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  • S. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1877 (Act X of 1877)
  • S. 44 of the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1888,
  • Act (52 Geo. 3, c. 101),
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1877 (Act X of 1877)
  • S. 44 of the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1888,
  • Act (52 Geo. 3, c. 101),
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion delivered by Sir John Edge

Factual and Procedural Background

These are consolidated appeals by defendants in Suit No. 1 of 1916 against decrees of the High Court at Madras dated 13 November 1919, which affirmed (with a minor variation as to a small portion of property) the preliminary decree of 15 April 1918 and the final decree of 30 September 1918 of the Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam.

The suit concerned a chatram (choultry) at Kumbakonam — known in succession as Rajappa Aiyar's chatram and later as Kalyanarama Aiyar's chatram — and property alleged to be endowments of that chatram. The plaintiffs (two Brahmins, one of whom died while the appeal was pending and whose legal representative remained on record) instituted the suit on 13 November 1916.

The plaintiffs sought declarations that (a) the chatram was a public charitable institution holding the properties listed in Schedule B and seven-ninths of the properties listed in Schedules C–F as endowments, (b) the defendants were not lawfully appointed trustees and should be removed, (c) fit persons be appointed trustees and a scheme for administration be settled, together with ancillary reliefs. The plaintiffs had obtained the written consent of the Advocate-General under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

The defendants denied that the plaintiffs had the requisite interest under Section 92, alleged the chatram was private and not dedicated to the public, denied the alleged endowments, and asserted they were duly appointed trustees. The Subordinate Judge tried the suit, received oral and documentary evidence, and found for the plaintiffs on the principal issues (including that the chatram was dedicated to the public, that the plaintiffs had locus under Section 92, and that the defendants were not duly appointed trustees), framing a scheme for management. The High Court on appeal concurred except as to a small portion of property, affirmed the decrees, and dismissed the appeals to it. The defendants appealed these affirmances to the Board, resulting in the present opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiffs had an interest in the charitable trust within the meaning of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and therefore locus standi to institute the suit.
  2. Whether the chatram was proved to be a public charitable trust (i.e., dedicated to the public).
  3. Whether the Courts below misconstrued the will of Swaminatha Aiyar dated 7 November 1881 (and whether any gift under that will was void for uncertainty).
  4. Whether the first defendant (Vaidyanatha Aiyar) had been properly appointed a trustee of the chatram and ought not to have been removed.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as presented by Mr. Upjohn)

  • The plaintiffs were not persons having an interest in the charitable trust within the meaning of Section 92 CPC, 1908, and therefore lacked locus standi; the written consent of the Advocate-General would not suffice if the plaintiffs had no interest.
  • The chatram had not been proved to be a public trust (i.e., it was a private chatram and not dedicated to the public).
  • The Courts below had misconstrued the will of Swaminatha Aiyar (7 November 1881); if so construed, some gifts to the chatram would be void for uncertainty under the Board's decision in Runchordas Vandrawandas v. Parbatibai.
  • The first defendant (Vaidyanatha Aiyar) had been properly appointed a trustee (or manager) and there was no ground for his removal.

Plaintiffs' / Respondents' Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The plaintiffs asserted that the chatram was a public charitable institution founded and dedicated to the public more than 60 years before suit, serving travellers and feeding poor Brahmins, and that the properties listed in Schedule B and seven-ninths of those in Schedules C–F were endowed to it.
  • They produced the written consent of the Advocate-General under Section 92 CPC, 1908, to support their entitlement to sue.

