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Smart Summary

Case Summary: CMPMO No. 492 of 2015 — Smt. Kalawati v. Sh. Netar Singh & Others

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, heard by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan and decided on March 11, 2016. The petitioner is Smt. Kalawati and the respondents are Sh. Netar Singh and others. The petition challenges an order passed by the learned District Judge, Mandi, which set aside an order of the trial Court that had granted the petitioner's application for injunction and, instead, dismissed that application.

The petitioner filed a suit for permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction, asserting that the suit land was jointly owned and possessed by the parties and that, until partition by metes and bounds was carried out, the respondents should be restrained from raising construction over what the petitioner described as the "best piece" of the land. Proceedings for partition were admittedly pending before the Assistant Collector (1st Grade). An interim injunction with a similar prayer was also sought.

The respondents opposed the suit and the interim application, raising preliminary objections (including maintainability, cause of action, suppression of material facts, estoppel, misjoinder/non-joinder of necessary parties, valuation and jurisdiction) and contesting the merits by stating that the parties were in separate possession under a family arrangement and that the petitioner had already constructed a house on the suit land. The trial Court directed that the parties maintain the status quo as to nature and possession of the suit land pending disposal of the suit. The lower Appellate Court reversed that order and dismissed the application for injunction. The present petition challenges the Appellate Court's dismissal on the ground that joint ownership and pending partition proceedings should have precluded the dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned lower Appellate Court erred in dismissing the petitioner's application for injunction (thereby setting aside the trial Court's status quo order) when the parties were recorded as joint owners and partition proceedings were pending.
  2. Whether, in the circumstances disclosed by the pleadings (including the petitioner's construction over the suit land and the nature of her pleadings), the petitioner was entitled to equitable relief in the form of an injunction restraining the respondents from raising construction pending partition.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The suit land is jointly owned and possessed by the parties; therefore, until partition by metes and bounds is completed, respondents should be restrained from raising construction over the best piece of the land.
  • Partition proceedings were pending before the Assistant Collector (1st Grade), which supported the need for injunctive relief to protect the petitioner's rights pending partition.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Raised various preliminary objections: maintainability, cause of action, suppression of material facts, estoppel, misjoinder and non-joinder of necessary parties, valuation and jurisdiction.
  • On merits, contended that parties were in separate possession under a family arrangement and that the petitioner had already constructed a house over the suit land (the respondents pleaded that the plaintiff had constructed two houses and two cow-sheds over the better portion of the suit land).
  • Admitted pendency of partition proceedings but denied that respondents were raising construction on the "best part" of the suit land; stated that the construction attributed to respondents was on a part of Khasra No. 160 which was not abutting Pairi road.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M. Gurudas and others v. Rasaranjan and others (2006) 8 SCC 3 Set out the well-known tripartite test for injunctions: (i) prima facie case, (ii) balance of convenience, and (iii) irreparable injury. The Court relied on this formulation as the starting point for analysing an application for injunction.
American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. (1975) 1 All ER 504 Explains that courts should be satisfied a claim is not frivolous and that there is a "serious question to be tried"; discusses preservation of status quo when other factors are evenly balanced. Quoted and used to explain the nature of "serious question to be tried" and the role of status quo in interlocutory relief.
Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. (1999) 7 SCC 1 Discusses the application of American Cyanamid principles in the context of intellectual property and interlocutory relief. Referred to for the proposition that certain IP cases have specific approaches to interlocutory relief; cited as part of the broader jurisprudence on injunctions.
S.M. Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury (India) Ltd. (2000) 5 SCC 573 Reiterated that the comparative strengths and weaknesses of parties may be considered, particularly in trademark matters, when deciding injunctions. Cited to show that assessment of prospects of success can be a relevant factor in certain contexts.
Transmission Corpn. of A.P. Ltd. v. Lanco Kondapalli Power (P) Ltd. (2006) 1 SCC 540 Deals with the identification of triable issues and their relevance to interlocutory relief. Referred to for the observation that the respondent had raised triable issues and to illustrate how triable issues are approached.
Series 5 Software v. Clarke (1996) 1 All ER 853 Noted that the prospect of success was historically considered important and that assessment of prospects can be relevant to balance of convenience. Cited to show the development of law in England on assessing prospects of success when granting injunctions.
Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (as cited in the opinion) Reiterates the injunction test: prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury; stresses bona fides and that the question must be serious. Used as an authority summarising principles to be considered before granting injunctions.
Dorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden and Others (1990) 2 SCC 117 Listed among authorities relevant to the principles for grant of injunctions and interlocutory relief. Cited as part of the body of case law supporting the court's legal framework for injunctions.
Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad (1992) 1 SCC 719 Another authority on interlocutory relief cited in the context of injunction jurisprudence. Referred to as part of the precedent matrix considered by the Court on injunction principles.
United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India (1981) 2 SCC 766 Authority cited among decisions on interlocutory relief and the principles guiding injunctions. Included in the list of decided cases relied upon to state legal propositions relevant to the matter.
Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co. (1995) 5 SCC 545 Authority on injunctions and related equitable principles. Cited as part of the jurisprudence on assessing claims for interlocutory relief.
Bina Murlidhar Hemdev v. Kanhaiyalal Lokram Hemdev (1999) 5 SCC 222 Authority among several decisions referenced on injunctions and related equitable considerations. Referred to in the compendium of authorities supporting the court's legal summary.
Ashok Kapoor v. Murtu (CMPMO No. 52 of 2014) — decided 24.6.2015 (High Court) Sets out detailed principles on rights and liabilities of co-sharers/co-owners, including: (i) co-owner not entitled to injunction simply because co-owner unless acts amount to ouster, (ii) mere construction/improvement not ouster, (iii) diminution in value/utility can attract injunction, (iv) detriment to other co-owners may justify injunction, (v) plaintiff must establish material injury, (vi) court's discretion guided by justice, equity and conscience; also lists requirements for temporary injunction and the need for clean hands. The Court relied extensively on these principles to summarise law governing co-owners' rights and the circumstances in which injunctions should be granted, and applied them to the facts of the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first noted the material facts apparent on record: the suit land is a substantial parcel; the petitioner is recorded as having a one-quarter share while the respondents jointly hold one-half share. It was also recorded that the petitioner had already constructed two houses on the suit land — an averment made clearly in para 3 of the respondents' written statement and supported by photographs attached to that pleading.

