Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of section 4(1) and 4(2)
  • provisions of act no. 45 of 1988
  • provision of section 4(3)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of section 4(1) and 4(2)
  • provisions of act no. 45 of 1988
  • provision of section 4(3)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — N.L. Ganguly, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The second appeal challenges the judgment and decree dated 13-2-1974 of the District Judge, Ballia (Civil Appeal No. 30 of 1970). The plaintiff filed a suit seeking partition of a half share in an Ahata described in Schedule Ga of the plaint. The plaint alleged that Bihari Ram was the common ancestor and that his three sons (Vishwanath Ram, Khedu Ram and Lautu Ram) had earlier executed an usufructuary mortgage of the ancestral house for Rs. 3,200 in favour of Hira Lal and Gauri Shanker Prasad. Following financial difficulties and separations within the extended family, the plaintiff Rameshwar Ram paid Rs. 3,400 to redeem the mortgage and spent a further Rs. 1,500 on repairs. The plaintiff asserted he and Paras Nath (defendant No. 1) had been treated as joint owners of the Ahata and constructions therein, but disputes (including criminal proceedings) made joint ownership inconvenient, prompting the partition suit.

Defendants 1–3 contested the suit, pleaded lack of plaintiff's title, raised limitation and asserted ownership/possession and a bar under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. Paras Nath (defendant No. 1) claimed he purchased the Ahata by sale-deed dated 25-1-1960 and that constructions were raised by him. Evidence produced at trial included family history, redemption of the mortgage, sale deeds, rent notes and invoices.

The Trial Court found the Schedule Ga property was acquired from joint funds of Rameshwar Ram and Paras Nath and that the plaintiff held a half share; the suit was decreed as within limitation. The lower appellate court upheld the Trial Court’s factual findings, concluding that (i) Rameshwar Ram and Paras Nath continued as joint coparceners and conducted joint business, (ii) the shop in Schedule kha was likely a benami purchase in the name of Paras Nath’s wife, and (iii) the Ahata was acquired from joint business funds and belonged to both brothers.