Additional Argument by Appellants' Junior Counsel

  • After main argument, the junior counsel contended that some small portions of the properties did not belong to the trust; the opinion records that those matters had been concurrently considered by the trial Judge and the High Court and that no evidence was pointed out to the Board to justify upsetting those conclusions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In Re the Master Governors and Trustees of the Bedford Charity [1819] 2 Swanston's Chan. Reports, 518 (dictum of Lord Eldon) Interpretation that statutory words authorising petitions were to be read as referring to "persons having an interest" (earlier described as a "direct interest"). Used to explain historical understanding of "interest" and to trace the development of the phrase "having an interest" in later legislation and procedure.
The Corporation of Ludlow v. Greenhouse [1827] 1 Bligh's Reports, ns. 17 Referenced in connection with Lord Eldon's observations on who may be considered to have an interest in a charity. Referred to as part of the historical authorities informing the understanding of "interest" in charitable contexts.
Jan Ali v. Ram Nath Mundal [1882] 8 Cal. 32 Illustration of an earlier case where plaintiffs (two Muhammadans who worshipped at a village mosque) were held to have no "direct interest" in the mosque. Referred to in discussing why the phrase "direct interest" was replaced by "having an interest" in later statutory amendment; the Board comments on the High Court of Calcutta's earlier conclusion.
Ramachandra Aiyar v. Parameswaran Unni [1918] 42 Mad. 360 (and related citations) Authority discussing that public Hindu temples are prima facie dedicated for the use of all Hindus resorting to them and on the concept of "interest" for S.92 purposes. The Board cites and affirms reasoning that a bare possibility that a Hindu might resort to a temple confers interest; uses it to explain legislative purpose and to justify treating public Hindu institutions as giving rise to an interest.
Runchordas Vandrawandas v. Parbatibai [1899] 23 Bom. 725 (P.C.) Decision applied as a test for when a gift may be void for uncertainty under testamentary dispositions relating to charitable gifts. The opinion notes that if the will of Swaminatha Aiyar had been misconstrued in a particular way the gift could have been void under this authority; the Board nevertheless holds the will was properly construed by the lower courts.
Parthasarathi Pillai v. Thiruvegada Pillai [1907] 80 Mad. 340 Authority relied upon by appellants to contend that a certain testamentary gift (a fraction of a fraction) might be void for uncertainty. The trial Judge considered and distinguished the will before him from the situation in that case; the Board agrees the will here was not void for uncertainty.
Boidya Gauranga Sahu v. Sudevi Mata [1916] 40 Mad. 613 Cited regarding the possible right of the last survivor of male descendants to appoint a trustee of a charity. The Board notes that Suri Aiyar, as last survivor of the male line, possibly had the right to appoint a trustee, but finds that in the present case he purported to appoint a manager of property he falsely alleged to be his own, not a trustee of existing trust property.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Board (Sir John Edge) addressed the four points argued by Mr. Upjohn in sequence and analysed the legal principles and factual findings of the courts below without disturbing the concurrent findings except where reasons required emphasis.

1. On locus standi under Section 92 CPC, 1908:

The Board accepted Mr. Upjohn's legal proposition that the consent of the Advocate-General alone would not confer the right to sue unless the plaintiffs had an "interest" within Section 92. The Board reviewed authorities (including Lord Eldon's dictum and the history of statutory language) explaining that earlier formulations required a "direct interest" but that the wording was subsequently altered (reference to S. 539 of Act X of 1877 and its amendment by Section 44 of the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1888) to require simply "having an interest."

The Board observed that public Hindu temples/choultries are prima facie dedicated for use by all Hindus resorting to them and that the legislative change was meant to prevent persons without any real interest from interfering in administration. Applying these principles to the facts, the Board held that the plaintiffs — being descendants (albeit in female lines) of the founder(s) — had an interest in the proper administration of the trust sufficient to confer locus to sue under Section 92.

2. On whether the chatram was a public trust:

The Board noted that the Subordinate Judge and the High Court had made concurrent findings that the chatram was a public trust. The Board added that it too found the chatram to be a public trust. Thus the appellants' contention on this point failed.

3. On construction of the will of Swaminatha Aiyar (7 November 1881):

The appellants contended that the lower courts misconstrued the will and that, if so construed, some gifts to the chatram would be void for uncertainty (citing Runchordas Vandrawandas v. Parbatibai). The Board examined the translation and the reasoning of the Subordinate Judge and the High Court. Both courts had held that the term "Dharmam" in the will referred to the chatram charity and that the gift was not void for uncertainty. The Board accepted the lower courts' construction and held that the will was not misunderstood by either court.

