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  • 40, Rule 1(d)
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  • Order 40, Rule 1
  • H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms H Act, 1972 (for short "the Act")
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • 40, Rule 1(d)
  • Order 40 Rule 1 CPC
  • Order 40, Rule 1
  • H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms H Act, 1972 (for short "the Act")
  • "5. Order 40 Rule 1 of the Civil P.C.
  • Order 40, Rule 1(d)
  • 28 "6. Order 40, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • 40, Rule 1)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This Letters Patent Appeal challenges the order dated 23rd July 2010 passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Suit No. 72 of 2008, titled Dr. Yashwant Singh Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Nauni versus Narender Dhand and others. The impugned order dismissed the application (OMP No. 403 of 2008) seeking the appointment of a Receiver over the suit property under Order 40 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).

The appellant/plaintiff had filed the suit for possession, mandatory injunction, and a money decree concerning immovable property situated in Mauza Nanganji, Kiutan, Tehsil and District Solan, Himachal Pradesh. The appellant alleged illegal possession by respondents and sought appointment of a Receiver to manage and preserve the property during litigation. The respondents admitted possession through a Trust and running a school on the property since 1992 with the appellant's consent.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the impugned order dismissing the application for appointment of a Receiver under Order 40 Rule 1 CPC is legal and justified.
  2. Whether the appellant/plaintiff has established the necessary conditions—strong prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss—to justify the appointment of a Receiver.
  3. Whether appointment of a Receiver is appropriate when the defendants/respondents are in lawful possession and running an educational institution on the suit property.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The defendants/respondents are in illegal possession of the suit property in breach of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972.
  • The suit property is in danger of being wasted or alienated by the defendants/respondents.
  • Appointment of a Receiver is necessary for effective management, preservation, improvement, and control of the suit property to prevent irreparable loss.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The Trust is in lawful possession and has been running the school on the property since 1992 with the appellant's consent and without causing any damage.
  • The possession is permissive, not illegal, and has continued uninterrupted for years.
  • The application for appointment of Receiver is aimed at dispossessing the respondents and defeating their vested rights.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
T. Krishnaswamy Chetty v. C. Thangavelu Chetty, AIR 1955 Mad 430 Laid down the "panch sadachar" or five tests for appointment of Receiver, emphasizing discretion must be exercised judicially and not arbitrarily. The Court applied these principles to assess whether the appellant had made out a strong prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss to justify Receiver's appointment.
Muniammal v. P.M. Ranganatha Nayagar and another, AIR 1955 Madras 571 Outlined three guiding principles for appointment of Receiver: strong prima facie case, danger of property being wasted, and good title or special equity in favor of plaintiff. The Court relied on these principles to evaluate the appellant's failure to show danger of wastage or strong title.
Rasi Dei v. Bikal Maharana and others, AIR 1965 Orissa 20 Stressed Receiver appointment as a harsh remedy, permissible only in extreme cases with manifest peril to applicant's interest. The Court noted the absence of imminent danger or waste to the property, thus not justifying Receiver's appointment.
Srinivasa Rao v. Buaburao and another, AIR 1970 Mysore 141 Held that Receiver should not be appointed if it would deprive a defendant of de facto possession unless compelling reasons exist. The Court emphasized that the respondents' possession was bona fide and legal, making Receiver appointment inappropriate.
Vijay Kumar and another v. B.K. Thapper and another, AIR 1976 Jammu and Kashmir 30 Recognized wide but sound discretion in appointment of Receiver; limited to exceptional cases where property is in danger of being wasted or lost. The Court found no exceptional circumstances warranting Receiver appointment in this case.
Industrial Credit & Investment Corporation of India Ltd. v. Karnataka Ball Bearings Corpn. Ltd., (1999) 7 SCC 488 Confirmed Court’s power under Order 40 Rule 1 CPC to appoint Receiver to protect rights and preserve suit property, but only as a matter of prudence and judicial discretion. The Court reiterated that Receiver appointment is not routine but contingent on just and convenient grounds, which were absent here.
Kalpana Kothari (Smt) v. Sudha Yadav (Smt) and others, (2002) 1 SCC 203 Held that discretion to appoint Receiver must balance interests of both parties and be exercised only when just and convenient. The Court applied this principle to conclude that the appellant failed to demonstrate justification for Receiver.
Firm Ashok Traders and another v. Gurumukh Das Soaluja and others, (2004) 3 SCC 155 Reaffirmed that Receiver appointment is a harsh remedy requiring fulfillment of stringent conditions. The Court found these conditions unmet in the present case.
Rajeshwar Nath Gaupta v. Administrator General and others, AIR 1989 Delhi 179 Followed 'panch sadachar' test and held Receiver should be appointed only if property is likely to be dissipated or irreparable mischief committed. The Court held that no such well-founded apprehension existed here.
Rogunatrao M. Dessai and another v. M/s. Mineira Nacional Ltd. and others, AIR 1974 Goa, Daman and Diu 41 Held Receiver cannot be appointed if it would deprive a person of possession. The Court noted respondents’ possession was not to be disturbed absent compelling reasons.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining the purpose of Order 40 CPC and Section 94 CPC, which empower the Court to appoint a Receiver to protect, preserve, and manage suit property during litigation, but only when it is just and convenient and to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated.

