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High Court of Delhi — Summary of Opinion (RFA (OS) 16/2016)

Factual and Procedural Background

Court: High Court of Delhi. Reserved: 06.04.2016. Pronounced: 22.04.2016. Coram: Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat and Ms. Justice Deepa Sharma.

The parties were partners in a business carried on from premises at Ajmal Khan Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi (suit property: No. 15A/26, basement). The plaintiff asserted a 50% share in the partnership property, the defendant a 25% share and a third person the remaining 25%. Disputes between the parties were referred to a sole Arbitrator by this Court's order dated 09.04.2008. On 24.04.2008 this Court passed an interim order directing the parties to deposit keys with the Arbitrator, appointing the parties as receivers in respect of the premises in their occupation and directing maintenance of accounts and status quo, pending the arbitration.

The Arbitral Tribunal inspected the properties and passed orders directing maintenance of status quo (inspection note dated 30.08.2008; orders dated 12.11.2008 and 25.02.2009). While arbitration proceedings (concerning partnership accounts, dissolution and related business matters) were pending, the plaintiff filed a partition suit (CS (OS) 1573/2012) in May 2012 seeking partition of the suit property and disclosed the pending arbitration and the interim orders.

The defendant resisted the suit, contending abuse of process and reliance on the interim orders and arbitration. The Single Judge, on 26.02.2014, passed a preliminary decree recognizing a 50% share for the plaintiff. After appointment and report of a Local Commissioner and further directions, the Single Judge passed a final decree (orders dated 14.01.2016 and clarified 03.02.2016) physically dividing the basement into two equal shares and directing demolition and reconstruction of a dividing wall to effectuate equal division.

The defendant filed this appeal (RFA (OS) 16/2016) challenging the preliminary and final decrees on grounds including that the civil court ought not to have proceeded because the disputes were subject to arbitration.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the civil court should have refrained from passing a preliminary and final decree of partition while related disputes were pending before an Arbitral Tribunal, and whether the arbitration proceedings ousted the civil court's jurisdiction (principally invoking Section 5 and Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996).
  2. Whether the appellant is precluded from challenging the correctness of the preliminary decree at the stage of appeal from the final decree by virtue of Section 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e., whether failure to appeal the preliminary decree bars later challenge).
  3. Whether the defendant's reliance on interim orders passed in the arbitration proceedings (status quo and receivership) rendered the partition decree a nullity or unenforceable.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Defendant)

  • The partition suit was not maintainable because related disputes between the parties had been referred to arbitration; Section 5 of the Arbitration Act (and related principles) required the civil court to abstain from deciding matters which were the subject of arbitration.
  • The Court's interim order dated 24.04.2008 (and subsequent arbitral orders/minutes) had put the parties into a status quo and receivership position; the civil court's decree of partition was made in direct contradiction of those binding interim orders and prejudiced the parties' rights.
  • Reliance placed on Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan (AIR 1954 SC 340) to contend that the civil decree rendered in the face of arbitration proceedings is a nullity and unenforceable; further reliance on an Arbitral Tribunal order (dated 18.01.2011) indicating that consequential distribution and possession issues would be addressed on finalization of accounts and dissolution of the partnership.

Respondent's Arguments (Plaintiff)

