Loading..
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • ARTICLE 309 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Indian Police Service Recruitment Rules
  • Section 115, sub-section (7).
  • Rule 11 of the amended Rule s, C
  • provisions of the Constitution. Proviso to Article 309
  • Punjab Service of Engineers (Irrigation Branch) Class I Service Rules, 1964
  • Article 309, the rules
  • Seniority Rules, Recruitment Rules and Promotion Regulations
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • ARTICLE 309 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Indian Police Service Recruitment Rules
  • Section 115, sub-section (7).
  • Rule 11 of the amended Rule s, C
  • provisions of the Constitution. Proviso to Article 309
  • Punjab Service of Engineers (Irrigation Branch) Class I Service Rules, 1964
  • Article 309, the rules
  • Seniority Rules, Recruitment Rules and Promotion Regulations
Smart Summary

Case Summary: LPA No. 8 of 2011 (High Court of Himachal Pradesh) — Judgment dated 30 November 2015

Factual and Procedural Background

This Letters Patent Appeal (LPA No. 8 of 2011) was filed by Satish Jamwal and others (appellants) against the State of Himachal Pradesh and others (respondents). The appeal challenged the judgment of the learned writ Court dated 30.12.2010 which had dismissed the petition seeking quashing of the Recruitment and Promotion Rules for the posts of District Audit Officer and Panchayat Instructor (Class-II) in the Department of Panchayati Raj, Himachal Pradesh.

Brief factual matrix (as presented in the opinion):

  • Appellants: working as Panchayat Inspectors. Private respondents: working as Auditors with respondent No.2.
  • Historically (prior to 1996/1999): Auditors were promoted to District Audit Officers (12 posts) and Panchayat Inspectors to Instructors (6 posts) — separate promotion avenues existed.
  • Amendment dated 15.07.1996: provided 50% reservation of promotions to Auditors and 50% to Panchayat Inspectors for respective higher posts, to give equal opportunities.
  • Amendment in 2007: both categories (Auditors and Panchayat Inspectors) having five years' service became eligible for promotion to higher posts on a combined basis; the earlier 50% reservation and the roster application were removed. Rule 11 of the amended Rules provided for preparation of a combined seniority list of eligible Auditors and Panchayat Inspectors on the basis of length of service without disturbing cadre-wise inter se seniority.
  • The learned writ Court dismissed the challenge to the 2007 amendment, holding that there was rationality in the State's approach of making both categories eligible for common higher posts on the basis of joint seniority. The present appeal challenged that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the amended Recruitment and Promotion Rules (notably the 2007 amendment removing the 50% reservation and introducing combined seniority) are contrary to executive instructions issued by the Government.
  2. Whether the 2007 amendment is liable to be struck down because it adversely affects the appellants' chances of promotion.
  3. Whether the amendment is arbitrary, illegal or contrary to basic principles of service law (i.e., whether it should be struck down on grounds of unconstitutionality or arbitrariness).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The Recruitment and Promotion Rules (as amended) are contrary to executive instructions issued by the Government.
  • The 2007 amendment is liable to be struck down because it affects and reduces the appellants' chances of promotion.
  • The amendment is illegal, arbitrary and against basic principles of service law.

