"ORDER XL
APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVERS
.
1. Appointment of receivers. - (1) Where it appears to the Court to be just and convenient, the Court may by P
order - .
(a) appoint a receiver of an H yproperty, whether before or after decree;
f
(b) remove any pers o on from the possession r or cu stody of theproperty;
t(c) co u mmit the same to thepossession, custody or managemento o f the receiver, and C (d) confer upon the receiver all such powers, as to bringing anddefending suits and for the h
realization, management,protection, preservation and g
improvement of the property, the i
collection of the rents and profitsthereof, the application anddisposal of such rents and profits, H
and the execution of documents as the owner himself has, or such of those powers as the Court thinks fit. (2) Nothing in this rule shall authorizethe Court to remove from the possession or custody of property any person whom
any party to the suit has not a present
right so to remove."
6
12. The mandate of Order 40 CPC is that the Court may appoint a Receiver of suit property, whether before or
.
after the decree, if it appears to the Court to be just . an P dconvenient.
13. The crux of the matter is - wheth f er it iHs 'just andconvenient' to appoint the Receiver?
14. 'Just and convenient', t to uso, mean that order(s) is/are not to be made arbitraril r y, whimsically or illegally. It cannot be made on a o ny gr u ound which has effect of defeatingthe equity. Th C e mandate is what is right and just accordingto the judicia l notion.
15.
h It has to be kept in mind that appointment of a
iReg ceiver deprives a person from enjoyment of suit property H
during the tenure of receivership, that is why it is known to be a harshest remedy. 16. In terms of the English law and the law developed in the Indian Courts, the applicant, who seeks
appointment of Receiver, has to carve out a strong prima
facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss.
7
17. Before we discuss all these issues, law and judgments occupying the field, it is necessary to understand
.
what are the pleadings of the parties.
P
18. Appellant/plaintiff/applicant invoked t H he orig.inaljurisdiction of this Court by the medium of C f ivi l Suit No. 72of 2008 for decree of possession, ma nd o atory injunction andmoney decree for an amount of t ₹ 2,16,00,000/- with 12% interest in respect of the imm r ovable property situated in
Mauza Nanganji, P o arga u na Kiutan, Tehsil and DistrictSolan, H.P. (fo C r short "the suit property"), the description ofwhich has be en given in the plaint.
19.
h It has been admitted in para 3 of the plaint that
ithge appellant/plaintiff/applicant invited several Trusts, H
Societies and Institutions, which were dealing and engaged in providing education and establishing educational institutions at school level - grass root level, for upgrading the junior level school, the details of which have been given
in para 2 of the plaint, and one of the Trusts, known as
Delhi Chinmaya Seva Trust, New Delhi (for short "the
8
Trust") came forward and offered to provide such services to the appellant/ plaintiff/applicant. It granted 99 years' lease
.
to the said Trust and the arrangement/memorandum P of understanding was reduced into writing on 4thMa H rch, 1.992,and possession of the suit property was hande d over to the said Trust, as has been mentioned in parasf 4 and 5 of the
plaint.
t o
20. It has been averred r that the lease deed was not registered and the o poss u ession to the Trust as well asdefendants/res C pondents/non-applicants No. 1 to 3 wasillegal, as pl eaded in paras 6 to 8 of the plaint.
21.
h The defendants/respondents/non-applicants No.
i1g to 4 have filed the written statement and have specifically H
admitted that the Trust is in possession and they have made the school functional, running the same and have not caused any damage to the property or the building. Further averred that the defendants/respondents/non-applicants are
manning the same, but, it is the property of the Trust.
9
22. It is admission on the part of the appellant/ plaintiff/applicant that the possession of the Trust was
.
permissive, not illegal one and it was at the request, rathe P r, on the persuasion and initiation of the appellant/plain.tiff/ applicant that the Trust came forward and ent ereHd into the possession of the suit property and madef the Chinmaya Educational Society, Nauni, Tehsi t l a ndo District Solan, H.P., functional. The said Soc u iety r was registered on 22 nd July,
1992.