The Court emphasized that appointment of a Receiver is a harsh remedy that deprives a person of possession and thus requires strict conditions to be met: a strong prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss. The Court applied the 'panch sadachar' principles from established case law, which require that the plaintiff demonstrate a strong likelihood of success, danger or loss to the property, and that the remedy is just and convenient.

In this case, the respondents’ possession was admitted and was shown to be permissive and lawful, with the Trust running a school on the property since 1992 without objection from the appellant. There was no evidence of damage, alienation, or imminent danger to the property. The appellant failed to establish a strong prima facie case or irreparable loss, and the balance of convenience favored the respondents who had maintained possession and developed the property.

The Court held that appointment of a Receiver to dislodge the respondents, who are bona fide possessors and running an educational institution, would cause irreparable harm to them. The Court further noted that the appellant had delayed raising objections for years, which militated against the appointment of a Receiver.

Accordingly, the Court found no just and convenient grounds to interfere with the possession of the respondents by appointing a Receiver and upheld the impugned order dismissing the application.

Holding and Implications

The Court's final decision is DISMISSED, upholding the order rejecting the appointment of a Receiver over the suit property.

The direct consequence of this decision is that the respondents remain in possession of the suit property, and no Receiver will be appointed. The Court did not create any new precedent but reaffirmed established legal principles governing the appointment of Receivers under Order 40 CPC, emphasizing the necessity of a strong prima facie case, irreparable loss, and balance of convenience before such a harsh remedy is granted.

    Horticulture And Forestry v. Sh. Narender Dhand And Others

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

    LPA No. 19 of 2011

    .

    Reserved on: 17.03.2016 Decided on: 31.03.20 . 16PH

    Dr. Yashwant Singh Parmar University of

    f … Appellant.Horticulture and Forestry Versus

    o

    Sh. Narender Dhand and others

    rt

    …Respondents. Coram

    The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Muansoor Ahmad Mir, Chief Justice. The Hon'ble M C r. Jus o tice Sureshwar Thakur, Judge.Whether appr oved for reporting? Yes. Fo g r the h appellant: Ms. Ranjana Parmar, Senior Advocate, i

    with Mr. Karan Singh Parmar,Advocate. H

    For the respondents: Mr. J.S. Bhogal, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Pramod Negi, Advocate, for respondents No. 1 to 4.Mr. Shrawan Dogra, Advocate General, with Mr. Anup Rattan & Mr.

    Romesh Verma, Additional Advocate

    Generals, and Mr. J.K. Verma, Deputy

    Advocate General, for respondent No.

    5.

    1

    2

    Mansoor Ahmad Mir, Chief Justice.

    This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against

    .

    the order, dated 23rdJuly, 2010, passed by the learn P ed Single Judge in Civil Suit No. 72 of 2008, titled as. Dr. Yashwant Singh Parmar University of Hort icuHlture and Forestry, Nauni versus Narender Dha f n o d and other, wherebyand whereunder miscellaneous r ap t plication, being OMP No.403 of 2008, for appoin u tment of Receiver in terms ofmandate of Order 40 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short "CPC") c o ame to be dismissed (for short "the

    impugned or de C r").

    2.

    h Appellant/plaintiff/applicant has assailed the

    iimg pugned order on the grounds taken in the memo of appeal H

    which are almost the same grounds as taken in the plaint and OMP No. 403 of 2008.3. The question is - whether the impugned order is legal or otherwise, is to be decided while taking note of the

    pleadings of the parties and the mandate of the provisions of

    Section 94 and Order 40 CPC.

    3

    4. Before we deal with the facts of the case, one has to understand what is the object of Order 40 CPC.

    .

    5. The aim and object of Order 40 CPC is to protec P t, preserve and manage the suit property during pendency. of a suit. The said power is subject to the controll ingH provision of Section 94 CPC and is to be exercise o d forf preventing theends of justice from being defeated t .

    6. It would be p u rofita r ble to reproduce Section 94CPC herein:

    "94 o . Supplemental proceedings. - In C order to prevent the ends of justice from being defeated the Court may, if it is soprescribed, - h

    (a) issue a warrant to arrest the g

    defendant and bring him before i

    the Court to show cause why heshould not give security for his H

    appearance, and if he fails to comply with any order for security commit him to the civil prison; (b) direct the defendant to furnishsecurity to produce any propertybelonging to him and to place the same at the disposal of the Court

    or order the attachment of any

    property;

    (c) grant a temporary injunction and in case of disobedience commit the person guilty thereof

    4

    to the civil prison and order that his property be attached and sold;

    (d) appoint a receiver of any property and enforce the .

    performance of his duties by attaching and selling his property;

    .P

    (e) make such other interlocutory orders as may appear to the Cou rt Hto be just and convenient."

