Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2005 INSC 451
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 24 of the Evidence Act
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2005 INSC 451
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 24 of the Evidence Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent (accused) was tried for the murder of his wife and was convicted by the trial court under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The conviction was based primarily on an extra-judicial confession allegedly made voluntarily before PW 1 (the village Sarpanch) and PW 2 & PW 3 (Ward Members), as well as on medical and investigative evidence provided by PW 5 (the doctor who conducted the post-mortem) and PW 9 (the investigating officer). On appeal, the High Court acquitted the respondent, describing the confession as unreliable because it was made to “strangers” and because of purported contradictions between the testimonies of PW 1 and PW 2. The State obtained special-leave to appeal, bringing the matter before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court erred in discarding the respondent’s extra-judicial confession as unreliable and thereby acquitting him.
  2. Whether the remaining circumstantial and medical evidence, together with the respondent’s false defence, established an unbroken chain of circumstances proving guilt under Section 302 IPC.

Arguments of the Parties

State (Appellant)

  • The extra-judicial confession was voluntary, credible, and corroborated by other evidence; PW 1, PW 2, and PW 3 were not “strangers” but village officials.
  • Medical and forensic evidence (blood-stained shirt, doctor’s opinion of throttling) supported the prosecution case.
  • The respondent’s plea that the deceased committed suicide was demonstrably false and should be treated as an additional incriminating circumstance.

Respondent (Accused)

  • Pointed to discrepancies between PW 1 and PW 2, suggesting that the confession lacked credibility.
  • Advanced a defence under Section 313 CrPC that the deceased had committed suicide because she was childless.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205 Extra-judicial confession can sustain conviction if voluntary, true, and made to a reliable witness. Relied upon to affirm that the confession before PW 1–3 could form the basis of conviction.
Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P., 1954 SCR 1098 Extra-judicial confession is admissible when free from suspicion. Cited in support of the above proposition.
Maghar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1975) 4 SCC 234 Confession evidence is not inherently tainted; corroboration needed only as a matter of caution. Used to rebut the High Court’s skepticism towards the confession.
Narayan Singh v. State of M.P., (1985) 4 SCC 26 Court should not presume that extra-judicial confession is weak evidence; credibility depends on circumstances. Applied to evaluate the surrounding circumstances of the confession.
Kishore Chand v. State of H.P., (1991) 1 SCC 286 Unambiguous, voluntary confession has high probative force. Bolstered reliance on PW 1–3’s testimony.
Baldev Raj v. State of Haryana, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 14 Surrounding circumstances must show confession is not induced or coerced. Supported finding that no coercion was suggested in cross-examination.
Piara Singh v. State of Punjab, (1977) 4 SCC 452 Principles on evaluating extra-judicial confessions. Referenced indirectly through earlier cases.
Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey, (1992) 3 SCC 204 Voluntary confession can sustain conviction even without corroboration. Affirmed the sufficiency of the confession evidence.
Swapan Patra v. State of W.B., (1999) 9 SCC 242 False explanation offered by accused provides an additional link in circumstantial cases. Used to treat the respondent’s suicide story as an incriminating circumstance.
State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, (2000) 1 SCC 471 A false answer to an incriminating circumstance can complete the evidentiary chain. Reinforced the impact of the respondent’s false defence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Reliability of the Extra-Judicial Confession: The Court found the High Court’s view that PW 1–3 were “strangers” to be perverse because they were village officials (Sarpanch and Ward Members). The confession was made voluntarily in PW 1’s house, and the defence never suggested coercion during cross-examination.

2. Consistency of Witness Testimony: Minor discrepancies between PW 1 and PW 2 regarding whether the accused sought protection were held to be natural lapses of memory after four years and not material contradictions.

3. Medical and Investigative Corroboration: The doctor (PW 5) confirmed death by throttling and ruled out suicide. PW 9 recovered a blood-stained shirt (later confirmed by FSL to contain human blood) and other incriminating material, and was led by the accused to the scene of crime and to the well where the body was found.

