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  • provisions of Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure
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  • provisions of Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure
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  • Section 10 differs from Section 11
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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition challenges the order of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), District Una, Himachal Pradesh, dated 2.1.2013 in CMA No. 10-VI/2013 arising out of Civil Suit No. RBT 94 of 2009. The respondent No. 1, Rajesh Kumar Kaushal, instituted Civil Suit No. 94 of 2009 for possession by way of specific performance of a contract relating to a share of land measuring 0-49-92 hectares, based on an agreement to sell dated 11.1.2008. In the alternative, the suit sought recovery of Rs. 8,42,000/-. The petitioner, Om Parkash, had earlier instituted Civil Suit No. 60 of 2008 for specific performance of an agreement dated 26.4.2006 against different parties. During pendency of that suit, this Court restrained defendants from alienating the suit property. The petitioner filed an application under Section 10 CPC read with Sections 94 and 151 CPC to stay proceedings in Civil Suit No. 94 of 2009, which was dismissed by the learned Civil Judge, prompting the present petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the provisions of Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) apply to stay the proceedings in Civil Suit No. 94 of 2009 on the ground that a prior suit (Civil Suit No. 60 of 2008) is pending involving the same subject matter and parties.
  2. Whether the matter in issue in the subsequent suit is directly and substantially in issue in the previously instituted suit such that the later suit should be stayed.
  3. Whether the parties to the two suits are the same and whether the courts in which the suits are instituted have competent jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The suit pending before this Court (Civil Suit No. 60 of 2008) pertains to the entire suit land.
  • The petitioner sought to stay the subsequent suit (Civil Suit No. 94 of 2009) on the basis of Section 10 CPC.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • Both suits are founded on totally different and independent causes of action.
  • Section 10 CPC is not attracted as the parties in the two suits are not the same.
  • The plaintiff in the subsequent suit is not a party to the earlier suit and the cause of action is distinct.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kalipada Banerji v. Charubala Dasee, AIR 1933 Calcutta 887 Three essential conditions for Section 10 CPC: (1) matter in issue in second suit directly and substantially in issue in first suit; (2) parties are the same; (3) court of first suit competent to grant relief claimed in second suit. Applied to hold that all three conditions must be satisfied for Section 10 CPC to apply; found lacking due to different parties and causes of action.
M/S Sohal Engineering Works v. Rustam Jehangir Vakil Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1981 Gujarat 110 Explanation of "directly and substantially in issue" under Section 10 CPC; distinction from "incidentally or collaterally in issue". Used to emphasize that Section 10 applies only when the whole subject matter in both suits is identical, not merely some issues.
R. Srinivasan v. Southern Petrochemical Industries Corporation Ltd., AIR 1992 Madras 363 Requirement of substantial identity of subject matter and field of controversy between suits for Section 10 CPC to apply. Applied to confirm that suits arising from different and independent transactions cannot be stayed under Section 10 CPC.
Ajit Singh v. Sadhu Singh, AIR 2004 Delhi 320 Section 10 CPC applies only if the entire subject matter in controversy is the same; mere common grounds or some identical issues insufficient. Relied upon to distinguish the present case where the suit properties and causes of action are distinct.
National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences v. C. Parameshwara, AIR 2005 SC 242 Clarification that Section 10 CPC applies only to civil suits and requires the whole subject matter to be identical; test is whether decision in prior suit operates as res judicata in subsequent suit. Heavily relied upon to confirm that Section 10 CPC was not attracted as the subject matters and parties differ.
Aspi Jal and another v. Khushroo Rustom Dadyburjor, (2013) 4 SCC 333 For Section 10 CPC to apply, entire subject matter must be the same; mere common grounds do not suffice. Applied to reinforce the principle that the suits must involve the same entire subject matter for Section 10 to be invoked.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a detailed comparison of the two suits. It found that Civil Suit No. 94 of 2009, instituted by Rajesh Kumar Kaushal, relates to an agreement dated 11.1.2008 for specific performance concerning a certain land share, whereas Civil Suit No. 60 of 2008, instituted by Om Parkash, concerns a different agreement dated 26.4.2006 involving different parties and land. The parties in the two suits are not the same, and the causes of action are independent and distinct.