4. On the appointment of the first defendant (Vaidyanatha Aiyar):

The Board analysed the relevant paragraphs (3, 10 and 11) of Suri Aiyar's will by which Vaidyanatha Aiyar was said to be appointed to the management of the choultry and attached properties. Paragraph 3 listed properties which Suri Aiyar purported to own; paragraphs 10–11 appointed Vaidyanatha as manager. The Board observed that Suri Aiyar was appointing a manager of property which he falsely alleged to be his own private property, rather than appointing a trustee of properties already held on trust. The Subordinate Judge had found that the appointment was made to provide a monthly income to the daughter of Suri Aiyar's late concubine and her children. The Board agreed that Suri Aiyar was not validly appointing a trustee of existing trust property and therefore the appointment did not entitle the first defendant to remain as a trustee.

The junior counsel's late contention that some small portions of the properties did not belong to the trust was noted but the Board observed those matters had been concurrently decided by the lower courts and that no new evidence was pointed out to justify overturning those findings.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Their Lordships advised that the consolidated appeals be DISMISSED WITH COSTS. The cumulative statement in the opinion is succinctly rendered as "Appeals dismissed."

Implications (direct effect):

  • The decrees of the High Court (13 November 1919) affirming the Subordinate Judge's preliminary and final decrees (dated 15 April 1918 and 30 September 1918 respectively) stand, subject only to the minor variation already noted by the High Court as to a small portion of property.
  • The findings that the chatram is a public charitable trust, that the plaintiffs had locus under Section 92 CPC, 1908, that the will of Swaminatha Aiyar was correctly construed by the courts below, and that the first defendant had not been validly appointed as a trustee were all upheld by the Board.
  • No broader rule of law as a new precedent is expressly stated by the Board beyond its application and explanation of existing statutory language and cited authorities; the practical result is that the plaintiffs' declarations and the scheme for administration framed by the lower court remain effective.

Note: This summary strictly reflects only the content and reasoning contained in the provided opinion text and does not add facts or inferences beyond that text.

    Vaidyanatha Ayyar and another v. Swaminatha Ayyar and another

    Sir John Edge :- These are consolidated appeals by defendants in a suit, No. 1 of 1916, from two decrees, dated the 13th November 1919, of the High Court at Madras, which affirmed with a trifling variation as to some property claimed, a preliminary decree, dated the 15th April 1918, and a final decree, dated the 30th September 1918, of the Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam.

    The suit relates to a chatram, also called a choultry, at Kumbakonam, and property alleged to be endowed property of the chatram. The chatram is now known as Kalyanarama Aiyar's chatram. Formerly it was known as Rajappa Aiyar's chatram. Two Brahmins were the plaintiffs. Since the suit was in appeal in the High Court one of the plaintiffs died; his legal representative is now on the record and is one of the respondents.

    The plaintiffs on the 13th November 1916, brought this suit and claimed a declaration that the chatram was a public charitable institution having the properties mentioned in Schedule B of the plaint and seven-ninths of the properties mentioned in Schedule C to F as endowments; a declaration that the defendants are not lawfully appointed trustees and are not entitled to any right to the management and administration of the institution or in the properties belonging to it; that the defendants be removed from the office; that fit and proper persons be appointed trustees for the administration of the trust and that the chatram and the properties belonging to it be vested in them; that a scheme for the administration of the trust be settled; and other reliefs. The case of the plaintiffs was that the chatram was a public chatram, which had been founded and dedicated to the public more than 60 years before suit as a charitable institution for the convenience of travellers as a haltin place and for the feeding of poor Brahmins resorting to it. The plaintiffs had obtained under S. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the consent in writing of the Advocate-General to their institution of the suit.

    The defendants denied that the plaintiffs were persons who had an interest in the trust within the meaning of S. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. They alleged that the chatram was a private chatram, and they denied that it had ever been dedicated to the public, and that it had ever been endowed with any of the properties claimed as endowments; they pleaded that they had been duly appointed trustees, and other matters which are immaterial if they had not been duly appointed as trustees.