Respondents' Position

  • The Advocate General supported the judgment rendered by the learned writ Court (i.e., the impugned amendment and the writ court's dismissal of the petition). No further detailed respondent arguments are recorded in the opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Priyanka Gautam and others v. State of H.P. and others (CWP No. 354 of 2014, decided 31 May 2014) Executive/administrative instructions cannot override statutory Rules made under Article 309; where rules exist, administrative instructions can fill gaps only if not inconsistent. The Court relied on this authority to reject the appellants' contention that the rules were contrary to executive instructions, observing that executive instructions must conform to statutory rules (not vice versa).
Dhole Govind Sahebrao v. Union of India, (2015) 6 SCC 727 Reaffirmation that mere chances of promotion are not conditions of service; only right to be considered is a term of service. Cited to support the proposition that a reduction in chances of promotion does not amount to a change in conditions of service and thus cannot, by itself, invalidate the amendment.
State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni, (1981) 4 SCC 130 Mere chances of promotion are not conditions of service; a right to be considered is a term of service but mere eligibility/chance is not. Applied to hold that the appellants' claim based on reduced chances of promotion did not demonstrate an alteration of conditions of service warranting invalidation of the Rules.
Palaru Ramkrishnaiah & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr., (1989) 2 SCC 541 Changes affecting the chances of promotion (delays or reduction) do not necessarily amount to variation in conditions of service. Referred to for the same legal proposition — the Court used it as part of a line of authorities confirming that mere diminution of promotion prospects is not a service-condition violation.
Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra, (1974) 1 SCC 317 Chances of promotion are not conditions of service; changes that merely affect chances do not vary conditions of service. Used as supporting authority in the chain of decisions cited to establish the general legal rule on promotion chances.
State of Mysore v. G. B. Purohit, (1967 SLR 753) Reiterated that mere chances of promotion are not conditions of service. Referenced through other authorities (cited in the opinion) to buttress the principle that loss of seniority places does not equate to reduction in rank or conditions of service.
Syed Khalid Rizvi & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 1993 Supp. (3) SCC 575 Examined whether seniority is a condition of service or part of recruitment rules; clarified that seniority is an incidence/interest of service and that chances of promotion are not conditions of service. Cited to explain the distinction between vested rights and interests (seniority) and to support the conclusion that seniority/rules of recruitment govern promotion, but mere chances are not protected as conditions of service.
State of M.P. v. Shardul Singh, (1970) 1 SCC 108 Definition/understanding of "conditions of service" — matters regulating holding of post from appointment to retirement. Referred to in the opinion's exposition of what constitutes conditions of service versus mere promotion chances.
I.N. Subba Reddy v. Andhra University, (1977) 1 SCC 554 Reiterated views on the meaning of conditions of service. Used as part of the supporting chain to define 'conditions of service' and to limit the protection afforded to mere promotion chances.
Mohd. Shujat Ali v. Union of India, (1975) 3 SCC 76 Rule which confers a right to actual promotion or a right to be considered for promotion is a condition of service. Cited to distinguish between a real promotion right (which is protected) and mere chances (which are not).
Mohd. Bhakar v. Krishna Redudy, (1970 SLR 768) Held that any rule affecting promotion relates to conditions of service (contextual citation in text). Part of the jurisprudential background invoked in the opinion to delineate scope of 'conditions of service'.
A. K. Bhatnagar v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 544 Seniority is an incidence of service and where service rules prescribe its computation it is governed by such rules. Cited to emphasize that seniority is governed by rules and can be fixed according to existing prescriptions; supports the legality of working out seniority by rules.
S.S. Bola & Ors. v. B.D. Sardana & Ors., (1997) 8 SCC 522 Distinguishes between vested rights and interests; seniority is an interest and chances of promotion are not a vested right; rules can be amended subject to law. Relied upon extensively to explain the difference between a right and an interest and to support the proposition that seniority/chances can be affected by valid law without creating a vested right to promotion.
B.S. Vadera v. Union of India, AIR 1969 SC 118; Raj Kumar v. Union of India, (1975) 4 SCC 13; K. Nagaraj v. State of A.P., (1985) 1 SCC 523; T. R. Kapur v. State of Haryana, 1986 Supp. SCC 584 Examples of decisions discussing amendment of Rules under Article 309 and retrospective effect; part of authorities on rule amendment principles. Referred to in context of discussing the competence to amend service rules and whether vested rights can be taken away by law.
Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P., (1977) 5 SCC 201 Discusses incidence of right to seniority and effect of amendments on rights/interests. Used to support the view that seniority is a facet of interest and can be regulated by law.
State Of Punjab v. Kailash Nath, (1989) 1 SCC 321 Discusses classification of conditions of service (salary, confirmation, promotion, seniority etc.) in context; relevant to what constitutes conditions of service. Referred to as part of jurisprudence on what constitutes conditions of service and the limits of that concept.
State Of Punjab v. Shri Kishan Das, (1971) 1 SCC 319 Discussed forfeiture of past service affecting increments/seniority and its constitutional implications (Article 311(2)); context used in S.S. Bola discussion. Cited as part of the discussion in S.S. Bola regarding alteration of seniority/forfeiture and constitutional consequences.
Jagadeesan v. Union of India, (1990) 2 SCC 228 Change in rules affecting chances of promotion does not amount to an invalid retrospective effect if right to be considered remains; mere chances are not protected. Invoked to reinforce that adverse impact on promotion chances is not in itself fatal to a re-determination of rules.
Union of India v. S. L. Dutta, (1991) 1 SCC 505 Policy changes that affect chances of promotion do not necessarily change conditions of service where eligibility to be considered remains. Cited to support the conclusion that change of policy affecting promotion prospects does not, per se, invalidate such change.
Union of India & Ors. v. Colonel G.S. Grewal, (2014) 7 SCC 303 Reiterated that promotions already granted are not taken away and future chances of promotion are not vested rights; chance of promotion is not a condition of service. Used to emphasize that unless a vested right is shown to have been taken away, an administrative/policy change affecting future promotion prospects cannot be struck down.
P.U. Joshi & others v. Accountant General, Ahmedabad & others, (2003) 2 SCC 632 Questions relating to constitution, pattern, nomenclature of posts, cadres, qualifications and avenues of promotion belong to the field of policy and are within the exclusive discretion of the State (subject to constitutional limits). Applied by the Court to underline that creation/restructuring of cadres and modification of promotion routes lies primarily within State policy-making competence and is not to be dictated by courts except where constitutional limits are breached.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court engaged in a two-part analysis addressing the appellants' principal contentions in sequence:

  1. On the contention that the amended Rules are contrary to executive instructions:
    • The Court observed that the submission proceeds from an erroneous premise: it is the executive instructions that must conform to statutory rules, not the other way round.
    • The Court relied on Priyanka Gautam (and the extract quoted) to hold that executive/administrative instructions cannot override or amend statutory Rules made under Article 309; administrative instructions can only fill gaps when Rules are silent and cannot be inconsistent.
    • Therefore, the appellants' argument that the Rules conflict with executive instructions failed at the threshold because statutory Rules have primacy over administrative instructions.
  2. On the contention that the amendment adversely affects the appellants' chances of promotion and hence alters conditions of service:
    • The Court undertook a detailed review of relevant authorities and a settled line of jurisprudence culminating in the proposition that "chances of promotion do not constitute conditions of service."
    • The Court identified the legal distinction between: (a) a right to be considered for promotion (a term/condition of service), and (b) mere chances or prospects of promotion (which constitute an interest but are not a protected condition of service).
    • Several Supreme Court authorities were cited and synthesized (for example, Dhole, State of Maharashtra v. Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni, Palaru Ramkrishnaiah, S.S. Bola, Syed Khalid Rizvi and others) to show that reduction/delay in promotion chances, by itself, does not amount to an unconstitutional or illegal change in service conditions.
    • The Court emphasized that seniority is an incidence/interest of service and is governed by service rules; no one has a vested right to promotion or seniority except insofar as rights have already accrued under law or by judicial declaration/mandamus.
    • The Court also noted that policy decisions (including amendments to rules governing recruitment and promotion patterns) fall within the State's discretion and must be respected unless shown to be arbitrary, mala fide or in violation of constitutional limitations — invoking P.U. Joshi for the proposition that constitution, pattern and avenues of promotion are matters of policy for the State.
    • Applying these principles to the facts, the Court observed that prior arrangements resulted in persons with longer service (Auditors) being deprived of promotion vis-à-vis some later-joined Panchayat Inspectors because of the 50% reservation/roster system; the 2007 amendment integrated both feeder categories (same pay scale) and provided for combined seniority and promotions based thereon.
    • The Court found no irrationality or illegality in integrating two feeder categories into a combined seniority list and in making promotions from that combined list. The mere fact that an individual's chances of promotion may be reduced did not amount to a change in conditions of service warranting judicial interference.
  3. On arbitrariness/unconstitutionality:
    • The Court held that there was no demonstration of arbitrariness, mala fides, or perverse application of policy in the amendment challenged.
    • Consequently, the Court concluded that the writ Court had erred in finding against the State and that the State's approach had sufficient rational basis.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Letters Patent Appeal is DISMISSED. The Court found no merit in the appeal and upheld the impugned result (i.e., it did not interfere with the writ Court's dismissal of the challenge to the amended Recruitment and Promotion Rules). The order also dismissed any pending application and left the parties to bear their own costs.