23. In C OMP o No. 403 of 2008, the foundation of theapplication
is that the defendants/respondents/non- applica h nts are in illegal possession of the suit property in
ibrg each of the mandate of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms H
Act, 1972 (for short "the Act") and the suit property is in danger of being wasted. The purpose of the school was to do and provide social service rather than to be a source of income to the defendants/respondents/non-applicants and
the Receiver is required to be appointed for effective
management, preservation, improvement and control of the
10
suit property. Further that the defendants/respondents/non- applicants are bent upon to alienate the suit property, which
.
will cause irreparable loss to the appellant/plainti P ff/ applicant and the appointment of the Receiver H is jus.t forpreservation of the entire property.
24. The defendants/respondents/nonf-applicants No. 1 to 4 resisted the same by th t e meodium of objections. Virtually, the grounds u taken r in the objections to theapplication are the same grounds, which have been taken by them in the rep C ly.
o25. T here is no prima facie proof on the file to the effect t h hat the defendants/respondents/non-applicants have
idag maged the suit property or they have done or are doing H
such an activity, which has effect of depriving of the appellant/plaintiff/applicant from its legal right, rather, it has been pleaded that these proceedings are aimed at to dispossess the defendants/respondents/non-applicants and
defeat their vested interests and rights.
11
26. Admittedly, the appellant/plaintiff/applicant has handed over the possession of the suit property to the Trust
.
in the year 1992. It has not raised any finger about t P he possession, raising of construction, constitution of Socie.ty in order to establish the school and running of t heH school till the year 2008. It is not an illegal possefssion, but, the possession with consent, rather, pe t rm isosive possession.
27. Can a Receiv u er be r appointed to dislodge thedefendants/responde o nts/non-applicants and take over thepossession, tha C t too, from an institutional society, which isrunning a sc hool imparting education to so many students?
The an h swer is in the negative for the following reasons:
i28g.The Madras High Court in the case titled as T.H
Krishnaswamy Chetty versus C. Thangavelu Chetty and others, reported in AIR 1955 Madras 430, has laiddown five tests and requirements, known as 'panch sadachar', for appointment of Receiver, while interpreting
what is 'just and convenient'. It is apt to reproduce paras 13
and 14 of the judgment herein:
12
"13. The five principles which can he described as the "panch sadachar' of our Courts exercising equity jurisdiction in appointing receivers are as follows :
.
(1) The appointment of a receiver pending a suit is a matter resting in the discretion of P
the Court. The discretion is not arbitrary or .
absolute: it is a sound and judicial discretion, taking into account al H l the circumstances of the case, exercise d-for the purpose of permitting th o e end f s of justice,and protecting the r ights of all partiesinterested in the t controversy and thesubject-matter and based upon the fact thatthere is no othe r r adequate remedy or meansof accomplishing the desired objects of thejudicial proceeding : - 'Mathusri v. Mathusri u , 19 Mad 120 (PC) (Z5); -'Si o vagnanathammal v. ArunachallamPillai', 21 Mad LJ 821 (Z6); - 'Habibullah C v. Abtiakallah', AIR 1918 Cal 882 (27); - 'Tirath Singh v. Shromani GurudwaraPrabandhak Committee', AIR 1931 Lah h
688 (28); - 'Ghanasham v. Moraba', 18Bom 474 (7.9); - 'Jagat Tarini Dasi v.Nabagopal Chaki', 34 Cal 305 (Z10); -
ig
'Sivaji Raja Sahib v. Aiswariyanandaji',AIR 1915 Mad 926 (Z11); - 'Prasanno MoyiDevi v. Beni Madbab Rai', 5 All 556 (Z12); H
- 'Sidheswari Dabi v. Abhayeswari Dahi', 15 Cal 818 (213); - 'Shromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar v. Dharam Das', AIR 1925 Lah 349 (Z14); -'Bhupendra Nath v. Manohar Mukerjee',AIR 1024 Cal 456 (Z15).
(2) The Court should not appoint a receiver except upon proof by the plaintiff that prima facie he has very excellent chance of succeeding in the suit. - 'Dhumi v. Nawab Sajjad All Khan', AIR 192.3 Uh 623 (Z16); - 'Firm of Raghubir Singh' Jaswant v.