The Court emphasized the principle underlying Section 10 CPC, which is to prevent concurrent litigation on the same matter between the same parties to avoid conflicting judgments and conserve judicial resources. The Court cited authoritative precedents that clarify that Section 10 applies only if the entire subject matter and parties are substantially the same, and the matter in issue in the subsequent suit is directly and substantially in issue in the prior suit.

Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the suits do not involve the same subject matter or parties, and the issues are not directly and substantially the same. The Court further noted that the test for applicability of Section 10 CPC is whether the decision in the previous suit would operate as res judicata in the subsequent suit, which is not the case here. The Court distinguished the present facts from cases where Section 10 was applied, underscoring that different transactions and causes of action preclude the application of Section 10.

Holding and Implications

The Court DISMISSED the petition, upholding the order of the learned Civil Judge dismissing the application to stay proceedings under Section 10 CPC.

The direct effect of this decision is that Civil Suit No. 94 of 2009 shall proceed independently and shall not be stayed on the ground of pendency of Civil Suit No. 60 of 2008. The ruling clarifies that Section 10 CPC cannot be invoked where the parties and subject matter differ substantially, thereby preventing unwarranted stays of suits on tenuous grounds. No new precedent beyond the application of established principles was set by this decision.

    Om Prakash Mehta Petitioner v. Rajesh Kumar Kaushal & Ors. S

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA.

    CMPMO No. 108 of 2013

    Reserved on: 21.12.2015.

    Decided on: 07.01.2016.

    Om Prakash Mehta ……Petitioner. Versus

    Rajesh Kumar Kaushal & ors. …….Respondents. .

    Coram

    The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge. P Whether approved for reporting? 1. Yes. .

    For the petitioner: Mr. Ajay Kumar Sr. Advocate with Mr. Dheeraj K. Vashishta, Advocate.

    For the respondents: Mr. Mukesh Thakur, Advocate, for resp onHdent No. 1. Mr. R.K.Gautam, Sr. Advocate, with Mr. Gaurav Gautam, Advocate, for respondent No. 2. f

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Justice Rajiv Sharma, J. o

    This petition is directed ag r ain t st t he order rendered by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Distt. Un u a, H.P., in CMA No. 10-VI/2013 in Civil Suit No. RBT 94 of 2009 dated 2.1.2013.

    2. Key facts, nec o essary for the adjudication of this petition are that respondent No. 1 S C h. Rajesh Kumar Kaushal has instituted civil suit No. RBT 94 of 2009 titled as Rajesh Kumar Kaushal vrs. Surjeet Singh and another for possession by way of specific performance of contract by execution of the sale deed g of theh land measuring 0-49-92 hectares, being 4992/21353 share out of the i land measuring 2-13-53 hectares, comprised in Khewat No. 20 min, H Khatoni No. 28, Kh. No. 2024/792, 887, 889 and 890, as entered in the nakal jamabandi for the year 2003-04, situated in Up-Mohal Rakkar Colony, Tehsil and Distt. Una, H.P. for the sum of Rs. 70,000/- per kanal as sale consideration on the basis of agreement to sell dated 11.1.2008 by defendants, namely, Surjeet Singh and Om Parkash, in favour of plaintiff and

    in the alternative suit for recovery for the sum of Rs. 8,42,000/-.

    1 Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

    1

    2

    3. The petitioner, Om Parkash has also instituted Civil Suit No. 60 of 2008 in this Court against Sh. Surjeet Singh and Deepika Vashisht for specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 26.4.2006. This Court vide order dated 8.3.2011 in OMPs No. 269 of 2008 and 602 of 2010 h . as restrained the defendants from alienating and transferring the suit P property in any manner, during the pendency of the suit. The H petition . er filed an application under Section 10 of the CPC read with Sections 94 and 151 CPC to stay the proceedings in Civil Suit No. 94 of 200 f 9. The application was contested by filing a detailed reply. It was su bm o itted that plaintiff i.e. Rajesh Kumar Kaushal has not been arrayed as party in suit filed before this Court and both the suits are not between th r e s t ame parties and the cause of action is also distinct. Civil Suit No. u 94 of 2009 was instituted in the month of August, 2008 and Civil S o uit No. 60 of 2008 was instituted in the month of September, 2008 in this Court. It is also averred that the judgment passed in Civil Suit No. 60 of C 2008 will not operate res judicata qua the plaintiff. The learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Distt. Una dismissed the application vide

    order dated h 2.1.2013. Hence, this petition. 4. ig Mr. Ajay Kumar, Sr. Advocate has vehemently argued that the suit pending before this Court pertains to the entire suit land. On the other