    7. The said provision of law manfdates that the Court may pass order(s) to pre r ven t t t he

    o ends of justice from being defeated, if it is so prescribed.

    8. What does the u word 'prescribed' mean? Section 2

    (16) CPC defines th o e word 'prescribed', in terms of which, 'prescribed' m e C ans prescribed by Rules.

    9.

    h In view of the above, Section 94 CPC can be

    iprg essed into service and orders can be passed if it isH

    provided by the Rules. 10. In the case in hand, we are dealing with Section 94 (d) and (e) read with Order 40 CPC.

    11. It is profitable to reproduce Order 40 CPC herein:

    5

    "ORDER XL

    APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVERS

    .

    1. Appointment of receivers. - (1) Where it appears to the Court to be just and convenient, the Court may by P

    order - .

    (a) appoint a receiver of an H yproperty, whether before or after decree;

    f

    (b) remove any pers o on from the possession r or cu stody of theproperty;

    t(c) co u mmit the same to thepossession, custody or managemento o f the receiver, and C (d) confer upon the receiver all such powers, as to bringing anddefending suits and for the h

    realization, management,protection, preservation and g

    improvement of the property, the i

    collection of the rents and profitsthereof, the application anddisposal of such rents and profits, H

    and the execution of documents as the owner himself has, or such of those powers as the Court thinks fit. (2) Nothing in this rule shall authorizethe Court to remove from the possession or custody of property any person whom

    any party to the suit has not a present

    right so to remove."

    6

    12. The mandate of Order 40 CPC is that the Court may appoint a Receiver of suit property, whether before or

    .

    after the decree, if it appears to the Court to be just . an P dconvenient.

    13. The crux of the matter is - wheth f er it iHs 'just andconvenient' to appoint the Receiver?

    14. 'Just and convenient', t to uso, mean that order(s) is/are not to be made arbitraril r y, whimsically or illegally. It cannot be made on a o ny gr u ound which has effect of defeatingthe equity. Th C e mandate is what is right and just accordingto the judicia l notion.

    15.

    h It has to be kept in mind that appointment of a

    iReg ceiver deprives a person from enjoyment of suit property H

    during the tenure of receivership, that is why it is known to be a harshest remedy. 16. In terms of the English law and the law developed in the Indian Courts, the applicant, who seeks

    appointment of Receiver, has to carve out a strong prima

    facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss.

    7

    17. Before we discuss all these issues, law and judgments occupying the field, it is necessary to understand

    .

    what are the pleadings of the parties.

    P

    18. Appellant/plaintiff/applicant invoked t H he orig.inaljurisdiction of this Court by the medium of C f ivi l Suit No. 72of 2008 for decree of possession, ma nd o atory injunction andmoney decree for an amount of t ₹ 2,16,00,000/- with 12% interest in respect of the imm r ovable property situated in

    Mauza Nanganji, P o arga u na Kiutan, Tehsil and DistrictSolan, H.P. (fo C r short "the suit property"), the description ofwhich has be en given in the plaint.

    19.

    h It has been admitted in para 3 of the plaint that

    ithge appellant/plaintiff/applicant invited several Trusts, H

    Societies and Institutions, which were dealing and engaged in providing education and establishing educational institutions at school level - grass root level, for upgrading the junior level school, the details of which have been given

    in para 2 of the plaint, and one of the Trusts, known as

    Delhi Chinmaya Seva Trust, New Delhi (for short "the

    8

    Trust") came forward and offered to provide such services to the appellant/ plaintiff/applicant. It granted 99 years' lease

    .

    to the said Trust and the arrangement/memorandum P of understanding was reduced into writing on 4thMa H rch, 1.992,and possession of the suit property was hande d over to the said Trust, as has been mentioned in parasf 4 and 5 of the

    plaint.

    t o

    20. It has been averred r that the lease deed was not registered and the o poss u ession to the Trust as well asdefendants/res C pondents/non-applicants No. 1 to 3 wasillegal, as pl eaded in paras 6 to 8 of the plaint.

    21.

    h The defendants/respondents/non-applicants No.

    i1g to 4 have filed the written statement and have specifically H

    admitted that the Trust is in possession and they have made the school functional, running the same and have not caused any damage to the property or the building. Further averred that the defendants/respondents/non-applicants are

    manning the same, but, it is the property of the Trust.

    9

    22. It is admission on the part of the appellant/ plaintiff/applicant that the possession of the Trust was

    .

    permissive, not illegal one and it was at the request, rathe P r, on the persuasion and initiation of the appellant/plain.tiff/ applicant that the Trust came forward and ent ereHd into the possession of the suit property and madef the Chinmaya Educational Society, Nauni, Tehsi t l a ndo District Solan, H.P., functional. The said Soc u iety r was registered on 22 nd July,

    1992.