13
Narinjan Singh', AIR 1923 Lah 48 (217); - 'Siaram Mohunt Siaram Das v. Mohunt Mohabir Das', 27 Cal 279 (Z18); - 'Mahammad Kasim v. Nagaraja Moopanar', AIR 1928-Mad 813 (Z19); -
.
'Banwarilal Chowdhury v. Motilal', AIR 1922 Pat 493 (220).
P
(3) Not only must the plaintiff show a case .
of adverse and conflicting claims to property, but, he must show H some emergency or danger or loss dem anding immediate action and of o his ow f n right, hemust be reasonably clear and free fromdoubt. The elem t ent of danger is animportant consideration. A Court will notact on possibl r e danger only; the dangermust be great and imminent demandingimmedia u te relief. It has been truly said thata Court will never appoint a receiverme o rely on the ground that it will do noharm. - "Manghanmal Tarachand v. C .Mikanbai', AIR 1933 Sind 231 (221); - 'Bidurramji v. Keshoramji', AIR 1939Oudh 31 (Z22); - 'Sheoambar Ban v. h
Mohan Ban', AIR 1941 Oudh 328 (223).(4) An order appointing a receiver will not
ig be. made where it has the effect ofdepriving a defendant of a 'de facto'possession since that might cause H
irreparable wrong. If the dispute is as to title only, the Court very reluctantly disturbs possession by receiver, but if the property is exposed to danger and loss andthe person in possession has obtained itthrough, fraud or force the Court will interpose by receiver for the security of the
property. It would be different where the
property is shown to be 'in medio', that is to
say, in the enjoyment of no one, as the
Court can hardly do wrong in taking
possession: it will then be the common
interest of all the parties that the Court
14
should prevent a scramble as no one seems to be in actual lawful enjoyment of the property and no harm can be done to anyone by taking it and preserving it for
.
the benefit of the legitimate who may prove successful. Therefore, even if there is no allegation of waste and mismanagement P
the fact that the property is more or less 'in .
medio' is sufficient to vest a Court with jurisdiction to appoint a receiv H er. - 'Nilambar Nilambar Das v. Mabal Behari Das', A IR 1927 Pat 220 (Z24); - 'Alkama Bibi v f . Syed Istak Hussain', AIR 1925 Cal 970 (Z25~.); - 'Mathuria Debya v. S hib o dayal Singh', 14Cal WN 252 (Z26); - 'Bhubaneswar Prasad
v. Rajeshwar P r ras t ad', AIR 1948 Pat 195(Z27). Otherwise a receiver should not beappointed u in supersession of a bone fidepossessor of property in controversy andbon o a fides have to be presumed until thecontrary is established or can be C indubitably inferred. (5) The Court, on the application of a h
receiver, looks to the conduct of the partywho makes the application and willusually refuse to interfere unless his
ig
conduct has been free from blame. He mustcome to Court with clean hands and shouldnot have disentitled himself to the equitable H
relief by laches, delay, acquiescence etc. 14. To sum up as stated in - 'Crawford V. Ross', 39 Ga 44 (Z28),"The high prerogative act of taking property out of the hands of one and
putting it in pound under the order
of the Judge ought not to be taken
except to prevent manifest wrong
imminently impending."
15
In 'Dozier v. Logan', 101 ga 173 (Z29) Atkinson J. said
"The appointment of a receiver is
.
recognised as one of the harshest remedies which the law provides for the enforcement of rights and is P
allowable only in extreme cases and .
in circumstances where the interest of the creditors is exposed to manife H st peril,"
f
Therefore, this exceed in o gly delicate andresponsible duty will be discharged withthe utmost caution and only when the 'panch sadach r ar' t or five requirementsembodied in the words just andconvenien u t (Order 40, Rule 1) are fulfilledby the facts of the case undercon o sideration -- ('Ramachandrayya v.Nethi Iswarayya', AIR 1952 Hyd 139(Z30))."