Implications:

  • The 2007 amendment to the Recruitment and Promotion Rules (which removed the 50% cadre-based reservation and provided for eligibility based on combined seniority of Auditors and Panchayat Inspectors with five years' service) stands upheld by this Court.
  • Direct consequence for the parties: the appellants' challenge to quash the amended rules is rejected; the State's rule-making action is validated; the appellants remain bound by the amended procedure for determination of seniority and promotion.
  • The Court's reasoning rests upon an established line of Supreme Court precedents emphasizing (a) the primacy of statutory rules over executive instructions and (b) the legal principle that mere chances of promotion are not conditions of service. The judgment applies those authorities to the facts and does not purport to create a new legal principle.
  • No broader or novel precedent was announced by this opinion beyond application and synthesis of existing authorities; the decision affirms the State's policy discretion in structuring promotion avenues subject to constitutional limits and absent arbitrariness.

Judicial panel: The Hon'ble Chief Justice Mansoor Ahmad Mir and The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan. Judgment delivered on 30 November 2015.

    Satish Jamwal And Others v. State Of H.P. And Others S

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

    LPA No. 8 of 2011 .

    Reserved on: 02.11.2015

    P

    Date of decision: November .30, 2015. Satish Jamwal and others … H .. Appellants Vs. f

    State of H.P. and others t o

    …. Respondents Coram The Hon'ble Mr. Justice M u ansoror Ahmad Mir, Chief Justice. The Hon'ble Mr. Just o ice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?Yes For the Appel lan C ts : Mr. R. K. Gautam, Senior Advocate with Ms. Archana Dutt, Advocate. For the R h espondents : Mr. Shrawan Dogra, Advocate General with Mr. Anup Rattan, Mr. Romesh g

    Verma, Addl. Advocate Generals and i

    Mr. J.K. Verma, Deputy Advocate General, for respondents No. 1 and 2. H

    Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment passed by the learned writ Court on 30.12.2010 whereby the prayer of the petitioners/appellants for quashing the Recruitment and Promotion

    Rules for the post of District Audit Officer/Instructor (Class-II) in the

    Department of Panchayati Raj, Himachal Pradesh has been dismissed.

    2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the appellants were working as Panchayat Inspectors, whereas the private respondents as Auditors with the respondent No.2. Prior to the year 1999, the Auditors used to be promoted as D.A.O. (12 posts) and Panchayat Inspector as _____________________

    1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the Judgment ?

    1

    2

    Instructor (6 posts), but in order to give equal opportunities to both categories, the Recruitment and Promotion Rules were amended . on 15.7.1996 wherein the provision of 50% to the category of A . ud P itors and 50% to the category of Panchayat Inspectors was made for promotion to the post of District Audit Officer and Panchayat Ins f tru cto H rs respectively. 3. The Rules were again amended in the year 2007 whereby both the categories i.e. Auditors an t d P an o chayat Inspectors having 5 years of service were made eligib r le for promotion to the post of District Audit Officers/Panchayat Ins u tructors, but the reservation of 50% earlier provided to each of the o category was done away with and consequently the application of the roster was also done away with. Rule 11 of the amended Rule s, C reads as follows: h "11.In case of recruitment By promotion from amongst the by promotion, deputation/ Auditors/Panchayat Inspectors who g

    transfer, grades from possess five years' regular service or which promotion, regular combined with continuous adhoc i

    deputation/transfer to be service rendered, if any, in the grade prior made: to regular appointment to the post. Provided that for the purpose of H

    promotion a combined seniority list of eligible Auditors and Panchayat Inspectors on the basis of length of service without disturbing their cadre-wise inter se-seniority shall be prepared."

    4. The amendment carried out in the Rules was assailed before the learned writ Court on number of grounds taken therein. However, the learned writ Court dismissed the petition by holding that there was rationality and reasoning in the approach of the respondent-State whereby both the categories have been made eligible to common higher posts on the basis of the joint seniority.

    5. Mr. R.K.Gautam, Senior Advocate, assisted by Ms. Archana Dutt, Advocate, learned counsel for the appellants has primarily raised three contentions:

    3

    (i) that the Recruitment and Promotion Rules are contrary to the executive instructions issued by . the Government ;

    (ii) that the amendment is liable to be struck . do P wn as it affects the chances of promotion of th H e appellants and: (iii) that the amendment deserves to be struck down as it is not only illegal, arbitrary but is against the basic principles of service law. f

    Whereas, the learned Advocate Gen t era l ohas supported the judgment rendered by the learned writ Court. r

    We have heard u learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record o of the case carefully. 6. Insof C ar as the first contention regarding the rules not being in tune with the executive instructions is concerned, suffice it to say that such arg h ument proceeds on erroneous assumptions because it is the

    e i xe g cutive instructions that have to be in tune with the statutory rules and not vice-versa. This aspect of the matter has already been considered in

    H detail by this Bench in case titled Priyanka Gautam and others vs. State of H.P. and others, CWP No. 354 of 2014 decided on 31stMay, 2014, wherein it was held:

    "13. It is settled proposition of law that executive instructions cannot overrule or override the statutory Rules. Therefore, in case there is a conflict between the executive instructions and the rules made under Article 309, the rules made under Article 309 will prevail and in case there is conflict between the rules framed under Article 309 and the law made by the legislature will prevail. It is further trite that administrative instructions or orders can only be issued in matters of which the Rules made under Article 309 are silent, therefore, administrative instructions can only supplant the Rules but cannot supplement the same. Even a policy decision taken by the Government cannot have the force of rule made under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Needless to state that Article 162 whereby the Government is competent to issue administrative instructions/orders and Article 309 operate in different area. In exercising the powers under Article 162, the Government

    4

    cannot ignore the Rules framed under Article 309. Thus, any appointment or regularisation of an appointment made in contravention of the rules made under Article 309 shall be void. It is equally P settled . law that the rules framed under Article 309 cannot be amende . d or modified by an administrative order or instruction even by way of adding to the provisions of the statutory rule, unless there is a H gap in the rule which required to be fill up. Therefore, what essen tially follows is that the Government cannot amend or supersede the statutory Rules by administrative instructions and it is only wh f en the Rules are silent on

    any particular point can the Government fill up the gaps and supplant

    the Rules or the law by issuing instru o ctions that too not inconsistent with

    the Rules. Thus, an adm r inistrati ve instruction cannot abridge or run counter to statutory provision otr Rule."