    H hand, Mr. R.K. Gautam, Sr. Advocate, has vehemently argued that both the suits are founded on totally different and independent causes of action. According to him, Section 10 CPC is not attracted in this case. He lastly contended that the suit pending before the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.),

    Distt. Una and before this Court are not inter se the same parties.

    3

    5. I have heard counsel for both the sides and have also gone through the impugned order and Civil Suit No. 94 of 2009 and Civil Suit No. 60 of 2008, carefully.

    6. Civil Suit No. 94 of 2009 has been instituted by Rajesh Kum . ar against the petitioner Om Parkash and Surjeet Singh for P specific performance of agreement dated 11.1.2008 of land as deta H iled in . the plaint. The suit instituted by the petitioner being Civil Suit No. 60 of 2008 is for specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 26.4 .2006 with respect to

    the land detailed in the plaint. f

    7. The issues in Civil Suit N t o. 60 o of 2008 were framed on 26.5.2010. The issues in Civil Suit No r . 94 of 2009 were framed on 19.1.2009. The parties in both the Civil Suits i.e. No. 94 of 2009 and 60 of 2008 are not the same and the matter i o n con u troversy is also different. Civil Suit No. 94 of 2009 was filed on 4.8.2008 and Civil Suit No. 60 of 2008 was filed on 4.6.2008. In the w C ritten statement filed by defendant No. 2 Om Parkash on 28.7.2010, no specific issue was raised, being preliminary or on merits that the suit of h the plaintiff is hit by principle of sub-judice. 8. ig The underlying principle of Section 10 CPC is to prevent Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits in

    H respect of the same matter in issue as well as to avoid recording of conflicting findings on issues which are directly and substantially in issue in previously instituted suit. Section 10 CPC applies only in those cases where the whole of the subject matter in both the suits is identical. The Court has gone

    through the plaints in both the civil suits i.e. Civil suit No. 94 of 2009 and

    Civil Suit No. 60 of 2008. Both the suits are instituted on totally different

    and independent causes of action. It is reiterated that Civil Suit No. 94 of

    4

    2009 has been filed for specific performance of agreement dated 11.1.2008 and Civil Suit No. 60 of 2008 for specific performance of contract dated 26.4.2006. The suit instituted by Om Parkash bearing No. 60 of 20 . 08 involves different issues as compared to the earlier suit filed by Rajesh Kumar Kaushal bearing No. 94 of 2009. Civil Suit No. 60 of 2008 h P as been

    instituted by Om Parkash against Surjeet Singh and Deepika . Vashishat.

    Rajesh Kumar Kaushal has not been made party in Civil Su H it No. 60 of 2008. Thus, learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Distt. Una h f as rightly come to the conclusion that the suit could not be stayed on the basis of subsequent suit filed by the petitioner bearing No. 60 of 2008 . T o he purpose of Section 10 CPC

    is also to save time and energy of Courts t and parties. In the present case,

    the same matter is not in issue u in bot r h the civil suits. There is no identity of the matter in issue in both o the Civil Suits. The whole of the subject matter in both the Civil Suits is not identical.

    9. The Di C vision Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Kalipada Banerji vrs. Charubala Dasee, reported in AIR 1933 Calcutta 887, has h held that the three essential conditions, that are necessary for br i ing g ing in the operation of Section 10, Civil P.C., are: (1) that the matter in issue in the second suit is directly and substantially in issue in the previously

    H instituted suit, (2) that the parties in the two suits are the same, and (3) that the Court, in which the first suit is instituted, is a Court of competent jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed in the subsequently instituted suit.