    23. In C OMP o No. 403 of 2008, the foundation of theapplication

    is that the defendants/respondents/non- applica h nts are in illegal possession of the suit property in

    ibrg each of the mandate of H.P. Tenancy and Land Reforms H

    Act, 1972 (for short "the Act") and the suit property is in danger of being wasted. The purpose of the school was to do and provide social service rather than to be a source of income to the defendants/respondents/non-applicants and

    the Receiver is required to be appointed for effective

    management, preservation, improvement and control of the

    10

    suit property. Further that the defendants/respondents/non- applicants are bent upon to alienate the suit property, which

    .

    will cause irreparable loss to the appellant/plainti P ff/ applicant and the appointment of the Receiver H is jus.t forpreservation of the entire property.

    24. The defendants/respondents/nonf-applicants No. 1 to 4 resisted the same by th t e meodium of objections. Virtually, the grounds u taken r in the objections to theapplication are the same grounds, which have been taken by them in the rep C ly.

    o25. T here is no prima facie proof on the file to the effect t h hat the defendants/respondents/non-applicants have

    idag maged the suit property or they have done or are doing H

    such an activity, which has effect of depriving of the appellant/plaintiff/applicant from its legal right, rather, it has been pleaded that these proceedings are aimed at to dispossess the defendants/respondents/non-applicants and

    defeat their vested interests and rights.

    11

    26. Admittedly, the appellant/plaintiff/applicant has handed over the possession of the suit property to the Trust

    .

    in the year 1992. It has not raised any finger about t P he possession, raising of construction, constitution of Socie.ty in order to establish the school and running of t heH school till the year 2008. It is not an illegal possefssion, but, the possession with consent, rather, pe t rm isosive possession.

    27. Can a Receiv u er be r appointed to dislodge thedefendants/responde o nts/non-applicants and take over thepossession, tha C t too, from an institutional society, which isrunning a sc hool imparting education to so many students?

    The an h swer is in the negative for the following reasons:

    i28g.The Madras High Court in the case titled as T.H

    Krishnaswamy Chetty versus C. Thangavelu Chetty and others, reported in AIR 1955 Madras 430, has laiddown five tests and requirements, known as 'panch sadachar', for appointment of Receiver, while interpreting

    what is 'just and convenient'. It is apt to reproduce paras 13

    and 14 of the judgment herein:

    12

    "13. The five principles which can he described as the "panch sadachar' of our Courts exercising equity jurisdiction in appointing receivers are as follows :

    .

    (1) The appointment of a receiver pending a suit is a matter resting in the discretion of P

    the Court. The discretion is not arbitrary or .

    absolute: it is a sound and judicial discretion, taking into account al H l the circumstances of the case, exercise d-for the purpose of permitting th o e end f s of justice,and protecting the r ights of all partiesinterested in the t controversy and thesubject-matter and based upon the fact thatthere is no othe r r adequate remedy or meansof accomplishing the desired objects of thejudicial proceeding : - 'Mathusri v. Mathusri u , 19 Mad 120 (PC) (Z5); -'Si o vagnanathammal v. ArunachallamPillai', 21 Mad LJ 821 (Z6); - 'Habibullah C v. Abtiakallah', AIR 1918 Cal 882 (27); - 'Tirath Singh v. Shromani GurudwaraPrabandhak Committee', AIR 1931 Lah h

    688 (28); - 'Ghanasham v. Moraba', 18Bom 474 (7.9); - 'Jagat Tarini Dasi v.Nabagopal Chaki', 34 Cal 305 (Z10); -

    ig

    'Sivaji Raja Sahib v. Aiswariyanandaji',AIR 1915 Mad 926 (Z11); - 'Prasanno MoyiDevi v. Beni Madbab Rai', 5 All 556 (Z12); H

    - 'Sidheswari Dabi v. Abhayeswari Dahi', 15 Cal 818 (213); - 'Shromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar v. Dharam Das', AIR 1925 Lah 349 (Z14); -'Bhupendra Nath v. Manohar Mukerjee',AIR 1024 Cal 456 (Z15).

    (2) The Court should not appoint a receiver except upon proof by the plaintiff that prima facie he has very excellent chance of succeeding in the suit. - 'Dhumi v. Nawab Sajjad All Khan', AIR 192.3 Uh 623 (Z16); - 'Firm of Raghubir Singh' Jaswant v.

    13

    Narinjan Singh', AIR 1923 Lah 48 (217); - 'Siaram Mohunt Siaram Das v. Mohunt Mohabir Das', 27 Cal 279 (Z18); - 'Mahammad Kasim v. Nagaraja Moopanar', AIR 1928-Mad 813 (Z19); -

    .

    'Banwarilal Chowdhury v. Motilal', AIR 1922 Pat 493 (220).