    7. Coming to the se u cond contention of the appellants regarding the amended rules af o fecting their chances of promotion, it may be observed that it is more than settled that such contention could have been acc h epted o

    Cnly if chances of promotions are treated as conditions of service, but then it is also settled that the mere chances of promotions a i re g not conditions of service and the fact that there is reduction in the H chances of promotion does not tantamount to a change in the conditions of service. A right to be considered for promotion is a term of service, but mere chances of promotion are not. Reference in this regard can conveniently be made to a recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dhole Govind Sahebrao vs. Union of India (2015) 6 SCC 727

    wherein it was held as under:

    "31. We shall now venture to deal with another aspect of the matter, emerging out of the impugned order passed by the High Court. The conclusions drawn by the High Court, as have been recorded in paragraph 46 of the impugned judgment and order dated 13.4.2007, emerged out of a consideration which was noticed in paragraphs 38 to

    45. Paragraphs 38 and 43 to 46 of the impugned judgment and order, have already been extracted hereinabove. A perusal of the above consideration reveals, that the High Court was swayed by the co- incidental prejudice suffered by the erstwhile members of the ministerial cadre, resulting in lost chances of promotion. The aforesaid

    5

    consideration could have been justified only if chances of promotion are treated as conditions of service. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, this Court has repeatedly examined the is . sue whether chances of promotion constitute conditions of service. In this behalf, reference may be made to a few judgments ren . derPed by this Court:

    32. First of all, we may advert to the decision r H endered by this Court in State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Chandra f kan t Anant Kulkarni & Ors., (1981) 4 SCC 130, wherein a thre e o Judge Bench of this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 141-42, para 16)

    "16. Mere chances of promotion are not conditions of service and the fact that the r re wtas reduction in the chances of promotion did not tanta u mount to a change in the conditions of service. A right to be considered for promotion is a term of service, but mere chances of promotion are not. Under the Departmental Examination Rules for STOs, 1954, framed by the former State Gover o nment of Madhya Pradesh, as amended on January 20, C 1960, mere passing of the departmental examination conferred no right on the STIs of Bombay, to promotion. By passing the examination, they merely became eligible for promotion. They had to be brought on to a select list not merely on the length of h

    service, but on the basis of merit-cum-seniority principle. It was, therefore, nothing but a mere chance of promotion. In consequence of the impugned orders of reversion, all that g

    happened is that some of the STIs, who had wrongly been i

    promoted as STOs Grade III had to be reverted and thereby lost a few places. In contrast, the conditions of service of ASTOs from Madhya Pradesh and Hyderabad, at least so far as one H

    stage of promotion above the one held by them before the reorganisation of States, could not be altered without the previous sanction of the Central Government as laid down in the Proviso to sub-section (7) of Section 115 of the Act." (emphasis in original).

    33. Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Palaru Ramkrishnaiah & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr., (1989) 2 SCC 541, wherein a three Judge Bench of this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 552 & 554, paras 12 & 15)

    "12. In the case of Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar, (1974) 1 SCC 317, the petitioners and other allocated Tahsildars from ex- Hyderabad State had under the notification of the Raj Pramukh dated September 15, 1955 all the vacancies in the posts of Deputy Collector in the ex-Hyderabad State available to them for promotion but under subsequent rules of July 30, 1959, 50 per cent of the vacancies were to be filled by direct recruitment and only the remaining 50 per cent were available for promotion and that too on divisional basis. The effect of this change obviously was that now only 50 per cent vacancies in the post of Deputy Collector being available in place of all the vacancies it was to take almost double the time for many other allocated Tahsildars to get promoted as Deputy Collectors. In other words it resulted in delayed chance of promotion. It was, inter alia, urged on behalf of the petitioners that the situation brought about by the

    6

    rules of July 30, 1959 constituted variation to their prejudice in the conditions of service applicable to them immediately prior to the reorganisation of the State and the rules were consequently invalid. While repelling this submission the Constitution Be . nch held: (SCC p. 329, para 15)

    '15…..All that happened as a result of making pPromotions to the posts of Deputy Collectors divisionwis . e and limiting such promotions to 50 per cen t o H f the total number of vacancies in the posts of Deputy Collector was to reduce the chances of promotion ava f ilable to the petitioners. It is now well settled by the decision of this Court in State of Mysore v. G. B. Puroh o it, 1967 SLR 753 (SC), that though a right to be considered for promotion is a condition of service, mere chances of promotion are not. A rule which merely affect chances of promotion cannot be regarded as varying a r con t diti on of service. In Purohit case (supra), the districtwise seniority of sanitary inspectors was changed to Statewise seniority, and as a result of this chan u ge the respondents went down in seniority and became very junior. This, it was urged, affected their o chances of promotion which were protected under the proviso to Section 115, sub-section (7). This contention was negatived and Wanchoo, J., (as he then was), speaking on behalf of this Court observed: 'It is said on C

    behalf of the respondents that as their chances of promotion have been affected their conditions of service have been changed to their disadvantage. We see no h

    force in this argument because chances of promotion are not conditions of service.' It is, therefore, clear that neither the Rules of 30-7-1959, nor the procedure for g

    making promotions to the posts of Deputy Collector i

    divisionwise varies the conditions of service of the petitioners to their disadvantage." H Xxx xxx xxx 15. It cannot be disputed that the Director General of Ordnance Factories who had issued the Circular dated November 6, 1962 had the power to issue the subsequent Circular dated January 20, 1966 also. In view of the legal position pointed out above the aforesaid circular could not be treated to be one affecting adversely any condition of service of