    10. The learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court in the case of

    M/S Sohal Engineering Works, Bhandup, Bombay vrs. Rustam Jehangir Vakil Mills Co. Ltd., Ahmedabad, reported in AIR 1981 Gujarat 110, has explained the term "directly and substantially in issue" as under:

    5

    "13. On a plain reading of the contents of Section 10 of the Code, it is crystal clear that the object of the provision is to prevent Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from adjudicating upon parallel litigations between the same parties having the same matter in issue with a view to avoiding conflict of decisions. The policy of the law is that if the matter in issue in the two parallel suits is identical in the interest of judicial comity, the Court in which the subsequently instituted suit is pending shall stay the proceedings and allow the previously instituted suit. to proceed. The key words in the Section are: "the matter in issue is directly and substantially in issue" in the previously instituted sui . t. T P he words "directly and substantially in issue" are used in contradistinction to the words "incidentally or collaterally in issue". That means that the Section would apply only if there is identity of the matt er H in issue in both the suits meaning thereby that the whole of the subject-matter in both the proceedings is identical and not merely one of the many issues which arise for determination in the two suits. That, however, does not mean that all the issues must be identical, that is, t f he subject matter need not

    be the same in every particular. To that extent, Section 10 differs from Section 11 which engrafts the do t ctrine of res judicata. Under Section 11 even if one of the two issues is commono to both the suits, the decision on that issue would operate as r r es judicata in any suit subsequently decided between the same parties so far as that issue is concerned. That is why the working test evo u lved by the Bombay High Court in the case of Trikamdas (AIR 1942 Bom 314) is that if by the decision in the previously instituted suit the subsequent suit would fail as a whole on the principle of res o judicata, the subsequent suit must be stayed. 14. There can, therefore, be little doubt that Section 10 of the Code is mandatory in character. If the matter in issue in the subsequently instituted suit is directly and substantially in issue in the previously

    instituted suit, the Court is precluded from proceeding with the

    subse quCently instituted suit. In that case it is imperative on the Court to h stay the subsequently instituted suit and await the decision in the previously instituted suit. It is, however, a question of fact to be gathered g

    from the pleadings of the two suits as to whether the matter in issue in i

    the subsequently instituted suit is directly and substantially in issue in the previously instituted suit. In the present two suits the parties are the same and both the suits arise out of the very same contract. The scope of H

    the first suit is, however, limited in that the endeavour of the plaintiff in that suit is to restrain the defendant from committing a breach of the contract. That suit, therefore, clearly arises under the contract. Once the contract is established and there is a reasonable apprehension of the contract being broken, the plaintiff is entitled to request the Court to restrain the defendant-firm from committing a breach of the contract. The subsequently instituted suit, however, proceeds on the basis that the defendant has been guilty of non-performance of the contract and, therefore, the plaintiff-company has become entitled to damages. The

    subsequently instituted suit also arises out of the very same contract, as

    its non-performance entitles the plaintiff-company to sue the defendant-

    firm in damages. In the first suit the question of breach of contract does

    not arise, but it is a suit based on an existing contract, which, it is

    apprehended, is about to be broken. The subsequent suit arises ex

    contractu as it proceeds on the basis that the defendant-firm has

    committed a breach of the contract and has, therefore, entitled the

    6

    plaintiff-company to sue for damages. Therefore, the field of controversy of the two suits cannot be said to be identical because what the plaintiff will have to prove in the first suit is merely the existence of the contract and the alleged apprehension of breach thereof. In the subsequent suit the plaintiff will have to prove not only the existence of the contract but failure on the part of the defendant-firm to perform its part of the contract and to establish its right to claim damages from the defendant- firm and to prove the quantum of damages. Strictly speaking, therefo.re, the field of controversy of the two suits cannot be said to be so identical that the decision of the former suit would conclude the subsequent suit on the doctrine of res judicata. Even if the plaintiff-companPy fails to prove in the former suit the alleged apprehension and. the suit is dismissed on that ground, the subsequent suit based on actual breach of contract will still survive. I am, therefore, of the opi H nion that Mr. Zaveri is not right when he contends that in the facts and circumstances of the two suits, the subsequently instituted suit ou f ght to have been stayed by the learned trial Judge."

