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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • The Act
  • Section 36 of the Act
  • Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 4(1), Section 5-A, Section 6, Section 9(1), Section 11, Section 16, Section 17(1), Section 48(1) of the Act
  • Section 17(1) of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • The Act
  • Section 36 of the Act
  • Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 4(1), Section 5-A, Section 6, Section 9(1), Section 11, Section 16, Section 17(1), Section 48(1) of the Act
  • Section 17(1) of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Government, exercising power under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, issued a notification dated 10-3-1959 to acquire 3500 acres of land while dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A (urgency procedure). Subsequently, the Government issued a notification dated 2-8-1966 under Section 48(1) withdrawing from acquisition of 15.54 acres, followed by two further notifications dated 16-2-1968 withdrawing from the entire acquisition in respect of large and smaller blocks respectively.

The appellants challenged the 2-8-1966 withdrawal notification in Civil Writ Petition No. 435 of 1966. The High Court dismissed the writ petition, finding that there was no proof of the Government having taken possession from the appellants. The appellants carried the matter to the Supreme Court, which in M/s Jethmull Bhojraj v. State of Bihar upheld the High Court’s finding that possession had not been taken. Later, in C.J.W.P. Nos. 252-253/1986, the High Court again dismissed the petitions, recording a concession by petitioners’ counsel that no document on record showed that possession had been taken pursuant to an alleged order under Section 17(1).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Government could validly withdraw from acquisition under Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, on the footing that possession of the land had not been taken.
  2. Whether the prior adjudication that possession had not been taken operated as res judicata, preventing reopening of that question in later proceedings on the plea that certain records were not earlier produced.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appellants relied on certain documents, including a notice under Section 17(1) calling upon them to deliver possession within 15 days from receipt of the notification under Section 17(1), to support their position regarding possession.

Government/Respondent's Stand (as recorded)

  • The Government’s stand in the High Court was that under the procedure in vogue in Bihar, an order by the Minister directing the concerned officer to take possession was required; since no such Ministerial order existed, possession was not taken.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M/s Jethmull Bhojraj v. State of Bihar (1972) 1 SCC 714; AIR 1972 SC 1363 Affirmation of the finding that the respondent did not take possession of the appellants’ lands. Treated as a prior binding determination; supported the conclusion that possession had not been taken and reinforced that the issue could not be reopened in later proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first set out the statutory basis for withdrawal. Section 48(1) permits the Government to withdraw from acquisition of any land “of which possession has not been taken” (except the case in Section 36). The central inquiry, therefore, was whether possession had been taken.

The Court explained that the Act contemplates two modes of taking possession after a Section 4(1) notification. Under the first mode (Section 16), where urgency is not invoked and the acquisition proceeds through Section 6 and culminates in an award under Section 11, the Collector takes possession under Section 16, and the land “thereupon vest[s] absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances.” Under the second mode, where Section 5-A inquiry is dispensed with by invoking Section 17(1), after service of notice under Section 9(1) requiring the owner to deliver possession on expiry of 15 days, the Collector takes possession pursuant to that process, and the land vests absolutely in the Government, divesting the owner’s title.

On the consequences of possession, the Court held that once possession is taken and vesting occurs, the Government has no power under Section 48(1) to withdraw from the acquisition. Conversely, if possession has not been taken, Section 48(1) allows withdrawal.

Applying these principles, the Court relied on the High Court’s recorded finding that there was no evidence showing possession had been taken and the resulting conclusion that the Government did not take possession. The Court also noted the earlier proceedings where petitioners’ counsel conceded there was no document on record demonstrating possession was taken. Given this, the Court held that the Government was at liberty to withdraw from acquisition under Section 48(1).

Additionally, the Court held that the prior decision on possession operated as res judicata, and the issue could not be reopened in later proceedings on the ground that some records were not produced earlier before the High Court.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED: The appeals were dismissed, with no order as to costs.

As a direct consequence, the Government’s withdrawal from acquisition under Section 48(1) was upheld on the basis that possession had not been taken. The Court also treated the earlier adjudication on the possession issue as binding between the parties by operation of res judicata, preventing that factual/legal determination from being reopened in later proceedings. The opinion does not indicate that any new broader precedent was laid down beyond applying the statutory scheme and the binding effect of the prior decision to the parties’ dispute.

    Jethmull Bhojraj v. State Of Bihar .

    Order

    1. The Government in exercising their power under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, published a notification on 10-3-1959 acquiring 3500 acres of land dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A. Thereafter the Government has issued a notification on 2-8-1966 under Section 48(1) of the Land Acquisition Act withdrawing from acquisition of an extent of 15.54 acres and other two notifications on 16-2-1968 withdrawing from the entire acquisition in respect of large and the smaller blocks respectively. The appellants challenged the first notification dated 2-8-1966 in Civil Writ Petition No. 435 of 1966. Therein the High Court found that there is no proof of taking possession from the appellants. Consequently the writ petition was dismissed. The appellants challenged in this Court the above decision and in M/s Jethmull Bhojraj v. State of Bihar (1972) 1 SCC 714, AIR 1972 SC 1363, this Court upheld the finding of the High Court that the respondent did not take possession of the lands from the appellants. Subsequently the two C.J.W.Ps Nos. 252-253/1986 were also dismissed by the High Court holding thus:

    “Learned counsel for the petitioners conceded that there is no document on the record showing that possession had been taken over by the State Government in pursuance of the alleged order under Section 17(1) of the Act.”

    2. The learned counsel for the appellants sought to rely on certain documents namely the selfsame notice issued under Section 17(1) calling upon the appellants to deliver possession of the land within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notification under Section 17(1). The stand taken in the High Court by the Government was that the procedure in vogue in Bihar State was that there should be an order passed by the Minister directing the officer concerned to take possession of the property but there was no such order passed by the Minister. Consequently possession was not taken. That stand was accepted by the High Court and in view of the concession made by the appellants that there is no recorded evidence that possession was taken from them, the High Court held that the Government is at liberty to withdraw from acquisition, by a notification issued under Section 48(1) of the Act.

    3. Section 48(1) postulates thus:

    “48. Completion of acquisition not compulsory, but compensation to be awarded when not completed.— (1) Except in the case provided for in Section 36 the Government shall be at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken.”

    4. The Act provides two modes of taking over possession of the acquired land pursuant to the notification under Section 4(1). The first is covered by Section 16 of the Act, namely, where the urgency clause under Section 17(1) was not invoked and proceedings were taken under Section 4 read with Section 6 and an award was made under Section 11. The Collector would, then, take possession of the land under Section 16 which shall “thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances”. The second mode of taking over possession is that where the inquiry under Section 5-A was dispensed with exercising the power under Section 17(1), after service of the notice under Section 9(1) calling upon the owner to deliver possession on expiry of fifteen days and the Collector to take possession in pursuance thereof. The land thereon stands vested in the Government absolutely free from all encumbrances. The title of the owner stands divested. Thereafter the Government have no power under Section 48(1) to withdraw from the acquisition. The finding recorded by the High Court is that there is no evidence to show that the possession was taken from the appellants and the conclusion is that the possession was not taken by the Government. Hence, the Government was at liberty to withdraw, from acquisition by exercising power under Section 48(1) of the Act. Moreover the previous decision operates as res judicata and in the later proceedings such decision cannot be reopened on the ground that certain record was not placed before the High Court on the earlier occasion. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. No costs.

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    Comments

    Jethmull Bhojraj v. State Of Bihar .
    (Jan 11, 1994)