    the Supervisors 'A'. Its only effect was that the chance of

    promotion which had been accelerated by the Circular November

    6, 1962 was deferred and made dependent on selection

    according to the Rules. Apparently, after the coming into force of

    the order dated December 28, 1965 and the Circular dated

    January 20, 1966 promotions could not be made just on

    completion of two years' satisfactory service under the earlier

    Circular dated November 6, 1962 the same having been

    superseded by the later circular. It is further obvious that in this

    view of the matter Supervisors 'A' who had been promoted

    before the coming into force of the order dated December 28,

    1965 and the Circular dated January 20, 1966 stood in a class

    separate from those whose promotions were to be made

    thereafter. The fact that some Supervisors 'A' had been

    promoted before the coming into force of the order dated

    December 28, 1965 and the Circular dated January 20, 1966

    could not, therefore, constitute the basis for an argument that

    those Supervisors 'A' whose cases came up for consideration for

    promotion thereafter and who were promoted in due course in

    accordance with the rules were discriminated against. They

    apparently did not fall in the same category."

    7

    34. This Court had also declared the position of law, on the above aspect of the matter, in Syed Khalid Rizvi & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 1993 Supp. (3) SCC 575, wherein a three Judge Bench P obser . ved as under: (SCC pp. 601-03, paras 30-31)

    "30. The next question is whether the seniority is . a condition of service or a part of rules of recruitment? In State of M.P. v. Shardul Singh, (1970) 1 SCC 108, this Court held that the term conditions of service means all thos f e c ond H itions which regulate the holding of a post by a person right from the time of his appointment (emphasis supp o lied) to his retirement and even beyond, in matters like pe nsions etc. In I.N. Subba Reddy v. Andhra University, (1977) 1 SCC 554, the same view was reiterated. In Mohd. Sh t ujat Ali v. Union of India, (1975) 3 SCC 76, a Constitution B r ench held that the rule which confers a right to actual promotion or a right to be considered for promotion is a rule prescribing a condition of the service. In Mohd. Bhakar v. Krishna Red u dy, 1970 SLR 768, another Constitution Bench held that any rule which affects the promotion of a person relates to his co o ndition of service. In State of Mysore v. G.B. Purohit, 1967 SLR 753, this Court held that a rule which merely affects chances of promotion cannot be regarded as varying a condition of service. Chances of promotion are not conditions of service. C The same view was reiterated in another Constitution Bench judgment in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra, (1974) 1 SCC 317. No doubt conditions of service h

    may be classified as salary, confirmation, promotion, seniority, tenure or termination of service etc. as held in State Of Punjab v. Kailash Nath ., (1989) 1 SCC 321, by a Bench of two Judges but g

    the context in which the law therein was laid must be noted. The i

    question therein was whether non-prosecution for a grave offence after expiry of four years is a condition of service? While negativing the contention that non-prosecution after expiry of 4 H

    years is not a condition of service, this Court elaborated the subject and the above view was taken. The ratio therein does not have any bearing on the point in issue. Perhaps the question may bear relevance, if an employee was initially recruited into the service according to the rules and promotion was regulated in the same rules to higher echelons of service. In that arena promotion may be considered to be a condition of service. In A.K. Bhatnagar v. Union of India, (1991) 1 SCC 544, this Court

    held that seniority is an incidence of service and where the

    service rules prescribe the method of its computation it is

    squarely governed by such rules. In their absence ordinarily the

    length of service is taken into account. In that case the direct

    recruits were made senior to the recruits by regularisation

    although the appellants were appointed earlier in point of time

    and uninterruptedly remained in service as temporary appointees

    along with the appellants but later on when recruited by direct

    recruitment, they were held senior to the promotees.

    31. No employee has a right to promotion but he has only the right to be considered for promotion according to rules. Chances of promotion are not conditions of service and are defeasible. Take an illustration that the Promotion Regulations envisage maintaining integrity and good record by Dy. S.P. of State Police Service as eligibility condition for inclusion in the select-list for recruitment by promotion to Indian Police Service. Inclusion and approval of the name in the select-list by the UPSC, after considering the objections if any by the Central Government is also a condition precedent. Suppose if 'B' is far junior to 'A' in State Services and 'B' was found more meritorious and suitable

    8

    and was put in a select- list of 1980 and accordingly 'B' was appointed to the Indian Police Service after following the procedure. 'A' was thereby superseded by 'B'. Two years later 'A' was found fit and suitable in 1984 and was accordin . gly appointed according to rules. Can 'A' thereafter say . th P at 'B' being far junior to him in State Service, 'A' should become senior to 'B' in the Indian Police Service. The answer is obviously no because 'B' had stolen a march over 'A' and became senior to 'A'. Here maintaining integrity and good record are conditions of

    recruitment and seniority is an incidence of service. Take

    another illustration that the State f Servic H e provides - rule of reservation to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. 'A' is a general candidate holding No. 1 rank according to the roster as he was most meritorious in o the State service among general candidates. 'B' scheduled castes candidate holds No. 3 point in the roster and 'C', scheduled tribe holds No. 5 in the roster. Suppose Indian Police Service Recruitment Rules also provide reservation to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as

    well. By operation r of thte equality of opportunity by Articles 14, 16(1), 16(4) u and 335, 'B' and 'C' were recruited by promotion from State Services to Central Services and were appointed earlier to 'A' in 1980. 'A' thereafter in the next year was found suitab o le as a general candidate and was appointed to the Indian Police Service. Can 'A' thereafter contend that since 'B' and 'C' were appointed by virtue of reservation, though were less C meritorious and junior to him in the State service and gradation list would not become senior to him in the cadre as IPS officer. Undoubtedly 'B' and 'C', by rule of reservation, had stolen a h

    march over 'A' from the State Service. By operation of rule of reservation 'B' and 'C' became senior and 'A' became junior in the Central Services. Reservation and roster were conditions of g

    recruitment and seniority was only an incidence of service. The i

    eligibility for recruitment to the Indian Police Service, thus, is a condition of recruitment and not a condition of service. Accordingly we hold that seniority, though, normally an incidence H

    of service, Seniority Rules, Recruitment Rules and Promotion Regulations form part of the conditions of recruitment to the Indian Police Service by promotion, which should be strictly complied with before becoming eligible for consideration for promotion and are not relaxable." (emphasis in original)