    11. The learned Single Judge of t t he M a o dras High Court in the case of R. Srinivasan vrs. Southern Petroc r hemical Industries Corporation Ltd., reported in AIR 1992 Madras 363, has held that there must be an identity of the subject-matter, the field o u f controversy between the parties in the two

    suits must also be the sa o me, but the identity contemplated and the field of controversy contem C plated should not be identical in every particular, but the identity and the field of controversy must be substantially the same. It has been held a h s follo ws:

    ig

    "8. Under Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, no Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between H

    the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the sme title where such suit is pending in the same or any other Court in India having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed. This section does not contemplate an identity of issues between the two suits, nor does it require that the matter in issue in the two suits should be entirely the same or identical. What the section requires is that the matter in issue in the two suits should be directly and substantially the same, and proper effect must be given to the language used by the

    legislature in S. 10 that the identity required is a substantial identity.

    There must be an identity of the subject-matter, the field of controversy

    between the parties in the two suits must also be the same, but the

    identity contemplated and the field of controversy contemplated should

    not be identical and the same in every particular, but the identity and the

    field of controversy must be substantially the same. Where there are

    different and indpendent transactions between the parties, a suit qua

    7

    one transaction cannot be stayed when a suit qua second transaction is filed."

    12. The learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court in the case of Ajit Singh vrs. Sadhu Singh, reported in AIR 2004 Delhi 320, has held that the provisions of Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply wh.en decision in one suit would non-suit the other suit. Only in that even P t it could be said that the matter in issue in both the suits are d.irectly and substantially the same. It also cannot be said that the wh H ole of the subject matter in both the suits is identical. In case of two f sui o

    ts between the same parties when the facts clearly disclose an d also establish that the suit property in the subsequent suit is ab r solu t tely distinct and separate from that of the earlier suit and there is no identity at all with regard to cause of action and also the reliefs that are sought in both suits, the subsequent suit

    between the same parties was nuot liable to be stayed as provisions of Section

    10 of CPC are not a C pplicab o le. It has been held as follows: "7. I have heard the counsel appearing for the parties and have h considered the pleadings and the records very carefully in the light of the submissions made by the counsel appearing for the parties. The earlier g

    suit is admittedly filed by the plaintiff against the defendants in respect i

    of the ground floor portion of the property No. L-59, Kalkaji, New Delhi. The contention in the said suit was that the plaintiff inducted the defendants, who are cousin brothers of the plaintiff, as Licensees as at H

    that relevant point of time when they were given shelter in the said premises, they were undergoing financial distress because of the death of their father, who was the uterine brother of the father of the plaintiff. The judgment and the decree that was passed by the Additional District Judge, Delhi in the other suit, namely, suit No. 63/1992 was only in respect of the ground floor of the property bearing No. L-59, Kalkaji, New Delhi. So far the present suit is concerned, the plaintiff was compelled to file this suit as according to the plaintiff the defendant forcibly entered into possession of the first floor and the barsati floor

    some time in 1993. The defendants in their written statement filed in the

    present suit have stated in paragraph 11 that in the first week of April

    1993, the plaintiff out of his own volition, voluntarily and having realised

    the mistake handed over the vacant possession of the first floor and the

    barsati floor to the defendants and had also assured the defendants to

    withdraw the suit pending before Tis Hazari, Delhi, but later on he

    resoled from the said assurance. The aforesaid facts clearly disclose and

    8

    also establish that the suit property in the present suit is absolutely distinct and separate from that of the earlier suit. The issues that are also being raised in the present suit cannot be said to be identical in view of the fact that the contention that is raised in the present suit is that the defendants forcibly entered into the possession of the first floor and the barsati floor whereas according to the defendants possession of the said floors was given by the plaintiff to the defendants of his own volition with a further statement that he will withdraw the suit, which i P s pend.ing in the Tis Hazari Courts, namely, suit No. 63/1992. Therefore, it cannot be said that the matters in issue in both the suits are identica . l. 8. Besides, the relief which is sought for by the plaintiff herein is a decree for recovery of possession of the first floor and the barsati floor of the