29. T he C same principles have been laid down by the Madras h High Court in the case titled as Muniammal ivegrsus P.M. Ranganatha Nayagar and another, H
reported in AIR 1955 Madras 571. It is profitable to reproduce para 19 of the judgment herein:"19. The principles which should guide Indian Courts in the appointment of a
Receiver are three in number. First of
all, a plaintiff applying for the
appointment of a Receiver must show
'prima facie' that he has a strong case
and good tide to the property or a
special equity in his favour and that the
16
property in the hands of the defendant is in danger of being wasted; --'Muhammad Qasim Ravather v. Nagaraja Moopanar', AIR 1928 Mad
.
813 at p. 814 (Z13). It is not enough for the plaintiff to show that he has a fair question to raise as to the extent of the P
right alleged as in the case of a .
temporary injunction, but he must H gofurther and make out that he has a good 'prima facie' title r f equ iringCourt's protection and safeguarding pending litigation and which must be
made out on the fa t cts of t o hat particularcase. 'Guruswami Pandiyan v. S. K. P.Chinnathambir r ar', AIR 1919 Mad 157at p. 158 (Z14). Secondly, where the property is in
me o dia th u at is to say, in the possessionof no one, a Receiver can readily be C appointed. But where any one is in possession under a legal claim strong &compelling reasons are necessary for h
interfering with such possession : --'Sivaji Raja Sahib v. AiswariyanaudajiSahib', AIR 1915 Mad 926 at p. 929
ig
(Z15); AIR 1924 Mad 482 at p. 483(Z12). Thus the 'bona fide' purchaser ofthe property -- 'bona fides have to beH
presumed unless and until the contrary can be inferred -- in dispute should not be disturbed by the appointment of a Receiver unless there is somesubstantial and compelling ground forsuch interference. Where there is no apprehension of
waste or danger a Receiver will not be
appointed merely on the ground that
the applicant apprehends difficulty in
obtaining possession 'of properly in the
event of success or in realising mesne
17
profits or the opposite party is poor or a woman. Specific acts capable of being tested should be alleged 21 Mad IJ 821 (Z11); AIR 1915 Mad 926 (Z15).
.
Voilently stated vague allegations constitute no substitute for vacuum of facts.
.P
Thirdly, an application for the appointment of a Receiver shou H ld always be made promptly and f del ay inmaking it is a circumstance unfavourable to such an appointment.
But of course the t m att o er should heconsidered judicially in all its aspectsbefore being dis r posed of as there may belegitimate reasons for preferring anapplication after delay: -- Pattiuha u rakettu v. Mauavedan', AIR1936 Mad 966 (Z1G). If all these
con o ditions are satisfied, and it is found C just and convenient to appoint a Receiver, the Court can exercise itsdiscretion in favour of the applicant." 30.
h Applying the tests to the instant case, the
ideg fendants/respondents/non-applicants are not in illegal H
possession and their possession is admitted. There is also nothing on record to show that the defendants/respondents/ non-applicants have acted in such a way in order to cause damage or loss to the suit property or have/are tried/trying
to alienate the suit property or are acting in such a way that
there is a great and eminent danger to the suit property.
18
31. Appointment of Receiver is one of the harshest remedies in the eyes of law. It is obligatory, rather, duty of
.
the appellant/plaintiff/applicant to carve out all the thr P ee ingredients which are sine quo non for grant of re H lief, i..e. (i)strong prima facie case, (ii) irreparable loss a f nd (iii) balanceof convenience.
32. The appellant/plain r tiff t /ap pl
oicant has not been able to show a prima facie u case, not to speak of carving out astrong prima facie ca o se.33. The C appellant/plaintiff/applicant has to showthat irrepar able loss will be caused to it if the Receiver is not app h ointed. Applying the test, it can be, prima facie,
isag id/held that in case Receiverisappointed, itwill cause H
irreparable loss to the defendants/respondents/non- applicants because they are in possession coupled with thefact that they have established the Society, are running the school and for sixteen years, the appellant/plaintiff/
applicant has not raised any finger.