    P

    (3) Not only must the plaintiff show a case .

    of adverse and conflicting claims to property, but, he must show H some emergency or danger or loss dem anding immediate action and of o his ow f n right, hemust be reasonably clear and free fromdoubt. The elem t ent of danger is animportant consideration. A Court will notact on possibl r e danger only; the dangermust be great and imminent demandingimmedia u te relief. It has been truly said thata Court will never appoint a receiverme o rely on the ground that it will do noharm. - "Manghanmal Tarachand v. C .Mikanbai', AIR 1933 Sind 231 (221); - 'Bidurramji v. Keshoramji', AIR 1939Oudh 31 (Z22); - 'Sheoambar Ban v. h

    Mohan Ban', AIR 1941 Oudh 328 (223).(4) An order appointing a receiver will not

    ig be. made where it has the effect ofdepriving a defendant of a 'de facto'possession since that might cause H

    irreparable wrong. If the dispute is as to title only, the Court very reluctantly disturbs possession by receiver, but if the property is exposed to danger and loss andthe person in possession has obtained itthrough, fraud or force the Court will interpose by receiver for the security of the

    property. It would be different where the

    property is shown to be 'in medio', that is to

    say, in the enjoyment of no one, as the

    Court can hardly do wrong in taking

    possession: it will then be the common

    interest of all the parties that the Court

    14

    should prevent a scramble as no one seems to be in actual lawful enjoyment of the property and no harm can be done to anyone by taking it and preserving it for

    .

    the benefit of the legitimate who may prove successful. Therefore, even if there is no allegation of waste and mismanagement P

    the fact that the property is more or less 'in .

    medio' is sufficient to vest a Court with jurisdiction to appoint a receiv H er. - 'Nilambar Nilambar Das v. Mabal Behari Das', A IR 1927 Pat 220 (Z24); - 'Alkama Bibi v f . Syed Istak Hussain', AIR 1925 Cal 970 (Z25~.); - 'Mathuria Debya v. S hib o dayal Singh', 14Cal WN 252 (Z26); - 'Bhubaneswar Prasad

    v. Rajeshwar P r ras t ad', AIR 1948 Pat 195(Z27). Otherwise a receiver should not beappointed u in supersession of a bone fidepossessor of property in controversy andbon o a fides have to be presumed until thecontrary is established or can be C indubitably inferred. (5) The Court, on the application of a h

    receiver, looks to the conduct of the partywho makes the application and willusually refuse to interfere unless his

    ig

    conduct has been free from blame. He mustcome to Court with clean hands and shouldnot have disentitled himself to the equitable H

    relief by laches, delay, acquiescence etc. 14. To sum up as stated in - 'Crawford V. Ross', 39 Ga 44 (Z28),"The high prerogative act of taking property out of the hands of one and

    putting it in pound under the order

    of the Judge ought not to be taken

    except to prevent manifest wrong

    imminently impending."

    15

    In 'Dozier v. Logan', 101 ga 173 (Z29) Atkinson J. said

    "The appointment of a receiver is

    .

    recognised as one of the harshest remedies which the law provides for the enforcement of rights and is P

    allowable only in extreme cases and .

    in circumstances where the interest of the creditors is exposed to manife H st peril,"

    f

    Therefore, this exceed in o gly delicate andresponsible duty will be discharged withthe utmost caution and only when the 'panch sadach r ar' t or five requirementsembodied in the words just andconvenien u t (Order 40, Rule 1) are fulfilledby the facts of the case undercon o sideration -- ('Ramachandrayya v.Nethi Iswarayya', AIR 1952 Hyd 139(Z30))."

    29. T he C same principles have been laid down by the Madras h High Court in the case titled as Muniammal ivegrsus P.M. Ranganatha Nayagar and another, H

    reported in AIR 1955 Madras 571. It is profitable to reproduce para 19 of the judgment herein:"19. The principles which should guide Indian Courts in the appointment of a

    Receiver are three in number. First of

    all, a plaintiff applying for the

    appointment of a Receiver must show

    'prima facie' that he has a strong case

    and good tide to the property or a

    special equity in his favour and that the

    16

    property in the hands of the defendant is in danger of being wasted; --'Muhammad Qasim Ravather v. Nagaraja Moopanar', AIR 1928 Mad

    .

    813 at p. 814 (Z13). It is not enough for the plaintiff to show that he has a fair question to raise as to the extent of the P

    right alleged as in the case of a .

    temporary injunction, but he must H gofurther and make out that he has a good 'prima facie' title r f equ iringCourt's protection and safeguarding pending litigation and which must be

    made out on the fa t cts of t o hat particularcase. 'Guruswami Pandiyan v. S. K. P.Chinnathambir r ar', AIR 1919 Mad 157at p. 158 (Z14). Secondly, where the property is in

    me o dia th u at is to say, in the possessionof no one, a Receiver can readily be C appointed. But where any one is in possession under a legal claim strong &compelling reasons are necessary for h

    interfering with such possession : --'Sivaji Raja Sahib v. AiswariyanaudajiSahib', AIR 1915 Mad 926 at p. 929

    ig

    (Z15); AIR 1924 Mad 482 at p. 483(Z12). Thus the 'bona fide' purchaser ofthe property -- 'bona fides have to beH

    presumed unless and until the contrary can be inferred -- in dispute should not be disturbed by the appointment of a Receiver unless there is somesubstantial and compelling ground forsuch interference. Where there is no apprehension of

    waste or danger a Receiver will not be

    appointed merely on the ground that

    the applicant apprehends difficulty in

    obtaining possession 'of properly in the

    event of success or in realising mesne

    17

    profits or the opposite party is poor or a woman. Specific acts capable of being tested should be alleged 21 Mad IJ 821 (Z11); AIR 1915 Mad 926 (Z15).

