At that stage, the counsel applied in writing that he may be given one more chance to produce the witness. This prayer was also rejected on the ground that the matter was being unnecessarily delayed. Another prayer made by the counsel was to permit him to produce a certified copy of the judgment of the criminal Court. The Tribunal pointed out that the judgment of the Criminal Court was neither binding nor relevant in the case. In the end, the Tribunal disallowing another opportunity to produce Ram Bhumian driver, closed the case, but allowed the production of a certified copy of the judgment of the Sessions Judge which was directed to be placed on the file, if properly stamped. While disallowing further opportunity to produce Ram Bhumian, the learned Tribunal observed that "this witness could have been produced", presumably meaning thereby that he could have been produced earlier.
2. Before me in this Court, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that under S. 110(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Claims Tribunal has all the powers of a civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses, with the result that the Tribunal should be deemed to be a civil Court governed by the provisions of O. XVI of the Code of Civil Procedure. If, therefore, a party applies to a Tribunal to summon a person whose attendance is required to give evidence or to produce documents, the Tribunal is bound to issue the summonses. In the alternative, the counsel has submitted that in any event, according to the latest Punjab Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules in force with effect from January, 1965, the provisions of O-16, Rr. 2 to 21 have been expressly made applicable to proceedings before the Claims Tribunal. If now the present petitioner were to apply for summoning a witness, then, but for the impugned order, the Tribunal would be bound to issue the process. In the interest of justice, the hurdle of the impugned order should be removed, submits the counsel. In my opinion, these submissions do not advance the petitioners case. Section 110C by no means clothes the Tribunal with all the characteristics of a civil Court so as to attract the provisions of O. 16, Code of Civil Procedure, and even the new Punjab. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal Rules exclude the applicability of R. 1 of O.16, C. P. Code, which authorises the parties to obtain summonses to persons whose attendance is required. This exclusion of R. 1 seems to be deliberate.
3. The petitioners counsel has, however, strongly urged that Ram Bhumian is his only witness in the Tribunal below and his main defence depends on this witnesss testimony. The controversy is only between him and the garage owners, the question to be adjudicated upon being as to which of the parties is liable. If Ram Bhumian was not available at the relevant time when the Local Commissioner went to the witnesss address at Lucknow, then in the interest of justice, the Claims Tribunal should have given one more opportunity to the present petitioner to produce the witness. The case had actually been adjourned to some future date and to close the evidence in these circumstances is violative of the basic rules of natural justice, in that the entire evidence of the present petitioner would be excluded.
4. The respondents learned counsel, Shri N.S. Keer has submitted that if Ram Bhumian is, as stated by Shri Suri, the driver of the present petitioner, then be could have been produced as a witness on an earlier occasion and to have a commission issued for his examination was apparently with the object of delaying the final disposal of the present proceedings. It is submitted that there is no ground for invoking this Courts jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution which is an extraordinary remedy available only in extraordinary circumstances. He has also made a passing reference to Order XVII Rule 3, Civil P.C., which empowers the Court to proceed to decide forthwith the suit in which a party has failed to produce evidence on getting time from the Court for the purpose. Order XVII, Rule 3, in my opinion, is, wholly out of place in the present circumstances, and apart from its inapplicability in terms, the Tribunal also did not proceed to decide the controversy forthwith.
5. I am quite conscious of the fact that Article 227 of the Constitution confers the power of superintendence on this Court which is to be exercised only in special cases where inter alia grave injustice is to be caused as a result of a serious breach of the Courts duty or a grave violation of a provision of law or of the well known rules at natural justice. In the present case, of course, the Tribunal has very wide powers for the purpose of adjudicating upon any claim for compensation within the contemplation of Section 110-C, Motor Vehicles Act, but the wide amplitude of power has its own inherent limitations in the form of observance of rules of natural justice. If after the return of the report by the Corn-mission, some opportunity had been given to the present petitioner, to produce the only material witness, as the counsel puts it, to prove the case, then perhaps the rules of natural justice would have been considered to have been fully complied with, but to close the evidence in these circumstances, appears to me to be almost arbitrary and violative of the basic rules of natural justice. This is all the more so because the Tribunal actually adjourned the case to some future date, the actual date so fixed not being discernible from the impugned order. I have, however been informed from the bar that written arguments have been handed over by the parties to the Tribunal. In the case in hand, the award of the Tribunal, in the absence of the present petitioners evidence, is likely to be final as against this party, and in some cases, an appeal is even under the law incompetent. There is, of course, no prescribed procedure rigidly controlling the proceedings of the Tribunal but this does not confer wholly unfettered, absolute and arbitrary power on the Tribunal to do what it likes or wills. The matter truly and essentially pertains to the domain of judicial discretion governed by rules of reason and justice. The Tribunal is, in the absence of positive authority, like the provisions of the C. P. Code expected to reason by analogy, as nearly as possible, to such provisions, and to come to a decision by weighing rival considerations according to the trained judicial technique. Since the case was going to be adjourned, no reason has been given as to how the cause of justice would have suffered by granting to the present petitioner one opportunity or examining on his own responsibility the one witness sought to be produced. An order for commission, having actually been issued, it is not easy to blame the petitioner, for not producing the witness in Court in the presence of that order.
6. Article 227 of the Constitution vests the High Court with a special responsibility and power over judicial institutions in the State to see that they function properly and discharge their functions according to law. The High Court under this Article, it is true, does not fit as a Court of appeal and has merely to consider whether the Tribunal has outstepped the limits of its jurisdiction or whether its conclusions are based on no material or are otherwise perverse or its orders are so clearly opposed to the recognised rules of natural justice as to cause manifest injustice which may not be readily remediable. In the present case, this test appears to me to be satisfied, I am accordingly of the view that in the case in hand it would promote the cause of justice for this Court to quash the impugned order and direct the Tribunal to give one more opportunity to the present petitioner to produce Ram Bhumian as a witness. It has been stated at the bar by Suri that he would produce the witness on his own responsibility on the date to be fixed by the Tribunal. As the case has been pending for a long time, it is in the interest of justice that it is disposed of within the month of June, 1965.
7. I would in the result quash the impugned order and send the case back for further proceedings in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. The parties have been directed to appear before the Tribunal on 01-06-1965 when another date would be fixed within the month of June for the production of Ram Bhumian as a witness on behalf of Messrs. Groz Beckert Saboo Ltd,, and for arguments by the parties. No further opportunity would be given for his production and the case should be disposed of before the expiry of the month of June 1965. There would be no order as to costs of the proceedings in this Court. Petition allowed.