19
34. In view of the pleadings of the parties read with
.
the other attending factors, balance of convenience al P so leans in favour of the defendants/respondents/ . non- applicants and not in favour of the app f ell an H t/plaintiff/applicant.
35. The Gwalior Bench of t the M o adhya Bharat Courtin the case titled as Madh r u Lal versus Ramji Das Chironji Lal and other u s, reported in AIR 1953 Madhya
Bharat 85, has also o laid down the same principle.
36. V ar C ious High Courts have almost laid down the same t h ests and in addition to the said tests, have also held
ithgat a person in possession should not be dispossessed H
unless it is shown that the property is in medio or it is necessary to preserve the property. Further, it has been held that even if Receiver is to be appointed, a person, who is in possession, should be appointed as Receiver, not a third
party.
20
37. It would be profitable to reproduce para 5 of the judgment rendered by the Orissa High Court in the case
.
titled as Rasi Dei versus Bikal Maharana and other P s,
reported in AIR 1965 Orissa 20, herein: .
"5. The appointment of rec f eive r Hisrecognised as one of the harshestremedies which the law p o rovides for theenforcement of rights and is allowableonly in extreme cases and incircumstances where the interest of the person seeking the t appointment of a
receiver u is exp r osed to manifest peril.Therefore, this exceedingly delicate andres o ponsible duty has to be dischargedby the Court with the utmost caution.The principles to be followed for C appointment of receiver as laid down are these; Not only must the plaintiffshow a case of adverse and conflicting h
claim to property, but he must showsome emergency or danger or loss g
demanding immediate action and of i
his own right he must be reasonablyclear and free from doubt. The element H
of danger is an important consideration. An order appointing a receiver will not be made where it has the effect of depriving a defendant of ade facto possession since that mightcause irreparable wrong. The highprerogative act of taking property out of the hands of one and putting it in
pound under the order of the Judge
ought not to be taken except to prevent
manifest wrong imminently impending.
Hence the Court should not appoint a
receiver of property in the possession of
21
the defendant who claim it by legal title, unless the plaintiff can show prima facie that he has a strong case and good title to the property. The
.
Court must consider whether special interference with the possession of defendant is required, there being well P
founded fear that the property H in .question will be disputed or otherirreparable mischief may be done unless the court gives protecti f on. Themere circumstance that the
appointment of a receiver will do no
harm to anyone t is no o ground forappointing a receiver." 38. The Mysore High r Court in the case titled as
Srinivasa Rao vers o us B u aburao and another, reported in AIR 1970 Mysore 141, while placing reliance upon the 'panch sada ch C ar' enunciated in T. Krishnaswamy's case
(supra h ), held that an order appointing a Receiver shall not
ibeg made if it has the effect of depriving a defendant ofH
de facto possession. It is apt to reproduce para 23 of the judgment herein: "23. The next contention urged on behalf of the petitioner was that the
appellate Court exceeded its
jurisdiction in interfering with the
order of the trial Court for the
appointment of a receiver. Reliance in
this behalf is placed on a decision in
Bipan Lal v. I. T. Commr. The
22
argument is that the appointment of a receiver is a matter, which falls within the discretionary powers of a Court and as such is not ordinarily reviewable on
.
appeal except to correct a clear and manifest abuse of justice. Sri K. Jagannatha Shetty, the learned counsel P
appearing on behalf of the respondents, .
did not dispute this proposition. But, what he submitted was that a tri H al Court in the exercise of its discretio nary power relating to the app o ointm f ent of areceiver, had clearly overlooked theseveral relevant c t ircumstances or atany rate, assumed certain facts infavour of such an appointment ofreceiver. His contention was that the two elem u ents tro be considered in allcases where an appointment of arec o eiver was sought were that theexistence of reasonable probability that C the plaintiff asking for the appointment of a receiver would ultimately succeedin obtaining the general relief sought h
for in his suit and that the property incontroversy would be wasted ordestroyed unless a receiver was
ig
appointed. He also submitted that it would not be H
enough to make mere general averments relating to the acts of waste or damage to the property. It must be established by affidavits setting out thegrounds upon which such petition wasbased. In addition to the abovecircumstances, the conduct of the parties would also become relevant. In
support of this proposition, which, was
not disputed by Sri Muralidhar Rao,
reliance has been placed on the
decisions in Iswara Shastry v.