  • Reliance on Section 97 CPC: because the defendant did not appeal the preliminary decree, he is precluded from disputing its correctness in an appeal from the final decree; the defendant's failure to challenge the preliminary decree forecloses the present attack.
  • The subject-matter of the arbitration (accounts, dissolution and other partnership matters) is different from the partition claim regarding the plaintiff's 50% ownership; the defendant never pleaded or proved that the partition claim was covered by an arbitration agreement or that the civil court's jurisdiction was ousted.
  • The defendant did not seek a reference of partition-related disputes to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act and did not include a prayer for such reference in the written statement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kiran Singh and Others v. Chaman Paswan and others, AIR 1954 S.C. 340 Cited by appellant to contend that a civil decree passed in the face of arbitration is a nullity and unenforceable. The Court recorded the appellant's reliance on this decision but did not accept that the decree was invalid; it held that the appellant had not shown that the partition claim was covered by an arbitration agreement or that the civil court's jurisdiction was ousted.
Mool Chand v. Dy. Director Consolidation, 1995 (5) SCC 631 Principle that failure to appeal against a preliminary decree bars challenging its correctness in an appeal against the final decree (statutory finality under Section 97 CPC). The Court relied on this authority to support the view that a preliminary decree, if not appealed, becomes final as to matters covered and bars later challenge in an appeal from the final decree.
Ahmed Musaji Saleji & Ors v. Hashim Ebrahim Saleji & Ors, AIR (1915) P.C. 116 (Privy Council) Held that failure to appeal against a preliminary decree operates as a bar to raising objections to it in an appeal from the final decree. The Court cited the decision as part of the line of authorities establishing the effect of Section 97 CPC and the finality of unchallenged preliminary decrees.
Venkata Reddy v. Pothi Reddy, AIR (1963) SC 992 (Supp. 2 SCR 616) Statement that a preliminary decree should, insofar as it deals with matters covered by it, be regarded as embodying the final decision of the Court passing that decree. The Court relied on this authority to underscore that a preliminary decree is final in respect of matters decided by it and supports barring later challenge under Section 97 CPC.
Gyarsi Bai & Ors v. Dhansukh Lal & Ors, AIR (1965) SC 1055 Affirmed the principle that a preliminary decree is final in respect of the matters decided before it is made; final decree ordinarily works out the rights already settled. Used by the Court as part of the jurisprudence confirming the finality of preliminary decrees for matters covered and as support for preclusion under Section 97 CPC.
Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Verma Transport Co., (2006) 7 SCC 275 Held that an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act filed after the filing of the written statement is not maintainable; mere disclosure of an arbitration agreement in the written statement is insufficient unless accompanied by a prayer for reference and the original agreement/certified copy. The Court applied this precedent to find that the defendant had not complied with Section 8 prerequisites (no application for reference at the time of first statement, no original arbitration agreement produced and no prayer for reference), and thus the civil court was not precluded from proceeding with the partition suit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded along two main strands: (A) the preclusive effect of Section 97 CPC regarding unchallenged preliminary decrees; and (B) the interplay between the civil court's jurisdiction and arbitration law (Sections 5 and 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996).

A. Section 97 CPC and Finality of Preliminary Decree:

  • The Court reviewed statutory text of Section 97 CPC and an established line of authorities (Mool Chand, Ahmed Musaji Saleji, Venkata Reddy, Gyarsi Bai) establishing that if a party aggrieved by a preliminary decree does not appeal, he is precluded from disputing its correctness in an appeal from the final decree.
  • Applying these principles, the Court observed that the defendant did not appeal the preliminary decree passed on 26.02.2014. The defendant therefore became precluded from contesting matters decided by that preliminary decree in the present appeal from the final decree.
  • The Court rejected the defendant's contention that the preliminary decree was a nullity capable of being attacked later: the defendant did not adequately demonstrate nullity in a manner that would overcome the statutory bar, nor did he explain why the preliminary decree was not challenged earlier.

B. Arbitration Jurisdiction (Sections 5 and 8 of the Arbitration Act):

  • The Court examined the defendant's reliance on Section 5 (and general arbitration principles) to contend that the civil court's jurisdiction was ousted. The Court noted Section 8(1) and 8(2) requirements: a party must apply before submitting its first statement on the substance of the dispute and must accompany the application with the original arbitration agreement or a certified copy.
  • Relying on Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Verma Transport Co., the Court held that a mere disclosure of an arbitration agreement in the written statement is insufficient without a prayer for reference and production of the agreement; and an application under Section 8 after the filing of the written statement is not maintainable.
  • The Court found that the defendant's written statement did not (a) seek a reference of the partition claim to arbitration under Section 8, (b) produce an arbitration agreement showing that partition was arbitrable, or (c) show that the civil court's jurisdiction was ousted by agreement. Consequently, the preconditions for referral under Section 8 were not satisfied and the civil court was entitled to proceed.
  • Moreover, the Court observed that the disputes before the Arbitral Tribunal related to partnership accounts, dissolution and winding-up issues and therefore involved a different set of entitlements than the straightforward claim of 50% ownership of the suit property, which the defendant had not disputed.