    .

    Voilently stated vague allegations constitute no substitute for vacuum of facts.

    .P

    Thirdly, an application for the appointment of a Receiver shou H ld always be made promptly and f del ay inmaking it is a circumstance unfavourable to such an appointment.

    But of course the t m att o er should heconsidered judicially in all its aspectsbefore being dis r posed of as there may belegitimate reasons for preferring anapplication after delay: -- Pattiuha u rakettu v. Mauavedan', AIR1936 Mad 966 (Z1G). If all these

    con o ditions are satisfied, and it is found C just and convenient to appoint a Receiver, the Court can exercise itsdiscretion in favour of the applicant." 30.

    h Applying the tests to the instant case, the

    ideg fendants/respondents/non-applicants are not in illegal H

    possession and their possession is admitted. There is also nothing on record to show that the defendants/respondents/ non-applicants have acted in such a way in order to cause damage or loss to the suit property or have/are tried/trying

    to alienate the suit property or are acting in such a way that

    there is a great and eminent danger to the suit property.

    18

    31. Appointment of Receiver is one of the harshest remedies in the eyes of law. It is obligatory, rather, duty of

    .

    the appellant/plaintiff/applicant to carve out all the thr P ee ingredients which are sine quo non for grant of re H lief, i..e. (i)strong prima facie case, (ii) irreparable loss a f nd (iii) balanceof convenience.

    32. The appellant/plain r tiff t /ap pl

    oicant has not been able to show a prima facie u case, not to speak of carving out astrong prima facie ca o se.33. The C appellant/plaintiff/applicant has to showthat irrepar able loss will be caused to it if the Receiver is not app h ointed. Applying the test, it can be, prima facie,

    isag id/held that in case Receiverisappointed, itwill cause H

    irreparable loss to the defendants/respondents/non- applicants because they are in possession coupled with thefact that they have established the Society, are running the school and for sixteen years, the appellant/plaintiff/

    applicant has not raised any finger.

    19

    34. In view of the pleadings of the parties read with

    .

    the other attending factors, balance of convenience al P so leans in favour of the defendants/respondents/ . non- applicants and not in favour of the app f ell an H t/plaintiff/applicant.

    35. The Gwalior Bench of t the M o adhya Bharat Courtin the case titled as Madh r u Lal versus Ramji Das Chironji Lal and other u s, reported in AIR 1953 Madhya

    Bharat 85, has also o laid down the same principle.

    36. V ar C ious High Courts have almost laid down the same t h ests and in addition to the said tests, have also held

    ithgat a person in possession should not be dispossessed H

    unless it is shown that the property is in medio or it is necessary to preserve the property. Further, it has been held that even if Receiver is to be appointed, a person, who is in possession, should be appointed as Receiver, not a third

    party.

    20

    37. It would be profitable to reproduce para 5 of the judgment rendered by the Orissa High Court in the case

    .

    titled as Rasi Dei versus Bikal Maharana and other P s,

    reported in AIR 1965 Orissa 20, herein: .

    "5. The appointment of rec f eive r Hisrecognised as one of the harshestremedies which the law p o rovides for theenforcement of rights and is allowableonly in extreme cases and incircumstances where the interest of the person seeking the t appointment of a

    receiver u is exp r osed to manifest peril.Therefore, this exceedingly delicate andres o ponsible duty has to be dischargedby the Court with the utmost caution.The principles to be followed for C appointment of receiver as laid down are these; Not only must the plaintiffshow a case of adverse and conflicting h

    claim to property, but he must showsome emergency or danger or loss g

    demanding immediate action and of i

    his own right he must be reasonablyclear and free from doubt. The element H

    of danger is an important consideration. An order appointing a receiver will not be made where it has the effect of depriving a defendant of ade facto possession since that mightcause irreparable wrong. The highprerogative act of taking property out of the hands of one and putting it in

    pound under the order of the Judge

    ought not to be taken except to prevent

    manifest wrong imminently impending.

    Hence the Court should not appoint a

    receiver of property in the possession of

    21

    the defendant who claim it by legal title, unless the plaintiff can show prima facie that he has a strong case and good title to the property. The

    .