    35. More recent in time, is the judgment rendered by another three Judge Division Bench in S.S. Bola & Ors. v. B.D. Sardana & Ors., (1997) 8 SCC 522. The majority opinion in the above judgment was rendered by Justice K. Ramaswamy. In the process of consideration, he observed as under: (SCC p. 622, para 145)

    "145. It is true that the Rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution can be issued by amending or altering the Rules with retrospectivity as consistently held by this Court in a catena of decisions, viz., B.S. Vadera v. Union of India, AIR 1969 SC 118; Raj Kumar v. Union of India, (1975) 4 SCC 13; K. Nagaraj v. State of A.P., (1985) 1 SCC 523; T.R. Kapur v. State of Haryana, 1986 Supp. SCC 584, and a host of other decisions. But the question is whether the Rules can be amended taking away the vested right. As regards the right to seniority, this Court elaborately considered the incidence of the right to seniority and amendment of the Act in the latest decision in Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P., (!977) 5 SCC 201, relieving the need to reiterate all of them once over. Suffice it to state that it is settled

    9

    law that a distinction between right and interest has always been maintained. Seniority is a facet of interest. The rules prescribe the method of selection/recruitment. Seniority is governed by the existing rules and is required to be worked out accordingly. . No one has a vested right to promotion or seniority but an officer has an interest to seniority acquired by working out . the P Rules. It would be taken away only by operation of valid law. Right to be considered for promotion is a rule prescribed by conditions of service. A rule which affects the promotion of a person relates to

    conditions of service. The rule merely affe H cting the chances of promotion cannot be regarded as f varying the conditions of service. Chances of promotion are not conditions of service. A rule which merely affects the o chances of promotion does not amount to change in the co nditions of service." 36. Consequent upon the above detailed consideration, K. Ramaswamy, J. recorded his conclusion in paragraph 153. On the issue in hand, sub- paragraph A r B otf paragraph 153 is relevant and is being extracted hereunder u : (S.S.Bola case, SCC p. 634) "AB. A o distinction between right to be considered for promotion and an interest to be considered for promotion has always been C maintained. Seniority is a facet of interest. The rules prescribe the method of recruitment/selection. Seniority is governed by the rules existing as on the date of consideration for promotion. Seniority is required to be worked out according to the existing h

    rules. No one has a vested right to promotion or seniority. But an officer has an interest to seniority acquired by working out the rules. The seniority should be taken away only by operation of g

    valid law. Right to be considered for promotion is a rule i

    prescribed by conditions of service. A rule which affects chances of promotion of a person relates to conditions of service. The rule/provision in an Act merely affecting the chances of H

    promotion would not be regarded as varying the conditions of service. The chances of promotion are not conditions of service. A rule which merely affects the chances of promotion does not amount to change in the conditions of service. However, once a declaration of law, on the basis of existing rules, is made by a constitutional court and a mandamus is issued or direction given for its enforcement by preparing the seniority list, operation of the declaration of law and the mandamus and directions issued by

    the Court is the result of the declaration of law but not the

    operation of the rules per se."

    (emphasis in original)

    37. S. Saghir Ahmad, J. concurred with the view expressed by Justice K. Ramaswamy, J. A dissenting view was recorded by G.B. Pattanaik, J. On the subject in hand, however, there was no dissent. The conclusions recorded by G.B. Pattanaik, J. were to the following effect (S.S. Bola case, SCC pp. 665-66 & 675 - 77, paras 199-202 &

    212)

    "199. To the said effect the judgment of this Court in the case of State Of Punjab v. Shri Kishan Das ., (1971) 1 SCC 319, wherein this Court observed an order forfeiting the [pic]past service which has earned a government servant increments in the post or rank he holds, howsoever adverse it is to him, affecting his seniority within the rank to which he belongs or his future chances of

    10

    promotion, does not attract Article 311(2) of the Constitution since it is not covered by the expression reduction in rank.

    200. Thus to have a particular position in the seniority list wi . thin a cadre can neither be said to be accrued or ves . ted right of a government servant and losing some places in the seniority list within the cadre does not amount to reduction in Prank even though the future chances of promotion get delayed thereby. It was urged by Mr Sachar and Mr Mahabi r S H ingh appearing for the direct recruits that the effect of redetermination of the seniority in accordance with the provisions of the Act is not only that the direct recruits lose a few places of seniority in the rank of Executive Engineer but their future chances of promotion are

    greatly jeopardised and that o right hfaving been taken away the Act must be held to be invalid. It is difficult to accept this contention since chances of promotion of a government servant are not a condit r ion t of service. In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni, (1981) 4 SCC 130, this Court held: (SCC p. 141, para 16)

    '6. M u ere chances of promotion are not conditions of o service and the fact that there was reduction in the chances of promotion did not tantamount to a change in the conditions of service. A right to be considered for C

    promotion is a term of service, but mere chances of promotion are not.' 201. To the said effect a judgment of this Court in the case of K. h

    Jagadeesan v. Union of India, (1990) 2 SCC 228, wherein this Court held: (SCC pp. 230-31, para 7)

    ig

    '7……The only effect is that his chances of promotion or his right to be considered for promotion to the higher post H

    is adversely affected. This cannot be regarded as retrospective effect being given to the amendment of the rules carried out by the impugned notification and the challenge to the said notification on that ground must fail.' 202. Again in the case of Union of India v. S.L. Dutta, (1991) 1 SCC 505, this Court held: (SCC p. 512, para 17) '17…..In our opinion, what was affected by the change of

    policy were merely the chances of promotion of the Air

    Vice-Marshals in the Navigation Stream. As far as the

    posts of Air Marshals open to the Air Vice-Marshals in the

    said stream were concerned, their right or eligibility to be

    considered for promotion still remained and hence, there

    was no change in their conditions of service.'