4. Respondent’s False Defence: The respondent’s claim that the deceased committed suicide was incompatible with the medical findings. Applying Swapan Patra and State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, the Court treated this false plea as an additional link in the chain of circumstances.

5. Cumulative Assessment: The confession, corroborating physical evidence, medical opinion, and false explanation formed a complete and unbroken chain establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court’s acquittal lacked reasoned analysis and was therefore unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; CONVICTION RESTORED. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s acquittal and reinstated the trial court’s conviction of the respondent under Section 302 IPC. The respondent’s bail bond and surety were cancelled, and he was ordered into custody within one month.

Implications: The decision reinforces the principle that a voluntary and credible extra-judicial confession, supported by corroborative circumstances and an accused’s false defence, can validly sustain a conviction. No new legal precedent was created, but the ruling underscores established standards for evaluating such confessions and circumstantial evidence.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    State Of A.P v. Kanda Gopaludu .

    H.K Sema, J.— The respondent was convicted by the trial court under Section 302 IPC. The trial court relying upon the extra-judicial confession made before PW 1, PW 2 and PW 3 found the respondent guilty. The trial court also relied upon the evidence of PW 9, the investigating officer corroborated by the evidence of PW 5, the doctor. On appeal being preferred by the accused, the High Court acquitted the accused-respondent herein.

    2. This appeal is preferred by the State by special leave.

    3. The High Court recorded the acquittal on the ground that PW 1 and PW 2 before whom the accused made extra-judicial confession are strangers and there is no reason for the respondent to make the extra-judicial confession before PW 1, PW 2 and PW 3. The High Court also found that the statements of PWs 1 and 2 were full of contradiction and artificial. On this ground the accused was acquitted, however, the High Court has not assigned any reason with regard to the alleged contradiction between the statements of PW 1 and PW 2 and the acquittal is not supported at all. It is now well-established principle of law that the judicial decision is based on reasons. We have been taken through the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3 before whom the accused made extra-judicial confession. It is now established principle of law that extra-judicial confession is admissible if it inspired confidence and is made voluntarily. The High Court reasoning that the accused has made a confession statement before a stranger is totally perverse. The evidence on record shows that PW 1 is the Sarpanch of the village, PW 2 and PW 3 are also Ward Members of the Village Gram Panchayat.

    4. It is the case of the prosecution that the accused had come to the house of PW 1 where PWs 2 and 3 were sitting together and chatting and he had made extra-judicial confession before them voluntarily. It is also the evidence on record that PWs 1 and 2 went to the police station and lodged an FIR while PW 3 was with the accused in the house of PW 1. It is also in the evidence on record that PW 9 arrested the accused from the house of PW 1.

    5. PWs 1, 2 and 3 were subjected to lengthy cross-examination. Not even a suggestion was put to the witnesses that the confession was tainted and non-voluntary or that it was obtained by coercion, inducement or promise of favour. In the case of Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2001) 2 SCC 205 this Court held in para 6 as under:

    “It is settled position of law that extra-judicial confession, if true and voluntary, it can be relied upon by the court to convict the accused for the commission of the crime alleged. Despite inherent weakness of extra-judicial confession as an item of evidence, it cannot be ignored when shown that such confession was made before a person who has no reason to state falsely and to whom it is made in the circumstances which tend to support the statement. Relying upon an earlier judgment in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of V.P 1954 SCR 1098, AIR 1954 SC 322, 1954 Cri LJ 910 this Court again in Maghar Singh v. State of Punjab (1975) 4 SCC 234 held that the evidence in the form of extra-judicial confession made by the accused to witnesses cannot be always termed to be a tainted evidence. Corroboration of such evidence is required only by way of abundant caution. If the court believes the witness before whom the confession is made and is satisfied that the confession was true and voluntarily made, then the conviction can be founded on such evidence alone. In Narayan Singh v. State of M.P (1985) 4 SCC 26 this Court cautioned that it is not open to the court trying the criminal case to start with a presumption that extra-judicial confession is always a weak type of evidence. It would depend on the nature of the circumstances, the time when the confession is made and the credibility of the witnesses who speak for such a confession. The retraction of extra-judicial confession which is a usual phenomenon in criminal cases would by itself not weaken the case of the prosecution based upon such a confession. In Kishore Chand v. State of H.P (1991) 1 SCC 286 this Court held that an unambiguous extra-judicial confession possesses high probative value force as it emanates from the person who committed the crime and is admissible in evidence provided it is free from suspicion and suggestion of any falsity. However, before relying on the alleged confession, the court has to be satisfied that it is voluntary and is not the result of inducement, threat or promise envisaged under Section 24 of the Evidence Act or was brought about in suspicious circumstances to circumvent Sections 25 and 26. The court is required to look into the surrounding circumstances to find out as to whether such confession is not inspired by any improper or collateral consideration or circumvention of law suggesting that it may not be true. All relevant circumstances such as the person to whom the confession is made, the time and place of making it, the circumstances in which it was made have to be scrutinised. To the same effect is the judgment in Baldev Raj v. State of Haryana 1991 Supp (1) SCC 14. After referring to the judgment in Piara Singh v. State of Punjab (1977) 4 SCC 452 this Court in Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey (1992) 3 SCC 204 held that the extra-judicial confession which is not obtained by coercion, promise of favour or false hope and is plenary in character and voluntary in nature can be made the basis for conviction even without corroboration.”

    6. PW 9, who is the investigating officer deposed that he received an information at about 8.30 a.m on 25-1-1992 and rushed to Hukumpeta PS and reached there at about 9.30 a.m and there he received a copy of the FIR from PW 8 and took up the investigation. In the course of the investigation he arrested the accused from the house of PW 1 and interrogated him in the presence of administrators PWs 1 and 2. He also found bloodstains on the shirt of the accused which the accused was wearing and seized them under the cover of Ext. P-2 marked as MO 5. He was also led by the accused in the presence of PWs 1 and 2 to the scene of occurrence. From the place of occurrence in the presence of PWs 1 and 2 he made a seizure under the cover Ext. P-3 and seized MOs 1 and 2 and prepared a sketch map. From the place of occurrence the accused led the investigating officer and others where the dead body of the deceased was found. The dead body was found floating in the well water. The dead body was identified by PW 6 who is the father of the deceased. The investigating officer also stated that the depth of the water was only two-and-a-half feet. The inquest report is Ext. P-5. The investigating officer found injuries on the tip of the nose of the deceased, right nostril, nail marks on the neck and throat of the deceased. He also found abrasions on the right and left knees and bitten marks on both the cheeks of the deceased. The statement of the investigating officer about the injuries found on the body of the deceased at the time of preparing the inquest report, Ext. P-5 is found well corroborated in material particulars by the evidence of the doctor, PW 5. The doctor, PW 5 found the following injuries:

    1. A lacerated injury over the tip of the nose, both medial ends of the nose show lacerations measuring about 1″ × 1/4″ × cartilage-deep.
    2. An abrasion present over both elbows on the posterior aspect measuring about 3/4″ × 1/4″ size.
    3. An abrasion present on both sides of the neck about 4 on the left side and 6 on the right side measuring about 1/2″ × 1/4″ in size, reddish in colour.
    4. An abrasion present over the right knee about 1.s″ in diameter, reddish-brown in colour.
    5. A scar mark present in the form of ″X+″ shaped over the upper 1/3rd of the lateral aspect of the thigh.
    On internal examination the doctor found the following: on opening the thorax both lungs were reddish-brown in colour, cut section shown congested. On squeezing nothing particular. Heart: normal size and shape, reddish in colour. Cut section shows blood clots in the right chamber. Liver: dark reddish-brown in colour. Normal in size and shape. Cut section nothing particular. Gall bladder full. Spleen: reddish-violet in colour, normal in size. Cut section shows congestion. Kidneys: both kidneys reddish in colour. Cut section shows congestion. Intestines: pale reddish in colour. Stomach: pale reddish in colour, contains semi-digested food material about 4 ounces. Whitish in colour. Bladder: empty. Uterus: normal in size and shape. Cut section nothing particular.