The Court examined the petitioner's replication and observed that it consisted only of a general/simple denial (para 3 of the replication: "para No. 3 of the written statement is also wrong hence denied and that para of the plaint is reaffirmed to be correct"). The Court applied the settled rule of pleading: specific factual averments in a pleading must be met by specific denials with sufficient explanation; failure to do so results in those averments being deemed admitted. On this basis the Court treated the respondents' pleading that the petitioner had already constructed houses as admitted by virtue of the replication's insufficiency.

The Court then reviewed authoritative principles governing interlocutory injunctions: the tripartite test of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury; the role of "serious question to be tried" (as explained in American Cyanamid); and later developments recognizing that, in certain contexts (notably some intellectual property and trademark cases), assessment of prospects of success or comparable strength may be relevant. The Court referred to an earlier High Court decision (Ashok Kapoor v. Murtu) which distilled specific principles applicable to co-owners, notably that:

  • A co-owner is not automatically entitled to an injunction against another co-owner merely because of joint ownership; injunction is warranted only if acts by the co-owner in possession amount to ouster or are prejudicial/adverse to the interest of the other co-owner.
  • Mere making of construction or improvement on common property does not, by itself, amount to ouster.
  • If the act in possession diminishes the value or utility of the property, or is otherwise detrimental to other co-owners, the out-of-possession co-owner may seek an injunction after establishing likely material injury to his rights.
  • Temporary injunction, being an equitable relief, requires that the plaintiff come with "clean hands" and satisfy the tripartite test; the court's discretion is to be exercised on the balance of convenience, justice, equity and conscience.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court emphasized the petitioner's conduct. Because the petitioner had, according to the respondents' pleaded averments (and not specifically denied), already raised construction on a portion of the suit land and had not disclosed this fact in her pleadings, she had not approached the Court with "clean hands." The Court invoked the equitable maxim "he who seeks equity must do equity" and concluded that the petitioner's admitted construction operates as an estoppel and waiver of her right to attack the construction being raised by the respondents. The Court held that the petitioner's failure of candid disclosure and the absence of a specific denial of the respondents' factual averments were independently sufficient grounds to refuse equitable relief in the form of an injunction.

On that basis, and having applied the established tests and authorities, the Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it. The Court also observed that its findings and observations were solely for the purpose of determining the petition and directed that the trial Court should decide the suit on its own merits without being influenced by the observations made in the petition proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The petition was dismissed and the petition "stands disposed of." The Court expressly dismissed the petition and all pending applications, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner's challenge to the Appellate Court's dismissal of the injunction application failed; the petitioner is not granted the injunction sought by this petition and must proceed with the suit in the trial Court. Pending applications connected to the petition were also dismissed.
  • The Court made clear that its factual observations and conclusions in the petition are for the limited purpose of deciding the Article 227 petition and instructed the trial Court to proceed to decide the main suit on its own merits without being influenced by the remarks made in this petition.
  • No new legal principle or precedent was asserted as being laid down by the Court; the decision applied established equitable and injunction principles (as reflected in prior case law and the earlier High Court decision cited) to the facts of the case, emphasizing pleading obligations and the requirement that an applicant for equitable relief come to court with clean hands.

Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan

Date of Decision: March 11, 2016

Disposition: Petition dismissed / disposed of.

    Smt. Kalawati Petitioner v. Sh. Netar Singh And Others S

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA. .

    CMPMO No. 492 of 2015. P

    Date of decision: March 11, 2 . 016 _____________________________________________ __ H ____________ Smt. Kalawati …Petitioner Versus f

    Sh. Netar Singh and others t o …Respondents Coram

    The Hon'ble Mr. Justice u Tarlork Singh Chauhan, Judge. Whether approved for o reporting? Yes For the Petition C er : Mr. Rajneesh K. Lal, Advocate. For the Res pondents : Mr. G.R. Palsra, Advocate. h Ta g rlok Singh Chauhan, Judge i This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India H

    is directed against the order passed by learned District Judge, Mandi whereby he set-aside the order passed by the trial Court and dismissed the application preferred by the petitioner for grant of injunction.

    2. The petitioner filed a suit for permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction on the ground that the suit land was jointly owned and possessed by the parties and therefore, until and unless partition is carried out by metes and bounds, the respondents be restrained from raising construction over the best piece of the land. It was further submitted that once the proceedings for partition were pending before ____________________

    1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the Judgment ? Yes

    1

    2

    the leaned Assistant Collector 1stGrade, then it was of the mor . e reasons that the respondents ought to be restrained. Similar P prayer was made in the application for interim injunction. .

    3. The respondents contested the suit as als H o the application by raising various preliminary objections like m f aintainability, cause of action, suppression of material facts, est o oppel, misjoinder and non- joinder of necessary parties, valuatio t n and jurisdiction. On merits, it was pleaded that the partie u s to r the lis were in separate possession under family arrangement and that the petitioner had already constructed a house o o ver the suit land. The pendency of the partition

    proceedings w a C s admitted, but it was denied that the respondents were raising h construction on the best part of the suit land, rather it was sp g ecifically stated that construction being raised was on a part of i Khasra No. 160 which was not abutting to Pairi road. H

    4. The learned trial Court granted the application by directing the parties to maintain status quo qua nature and possession of the suit land till the disposal of the suit. This order was questioned in appeal before the learned lower Appellate Court, who reversed the

    order passed by the trial Court and ordered the dismissal of the

    application. It is against this order that the instant petition has been

    filed on the ground that once the parties were recorded in joint

    ownership and possession, then there was no occasion for the learned

    lower Appellate Court to have dismissed the application when partition

    had not been effected and proceeding qua the same were admittedly

    pending before the Collector.