    xxx xxx xxx

    212. So far as the rules dealing with Irrigation Branch are concerned, the said rules namely the Punjab Service of Engineers (Irrigation Branch) Class I Service Rules, 1964 have not been considered earlier by this Court at any point of time. One Shri M.L. Gupta was appointed to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer as a direct recruit on 27-8-1971, pursuant to the result of a competitive examination held by the Haryana Public Service Commission in December 1970. The said Shri Gupta was promoted to the post of Executive Engineer on 17-9- 1976. He made a representation to the State Government to fix up his seniority in accordance with the service rules but as the

    11

    said representation was not disposed of for more than three years he approached the High Court of Punjab and Haryana by filing CWP No. 4335 of 1984. That petition was disposed of by the High Court on the undertaking given by the State that . the seniority will be fixed up soon. The said undertaking not having been complied with, the said Shri Gupta approached the High Court in January 1986 by filing a contempt petition. In PSeptember 1986 the State Government fixed the inter se senio . rity of the said Shri Gupta and other members of the Service and Gupta was shown at Serial No. 72. Two promotees had been shown at Serial Nos. 74 and 75. Those two promote H es filed a writ petition challenging the fixation of inter se sen iority between the direct recruits and promotees and the High Court of Punjab and Haryana by its judgment pa ssed in M

    fay 1987 quashed the order dated 29-9-1986 whereunder o the seniority of the direct recruits and promotees has b t een fixed and called upon the State Government to pas r s a speaking order assigning position in the gradation list. The State Government issued a fresh notification on 24-7-1987 giving detailed reasons reaffirming the earlier seniority wh u ich had been notified on 29-9-1986. Prior to the aforesaid notification of the State Government Shri Gupta had filed a writ petition in the Punjab and Haryana High Court which had b o een registered as CWP No. [pic]6012 of 1986 claiming his seniority at No. 22 instead of 72 which had been given to him under the notification dated 29-9-1986. The promotees also filed C a writ petition challenging the government order dated 24-7-1987 which was registered as CWP No. 5780 of 1987. Both the writ petitions, one filed by the direct recruit, Shri Gupta, (CWP No. h

    6012 of 1986) and the other filed by the promotees (CWP No. 5780 of 1987) were disposed of by the learned Single Judge by judgments dated 24-1-1992 and 4-3-1992, respectively, g

    whereunder the learned Single Judge accepted the stand of the i

    promotees and Shri Gupta was placed below one Shri O.P. Gagneja. The said Shri Gupta filed two appeals to the Division Bench against the judgment of the learned Single Judge, which H

    was registered as Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 367 and 411 of 1992. The aforesaid letters patent appeals were allowed by judgment dated 27-8-1992. This judgment of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court was challenged by the State of Haryana in the Supreme Court which has been registered as CAs Nos. 1448-49 of 1993. This Court granted leave and stayed the operation of the judgment in the matter of fixation of seniority. The promotees also challenged the said judgment of the Division Bench in this Court which has been

    registered as CAs Nos. 1452-1453 of 1993. During the pendency

    of these appeals in this Court, an Ordinance was promulgated on

    13-5-1985 as Ordinance No. 6 of 1995 and the said Ordinance

    was replaced by the impugned Act 20 of 1995 by the Haryana

    Legislature. The validity of the Act was challenged by the said

    Shri Gupta and pursuant to the order of this Court the said writ

    petition having been transferred to this Court has been

    registered as TC No. 40 of 1996. So far as the validity of the Act

    is concerned, the question of any usurpation of judicial power by

    the legislature does not arise in relation to the Irrigation Branch

    inasmuch as the Recruitment Rules of 1964 framed by the

    Governor of Punjab in exercise of power under proviso to Article

    309 of the Constitution which has been adapted by the State of

    Haryana on and from the date Haryana was made a separate

    State had not been considered by this Court nor has any

    direction been issued by this Court. The legislative competence

    of the State Legislature to enact the Act had also not been

    assailed and in our view rightly since the State Legislature has

    the powers under Entry 41 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to

    frame law governing the conditions of service of the employees

    12

    of the State Government. That apart Article 309 itself stipulates that the appropriate legislature may regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any S . tate subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Proviso to Article 309 confers power on the President in connection w . ith P the affairs of the Union and on the Governor in connection with the affairs of the State to make rules regulating the recruitment and the conditions of service until provision in that behalf is made by or

    under an Act of the appropriate legislature under Article 309

    main part. In this view of the matter f , the le H gislative competence of the State Legislature to enact the l egislation in question is beyond doubt. The only que o stion which, therefore, arises for consideration and which is contended in [pic]assailing the validity of the Act is that under the Act the direct recruits would lose several positions in the gradation list and thereby their accrued and vested rights w r ould get jeopardised and their future chances of promotion also wo t uld be seriously hampered and such violation tantamounts to violation of rights under Part III of the Constitution. u For the reasons already given while dealing with the aforesaid contention in connection with the Public Health Branch and the Buildings and Roads Branch the contention raised o in the transfer case cannot be sustained and, therefore, the transfer case would stand dismissed. The Act in question dealing with the service conditions of the engineers belonging to C the Irrigation Branch must be held to be a valid piece of legislation passed by the competent legislature and by giving it retrospective effect no constitutional provision has been violated h

    nor has any right of the employee under Part III of the Constitution been infringed requiring interference by this Court." g

    38. Finally, reference may be made to a decision rendered by this i

    Court in Union of India & Ors. v. Colonel G.S. Grewal, (2014) 7 SCC 303, wherein this Court observed as under: (SCC p. 315, para 28)