    The learned Subordinate Judge who tried the suit recorded oral and documentary evidence, and he found that the plaintiffs having obtained the consent in writing of the Advocate-General were persons who were entitled to institute the suit; that the chatram had been dedicatad to the public and had been endowed as alleged in the plaint; that the defendants were not duly appointed trustees, and decided that a scheme for the management of the trust should be framed; and he framed a scheme for the management of the trust. The learned Judges of the High Court on appeal concurred with the findings of the Subordinate Judge except that they found that a small portion of the property claimed as endowment was not endowed property and with that variation as to the endowed property affirmed by their decrees the decrees of the Subordinate Judge, and dismissed the appeals to their Court. From those decrees of the High Court these consolidated appeals have been brought.

    Mr. Upjohn, who appeared for the appellants, in his very able and exhaustive argument in support of these consolidated appeals, took and relied upon four points only. They were (1) that the plaintiffs were not persons who had an interest in the charitable trust within the meaning of S. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and consequently had no locus standi to institute this suit; (2) that the chatram was not proved to be a public trust; (3) that the Courts below bad misconstrued the will of Swaminatha Aiyar of the 7th November, 1881; and (4) that the first defendant had been properly appointed a trustee and there was no ground for removing him from his office as trustee of the charity. Their Lordships will deal with these points in the order in which they were argued by Mr. Upjohn.

    Mr. Upjohn's first point was that assuming for the purpose only of his argument that the chatram had been dedicated to the public with a trust created for public purposes of a charitable nature, the suit would not lie if the plaintiffs had not within the meaning of S. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, an interest in the trust. That is a perfectly sound argument. The consent in writing of the Advocate-General to the institution of the suit by the plaintiffs would not bring the suit within the meaning of S. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, unless the plaintiffs had an interest in the trust. Mr. Upjohn contended that the plaintiffs had no interest in the trust within the meaning of S. 92. The question is had the plaintiffs an interest in the trust within the meaning of the section? They were descendants in female lines of Rajappa Aiyar and his son Kalyanarama Aiyar, one of whom, probably the former, founded and dedicated to the public the chatram as a charitable institution, and are of the founder's kin. The chatram was at first known as Rajappa Aiyar's chatram and was subsequently known as Kalyanarama Aiyar's chatram.

    On the 22nd August 1864 the five sons of Kalyanarama Aiyar executed a partition deed in which the chatram and the lands then belonging to it, from which the income of the chatram was deilved, were mentioned. The lands belonging to the chatram were excepted from the partition, but it was agreed that the five brothers should manage the chatram lands according to the order of seniority. It is obvious that the chatram must have been endowed with these lands before the date of that deed of partition. Mr Upjohn contended that "an interest in the trust" to be within S. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, must be of some special interest and not merely a sentimental interest, and he referred to the dictum of Lord Eldon, L. C., In In Re the Master Governors and Trustees of the Bedford Charity [1819] 2 Swanston'a Chan. Reports, 518 in which in a reference to Sir Samuel Romilly's Act (52 Geo. 3, c. 101), which authorised persons other than the Law Officers to present petitions to the Court in certain matters of public charities, Lord Eldon said : "The Act, indeed, authorises any two or mere persons to present a petition; but I conceive that those words must be understood to mean persons having an interest." which earlier at page 518 Lord Eldon interpreted as meaning "a direct interest in the charity." Mr. Upjohn also referred to the observations of Lord Eldon, L. C , in The Corporation of Ludlow, etc. v. Greenhouse [1827] 1 Bligh's Reports, ns. 17. It may be that the dictum of Lord Eldon in the Bedford Charity Case [1819] 2 Swanston'a Chan. Reports, 518 caused those who were responsible for the drafting of S. 539 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1877 (Act X of 1877) to draft that section as giving a right in cases of a breach of trust created for public charitable purposes to "two or more persons having a direct interest in the trust," and who had obtained the consent of the Advocate-General, to institute a suit under that section. It must, however, have subsequently appeared to the Governor-General of India in Council that the limitation of a "direct" interest was not expedient in India, and it was enacted by S. 44 of the Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1888, which amended the procedure then in force, "That in S. 539, for the words having a direct interest" the words 'having an interest' shall be substituted." It may be that Coutts Trotter, J., was correct in stating, in Ramachandsra Aiyar v. Parameswaran Unni [1918] 42 Mad. 360 - 36 M.L. J. 396 - 35 M. L. T. 304 - 50 I. C. 693 - 9 L. W. 492 - (1919) M.W.N. 370 that it was in consequence of the decision in Jan Ali v. Ram Nath Mundal [1882] 8 Cal. 32 - 9 C.L.R. 433 that the change in the law was made by omitting the word " direct." In that case the High Court at Calcutta had held that the plaintiffs two Muhammadans who lived in a village and workshipped regularly at the village mosque, had no direct interest in the mosque. Their Lordships would have considered that Muhammadans who worshipped regularly in the mosque of the village had a direct interest in the trust relating to the mosque. But so that they may not be misunderstood as to the meaning of 'interest' in S. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, they think it advisable to say that public "Hindu Temples are prima facie to be taken." as Sir John Wallis, C. ., said in Ramchandra Aiyar v. Parameswaran Unni [1918] 42 Mad. 360 - 36 M.L. J. 396 - 35 M. L. T. 304 - 50 I. C. 693 - 9 L. W. 492 - (1919) M.W.N. 370 '' to be dedicated for the use of all Hindus resorting to them." They agree with Sir John Wallis that the bare possibility, however remote, that a Hindu might desire to resort to a particular temple gives him an interest in the trust appears to defeat the object with which the legislature inserted these words in the section. '' That object was to prevent people interfering by virtue of the section (S. 92) in the administration of charitable trusts, merely in the interests of others and without any real interest of their own." In the present case their Lordships are of opinion that the fact that the plaintiffs are descendants although only in female lines of the founder of the chatram gave them an interest in the proper administration of the trust sufficient to enable them to maintain this suit although they themselves may never find it necessary to use the chatram as a rest house or to obtain food there.