    3

    I have heard learned counsel for the parties and hav . e gone through the records of the case carefully. P

    5. It is not in dispute that the suit land comprises . of a fairly big chunk of land wherein the petitioner is having 1 /4tHhshare, whereas the respondents are owners to the extent o o f half f share. It is also not in dispute that insofar as the petitioner is concerned, she has already constructed two house(s) over the r su t it la nd. No doubt, learned counsel for the petitioner has trie u d to dispute this position but then the pleadings in the su o it stand in the way of the petitioner. The respondents in para 3 of the written statement had clearly averred as under: C

    h " …..The plaintiff has already constructed two houses and two cow-sheds over the better portion of the suit land and the

    ig

    defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have not constructed any house over the suit land as yet. Photographs of the house of plaintiff H

    snapped over the suit land are attached herewith for kind perusal of the learned Court, which fact has been suppressed by the plaintiff from this learned Court and thus, the plaintiff has not come with clean hands before the learned Court for redressal ; hence she is not entitled for any equitable relief of injunction against the defendants…"

    6. In response to the aforesaid averments, the petitioner in the replication has only come out with the simplicitor denial as would be evident from para-3 of the replication which reads thus:

    "3. That para No. 3 of the written statement is also wrong hence denied and that para of the plaint is reaffirmed to be correct."

    7. Even if the entire replication is read, it would evident that the petitioner has not at all disputed the aforesaid averments. It is more

    4

    than settled rule that a specific averment in the pleading is required . to be rebutted with a specific denial alongwith sufficient explan . at P ion and reasons for denial. Once, there is no denial much less specific denial, then the contents of the written statement sha f ll b e H deemed to have been admitted.

    8. The factors required to be b or o ne in mind while granting or refusing injunction have been s r ucc t inctly dealt with by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.Gurud u as and others versus Rasaranjan and others (2006) 8 SCC 3 o 67 in the following manner:- "18. C While c nsidering an application for injunction, it is well- settled, t he courts would pass an order thereupon having regard to: h

    (i) Prima facie case (ii) Balance of convenience g

    (iii) Irreparable injury. i

    19. A finding on 'prima facie case' would be a finding of fact. However, H

    while arriving at such finding of fact, the court not only must arrive at a conclusion that a case for trial has been made out but also other factors requisite for grant of injunction exist. There may be a debate as has been sought to be raised by Dr. Rajeev Dhawan that the decision of House of Lords in American Cyanamid v. Ethicon Ltd. (1975) 1 All ER 504 would have no application in a case of this nature

    as was opined by this Court in Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. .(1999) 7 SCC 1 and S.M Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury (India) Ltd. . (2000) 5 SCC 573, but we are not persuaded to

    delve thereinto.

    20. We may only notice that the decisions of this Court in Colgate Palmolive (supra) and S.M. Dyechem Ltd (supra) relate to intellectual property rights. The question, however, has been taken into consideration by a Bench of this Court in Transmission Corpn. of A.P. Ltd. v. Lanco Kondapalli Power (P) Ltd. (2006) 1 SCC 540 stating:

    (SCC pp. 552-53, paras 36-40)

    "36.The Respondent, therefore, has raised triable issues. What would constitute triable issues has succinctly been dealt

    5

    with by the House of Lords in its well-known decision . in American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd.(1975)1 All ER 504 holding: ( All ER p.510 c-d) .P

    'Your Lordships should in my view take this opportunity of declaring that there is no suc h r H ule. The use of such expression as 'a probability', 'a prima facie case', or 'a strong prima facie case' in f the context of the exercise

    of a discretionar y o power to grant an interlocutory injunction lead t s to confusion as to the object sought to be achieve r d by this form of temporary relief. The court no doubt must be satisfied that the claim is not frivo u lous or vexatious; in other words, that there is a o serious question to be tried.' It was further observed (All ER pp.511 b-c & 511j)