In appeal, the appellant moved to add a new ground (ground No. 14) contending that the Ahata was a benami transaction and therefore the suit must fail under the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (Act No. 45 of 1988). The appellate court allowed the additional ground; evidence paragraphs and witness statements were relied upon by the appellant. After hearing both parties and analysing the evidence and statutory provisions, the court dismissed the second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Ahata (Schedule Ga) and related constructions were a benami transaction within the meaning of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988.
  2. Whether the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (including the prospective operation of certain sections) applies to the present suit and appeal, and if so, whether its provisions defeat the plaintiff's claim.
  3. Whether the exception in section 4(3) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (which preserves property held in the name of a coparcener for the benefit of coparceners) applies to the facts — i.e., whether Rameshwar Ram and Paras Nath were coparceners and the property was held for the benefit of the coparcenary.
  4. Whether concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Trial Court and the lower appellate court are open to interference in this second appeal.
  5. Whether the omission to frame specific issues at trial vitiates the proceedings where parties led evidence on the controversy.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Ahata was purchased in the name of the defendant-appellant (or in the name of Paras Nath’s wife) but was in substance paid for by the plaintiff-respondent; therefore the transaction is benami within section 2(a) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988.
  • On this admitted case of benami purchase, and by virtue of Act No. 45 of 1988, the suit is liable to fail and the appeal should be allowed (ground No. 14 added in appeal).
  • The appellate court had allegedly made out a new case in appeal (benefit should not be given to the respondent when the matter was not pleaded at trial), and even if joint acquisition is assumed, it was not pleaded and therefore should not benefit the respondent.
  • Relied upon authority (Om Prakash v. Jai Prakash and Mithleah Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare) to show that provisions of sections 4(1) and 4(2) of the Benami Act operate prospectively and on future suits/actions; argued prospective effect should be considered.
  • Relied upon evidence of witnesses (PW1 paragraphs 8, 30, 34; PW2 paragraph 5; PW3 paragraph 3) asserting that the Ahata was purchased by the plaintiff-respondent and/or jointly and that entries on sale deeds and documents do not reflect true beneficial ownership.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Both Trial Court and lower appellate court recorded concurrent findings of fact that Rameshwar Ram and Paras Nath remained joint coparceners and conducted joint business; those findings are based on appraisal of evidence and are not open to attack in a second appeal.
  • Omission to frame particular issues does not vitiate the proceedings where the parties were fully aware of the facts and led evidence on all aspects; reliance was placed on Supreme Court authorities (Medunri Kamaswaramma v. Sampati Subbarao; Kunju Keswan v. M. N. Philip; Bhairav Chandra Nandan v. Randhir Chandra Dutta) to support that proposition.
  • The evidence (invoices, joint business names, house-tax receipt in joint names, applications to the Notified Area, etc.) demonstrates joint acquisition from joint funds and supports the courts’ factual findings that the property belonged to both brothers.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Om Prakash and another v. Jai Prakash and another, AIR 1992 SC 885 As cited by appellant to support that provisions of sections 4(1) and 4(2) of the Benami Act, 1988 have prospective operation and apply to future suits/claims. The decision was relied upon by the appellant. The court considered the submission but proceeded on the basis that section 4(3) of the Benami Act (coparcener exception) applied on the facts; the prospective argument did not alter the court’s result as the court found the coparcenary exception applicable.
Mithleah Kumari and another v. Prem Behari Khare, AIR 1989 SC 1247 As cited by appellant to show prospective effect of certain sections of the Benami Act (similar purpose as Om Prakash). The court noted the reliance but, given its finding that the property fell within section 4(3) (coparcener exception), the prospective operation argument did not change the outcome of the appeal.
Medunri Kamaswaramma v. Sampati Subbarao, AIR 1963 SC 894 Authority for the proposition that omission to frame issues does not necessarily vitiate a trial where parties have led evidence and material evidence suffices to reach a correct conclusion. The court accepted the principle cited and held that omission to frame issues in the present case did not vitiate the proceedings because parties led evidence on the relevant matters; concurrent findings of fact therefore stood.
Kunju Keswan v. M. N. Philip and others, AIR 1964 SC 164 Cited in support of the proposition (with Medunri) that omission to frame issues is not a ground for remitting the case where evidence suffices. The court relied on the cited authority as part of the body of precedent supporting the view that the evidence on record was sufficient and the proceedings were not vitiated by omission to frame particular issues.
Bhairav Chandra Nandan v. Randhir Chandra Dutta, AIR 1988 SC 396 Cited alongside other Supreme Court decisions to show that a suit should not be dismissed merely for omission to frame issues when evidence is available to decide the controversy. The court treated this authority similarly to the other cited Supreme Court decisions and used it to support the conclusion that the lower courts’ findings should not be set aside for omission to frame issues.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the following analytical steps, based exclusively on the record and submissions:

  1. Procedural step: The court allowed the appellant’s application in appeal to add ground No. 14, which alleged the transaction was benami under Act No. 45 of 1988.
  2. Evidence considered: The court reviewed witness evidence referenced by the appellant (PW1 Rameshwar Ram — paras. 8, 30, 34; PW2 Sukh Dev Ram — para. 5; PW3 Ram Jatam — para. 3), which included admissions and statements that the Ahata and constructions had been paid for by Rameshwar Ram or by joint funds.
  3. Statutory framework: The court considered the definition of "benami transaction" in section 2(a) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 and section 4(3) of the same Act, which expressly excludes from operation of Section 4 those situations where the person in whose name the property is held is a coparcener in a Hindu Undivided Family and the property is held for the benefit of the coparceners.
  4. Findings of fact: The court accepted the concurrent factual findings of the Trial Court and the lower appellate court that Rameshwar Ram and Paras Nath continued as joint coparceners and conducted joint business (despite another brother having separated). The court highlighted documentary and oral evidence supporting this conclusion: business conducted in joint names across various invoices; a house-tax receipt in the joint names of Rameshwar Ram and Paras Nath; applications and business records indicating joint enterprise; and the improbability that Smt. Bachni (Paras Nath’s wife) purchased the shop from her own funds at a very young age.
  5. Application of statutory exception: Given the factual finding that the brothers were coparceners and the property was held for their joint benefit, the court held that section 4(3) of the Benami Act applied. Under that provision, the benami enactment would not impair the rights of coparceners or co-owners of a Hindu Undivided Family where the property is held in the name of a coparcener for the benefit of the family.
  6. On prospective operation argument: Although the appellant relied on authorities to contend certain sections of the Benami Act operate prospectively, the court’s analysis turned on the section 4(3) exception and the established factual finding of joint acquisition from joint funds; the prospective-operation argument did not alter the result on the facts before the court.
  7. On procedural defect argument (omission to frame issues): The court applied the line of Supreme Court precedent cited by the respondent (Medunri, Kunju Keswan, Bhairav Chandra Nandan) to hold that omission to frame issues did not vitiate the proceedings where parties were fully aware of the controversy and had led evidence on all relevant aspects; therefore the lower courts’ findings were not set aside on that procedural ground.