    As to the second point argued by Mr. Upjohn it is sufficient to say that there are concurrent findings that the chatram was a public trust, and their Lordships may add they also find that the chatram is a public trust.

    As to third point argued by Mr. Upjohn, that the Courts below misconstrued the will of Swaminatha Aiyar of the 7th November, 1881, that contention if well founded would show that the gift of some of the property to the chatram, which each Court has found to belong to the chatram, was a void gift within the decision of the Board in Runchordas Vandrawandas v. Parbatibai [1899] 23 Bom. 725 - 26 I. A. 71 - 1 Bom. L. K. 607 - 3 C.W.N. 621 - 7 Sar. 543 (P. C.). The testator was one of the five sons of Kalyanarama Aiyar. It is not necessary to set out the translation of the whole of his will; the contention turns on the meaning of part of the will.

    After referring to the partition of 22nd August, 1894, between him and his brothers and some other matters, the testator's will is translated continues, so far as is material, as follows :- "The arrangement which I make regarding the aforesaid properties is this :- After my decease my properties and my estate shall be managed with all rights by my divided brothers, K. Venkatranga Aiyar and K. Suryanarayana Aiyar as executers. The incomes from the villages and gardens shall be divided into three portions and two portions thereof shall be given to my wife, and the said house and the Ethiradi manai (mamai in front of it) be given to her for her occupation; and with the remaining one portion, the debts due by me and the debts contracted by me and K. Veakataranga Aiyar on the security of our family properties shall be discharged. After the said two kinds of debts are discharged, the said executors shall with the said one third portion of the said income nuke annadhanam (feed poor people) in our family choultry in Perumbandi new under the management of K. Venkataranga Aiyar. My wife shall take all the aforesaid moveable properties and enjoy them according to her pleasure, and if she dies leaving any moveable properties, they shall he used by the said executors themselves for the said feeding charity. After my wife's decease, two out of three periods of the income enjoyed by her shall be utilised for the charity and the remaining one out of the three shares, and the dwelling-house and marni in frout, shall be taken by K. Venkataranga Aiyar and K. Suryanarayana Aiyar and their posserity. The other dayadis have no right whatever.

