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  • Section 2(d) of the Haryana Children Act, 1974
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  • Section 2(d) of the Haryana Children Act, 1974
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The State of Haryana filed an appeal against a judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Criminal Appeal No. 584 of 1978. The respondent Balwant Singh had been convicted by the trial court under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life, and also convicted under Section 323 IPC with a sentence of two months' rigorous imprisonment.

The High Court set aside these sentences after holding that the respondent was below 16 years of age on the date of the offence and therefore fell within the definition of “child” under Section 2(d) of the Haryana Children Act, 1974. On that basis, the High Court concluded he could only be detained in a special school up to the age of 18 years, but also held that because he had already completed 18 years by the time of its judgment, he could not be sent to a special school and thus directed that he “shall stand discharged of his bail bonds.”

The High Court drew its inference regarding age solely from an entry in the respondent’s statement under Section 313 CrPC, where his age was mentioned as 17 years.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court was justified in holding that the respondent was a “child” under Section 2(d) of the Haryana Children Act, 1974 on the date of occurrence, based only on an age entry in the Section 313 CrPC statement.
  2. Whether the High Court erred in disposing of the criminal appeal without examining the case on merits, having proceeded solely on the question of the respondent’s age/juvenility.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court reviewed the record and noted that the respondent faced trial in the Sessions Court only after committal by the Magistrate, and that the respondent’s age at the trial court stage (including at framing of charge) was stated as 17 years. The Court inferred that the Magistrate was not satisfied that the respondent was a “child” within the meaning of the Haryana Children Act, 1974.

The Court emphasized that no plea of juvenility/child status was raised on behalf of the respondent either before the committal court or before the trial court. In the Supreme Court’s view, where it was not the respondent’s case at those stages that he was a child who should have been dealt with by the juvenile court mechanism, it was unsustainable for the High Court to conclude that he was a “child” on the date of occurrence merely on the basis of an entry in the Section 313 CrPC statement, particularly when there was no other supporting material.

On that basis, the Court held that the High Court’s finding that the respondent was a “child” could not be sustained in law or on facts and therefore set it aside. The Court further noted that the High Court had not decided the appeal on merits at all, having proceeded only on the question whether the respondent was a child. Considering the “interest of justice,” the Court directed that the criminal appeal must be examined on merits.

Holding and Implications

ALLOWED (WITH REMAND): The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s finding that the respondent was a “child” under the Haryana Children Act, 1974 and remitted the matter to the High Court to examine and decide the criminal appeal on its merits according to law.

The direct effect is that the High Court’s disposal of the appeal on the sole basis of the “child” finding was undone, and the High Court must now adjudicate the appeal on merits. The opinion does not state any broader implications beyond this remittal and does not set out any new precedent.

    State Of Haryana v. Balwant Singh .

    Order

    1. This appeal is directed by the State of Haryana on being aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 584 of 1978 holding that the respondent Balwant Singh was less than 16 years of age on the date of the commission of the offence and as such he was covered by the definition of term “child” as given in Section 2(d) of the Haryana Children Act, 1974 and he, therefore, has to be detained only in a special school up to the age of 18 years. On the above finding the High Court set aside the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed on the respondent by the trial court for the conviction under Section 302 IPC and the sentence of two months' R.I under Section 323 IPC and ordered that the respondent “shall stand discharged of his bail bonds” and that he could not be sent even to special school as required by law as by the time of the pronouncement of the judgment, he had completed the age of 18 years. The High Court for drawing such inference has placed reliance only on an entry made in the statement of the accused, recorded under Section 313 CrPC wherein the age of the respondent was mentioned as 17 years.

    2. We have gone through the records carefully. It appears that the respondent took his trial before the trial court only on being committed by the Magistrate. It may be noticed that the age of the respondent before the trial court even at the stage of framing the charge was given at 17 years. Evidently, the Magistrate before whom the respondent was brought, was not satisfied that the respondent was a child within the definition of the word ‘child’ under the Haryana Children Act. Admittedly, neither before the committal court nor before the trial court, no plea was raised on behalf of the respondent that he was a child and that he should not have been committed by the Magistrate and thereafter tried by the sessions court and that he ought to have been dealt with only by the court of Juveniles. When it is not the case of the respondent that he was a child both before the committal court as well as before the trial court, it is very surprising that the High Court, based merely on the entry made in Section 313 statement mentioning the age of the respondent as 17 has concluded that the respondent was a ‘child’ within the definition of the Act on the date of the occurrence though there was no other material for that conclusion. This observation of the High Court, in our considered view, cannot be sustained either in law or on facts. Hence, we set aside that finding of the High Court that the respondent was a ‘child’.

    3. After going through the judgment of the High Court, we find that the High Court has not decided the case on its merits, but had proceeded only on this question as to whether the respondent was a child or not.

    4. Under these circumstances, we feel, in the interest of justice that the entire case has to be examined on its merits and disposed of. Hence, while setting aside the judgment of the High Court holding that he was a child, we remit the matter to the file of the High Court which has to examine the appeal on its merits, and decide it according to law.

    5. The appeal is allowed subject to the above order of remittal.

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    Comments

    State Of Haryana v. Balwant Singh .
    (Jan 15, 1992)