunal have been given in Rule 21, which is as follows:—

    “21. Form and manner of appeals against the award of Claims Tribunal:

    An appeal against the award of a Claims Tribunal shall be preferred in the form a memorandum stating concisely the grounds on which the appeal is preferred. It shall be accompanied by a copy of the judgment and the award appealed against.”

    5. The emphasis has been laid by the learned counsel for the respondent on the fact that in the aforesaid rule, it is stated that the memorandum of appeal shall be accompanied by a copy of the judgment and award appealed against. Relying on the aforesaid phraseology, his contention is that the award is not the same thing as judgment and both should accompany the memorandum of appeal. The word ‘award’ has not been defined in the Act. The learned counsel for the respondent says that award is the same thing as a decree as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of his contention, he relies on a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Shanti Devi v. General Page: 280Manager, Haryana Roadways, Ambala 1971 A.C.J 247, wherein it has been stated that it is apparent from the perusal of the rules that the word ‘award’ has been used synonmous with the word ‘decree’ and it has not been used to convey the meaning that the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal are in the nature of arbitration proceedings. The question for determination before the Full Bench was as to whether an appeal was maintainable under clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the decision of a learned Single Judge of the High Court in appeal filed against the award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal under section 110-D of the Act. In interpreting clause 10 of the Letters Patent, these observations were made by the Full Bench it is not stated that the award shall be prepared in the same way in which the decree is prepared. The judgment and the award may be contained in the same document. A reading of Rule 19 show that the Tribunal while passing order shall record concisely the findings on each issue framed and the reasons for such findings. This part of the order may be called a judgment. If is further provided that it shall make an award specifying the amount of compensation to be paid by the insurer and also the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid. The part of the order which contains the aforesaid findings, it appears will be termed as the award. It is not necessary that a separate document shall be prepared which may contain the amount of compensation to be paid by the insurer and also the name of person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and that document is to be termed as an award. The word ‘decree’ has been defined in sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and what the decree has to contain has been provided in Rule 6 of Order XX of the Code of Civil Procedure. Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 6 of Order XX says that the decree shall agree with the judgment: it shall contain the number of the suit, the names and descriptions of the parties, and the particulars of the claim, and shall specify clearly the relief granted or other deter mination of the suit. In sub-rule (2) of the Rule 6 of Order XX it is stated that the decree shall also state the amount of costs incurred in the suit and by whom or out of what property and in what proportions such costs are to be paid. Rules 9 to 18 of Order XX of the Code of Civil Procedure pertain to decrees that are to be prepared in different type of cases. The forms of decrees are provided in Appendex ‘D’. The aforesaid provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been made applicable to the proceedings before the Tribunal. It appears from the aforesaid rules it is not necessary that a separate award in the form of a decree should be prepared by the Tribunal. If that had been the intention, that would be specifically stated in the Rules and the Act. The word ‘award’ has not been defined either in the Act or in the Rules. In case it has not been defined its ordinary dictionary meaning shall have to be taken into consideration for interpreting it. ‘Award’ has been defined in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Third Edition as “(1) A sentence or decision after examination, esp. that of an arbitrator or umpire: the document embodying it. (2) That which is awarded or assigned as payment, penalty etc.” In Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Second Edition ‘Award’ has been defined as “(1) a judgment, sentence, or decision: (2) ………… (3) something awarded.” In Black's Law Dictionary the definition of the word is as follows, “the decision of determination rendered by arbitrators or commissioners, or other private or extra-judicial deciders, upon a controversy submitted to them.” The aforesaid definitions shows that the award is the decision of the Tribunal or the arbitrators upon a claim. The learned counsel for the respondent refers to the memo of costs prepared by the Court and states that it was an award and a copy there of should have been annexed with the appeal. This contention of the learned counsel for the respondent has no force. The memo of costs has not been provided in the Rules. It only gives the details of the expenses that a party can claim on Page: 281account of costs. It cannot be termed as an award. According to sub-rule (2) of Rule 6 of the Order XX, the costs have to form part of a decree but it is not necessary that the costs shall be a part of an award. In the present case, the claim application has been dismissed. The order of dismissal is the award in the case. Both the judgment and the award are incorporated in the same document dated February 26, 1970. For the reasons given above, I do not find any merit in the preliminary objection of the learned counsel for the respondent and reject the same.