    H

    "28. As pointed out above, the Tribunal has partly allowed the OA of the respondent primarily on the ground that the decision contained in the Government Order dated 23-4-2010 amends the promotion policy retrospectively thereby taking away the rights already accrued to the respondent in terms of the earlier policy. It is also mentioned that the revised policy fundamentally changes the applicant's prospects of promotion. What is ignored is that

    the promotions already granted to the respondent have not been

    taken away. Insofar as future chances of promotions are

    concerned, no vested right accrues as chance of promotion is

    not a condition of service. Therefore, in the first instance, the

    Tribunal will have to spell out as to what was the vested right

    which had already accrued to the respondent and that is taken

    away by the Policy decision dated 23-4-2010. In this process,

    other thing which becomes relevant is to consider that once the

    respondent is permanently seconded in DGQA and he is allowed

    to remain there, can there be a change in his service conditions

    vis--vis others who are his counterparts in DGQA, but whose

    permanent secondment is not in cloud? To put it otherwise, the

    sole reason for issuing Government Policy dated 23-4-2010 was

    to take care of those cases where permanent secondment to

    DGQA was wrongly given. As per the appellants, since the

    respondent had suffered final supersession, he was not entitled

    to be seconded permanently to DGQA. This is disputed by the

    respondent. That aspect will have to be decided first. That apart,

    even if it be so, as contended by the appellants, the appellants

    have not recalled the permanent secondment order. They have

    allowed the respondent to stay in DGQA maintaining his

    13

    promotion as Colonel as well, which was given pursuant to . this secondment. The question, in such circumstances, that would arise is whether the respondent can be treated differently even if he is allowed to remain in DGQA viz. whether not allowing him to take further promotions, which benefit is still available to others

    whose permanent secondment is not in dispute, wo . uld amount to discrimination or arbitrariness thereby offending ArticPles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In our opin H ion, these, and other related issues, will have to be argued and thrashed out for coming to a proper conclusion."

    39. It is apparent from a collective peru sal of the conclusions recorded in the judgments extracted in the f foregoing paragraph, that chances of promotion do not constitute a condition of service. In that view of the matter, it is inevita t ble to ohold, that the High Court erred in recording its eventual det r ermination on the basis of the fact that the promulgation of the TA Rules, 2003 and the STA Rules, 2003 was discriminatory and arbitrary with regard to the fixation of the inter se

    seniority, since the u same seriously prejudiced the chances of promotion

    of the erstw o hile members of the ministerial cadre, namely, those memb C ers of the original ministerial cadre, who had not opted for ap pointment/absorption into the cadre of Data Entry Operators, with reference to and in comparison with, those members of the original h ministerial cadre who had opted for appointment/absorption into the g

    cadre of Data Entry Operators. i

    40. As a proposition of law it is imperative for us to record, that H

    chances of promotion do not constitute conditions of service, and as such, mere alteration of chances of promotion, would not per se call for judicial interference. The above general proposition would not be applicable, in case the chances of promotion are altered arbitrarily, or on the basis of considerations which are shown to be perverse or mala fide."

    8. Finally, coming to the question as to whether the Rules are arbitrary, unconstitutional or contrary to service law as alleged, it would be noticed that prior to the year 1996, there were 69 sanctioned posts of Auditors and they used to be eligible for promotion to the 12 posts of District Audit Officers. On the other hand 69 Panchayat Inspectors were eligible to be promoted to six posts of Panchayati Raj Department Instructors. This means that the persons with much longer service in the Auditors category were being deprived of their promotion in comparison

    14

    with the persons who had joined much later as Panchayat Inspectors and attained promotion only on account of the reservation in the roster. .

    9. It is not in dispute that both the Auditors and P P anchayat Inspectors were in the same scale of pay and both were H const.ituted in the feeder category for filling up the higher posts of Distr ict Audit Officers and Panchayati Raj Department Instructors. Obviously f , when there were less

    avenues of promotion provided to the t Au di o tors, there was a lot of heart burning and unrest which ultimately r led to the amendment in the Rules. 10. It is otherwise m u ore than settled that the question relating to constitution, pattern, n o omenclature of posts, cadres, categories, their creation/abolition, prescription of qualifications and other conditions of service pertain to C the field of policy and within the exclusive discretion and juris h diction of the State, though obviously subject to certain limi g tations or restrictions envisaged in the Constitution and, therefore, it i i s not for the statutory tribunals or the Courts at any rate to direct the H Government to have a particular method of recruitment or eligibility criteria for further promotion as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.U.Joshi and others vs. Accountant General, Ahmedabad and others (2003) 2 SCC 632 as under:

    " 10. "We have carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of both parties. Questions relating to the constitution, pattern, nomenclature of posts, cadres, categories, their creation/abolition, prescription of qualifications and other conditions of service including avenues of promotions and criteria to be fulfilled for such promotions pertain to the field of Policy and within the exclusive discretion and jurisdiction of the State, subject, of course, to the limitations or restrictions envisaged in the Constitution of India and it is not for the Statutory Tribunals, at any rate, to direct the Government to have a particular method of recruitment or eligibility criteria or avenues of promotion or impose itself by substituting its views for that of the State. Similarly, it is well open and within the competency of the State to change the rules relating to a service and alter or amend and vary by

    15

    addition/subtraction the qualifications, eligibility criteria and other conditions of service including avenues of promotion, from time to time, as the administrative exigencies may need or necessitate. Likewise, . the State by appropriate rules is entitled to amalgamate departments or bifurcate departments into more and constitute different caPtegories of posts or cadres by undertaking further classification, .bifurcation or amalgamation as well as reconstitute and res truc H ture the pattern and cadres/categories of service, as may be re f quired from time to time by abolishing existing cadres/posts and o creating new cadres/posts. There is no right in any employee of th e State to claim that rules governing conditions of his service should be forever the same as the one when he entered service for all purpose t s and except for ensuring or safeguarding rights or benefits already earned, acquired or accrued at a particular point of time, a G u overnm r ent servant has no right to challenge the authority of the State to amend, alter and bring into force new rules

    relating to ev o en an existing service. "

    11. Ev en C otherwise, we do not find any irrationality or illegality in the actio h n of the respondents whereby two feeder categories in the same pay g scale have been integrated by way of joint seniority list on the basis o i f length of service and thereafter further the promotions are to be made

    H on the basis of the combined seniority list of both the feeder categories. 12. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed alongwith pending application, if any. The parties are left to bear their costs.

    ( Mansoor Ahmad Mir ) Chief Justice

    November 30, 2015 ( Tarlok Singh Chauhan ), (GR) Judge

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Satish Jamwal And Others v. State Of H.P. And Others S
    (Nov 30, 2015)