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Disposition
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  • Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution
  • Article 226 of the Constitution and Article 227 of the Constitution
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution
  • Article 226 of the Constitution and Article 227 of the Constitution
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The matter reached the Supreme Court by way of special leave, which was granted. The dispute arose from a High Court proceeding where a learned Single Judge decided a petition filed under both Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. A Division Bench of the High Court held that a Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) would not lie against such a Single Judge judgment. The Supreme Court considered the maintainability of an LPA in this context and the correctness of the Division Bench’s view.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court was right in holding that a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 does not lie against the judgment of a learned Single Judge in a petition filed under both Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Radhikabai, 1986 Supp SCC 401, (1986) 1 SCR 731 Where facts justify invoking either Article 226 or 227 and a petition is filed under both, the court should (in fairness and justice) treat it as under Article 226 so as not to deprive the party of the valuable right of appeal under Clause 15, provided the substantial part of the order is under Article 226; ancillary directions pertaining to Article 227 should not defeat the appeal. The Supreme Court relied on this principle to conclude that, since the Single Judge’s relief indicated exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 (and not Article 227), an LPA under Clause 15 was maintainable.
Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque, (1955) 1 SCR 1104, AIR 1955 SC 233 Cited within the quotation in Umaji Keshao Meshram as an example of petitions filed under both Articles 226 and 227. Not independently analysed; referenced through Umaji to contextualize the category of mixed Article 226/227 petitions.
Aidal Singh v. Karan Singh, AIR 1957 All 414, 1957 All LJ 389 (FB) Cited within the quotation in Umaji Keshao Meshram for the view that such mixed petitions should be treated as under Article 226 to preserve the Clause 15 appellate remedy where the substantial order is under Article 226. Adopted indirectly via the Supreme Court’s agreement with the approach endorsed in Umaji.
Raj Kishan Jain, v. Tulsi Dass Etc., AIR 1959 Punj 291 Cited within the quotation in Umaji Keshao Meshram as supporting the same approach on maintainability of appeals in mixed Article 226/227 petitions. Relied upon only through Umaji (no separate reasoning provided in this order).
Barham Dutt v. Peoples' Co-operative Transport Society Ltd., New Delhi, AIR 1961 Punj 24, ILR (1961) 1 Punj 283 Cited within the quotation in Umaji Keshao Meshram as another authority supporting preservation of Clause 15 appeal where the substantial order is under Article 226. Relied upon only through Umaji (no separate reasoning provided in this order).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court identified the sole question as whether an LPA lies against a Single Judge’s decision where the underlying petition was filed under both Articles 226 and 227. It then referred to and relied upon the principle laid down in Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Radhikabai regarding the scope of Clause 15 LPAs in such “mixed” petitions. As per that principle, where the facts justify recourse to either Article 226 or 227 and the petition is filed under both, the court should treat the petition as under Article 226 so as not to deprive the party of a valuable right of appeal, so long as the substantial part of the order is under Article 226.

Applying this framework, the Court examined the relief granted by the learned Single Judge in the present case and found that it clearly indicated exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 rather than Article 227. Consequently, an LPA under Clause 15 was maintainable before the Division Bench. On that basis, the Court held that the Division Bench erred in rejecting maintainability.

Holding and Implications

ALLOWED; DIVISION BENCH JUDGMENT SET ASIDE; MATTER REMANDED.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court Division Bench judgment that held the LPA not maintainable, and remanded the matter to the High Court with an expectation that the Division Bench would hear the LPA on merits and dispose of it expeditiously, preferably within four months. No order as to costs was made. The direct effect is restoration of the LPA for merits consideration; the order applies the existing rule stated in Umaji Keshao Meshram and does not indicate that any new precedent was created in this opinion.

    Ratnagiri Distt. Central Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Watve

    Order

    1. Special leave granted. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

    2. The only question involved in this matter is as to whether the High Court was right in holding that a Letters Patent Appeal will not lie against the judgment delivered by a learned Single Judge in a petition which was filed under both the Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Having gone through the judgment of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench and having heard learned counsel for the parties, in our opinion, the question about the scope of Letters Patent Appeal under clause 15 has been clearly laid down by this Court in a judgment reported in Umaji Keshao Meshram v. Radhikabai 1986 Supp SCC 401, (1986) 1 SCR 731 wherein it was observed as follows at pages 837-38 :

    “Petitions are at times filed both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The case of Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque (1955) 1 SCR 1104, AIR 1955 SC 233 before this Court was of such a type. Rule 18 provides that where such petitions are filed against orders of the tribunals or authorities specified in Rule 18 of Chapter XVII of the Appellate Side Rules or against decrees or orders of courts specified in that rule, they shall be heard and finally disposed of by a Single Judge. The question is whether an appeal would lie from the decision of the Single Judge in such a case. In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226, and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Such was the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Aidal Singh v. Karan Singh AIR 1957 All 414, 1957 All LJ 389 (FB) and by the Punjab High Court in Raj Kishan Jain v. Tulsi Dass AIR 1959 Punj 291 and Barham Dutt v. Peoples' Co-operative Transport Society Ltd., New Delhi AIR 1961 Punj 24, ILR (1961) 1 Punj 283 and we are in agreement with it.”

    3. It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned Single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.

    4. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. No orders as to costs.

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    Comments

    Ratnagiri Distt. Central Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Watve
    (Jan 27, 1989)