    C

    'Where other factors appear to be evenly balanced it is h

    a counsel of prudence to take such measures as are calculated to preserve the status quo. If the defendant g

    is enjoined temporarily from doing something that he i

    has not done before, the only effect of the interlocutory injunction in the event of his succeeding at the trial is to H

    postpone the date at which he is able to embark on a course of action which he has not previously found it necessary to undertake; whereas to interrupt him in the conduct of an established enterprise would cause much greater inconvenience to him since he would have to start again to establish it in the event of his

    succeeding at the trial.

    * * *

    The factors which he took into consideration, and in my

    view properly, were that Ethicon's sutures XLG were

    not yet on the market; so that had no business which

    would be brought to a stop by the injunction; no

    factories would be closed and no workpeople would be

    thrown out of work. They held a dominant position in

    the United Kingdom market for absorbable surgical

    sutures and adopted an aggressive sales policy.'

    6

    37. We are, however, not oblivious of the subseque . nt development of law both in England as well as in this jurisdiction. The Chancery Division in Series 5 . So P ftware v. Clarke (1996) 1 All ER 853] opined: (All ER p.864 c-e) 'In many cases before Am eri H can Cyanamid the prospect of success was one of the important factors taken into account o in a f ssessing the balance of convenience. The courts would be less willing to subject the plaintiff to the risk of irrecoverable loss which wou r ld b t efal l him if an interlocutory injunction was refused in those cases where it thought he was likely to win u at the trial than in those cases where it thought he o was likely to lose. The assessment of the prospects of success therefore was an important factor in deciding C

    whether the court should exercise its discretion to grant interlocutory relief. It is this consideration which American Cyanamid is said to have prohibited in all but h

    the most exceptional case. So it is necessary to consider with some care what was said in the House of

    ig

    Lords on this issue.' 38. In Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. .

    H

    (1999) 7 SCC 1, this Court observed that Laddie, J. in Series 5 Software (supra) had been able to resolve the issue without any departure from the true perspective of the judgment in American Cyanamid. In that case, however, this Court was considering a matter under Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969.

    39.In S.M Dyechem Ltd. v. Cadbury (India) Ltd. . (2000) 5 SCC

    573, Jagannadha Rao, J. in a case arising under Trade and

    Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 reiterated the same principle

    stating that even the comparative strength and weaknesses of

    the parties may be a subject matter of consideration for the

    purpose of grant of injunction in trade mark matters stating :

    (SCC p.591, para 21)

    '21…..Therefore, in trademark matters, it is now

    necessary to go into the question of "comparable

    strength" of the cases of either party, apart from

    7

    balance of convenience. Point 4 is decid . ed accordingly.'

    40.The said decisions were noticed yet again . iPn a case involving infringement of trade mark in Ca H dila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd.(200 f 1) 5 SCC 73." 21. While considering the question o of granting an order of injunction one way or the other, evidently , the court, apart from finding out a prima facie case, would cons t ider the question in regard to the balance of convenience of the par r ties as also irreparable injury which might be suffered by the plaintiffs if the prayer for injunction is to be refused. The contention of the plaintiffs must be bona fide. The question sought to be tried must be a serious question and not only on a mere

    triable issue o .(See uDorab Cawasji Warden v. Coomi Sorab Warden and Others , (1990) 2 SCC 117, Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad

    S ing C h(1992) 1 SCC 719, United Commercial Bank v. Bank of India (1981) 2 SCC 766, Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co. (1995) h 5 SCC 545, Bina Murlidhar Hemdev v. Kanhaiyalal Lokram Hemdev (1999) 5 SCC 222 and Transmission Corpn. of A.P. Ltd (supra)."