    premises in question. The said relief would f not be available and could not be given to the plaintiff automatically and on thHe basis of the decree which is already passed even when the same is upheld by the appellate court. In the subsequent suit, the plai o ntiff has also claimed for mesne profits and damages, which are als o not issues, which had arisen for consideration in the earlier suit. The provisions of Section 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply w t hen decision in one suit would non-suit the other suit. Only in that e r vent it could be said that the matter in issue in both the suits are directly and substantially the same. It also cannot be said that the whole of u the subject matter in both the suits is identical. It is true that some of the issues which would arise for consideration could be identical but not all the issues. There is no identity at all with regard to the cause of o action and the suit property and also the reliefs that are sought for. The decision of this Court in Sagar Shamsher Jung Bahadur Rana and another v. The Union of India and others (supra) is distingu C ishable on facts. The ratio that is laid down in the said decision was r endered in the context of the facts of that case. It is also clear from a reading of the said judgment that this Court while deciding the said case applied the principles of res judicata for stay of the suit. In the said h proceedings the plea of res judicata was specifically raised by the defendant whereas in the present suit the defendants have not raised the g

    plea of res judicata specifically and, therefore, in my considered opinion i

    the ratio of the said decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The plaintiff in the said suit, which was stayed, claimed recovery of Rs. 18 lacs on account of principal amount and interest by sale of the H

    mortgaged property. The present suit is, however, filed for decree for recovery of possession and for damages and mesne profits, which relief cannot be said to be identical with that of the relief sought for in the suit No. 62/1993." 13. In the case of National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences vrs. C. Parameshwara, reported in AIR 2005 SC 242, their lordships of the Supreme Court have explained applicability of "directly and

    substantially in issue". Their lordships have further held that the

    fundamental test for applicability of S. 10 is whether decision in previous suit

    9

    operates as res judicata in subsequent suit. Their lordships have further held that Section 10 CPC only applies in cases where whole of the subject matter in both the suits is identical. It has been held as follows:

    "8. The object underlying Section 10 is to prevent Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits in respect. of the -same matter in issue. The object underlying Section 10 is to avoid two parallel trials on the same issue by two Courts and P to avoid recording of conflicting findings on issues which are . directly and substantially in issue in previously instituted suit. The language of Section 10 suggests that it is referable to a suit instituted in the civil

    Court and it cannot apply to proceedings of ot f her na H ture instituted under any other statute. The object of Section 10 is to prevent Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits between the same parties in respect of the same matter in issue. The fundamental test to attract Section 10 is, whether on final decision being

    reached in the previous suit, suc t h de cis o ion would operate as res-judicata in the subsequent suit. Section 10 applies only in cases where the whole of the subject matter in both the suits is identical. The key words in Section 10 are "the matter in r issue is directly and substantially in issue" in the previous institu u ted suit. The words "directly and substantially in issue" are used in contra-distinction to the words "incidentally or collaterally in issue". Therefore, Section 10 would apply only if there is identity of the o matter in issue in both the suits, meaning thereby, that the whole of subject matter in both the proceedings is identical." 14. Their lo C rdships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Aspi Jal and anothe r vrs. Khushroo Rustom Dadyburjor, reported in (2013) 4 SCC 333, h have held that for Section 10 CPC to be attracted, it is essential that g the entire subject matter in controversy must be the same between pr i evious suit and the subsequent suit. Mere common grounds in previous H suit and subsequent suit would not attract Section 10 CPC. Their lordships have explained the words and phrases "matter in issue" as follows: "9. Section 10 of the Code which is relevant for the purpose reads as follows:

    " 10. Stay of suit.- No Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim litigating under the same title where such suit is pending in the same or any other Court in India having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed, or in any Court beyond the limits of India established or

    10

    continued by the Central Government and having like jurisdiction, or before the Supreme Court. Explanation.- The pendency of a suit in a foreign Court does not preclude the Courts in India from trying a suit founded on the same cause of action."