The court therefore synthesised the factual findings and statutory exception to conclude that the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 did not defeat the plaintiff’s claim because the property fell within the coparcenary exception of section 4(3).

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct effects on the parties:

  • The second appeal was dismissed and the decree of the lower courts affirming the Trial Court’s decree stands.
  • The parties were ordered to bear their own costs.

Broader implications: The opinion’s operative conclusion hinges on the factual finding that the property was acquired from joint/coparcenary funds and therefore falls within section 4(3) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. The opinion does not purport to set out a novel legal precedent beyond applying the statutory exception on the facts; it does not discuss broader precedent-setting consequences.

    Paras Nath And Others v. Rameshwar Ram And Others

    N.L.Ganguly, J.-

    This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 13-2-1974 passed by the District Judge, Ballia in Civil Appeal Mo. 30 of 1970. The plaintiff filed a suit for partition of one half share in the Ahata described in Schedule Ga. of the plaint.

    2. In the plaint it was pleaded that Bihari Ram was the common ancestor of the parties, who had three sons Vishwanath Ram, Khedu Ram and Lautu Ram. The aforesaid Bihari Ram's three sons mortgaged the house in question for Rs. 3,200 with Hira Lal Gauri Shanker Prasad. This was an usufructuary mortgage. After execution of the mortgage deed the family of the aforesaid Vishwanath Ram and two other brothers had no place left for residence or for doing any business. Their financial condition was also in a very bad state. Vishwanath Ram and Lautu Ram for some time went to Bengal to do some business there. Gauri Shanker, the brother of plaintiff No. 1, and defendant No. 1 and the son of Khedu Ram also separated. The plaintiff No. 1 also left the village to do some business. The plaintiff No. 1 began to maintain his own father and also Parasnath, defendant appellant.

    3. The plaintiff accumulated some capital and in the year 1949 Hira Lal Gauri Shanker brought a suit on the basis of mortgage in their favour. The plaintiff paid Rs. 3,400 to them and redeemed the mortgaged property. He spent another sum of Rs. 1,500 on the repairs of the house. Ramadhar s/o Lautu Ram finding that he could not pay the mortgage money surrendered his share in favour of Khedu Ram. The plaintiff No. 1 also purchased the shop described in schedule kha of the plaint in the name of Bachni Devi wife of Parasnath, defendant. The plaintiff then purchased the property given in Schedule Ga of the plaint.

    4. The plaintiff pleaded that he used to give money to Paras Nath and after the Ahata was acquired constructions were raised therein. The plaintiff and Paras Nath were always taken to be owners of this Ahata and constructions inside it. Differences arose between the plaintiff and Paras Nath. Paras Nath had brought a criminal case against the plaintiff. It was, therefore not convenient to keep the property joint hence the suit.