    i 9.g Learned counsel for the petitioner would vehemently argue H

    that since the respondents are admittedly joint owners of the property, therefore, they should be restrained from raising any construction till the suit is finally ordered to be partitioned more particularly when the same are already pending. The matter is not so simple as is being

    portrayed by the petitioner. This Court in an elaborate judgment has

    considered the rights and liabilities of co-owners in CMPMO No. 52 of

    2014 titled as Ashok Kapoor vs. Murtu decided on 24.6.2015 and

    thereafter concluded as follows:

    46. On consideration of the various judicial pronouncements and on the basis of the dominant view taken in these decisions on the rights and liabilities of the co-sharers and their rights to raise construction to the exclusion of others, the following principles can conveniently be laid down:-

    8

    i) a co-owner is not entitled to an injunction restraining another . co- owner from exceeding his rights in the common property absolutely and simply because he is a co-owner unless any act of the person in p P ossession of the property amounts to ouster prejudicial or adverse to the in . terest of the co-owner out of possession.

    ii) Mere making of construction or improvement H of, in, the common property does not amount to ouster.

    (iii) If by the act of the co-owner in possess o ion the f value or utility of the property is diminished, then a co-owner out of posse ssion can certainly seek an injunction to prevent the diminution of the value and utility of the property. (iv) If the acts of the co-owner in possession are detrimental to the interest of other co-owners, a co-owner out of postsession can seek an injunction to prevent

    such act which is detrimenta u l to his rinterest. (v) before an in o junction is issued, the plaintiff has to establish that he would sustain, by the act he complains of some injury which materially would affect his position or C his enjoyment or an accustomed user of the joint property would be inconven ienced or interfered with. (v h i) the question as to what relief should be granted is left to the discretion of the Court in the attending circumstances on the balance of convenience and in exercise g of its discretion the Court will be guided by consideration of justice, equity and good i

    conscience. H

    47. The discretion of the Court is exercised to grant a temporary injunction only when the following requirements are made out by the plaintiff:- (i) existence of a prima facie case as pleaded, necessitating protection of the plaintiff's rights by issue of a temporary injunction;

    (ii) when the need for protection of the plaintiff's rights is compared with or weighed against the need for protection of the defendant's right or likely infringement of the defendant's rights, the balance of convenience tilting in favour of the plaintiff; and

    (iii) clear possibility of irreparable injury being caused to the plaintiff if the temporary injunction is not granted.

    In addition, temporary injunction being an equitable relief, the discretion to grant such relief will be exercised only when the plaintiff's conduct is free from blame and he approaches the Court with clean hands.

    9

    10. It would be evident from the decision, the mere fact th . at the parties are co-owners and joint owners etc. is not the sole P criteria for granting or refusing injunction, the conduct of the parties . too plays an important role and in such like cases, the plaintif f c H onduct has to be free from blame so as to enable the court o to con f clude that the plaintiff has approached the Court with clean ha nds. But here is a case where the petitioner though claims herse t lf to be a joint owner with the respondents after having alr u eady r raised construction over the suit land seeks an injunction a o gainst the respondents without even disclosing this fact.

    11. T he C injunction being an equitable relief, the person seeking h injunction must come with clean hands. The well known m g echanism that applies in such matter is "he who seeks equity must i do equity". Since the petitioner has admittedly raised construction of H

    her house(s) on a portion of the suit land, she is estopped and has waived of her right to assail and question the construction being raised by the respondents. The fact that the petitioner has not approached the court with clean hands in itself is a sufficient ground for not granting the

    relief of injunction.

    12. Having said so, I find no merit in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed, so also the pending applications, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. However, before parting, it may be observed that the findings, observations, reasons and conclusions recorded hereinabove are solely for the purpose of determination of this petition and the trial Court shall proceed to decide the matter without being influenced by whatsoever observed hereinabove.

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    With these observations, the petition stands disposed of.

    P.

    March 11, 2016 (Tarlok Singh Ch . auhan)

    (GR) H Judge t o

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    Smt. Kalawati Petitioner v. Sh. Netar Singh And Others S
    (Mar 11, 2016)