    6. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that appellants 5 to 7 are the minor daughters of the deceased and they are entitled to the benefits of section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and could file the claim within the same period after the disability has ceased as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefore in the Act. He submits that as the aforesaid appellants are still minors, therefore their claim cannot be dismissed as barred by limitation. There is force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants. Sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that the provisions contained in section 4 to 24 shall apply to all enactments if they are not expressly excluded by such Act. The aforesaid section is as follows:

    “29. Savings, (1) xxx

    (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule any for the purpose determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.

    sub-section (1) of section 6 of the Limitation Act permits the minors to institute the suit after the disability has ceased within the period of limitation that is prescribed in the third column of the Schedule. The aforesaid sub-section is as follows:—

    “6. Legal disability.

    (1) Where a person entitled to institue a suit or make application for the execution of a decree is, at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned, a minor or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application within the same period after the disability has ceased, as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified therefor in the third column of the Schedule.

    (2) xxxx

    (3) xxxx

    (4) xxxx

    (5) xxxx

    Explanation x x”

    7. The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that sub-section (1) of section 6 of the Limitation Act applies to suits and not to claim applications and that the periods of limitation are extended only in such cases which are provided in the Schedule to the Limitation Act. The word ‘suit’ has not been defined in the Limitation Act, 1963. The suit according to section 26 of the Code of Civil Procedure is instituted by the presentation of plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act 1963 clearly provides that the provisions of section 4 to 24 apply to all enactments. It means that the aforesaid provisions are also a part of the Act. The main question for determination is whether the claim filed by the appellants falls within the definition of the word ‘suit’ Page: 282under section 6 of the Limitation Act. ‘suit’ has been defined in Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary Second Edition as “an act or an instance of suing or seeking by entreaty: solicitation; a petition, as to make suit to the King.” In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the definition of the word is “the action of suing in a Court of law, legal prosecution; a process instituted in a Court of Justice for the recovery or protection of a right, the enforcement of a claim or the redress of a wrong.” In a case where recovery is to be made on account of some injury or death under the Act; an application is to be filed in Tribunal. The application will be in the nature of a suit. It cannot be said that section 6 of the Limitation Act will apply only to the suits under the Code of Civil Procedure and not to similar proceedings under other enactments.

    8. The next question that arises is as to whether section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to such cases the limitations of which are provided in the Schedule or it applies to other cases also of which the limitation is not provided in the Schedule, sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Limitation Act provides that where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply as if such period were prescribed by the Schedule. As the Schedule is amended by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 29 by the provisions of the Act, the claim application can be dismissed under section 3 of the Limitation Act, if it is not filed within the limitation prescribed by the Act. The limitation provided under the Act will be taken to a part of the Schedule for the purpose of section 6 of the Limitation Act. The provisions of Limitation Act are to be construed strictly, that is, in favour of the right to proceed. The Courts should avoid such a construction that destroys a valuable right to sue. Therefore, the minors are entitled to the benefit of the provisions of section 6 in filing the claims under the Act. The learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on N. Sri ramamurthi v. N. Sooramma A.I.R 1963 A.P 492 wherein it has been observed that in construing statutes of limitation equitable considerations or principles of natural justice were out of place and that a decision had to be reached on interpreting the language of the section. There is no dispute about the aforesaid proposition. In the present case, I have already held that section 6 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the present case and my decision is not based on equitable consideration but on interpretation of the statutes. In the circumstances, the respondent cannot derive any benefit from the aforesaid observations of the Division Bench in N. Sriramamurthi's case. The facts of that case were also different. The learned Judges were interpreting section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was provided by section 29 of Limitation Act 1908 that the provisions contained in section 4, 9 to 18 and 22 would apply only in so far as and to the extent to which they were not expressly excluded by such special or local law and that the remaining provisions of that Act would not apply. Now, the Legislature has amended the aforesaid section in the new Limitation Act. Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure has also been omitted by section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In the circumstances, the ratio in that case will not be applicable to the present case. The view which I have taken finds support from a Division Bench judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Hayatkhan v. Mangilal 1970 A.C.J 254 wherein it has been observed as follows:—