Ramakrishna Shastry, 1965-1 Mys LJ
23
342, Bore Gowda v. K. Channegowda, 1965-2 Mys LJ 548, Saraswathi Bai v. Kamala Bai, 1964-1 Mys LJ 551 and Krishnaswamy v. Thangavelu, AIR
.
1935 Mad 430. In the last of the above decisions, after a detailed examination of the several cases bearing on the P
subject, Ramaswamy, J. has .
enunciated five principles, which have been described by him as the 'pan H ch sadaachar', which should be born e in mind by the Courts while ex f ercising equity jurisdiction in appointing receivers. The principles o are; that the question of appointing a receiver is a matter resting r in t t he discretion of theCourt; that a receiver should not beappointed u unless the party has anexcellent chance of succeeding in thesui o t; that plaintiff himself shall showthat there was some emergency or C danger or loss that may be caused to the right involved in the suit; that anorder appointing a receiver shall not be h
made if it has the effect of depriving adefendant of do facto possession; that,however, the position would be different
ig
if the property is shown to be 'in medio'that is tosay, in theenjoyment ofnoone, and that the Court should always H
look into the conduct of the parties who seek for the appointment of a receiver." 39. The Goa, Daman and Diu JudicialCommissioner's Court in the case titled as Rogunatrao M. Dessai and another versus M/s. Mineira Nacional Ltd.
And others, reported in AIR 1974 Goa, Daman and Diu
24
41, held that the Receiver cannot be appointed when the effect of the appointment is to deprive a person from his
.
possession.
P
40. The Jammu and Kashmir High Court H in the .casetitled as Vijay Kumar and another f v ersus B.K.Thapper and another, reported in A I o R 1976 Jammu andKashmir 30, held that the co r urt t has a wide discretion inthe matter of appointment of Receiver but the discretion must be sound and o reas u onable and the Court should notappoint a rece C iver save in exceptional circumstances, suchas, when t he property is in danger of being wasted,
destroy h ed or lost. It is apt to reproduce paras 5 and 6 of the
ijug dgment herein: H
"5. Order 40 Rule 1 of the Civil P.C. empowers a court to appoint receiver of any property where it appears to the court to be just and convenient thatsuch appointment should be made. Theexercise of this power is however limited by the proviso that the appointment of
receiver will not authorise the court -
"To remove from the possession or the custody of property any person whom any party to the suit has not a present right so to remove."
25
The proviso clearly refers to a case where a person in possession is a third person and the parties to the suit have
.
no present right to disturb his possession. This was the view taken by Ramesam and Cornish, JJ. In Pp>
Vythulinga Pandarasannadhi v. Board .
of Control, Thiagarajasw amiDevasthanam, (AIR 1932 Mad f 193). H Ifully agree with this view. I make theseobservations because it w o as argued byMr. Inder Dass that t he provision wasan impediment in the way of theappointment of a re t ceiver in the presentcase having re r gard to the fact, as hesaid, that the plaintiffs had yet toestablish u thei right to eject thedefendants and that way they had nopre o sent right to disturb theirpossession.
C6. In the ordinary sense, the words'Just and convenient', would denote h what is practicable and what theinterests of justice require. Now what ispracticable and in the interests of
ig
justice in one case may not be so in theother case. Different considerationsarise in different cases depending onH
the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court has, therefore, a wide discretion in the matter of appointment of Receiver but the discretion must besought and reasonable. The court maybe influenced mainly by the particular facts of each case, it must also be
guided by road and well established
principles which have covered the
previous practice and which, though
unexpressed, may be said to be lying
dormant in the provisions of the Code."
26
41. The same principle has been laid down in the cases titled as Prem Prakash Kapoor versus Gobind
.