    Their Lordships assume the words "the charity" in the translation are the correct rendering of the vernacular which they are informed is in Tamil. If those words are the the correct rendering of the vernacular they plainly refer to the chatram charity which had immediately before been indicated and the gift was not void for uncertainty. The original will was before the learned Subordinate Judge who tried the suit and who understood Tamil. This is what he said as to that part of the will :- "14. It is next contended that this gift of a 2/3rd share in the 2/3rd share to a Dharman was invalid, and the decision in Parthasara hi Pillai v. Thiruve gada Pillai [1907] 80 Mad. 340 - 17 M. L. J. 379 - 2 M. L. T. 198 was relied upon. A perusal of Swaminatha Aiyar's will indicates to my mind that the Dharmam he intended to create in respect of the 2/3rd share in the 2/3rd share was the Dharmam to which he gave a 1/3rd share in the income : and that the gift of 2/3rd share of a 2/3rd share is not void for uncertainty.

    "15. It was lastly contended that it was not open to this Court to construe the terms of Swaminatha Aiyar's will, in so far as they relate to the charity : but it appears to me that it is open to this Court to see what interest the charity has in Swaminatha Aiyar's properties. I therefore find that the chatram has a 7/9th share in the income from the C to F Schedule properties under Swaminatha Aiyar's will" This is what the learned Judges of the High Court said on that subject : "As regards 2/3rd of the income of the properties given to the wife which the will directs to be utilised for Dharmam on her death, it is argued that the references is not to this choultry but to charity generally. The learned Subordinate Judge has held that the word 'Dharmam' refers to this choultry and we think he is right in that construction. In that view of the will the choultry becomes entitled under Exhibit C to 7/9ths of the income of the properties." Their Lordships hold that the will was not misunderstood by either of the Courts.

    As to the fourth and last point argued by Mr. Upjohn that the first defendant, Vaidyanatha Aiyar, had been properly appointed a trustee of the chatram and ought not to have been removed, it is necessary to see what the appointment in fact was. His appointment was made by the 10th and 11th paragraphs of the will of Suri Aiyar, probate of which was granted on the 17th July 1915. Suri Aiyar was the last survivor of the five brothers who were the sons of Kalyanarama Aiyar. The 10th and the 11th paragraphs of the will, as translated, were as follows :- "10. The choultry mentioned in paragraph 3 aforesaidoand the entire properties attached thereto shall be in the management of the aforementioned R. Vaityanatha Aiyar. The Brahmin feeding and the Dwalas Kaitalai of the said choultry shall be conducted on a scale not inferior to what is being conducted now.

    "11. After the abovementioned Vaidyanatha Aiyar, his younger brother the said R. Narayanaswami Aiyar and after him, my friend Jayakrishnachariar residing in Melakkaveri Achari Agraharam shall look after the management of said choultry and of the entire properties attached thereso." Turning to the 3rd paragraph of the will it will he seen what were the properties for the management of which Vaidyanatha Aiyar was appointed. That 3rd paragraph is, as translated, as follows :- "3. Besides the abovesaid properties there are i? Kumbakonam Town to the northern side of the Cauver, my family choultry, the buildings attached thereto, lands, grounds bandy pettai, etc., properties. These belong to me and are in my possession and enjoyment." Suri Aiyar was appointing Vaidyanatha Aiyar manager of properties which he falsely alleged belonged to himself as proprietor, and was not appointing him as a trustee of properties which were already trust properties. Suri Aiyar as the last survivor of the descendants in the male line of the founder of the chatram possibly had a right to appoint a trustee of the charity. See Boidya Gauranga Sahu v. Sudevi Mata [1916] 40 Mad 613 - 32 M. L. J. 597 - I. C. 589 - (1917) M. W. N. 429.

    But that was not what he was professing to do. He was professing to appoint a manager of property which be falsely alleged to be his own private property, and in the opinion of the Subordinate Judge his object was to afford a monthly income for the daughter of his late concubine and her children.

    After Mr. Upjohn had concluded his arguments in support of the appeals his junior counsel addressed the Board on a subject which Mr. Upjohn had not referred to and contended that some small portions of the properties did not belong to the trust, but they had been concurrently dealt with in the decrees of the trial Judge and the High Court as the properties of the charitable trust, and the attention of their Lordships was not directed to any evidence sufficient to justify the contention.

    Their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that these consolidated appeals should be dismissed with costs.

    Appeals dismissed.

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    Comments

    Vaidyanatha Ayyar and another v. Swaminatha Ayyar and another
    (Jun 19, 1924)