    “The word ‘suit’ occurring in section 6 is capabale of having a very wide connotation and may include any legal proceedings commenced by one person against another in order to enforce civil rights. The provisions of section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963 were therefore applicable to applications for compensation under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which Page: 283were in the nature of a suit.”

    9. Another contention that has been raised by the learned counsel for the respondents is that the Act has got its own peculiarities and it does not require that all the legal representatives of the deceased be included in a claim application. Petition by one of the claimants is sufficient. He, therefore, urges that if the claim application by appellants 1 to 4 is barred by limitation, the claim of the other appellants should be rejected as barred by time. He further urges that the claim by one of the legal representatives is in the form of a representative claim and if that is barred by limitation, the other claimants cannot take benefit of their minority. This contention of the learned counsel for the respondent has no force. It may be that some claimants are treated to be representative of others for some purposes. It, however, cannot be said that the claim of the minors should be dismissed on the ground that the claim of the majors is held to be barred by limitation. The learned counsel has placed reliance on Pijush Kami Ghosh v. Smt. Maya Rani Chatterjee 1971 A.C.J 267 wherein it has been observed that an application made by one or more heirs of the deceased is maintainable even if other heirs are not impleaded. It is further observed that in such cases the power of Tribunal is not limited to awarding compensation in favour of the applicants or to the extent of their shares. The aforesaid observations do not help the contention of the learned counsel. They do not say that each claimant has not an independent right to file claim application, and dismissal of the claims of the other persons. The Tribunal, however, in an application by some is entitled to grant relief to other legal representatives as is clear from the language of section 110-A of the Act. The proceedings before the Tribunal are in the nature of summary proceedings. The learned counsel for the respondent has also referred to the observations of the Division Bench of this Court in Northern India Transporters Insurance Co. Ltd., Jullundur v. Smt. Amra Wati 1966 A.C.J 13, 165, wherein it has been observed that a claim, which arises out of the Act, is to be made on behalf of the heirs mentioned in it. It is further observed that, merely because the names of the daughters were brought into the proceedings at a later stage, there is no justification for excluding the compensation payable to them on the ground that their claim was belated. The aforesaid case has been decided on the same reasoning on which Pijush Kanti Ghosh's case was decided by the Calcutta High Court. Those observations are not applicable to the facts of the present case. School Certificates of appellants 5 to 7 Exhibits A-1 to A-3 respectively, show that they were minors on the date of institution of the claim. The Tribunal on the basis of the said evidence held that they were minors. It, however, observed that the period of limitation prescribed for making an application for compensation is 60 days for all persons including the minors. It further held that the claimants-appellants have to explain each day's delay in filing the application late and that the appellants failed to do so. Consequently their claim was dismissed by it. The Tribunal has not properly appreciated the law regarding claim of the minors and erred in holding that they are not entitled to the benefit of provisions of section 6 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Their claim could not be dismissed on that ground as they are entitled to get the period of limitation extended on the basis of section 6. The question whether the minors are entitled to condonation of delay in the present case under proviso to sub-section (3) of section 110-A of the Act does not arise. The learned counsel for the appellants has expressed his inability to challenge the finding of the Tribunal that the appellants 1 to 4 are not prevented by sufficient cause from making the claim in time.

    10. For the reasons recorded above, I partly accept the appeal and remand the case of appellants 5 to 7 to the Page: 284Tribunal for decision on merits. In view of the partial success of the appeal, I leave the parties to bear their own costs.

    11. Appeal partly allowed.

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    Pritpal Singh And Others v. New Suraj Transport Co. (P.) Ltd., Amritsar And Others
    (Mar 28, 1973)