    5. The defendants No. 1 to 3 contested the suit, filed written statement and pleaded that the plaintiff had no right or title to maintain the suit. The plea of limitation was also raised. The defendants pleaded that they are in possession and the suit was barred under section 34 of the specific relief act. The defendant Paras Nath pleaded that the Ahata was purchased by him from Gauri Shanker Prasad by means of a sale-deed dated 25-1-1960 and the constructions were raised by him inside the Ahata. He pleaded that the plaintiff Rameshwar Ram and Gauri Shanker Prasad had separated soma 20-21 years back and only Khedu Ram Paras Nath and Ramji Ram and Smt. Kalika remained joint. It was stated that in the year 1927 the three sons of Bihari Ram had executed an usufructuary mortgage deed of the ancestral house in favour of Gauri Shanker Prasad and Hira Lal. In 1949 one suit being brought on the basis of this mortgage it was redeemed by plaintiff No. 1 Rameshwar Ram. Defendant No. 1 had brought Original suit No. 184 of 1968 for redemption of his share in the house. He had also taken the shop in the property given in schedule ka on rent from other members of the family by means of a rent note dated 15-5-2006 (Kunwar Sudi Samwat). It was said that the shop described in schedule kha belonged to Smt. Bachni who purchased the same from her money and the plaintiff was in occupation of this shop as a tenant on payment of Rs. 30 per month as rent. Gauri Shanker defendant had filed a separate written statement in which he stated that after the death of Bihari Ram his sons continued joint. After 1927 Lautu Ram Vishwanath separated from Khedu Ram but the joint family property was not partitioned and redeemed the usufructuary mortgage with the joint family money. He had no separate business and this property was also acquired from the joint family funds.

    6. The Trial Court found that the property described in schedule Ga was acquired from the joint funds of plaintiff No. 1 Rameshwar Ram and defendant No. 1 Paras Nath. He also found that the plaintiff had half share in it. The Trial Court found that the suit was within limitation. Ho decreed the suit of the plaintiff.

    7. The lower appellate court found as a fact that the Ahata described in schedule Ga was purchased in the name of Paras Nath in the year 1960 at a time when the plaintiff and defendant Paras Nath had joint business. The lower appellate court found that it was not proved that there had been a partition between the plaintiff and Paras Nath and they were living separately. It has also been found that there was no reliable evidence to show that Paras Nath ever did separate business. The shop described in schedule kha was purchased in the year 1955 at a time when Paras Nath was 19 years of age. His wife must have been much younger and it was not possible to believe that though a girl in her teens could purchase the shop out of her own money. Thus the lower appellate court found that the shop was purchased in the name of Smt. Bachni benami. Since this shop was purchased benami, it is not unlikely that this Ahata, though purchased in the name of Paras Nath alone, belonged to both these brothers. The sale deed (Ext. 103) & on the record filed by Rameshwar Ram. The appellate court from the evidence on record found that when the sale deed was executed Paras Nath was about 24 years of age and it was not shown that he was doing any separate business or had separate money to purchase this property. The finding of the Trial Court, therefore, that Rameshwar Ram and Paras Nath were doing joint business and this property was purchased from the funds of their joint business was upheld by the lower appellate court.