    Court must consider whether special interference with the possession of defendant is required, there being well P

    founded fear that the property H in .question will be disputed or otherirreparable mischief may be done unless the court gives protecti f on. Themere circumstance that the

    appointment of a receiver will do no

    harm to anyone t is no o ground forappointing a receiver." 38. The Mysore High r Court in the case titled as

    Srinivasa Rao vers o us B u aburao and another, reported in AIR 1970 Mysore 141, while placing reliance upon the 'panch sada ch C ar' enunciated in T. Krishnaswamy's case

    (supra h ), held that an order appointing a Receiver shall not

    ibeg made if it has the effect of depriving a defendant ofH

    de facto possession. It is apt to reproduce para 23 of the judgment herein: "23. The next contention urged on behalf of the petitioner was that the

    appellate Court exceeded its

    jurisdiction in interfering with the

    order of the trial Court for the

    appointment of a receiver. Reliance in

    this behalf is placed on a decision in

    Bipan Lal v. I. T. Commr. The

    22

    argument is that the appointment of a receiver is a matter, which falls within the discretionary powers of a Court and as such is not ordinarily reviewable on

    .

    appeal except to correct a clear and manifest abuse of justice. Sri K. Jagannatha Shetty, the learned counsel P

    appearing on behalf of the respondents, .

    did not dispute this proposition. But, what he submitted was that a tri H al Court in the exercise of its discretio nary power relating to the app o ointm f ent of areceiver, had clearly overlooked theseveral relevant c t ircumstances or atany rate, assumed certain facts infavour of such an appointment ofreceiver. His contention was that the two elem u ents tro be considered in allcases where an appointment of arec o eiver was sought were that theexistence of reasonable probability that C the plaintiff asking for the appointment of a receiver would ultimately succeedin obtaining the general relief sought h

    for in his suit and that the property incontroversy would be wasted ordestroyed unless a receiver was

    ig

    appointed. He also submitted that it would not be H

    enough to make mere general averments relating to the acts of waste or damage to the property. It must be established by affidavits setting out thegrounds upon which such petition wasbased. In addition to the abovecircumstances, the conduct of the parties would also become relevant. In

    support of this proposition, which, was

    not disputed by Sri Muralidhar Rao,

    reliance has been placed on the

    decisions in Iswara Shastry v.

    Ramakrishna Shastry, 1965-1 Mys LJ

    23

    342, Bore Gowda v. K. Channegowda, 1965-2 Mys LJ 548, Saraswathi Bai v. Kamala Bai, 1964-1 Mys LJ 551 and Krishnaswamy v. Thangavelu, AIR

    .

    1935 Mad 430. In the last of the above decisions, after a detailed examination of the several cases bearing on the P

    subject, Ramaswamy, J. has .

    enunciated five principles, which have been described by him as the 'pan H ch sadaachar', which should be born e in mind by the Courts while ex f ercising equity jurisdiction in appointing receivers. The principles o are; that the question of appointing a receiver is a matter resting r in t t he discretion of theCourt; that a receiver should not beappointed u unless the party has anexcellent chance of succeeding in thesui o t; that plaintiff himself shall showthat there was some emergency or C danger or loss that may be caused to the right involved in the suit; that anorder appointing a receiver shall not be h

    made if it has the effect of depriving adefendant of do facto possession; that,however, the position would be different

    ig

    if the property is shown to be 'in medio'that is tosay, in theenjoyment ofnoone, and that the Court should always H

    look into the conduct of the parties who seek for the appointment of a receiver." 39. The Goa, Daman and Diu JudicialCommissioner's Court in the case titled as Rogunatrao M. Dessai and another versus M/s. Mineira Nacional Ltd.

    And others, reported in AIR 1974 Goa, Daman and Diu

    24

    41, held that the Receiver cannot be appointed when the effect of the appointment is to deprive a person from his

    .

    possession.

    P

    40. The Jammu and Kashmir High Court H in the .casetitled as Vijay Kumar and another f v ersus B.K.Thapper and another, reported in A I o R 1976 Jammu andKashmir 30, held that the co r urt t has a wide discretion inthe matter of appointment of Receiver but the discretion must be sound and o reas u onable and the Court should notappoint a rece C iver save in exceptional circumstances, suchas, when t he property is in danger of being wasted,

    destroy h ed or lost. It is apt to reproduce paras 5 and 6 of the

    ijug dgment herein: H

    "5. Order 40 Rule 1 of the Civil P.C. empowers a court to appoint receiver of any property where it appears to the court to be just and convenient thatsuch appointment should be made. Theexercise of this power is however limited by the proviso that the appointment of

    receiver will not authorise the court -

    "To remove from the possession or the custody of property any person whom any party to the suit has not a present right so to remove."

    25

    The proviso clearly refers to a case where a person in possession is a third person and the parties to the suit have

    .

    no present right to disturb his possession. This was the view taken by Ramesam and Cornish, JJ. In Pp>

    Vythulinga Pandarasannadhi v. Board .

    of Control, Thiagarajasw amiDevasthanam, (AIR 1932 Mad f 193). H Ifully agree with this view. I make theseobservations because it w o as argued byMr. Inder Dass that t he provision wasan impediment in the way of theappointment of a re t ceiver in the presentcase having re r gard to the fact, as hesaid, that the plaintiffs had yet toestablish u thei right to eject thedefendants and that way they had nopre o sent right to disturb theirpossession.

    C6. In the ordinary sense, the words'Just and convenient', would denote h what is practicable and what theinterests of justice require. Now what ispracticable and in the interests of

    ig

    justice in one case may not be so in theother case. Different considerationsarise in different cases depending onH

    the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court has, therefore, a wide discretion in the matter of appointment of Receiver but the discretion must besought and reasonable. The court maybe influenced mainly by the particular facts of each case, it must also be

    guided by road and well established

    principles which have covered the

    previous practice and which, though

    unexpressed, may be said to be lying

    dormant in the provisions of the Code."