Ram Kapoor and others, reported in AIR 1976 Jam . m P u and Kashmir 37; Chandrashekhar Sid H ramappa Chinchansure versus Bhaurao f S idramappa Chinchansure and others, rep or o ted in AIR 1983Bombay 475.
t
42. The Delhi H u igh rCourt in the case titled as Rajeshwar Nath G o upta versus Administrator General and others, r C eported in AIR 1989 Delhi 179, following the
'panch sada char' described in T. Krishnaswamy's case
(s g uprah), held that Court should not appoint a Receiver to i take possession of immovable property from the defendants
H
unless and until the Court is of the opinion that there is a well founded reason to believe that the property in question will be dissipated or that other irreparable mischief may be
committed and calls for the interference and protection of
the Court.
27
43. In the cases titled as Ravi Kumar versus Misha Vadhera and others, reported in AIR 1995 Delhi
.
175, and Sanatan Barik and another versus Pu . rn P a Chandra Barik, reported in AIR 2003 Orissa 1 H 27, it has been held that the application for appointm f en t of Receiver should not be disposed of summarily, bu o t is to be consideredcautiously and judicially.
t
44. The Apex Court in r the case titled as Industrial Credit & Investme o nt Cuorporation of India Ltd. Andothers versu C s Karnataka Ball Bearings Corpn. Ltd.and others , reported in (1999) 7 Supreme Court Cases 48 g 8, he h ld that the law Courts are entrusted with the power i under Order 40 Rule 1 CPC to protect the rights of the
H
parties, preserve the subject matter of a lis and to do complete justice between the parties. Further held that theCourt may appoint a Receiver not as a matter of course but as a matter of prudence and just according to judicial notion.
It is profitable to reproduce para 6 of the judgment herein:
28
"6. Order 40, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly provides for the appointment of a Receiver over a property whether before or after the
.
decree and the Court may by an order confer on the Receiver all powers of realisation, management, protection, P
preservation and improvement of the .
property. Order 40, Rule 1(d) specifically provides for realisa f tion an H dthe words "or such of those powe rs asthe Court thinks fit" o appearing inOrder 40, Rule 1(d) ought to beinterpreted in a m t ann er so as to givefull effect to the legislative intent in thematter of conferment of powers by theCourt to preserve and maintain the property u througrh the appointment of aReceiver. Needless to record here thatthe o re is existing a power which istotally unfettered in terms of the C provisions of the statute. Law courts, however, in the matter of appointmentof a Receiver through a long catena of h
cases, imposed a self-imposedrestriction on the use of discretion in amanner which is in consonance with
ig theconcept of justice and to meet theneed of the situation "unfettered" doesnot and cannot mean unbridled orH
unrestricted powers and though exercise of discretion is of widest possible amplitude, but the same has to exercised in a manner with care,caution and restraint so as to subservethe ends of justice. The law courts are entrusted with this power under Order
40, Rule 1 so as to bring about a feeling
of securedness and to do complete
justice between the parties."
29
45. The Apex Court in the cases titled as Kalpana Kothari (Smt) versus Sudha Yadav (Smt) and others
.
with Parasnath Builders Pvt. Ltd. Versus Su . dh P a Yadav (Smt) and others, reported in (2002) 1 H Supreme Court Cases 203; and Firm Ashok f Tr aders and another versus Gurumukh Das S o aluja and others,
reported in (2004) 3 Supreme r Co t ur t Cases 155, held thatthe basic principle govern u ing the discretion of the Court inappointing a Receiver is whether it is 'just and convenient' to do so an d C the in
30
the suit property is in danger of being wasted. The appellant/plaintiff/applicant has failed to satisfy the tests
.
laid down by the Madras High Court in . P T.Krishnaswamy's case (supra).
47. Having said so, the learned Sin f gl e HJudge has rightly made the discussions, need no in o terference.48. Viewed thus, the imp t ugned order merits to be upheld and the appeal is t u o be d r ismissed.49. Having g o lance of the above discussions, theimpugned ord C er is upheld and the appeal is dismissedalongwith th e pending applications, if any. h
(Mansoor Ahmad Mir) ig
Chief Justice
H
(Sureshwar Thakur) Judge March 31, 2016 ( rajni )