    The doctor opined that the deceased appeared to have died of asphyxia due to throttling with the duration of about 18 to 20 hours prior to the post-mortem examination.

    7. The doctor, PW 5 in cross-examination denied the suggestion that the death was suicidal. The doctor categorically ruled out suicidal death. He stated that in case of drowning by asphyxia on squeezing of lungs there will be frothy bloodstained fluid oozing on cut section. In case of death on account of asphyxia by drowning there will be frothy bloodstained fluid both from the nose and mouth. There will not be any swelling of the neck in cases of death by drowning on account of asphyxia. The doctor has denied a suggestion that the fracture of hyoid bone will also occur by a sudden fall on the edge of stones.

    8. We have been taken through the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3 before whom extra-judicial confession has been made by the accused. The testimony of PWs 1, 2 and 3 is consistent. The learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that in the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 there is contradiction that the accused did not state before them that he came seeking protection from them. In our view, this discrepancy cannot be termed as a contradiction which would be fatal to the prosecution case. Every discrepancy in the statement of a witness cannot be treated as fatal to the prosecution case. A discrepancy which is not fatal to the prosecution does not create any infirmity. The incident had taken place on 24-1-1992 and PW 2 was examined on 22-1-1996 after almost four years. Human memories are apt to blur with the passage of time. After lapse of almost four years, it cannot be expected that a witness can depose with mathematical precision.

    9. Apart from the unimpeached evidence against the accused there is yet another strong incriminating material apparent against the accused. In his statement under Section 313 the accused while denying the commission of any offence took the plea that the deceased has committed suicide. His specific plea was that the deceased committed suicide as she had no issue. This plea is completely belied by the medical evidence of the doctor, PW 5. We have no hesitation to hold that he has taken a false plea and this plea can be taken as an additional link in the chain of circumstances.

    10. In the case of Swapan Patra v. State of W.B (1999) 9 SCC 242 this Court held in para 4 as under:

    “4. It is well settled that in a case of circumstantial evidence when the accused offers an explanation and that explanation is found to be untrue then the same offers an additional link in the chain of circumstances to complete the chain. Applying the aforesaid principle, we have no hesitation to hold that the circumstances established in the case complete the chain of circumstances to prove the charge of murder against the appellant Swapan Patra and, therefore, the conviction of appellant Swapan Patra has to be upheld under Section 302 IPC. So far as the other two appellants are concerned, as stated earlier, in the absence of any positive evidence even about their presence in the house at the relevant point of time, it is difficult to rope them in even if all other circumstances narrated earlier are established and, therefore, they are entitled to an order of acquittal.”

    11. In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Suresh (2000) 1 SCC 471, the same was reiterated in para 27 as under:

    “27. It is regrettable that the Division Bench had practically nullified the most formidable incriminating circumstance against the accused spoken to by PW 22 Dr. Nand Kumar. We have pointed out earlier the injuries which the doctor had noted on the person of the accused when he was examined on 25-12-1995. The significant impact of the said incriminating circumstance is that the accused could not give any explanation whatsoever for those injuries and therefore he had chosen to say that he did not sustain any such injury at all. We have no reason to disbelieve the testimony of PW 22 Dr. Nand Kumar. A false answer offered by the accused when his attention was drawn to the aforesaid circumstance renders that circumstance capable of inculpating him. In a situation like this such a false answer can also be counted as providing ‘a missing link’ for completing the chain.”

    12. Another incriminating material against the accused is the seizure of shirt stained with blood. The shirt was sent to FSL. The FSL report was marked as Ext. P-15. The report shows that Item 1 which is the shirt seized from the accused was stained with human blood.

    13. In the premises aforestated, the High Court has committed a grave error in law as well as in facts in recording the acquittal. The High Court order of acquittal is hereby set aside. The order of the trial court recording the conviction of the accused is restored. The accused Kanda Gopaludu is on bail, his bail bond and surety stand cancelled. He is directed to be taken into custody forthwith. Compliance within one month.

    14. The appeal is allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    State Of A.P v. Kanda Gopaludu .
    (Sep 27, 2005)