    From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is evident that wher.e a suit is instituted in a Court to which provisions of the Code a . pply, it shall not proceed with the trial of another suit in which the matter P in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties. For application of the provisions of Section 10 of the Code, it is further required that the Court in which the previous

    suit is pending is competent to grant the f relief claimed. The use of negative expression in Section 10, i.e. "no court shHall proceed with the trial of any suit" makes the provision mandatory and the Court in which the subsequent suit has been filed is prohibited from proceeding with the trial of that suit if the conditions laid d o own in Section 10 of the Code are satisfied. The basic purpose and the underlying object of Section 10 of the Code is to prevent the Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously entertaining a t nd adjudicating upon two parallel litigations in respect of same cause of action, same subject matter and

    the same relief. This is to pin down the plaintiff to one litigation so as to

    avoid the possibility o u f contrradictory verdicts by two courts in respect of the same relief and is aimed to protect the defendant from multiplicity of proceeding.

    10. The view o which we have taken finds support from a decision of this Cou C rt in National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences vrs. C.Par ameshwara, (2005) 2 SCC 256 in which it has been held as follows: " 8. The object underlying Section 10 is to prevent courts of h

    concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits in respect of the same matter in issue. The object underlying g

    Section 10 is to avoid two parallel trials on the same issue by two i

    courts and to avoid recording of conflicting findings on issues which are directly and substantially in issue in previously instituted suit. The language of Section 10 suggests that it is H

    referable to a suit instituted in the civil court and it cannot apply to proceedings of other nature instituted under any other statute. The object of Section 10 is to prevent courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits between the same parties in respect of the same matter in issue. The fundamental test to attract Section 10 is, whether on final decision being reached in the previous suit, such decision would operate as res-judicata in the subsequent suit. Section 10 applies only in cases where the whole of the subject-matter in both the suits is

    identical. The key words in Section 10 are "the matter in issue is

    directly and substantially in issue" in the previous instituted suit.

    The words "directly and substantially in issue" are used in

    contradistinction to the words "incidentally or collaterally in

    issue". Therefore, Section 10 would apply only if there is identity

    of the matter in issue in both the suits, meaning thereby, that the

    whole of the subject-matter in both the proceedings is identical."

    11

    11. In the present case, the parties in all the three suits are one and the same and the court in which the first two suits have been instituted is competent to grant the relief claimed in the third suit. The only question which invites our adjudication is as to whether "the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in previously instituted suits". The key words in Section 10 are "the matter in issue is directly and substantially in issue in the previously instituted suit". The test for applicability of Section 10 of the Code is whether on a final decis.ion being reached in the previously instituted suit, such decision would operate as res-judicata in the subsequent suit. To put it di . fferently one may ask, can the plaintiff get the same relief in the subsequent Psuit, if the earlier suit has been dismissed? In our opinion, if the answer is in affirmative, the subsequent suit is not fit to be stayed. However, we

    hasten to add then when the matter in con f trov er H sy is the same, it is immaterial what further relief is claimed in the subsequent suit. 12. As observed earlier, for application of Section 10 of the Code, the matter in issue in both the suits have to be directly and substantially in

    issue in the previous suit but the qu es o tion is what "the matter in issue" exactly means? As in the present case, many of the matters in issue are common, including the issue as to whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recovery of possession of the suit t premises, but for application of Section

    10 of the Code, the e u ntire s r ubject-matter of the two suits must be the same. This provision will not apply where few of the matters in issue are common and will apply only when the entire subject matter in controversy is s o ame. In other words, the matter in issue is not equivalent to any of the questions in issue. As stated earlier, the eviction in the third suit has been sought on the ground of non-user for six months prior to the insti C tution of that suit. It has also been sought in the earlier two suits on th e same ground of non-user but for a different period. Though the ground of eviction in the two suits was similar, the same were based on different causes. The plaintiffs may or may not be able to establish the h ground of non-user in the earlier two suits, but if they establish the ground of non-user for a period of six months prior to the institution of g

    the third suit that may entitle them the decree for eviction. Therefore, in i

    our opinion, the provisions of Section 10 of the Code is not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case." H 15. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. The same is dismissed, so also the pending application(s), if any. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the learned trial Court on 15.2.2016. January 07, 2016, ( Rajiv Sharma ),

    (karan) Judge.

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