    8. The lower appellate court while recording the above mentioned finding had considered the evidence adduced by the defendant-appellant Paras Nath and found that the evidence adduced by the defendant was discrepant. It was admitted by Paras Nath that no partition took place between the plaintiff Rameshwar Ram and defendant Paras Nath. From the evidence on record it was established that both the brothers Rameshwar Ram and Paras Nath were doing joint business. Both of them jointly applied to the notified area to undertake the repairs of the ancestral house and the sale deed executed by Vishwanath Ram was executed in favour of both the brothers jointly. This evidence was considered by the lower appellate court at a conclusion that there has been no partition between the plaintiff and the defendant. The lower appellate court held, that these two brothers Rameshwar Ram and Paras Nath were doing joint business, hence the consideration for the purchase of this property naturally came from the funds of the joint business. Gauri Shanker had never acquired any share in this property and the plaintiff No. 1 and defendant No. 1 had half share each in this property. It is also to be noted that the trial court and the lower appellate court both examined the application submitted before the Notified Area for separately assessing Gauri Shanker, who had separated. The lower appellate court also held from the facts on record that in the business the joint name was used, which itself was indicative of the fact that the two brothers remained joint and had been doing business jointly. It was also in evidence that subsequently the business was done by these people in the names of Khedu Ram Rameshwar Ram, Rameshwar Ram Paras Nath, Hira Lal Jawahar Lal being the sons of Paras Nath and Rameshwar Ram Satya Narain, which shows that the business was done in joint names of both these brothers or their sons and they continued to be joint. Had they been separated, they could not have named their business in the name other's sons. A large number of invoices were also filed in the name of these firms. Invoices No. 4 to 22 were in the name of Paras Nath Rameshwar Ram, Invoices No. 23 and 24 were in the name of Khedu Ram Rameshwar Ram, Invoices No. 25 to 33 were in the name of Jawahar Lal Hira Lal and invoices No. 34, 35, and 37 to 47 were in the name of Jawahar Lal Hira Lal. On some of the invoices it was noted that the commodity indented was collected by Paras Nath on behalf of the firm. Thus items in respect of which Invoices Ext. 23, 24, 25 and 36 were issued, were collected by Paras Nath. If Paras Nath collected items for the firms aforesaid, then it was clear he was joint with Rameshwar Ram. Had he been separated, he would never have bothered to collect these items nor could Ramesh was Ram have trusted him with those items. Ext. 50 is a house tax receipt in the joint name of Rameshwar Ram and Paras Nath in respect of the ancestral house and shop. From all these documents it is clear that though Gauri Shanker had separated, Rameshwar Ram and Paras Nath had continued to be joint and were doing business jointly.

    9. Sri U. K. Misra, learned counsel for the appellant, moved an application in appeal for adding a ground in the memo of appeal. A copy of this application was served on Sri Prakash Krishna, counsel for the respondent on 13-11-1991. Sri Prakash Krishna filed no objection to the said application rather he submitted that he had no objection in the ground sought to be added. The ground sought to be added in the memo of appeal as ground No. 14 is quoted below:

    "14. Because, on the admitted case of the plaintiff-respondent, he purchased the land in suit in the name of the defendant-appellant from his own funds and is thus a benami transaction and in view of the provisions of act no. 45 of 1988 the suit is liable to fail and the appeal deserves to be allowed."

    10. The application for adding additional ground in the memo of appeal was allowed on the date of heating and today I allow the ground to be added in the memo of appeal.

    11. The learned Counsel for the appellant Sri U. K. Misra placed the evidence of PW I Rameshwar Ram and placed paragraphs 8, 30 and 34 of the said statement. He also referred to the statement of PW 2 Sukh Dev Ram and placed paragraph 5 of his statement. Lastly, he placed the statement of P. W. Ram Jatan and referred to paragraph 3 of his statement.

    12. In paragraph 8 of PW 1 Rameshwar Ram it was stated that the Ahata in question was purchased by him and Parasnath from Gauri Shanker and for making constructions of the house in the Ahata both spent the money. In paragraph 30 of the said statement it was stated that the sale-deed was got executed by Rameshwar Ram out of the income earned by him from business at Kamal and Sheorapulli. That business was closed in the year 1967. In the statement of Sukh Deo Ram PW 2 vide para 5 it was pointed out that the Ahata and the land on which the house was purchased by Rameshwar Ram himself. It was purchased in the name of Paras Nath. PW 3 Ram Jatam stated that the Ahata and the shop in question was constructed jointly in partnership.

    13. The learned Counsel for the appellant referred to the definition of 'benami transaction' as given in section 2(a) of the benami transaction (prohibition) act, 1988, which reads as under:

    "2(a) 'Benami transaction' means any transaction in which property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by another person."

    The learned Counsel for the appellant placed the provision of section 4(3) of the aforesaid act, which reads as under:

    "4 (3) Nothing in this Section shall apply-

    (a) where the person in whose name the property is held is a coparcener in a Hindu Undivided Family and the property is held for the benefit of the coparceners in the family; or

    (b) where the person in whose name the property is held is a trustee or other person standing in a fiduciary capacity, and the property is held for the benefit of another person for whom he is a trustee or towards whom he stands in such capacity."

