Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2004 INSC 189
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Article 226 and alternatively Article 227 of the Constitution
  • Section 21 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P Act 13 of 1972)
  • Article 226 of the Constitution, Article 227 of the Constitution
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2004 INSC 189
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Article 226 and alternatively Article 227 of the Constitution
  • Section 21 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P Act 13 of 1972)
  • Article 226 of the Constitution, Article 227 of the Constitution
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, the landlord-owner of a shop, sought eviction of the respondent-tenant under clauses (a) (bona fide requirement) and (b) (dilapidated condition) of Section 21(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. The landlord asserted that he needed the premises for his own business of fertilizers and agricultural implements and that the building was structurally unsafe, as evidenced by cracks, a municipal notice dated 27-2-1985 requiring demolition of parts of the structure, and reports of two Local Commissioners.

The prescribed authority (trial court) dismissed the eviction application on 15-2-1989. On appeal, the Additional District Judge re-evaluated the evidence, accepted both grounds for eviction, and allowed the landlord’s claim on 17-7-1997. The tenant then filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. A learned Single Judge set aside the appellate judgment and reinstated the trial court’s decision. The present Supreme Court proceedings arise from the landlord’s challenge to the High Court’s interference.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution, could re-appreciate evidence and overturn the factual findings of the appellate court in an eviction matter.
  2. Consequently, whether the appellate court’s order granting eviction on grounds under Section 21(1)(a) and (b) of the U.P. Act 13 of 1972 should be restored.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675 Limits of certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction: only self-evident errors may be corrected; re-appreciation of evidence is impermissible. The Court relied on this decision to conclude that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by re-evaluating evidence and acting like an appellate court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court observed that the High Court had effectively exercised certiorari jurisdiction to re-appreciate evidence, a course barred by the principles set out in Surya Dev Rai. An error correctable in certiorari must be apparent on the face of the record; if two views are reasonably possible, the High Court cannot substitute its own assessment. Furthermore, supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is also not intended for reevaluation of facts or drawing fresh inferences. The High Court itself acknowledged that it reassessed the evidence “carefully,” thereby acting as an appellate body beyond its constitutional remit. Finding no patent error in the appellate court’s judgment, the Supreme Court held that the High Court’s interference was unjustified.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment set aside; appellate court judgment restored.

Direct Effect: The respondent-tenant must vacate the premises within four months, conditional on filing an undertaking within four weeks. Costs were not awarded.

Broader Implication: The decision reinforces the doctrinal limits on High Court interference under Articles 226 and 227, emphasizing that these jurisdictions cannot be used to re-appraise evidence or function as a second appeal.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi Prakash .

    R.C Lahoti, J.— Leave granted.

    2. The appellant is the landlord-owner of the suit premises in occupation of the respondent as the tenant. Proceedings for eviction of the respondent were initiated by the landlord on the grounds available under clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P Act 13 of 1972). The appellant's case was that the premises in occupation of the respondent were required bona fide by the appellant for his own business of fertilizers and agricultural implements. It was also alleged that the shop in occupation of the respondent was in a dilapidated condition. It was an old construction. Cracks had developed in the walls and the lintel. The corners of walls had given way. The local municipality had served a notice on the appellant on 27-2-1985 to demolish the verandah and lintel. Hence, it was necessary to demolish the shop and reconstruct the same.

    3. The prescribed authority, which is the trial court, vide its judgment dated 15-2-1989 directed the appellant's application to be dismissed. The appellant preferred an appeal which was allowed. Vide the judgment dated 17-7-1997, the learned Additional District Judge held the availability of both the grounds of eviction in favour of the appellant. The learned ADJ entered into reappreciation of evidence and assigned reasons to show why the findings arrived at by the trial court could not have been sustained. In the shop, in occupation of the respondent, he was running the business of fertilizers and agricultural implements and thus it could not be denied that the shop was suited for the business which the appellant proposed to have in the premises. There were two reports by two Local Commissioners, submitted on spot inspection, one of which was believed and such other evidence as available on record was appreciated in the light of the report of the Local Commissioner. The appellate court was persuaded to form an opinion, and in our opinion rightly, that the shop was an old construction which needed to be demolished as it was in a bad shape.

    4. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the appellate court, the respondent preferred a writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad under Article 226 and alternatively under Article 227 of the Constitution. It was heard by a learned Single Judge of the High Court. The High Court has set aside the judgment of the appellate court and restored that of the trial court. A perusal of the judgment of the High Court shows that the High Court has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside the judgment of the appellate court. Though not specifically stated, the phraseology employed by the High Court in its judgment goes to show that the High Court has exercised its certiorari jurisdiction for correcting the judgment of the appellate court. In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai (2003) 6 SCC 675 this Court has ruled that to be amenable to correction in certiorari jurisdiction, the error committed by the court or authority on whose judgment the High Court was exercising jurisdiction, should be an error which is self-evident. An error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or by indulging in a long-drawn process of reasoning, cannot possibly be an error available for correction by writ of certiorari. If it is reasonably possible to form two opinions on the same material, the finding arrived at one way or the other, cannot be called a patent error. As to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai (2003) 6 SCC 675 that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a court of appeal. The High Court has itself recorded in its judgment that — “considering the evidence on the record carefully” it was inclined not to sustain the judgment of the appellate court. On its own showing, the High Court has acted like an appellate court which was not permissible for it to do under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution.

    5. The approach of the High Court cannot be countenanced. The appeal is allowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and that of the appellate court is restored. The respondent is allowed four months' time from today for vacating the suit premises subject to filing the usual undertaking within a period of 4 weeks from today. No order as to costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Ranjeet Singh v. Ravi Prakash .
    (Mar 18, 2004)