    26

    41. The same principle has been laid down in the cases titled as Prem Prakash Kapoor versus Gobind

    .

    Ram Kapoor and others, reported in AIR 1976 Jam . m P u and Kashmir 37; Chandrashekhar Sid H ramappa Chinchansure versus Bhaurao f S idramappa Chinchansure and others, rep or o ted in AIR 1983Bombay 475.

    t

    42. The Delhi H u igh rCourt in the case titled as Rajeshwar Nath G o upta versus Administrator General and others, r C eported in AIR 1989 Delhi 179, following the

    'panch sada char' described in T. Krishnaswamy's case

    (s g uprah), held that Court should not appoint a Receiver to i take possession of immovable property from the defendants

    H

    unless and until the Court is of the opinion that there is a well founded reason to believe that the property in question will be dissipated or that other irreparable mischief may be

    committed and calls for the interference and protection of

    the Court.

    27

    43. In the cases titled as Ravi Kumar versus Misha Vadhera and others, reported in AIR 1995 Delhi

    .

    175, and Sanatan Barik and another versus Pu . rn P a Chandra Barik, reported in AIR 2003 Orissa 1 H 27, it has been held that the application for appointm f en t of Receiver should not be disposed of summarily, bu o t is to be consideredcautiously and judicially.

    t

    44. The Apex Court in r the case titled as Industrial Credit & Investme o nt Cuorporation of India Ltd. Andothers versu C s Karnataka Ball Bearings Corpn. Ltd.and others , reported in (1999) 7 Supreme Court Cases 48 g 8, he h ld that the law Courts are entrusted with the power i under Order 40 Rule 1 CPC to protect the rights of the

    H

    parties, preserve the subject matter of a lis and to do complete justice between the parties. Further held that theCourt may appoint a Receiver not as a matter of course but as a matter of prudence and just according to judicial notion.

    It is profitable to reproduce para 6 of the judgment herein:

    28

    "6. Order 40, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure expressly provides for the appointment of a Receiver over a property whether before or after the

    .

    decree and the Court may by an order confer on the Receiver all powers of realisation, management, protection, P

    preservation and improvement of the .

    property. Order 40, Rule 1(d) specifically provides for realisa f tion an H dthe words "or such of those powe rs asthe Court thinks fit" o appearing inOrder 40, Rule 1(d) ought to beinterpreted in a m t ann er so as to givefull effect to the legislative intent in thematter of conferment of powers by theCourt to preserve and maintain the property u througrh the appointment of aReceiver. Needless to record here thatthe o re is existing a power which istotally unfettered in terms of the C provisions of the statute. Law courts, however, in the matter of appointmentof a Receiver through a long catena of h

    cases, imposed a self-imposedrestriction on the use of discretion in amanner which is in consonance with

    ig theconcept of justice and to meet theneed of the situation "unfettered" doesnot and cannot mean unbridled orH

    unrestricted powers and though exercise of discretion is of widest possible amplitude, but the same has to exercised in a manner with care,caution and restraint so as to subservethe ends of justice. The law courts are entrusted with this power under Order

    40, Rule 1 so as to bring about a feeling

    of securedness and to do complete

    justice between the parties."

    29

    45. The Apex Court in the cases titled as Kalpana Kothari (Smt) versus Sudha Yadav (Smt) and others

    .

    with Parasnath Builders Pvt. Ltd. Versus Su . dh P a Yadav (Smt) and others, reported in (2002) 1 H Supreme Court Cases 203; and Firm Ashok f Tr aders and another versus Gurumukh Das S o aluja and others,

    reported in (2004) 3 Supreme r Co t ur t Cases 155, held thatthe basic principle govern u ing the discretion of the Court inappointing a Receiver is whether it is 'just and convenient' to do so an d C the in

    oterests of both the parties are to be balance h d while deciding whether it is desirable to appoint aRe g ceiver. i 46. Keeping in view the ratio of English law, law H made by theApex Court and the other High Courts, as discussed hereinabove, one comes to an inescapableconclusion that the appellant/plaintiff/applicant has failed to carve out a prima facie case, not to speak of strong prima facie case. It has also failed to, prima facie, carve out that

    30

    the suit property is in danger of being wasted. The appellant/plaintiff/applicant has failed to satisfy the tests

    .

    laid down by the Madras High Court in . P T.Krishnaswamy's case (supra).

    47. Having said so, the learned Sin f gl e HJudge has rightly made the discussions, need no in o terference.48. Viewed thus, the imp t ugned order merits to be upheld and the appeal is t u o be d r ismissed.49. Having g o lance of the above discussions, theimpugned ord C er is upheld and the appeal is dismissedalongwith th e pending applications, if any. h

    (Mansoor Ahmad Mir) ig

    Chief Justice

    H

    (Sureshwar Thakur) Judge March 31, 2016 ( rajni )

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