    Sri U. K. Misra submitted that the appellate court made out a new case in appeal. He also submitted that even if the finding of the courts below that it was a joint acquisition is taken as correct, since it was neither pleaded nor the case, benefit could not go to the respondent. Sri U. K. Misra placed reliance on the case reported in AIR 1992 SC 885 - Om Prakash and another v. Jai Prakash and another case reported in AIR 1989 SC 1247; Mithleah Kumari and another v. Prem Behari Khare. The learned Counsel for the appellant placed these two decisions to show that the provisions of section 4(1) and 4(2) of the benami transaction (prohibition) act, 1988 is prospective and shall apply to the present (future stages) and future suits, claims or action only. It was also pointed out that in a suit for recovery of benami property if appeal is pending on the date of coming into force of Section 4, the appellate court can take into account the subsequent legislative changes in the Benami Act. Since second appeal is undoubtedly a continuation of the suit, the provisions of the Act though it was enacted and enforced after the judgment of the lower appellate court, still the provisions shall be applicable to the suit and appeal.

    14. The learned Counsel for the respondent Sri Prakash Krishna reiterated the findings of fact recorded by the lower appellate court affirming the findings recorded by the trial court. He submitted that since both the courts below as a fact found that Gauri Shanker had separated and Rameshwar Ram and Paras Nath continued to live jointly. These findings of fact are not open to challenge in second appeal as they have been recorded after appreciating the evidence on record. He also submitted that the learned Counsel for the appellant has not been able to show that the findings of fact recorded by the two courts below concurrently are, in any manner, vitiated. He submitted that the submission of the learned Counsel for the appellant that necessary issues were not framed and the parties had no opportunity to understand the real controversy and dispute for want of framing necessary issues the judgment of the court below shall stand vitiated is wholly misconceived. He submitted that there was nothing concealed or unknown between the parties. Both the parties were fully aware of the facts and circumstances involved in the suit and evidence was led by both the parties on all possible aspects involved in the suit. He submitted that mere omission to frame issues is not to vitiate the proceedings. He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1963 SC 894, Medunri Kamaswaramma v. Sampati Subbarao. The Supreme Court also observed that a suit could not be dismissed in such a narrow ground nor such a ground was sufficient for remitting the case to the court below when the parties have led evidence in the case and material evidence on record is sufficient to reach a right conclusion. The above view was also taken in AIR 1964 SC 164, Kunju Keswan v. M. N. Philip and others, AIR 1988 SC 396 ; Bhairav Chandra Nandan v. Randhir Chandra Dutta.

    15. After hearing the learned Counsel for the parties I have no hesitation in holding that the suit, as framed by the plaintiff and the defence as set up and evidence led by the parties in the suit, clearly show that Rameshwar Ram and appellant Paras Nath remained joint in the coparcenary Hindu undivided family, although another brother had separated. It has also been found that Rameshwar Ram had been earning and giving money for purchase of the land of Ahata and construction was also made by the money paid by him. The finding of the courts below that at the time the shop in question was purchased in the name of Smt. Bachni, who is the wife of Paras Nath, the age of Paras Nath was 19 years and it was observed that the age of Smt. Bachni must have been much younger than Paras Nath. There was thus no possibility or believable fact that at such tender age Smt. Bachani would have purchased it out of her own money. Since Paras Nath and Rameshwar Ram constituted joint coparcenary Hindu family, the property in the name of either of the coparceners shall not provide any benefit to the person whose name alone the property was recorded and the provision of section 4(3) of the benami transactions (prohibition) act, 1988 shall come into play. The benami transactions (prohibition) act would not affect the rights of the corparceners and co-owners of the Hindu Unidivided Family.

    16. After hearing the learned Counsel for the appellant and the respondent and perusing the record, I am of the view that the second appeal does not call for any interference and is hereby dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.

    Appeal dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Paras Nath And Others v. Rameshwar Ram And Others
    (Oct 21, 1994)