C. Conclusion of Analysis:

  • Because the defendant failed to challenge the preliminary decree and did not fulfill statutory requirements for seeking reference to arbitration, the Court concluded the appeal was not maintainable.
  • The Court found the appellant's explanation and reliance on interim arbitral orders inadequate to displace the civil court's jurisdiction or to demonstrate that the preliminary decree was a nullity.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court dismissed the appeal. The core ruling is summarized as:

DISMISSED

Direct consequences:

  • The final decree passed by the learned Single Judge (including the physical division and consequential directions for the suit property) stands.
  • No costs were awarded ("No costs").

Broader implications:

The opinion confines itself to application of Section 97 CPC and the statutory scheme under Sections 8 and 5 of the Arbitration Act. It does not purport to lay down an expansive new principle beyond those statutory and precedential applications; accordingly, the direct effect is limited to the parties (i.e., the final decree remains operative), and the Court did not pronounce any wider departure from established law.

    Ravinder Kaur v. Gagandeep Singh

    * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Reserved on: 06.04.2016

    Pronounced on: 22.04.2016

    + RFA (OS) 16/2016, C.M. APPL.6799-6801/2016

    RAVINDER KAUR …………Appellant Through: Sh. P.V. Kapur, Sr. Advocate with Sh. J.S. Bhasin, Ms. Rashmi Priya, Ms. Divya Kapur, Sh. Nishant Shokeen and Sh. Indrajit Singh, Advocates.

    Versus

    GAGANDEEP SINGH ……..Respondent

    Through: Sh. Jagjit Singh with Sh. Bhagat Singh, Advocates.

    CORAM:

    HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE DEEPA SHARMA

    MR. JUSTICE S. RAVINDRA BHAT

    %

    1. The defendant in a suit on the file of this Court, appeals a final decree made by the learned Single Judge, on 14.01.2016. The appellant urges in essence that the partition suit - which was decreed finally- was not maintainable, by reason of pending arbitration proceedings. The appeal is thus premised on Section 5 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("Arbitration Act").

    2. The plaintiff and defendant entered into a partnership agreement for carrying out business under the style of "Nu-Nischal's Klick Selection" from property No. 15A/26, (basement), WEA, Karol Bagh, New Delhi (hereafter

    1

    "suit property"). The suit property is owned and possessed jointly by the plaintiff and the defendant. In the partnership, however, the plaintiff has 50% share while defendant has 25% share. The balance 25% share is with Sahib Singh, s/o Late Amarjeet Singh, the plaintiff's brother. The partners of the firm thus are closely related. The firm apparently did not succeed and the partners mutually settled to work separately from December 2007. Both started carrying their businesses independently. The plaintiff independently started his business from the ground floor 15A/16, WEA, Ajmal Khan Road Karol Bagh, New Delhi. The disputes between parties was referred to the sole Arbitrator appointed by this Court by its order dated 09.04.2008 in OMP No. 192/2008 and OMP No 193/2008 with consent of parties.

    3. On 24.04.2008 this Court made an ad-interim order, which was to bind the parties (in OMP 192/2008 and OMP 193/2008). The said order is extracted below:

    "Vide order dated 9.04.2008, an Arbitrator was appointed with the consent of the parties to adjudicate the disputes inter se the parties. The parties were directed to appear before the learned Arbitrator on 28.04.2008. Counsels for the parties state that in the interregnum, during the period when the Local Commissioners were directed to complete the proceedings of commissions in terms of the orders dated 9.04.2008 and 11.04.2008, further disputes have arisen between the parties and that each of them feels threatened by the other, thus hindering the smooth transaction of business at the two shops, subject matter of the present OMPs. Both the parties express an apprehension that the other party may obstruct their ingress and egress into the said shops and create hindrances in the peaceful running of the business from the premises, during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings. However, neither of the parties disputes the fact that the partnership deed executed between the

    2

    parties could be dissolved in accordance with the terms and conditions contained therein. While counsel for the petitioner submits that the partnership stands dissolved in view of his notice dated 31.3.2008, counsel for the respondent objects to the modality of the termination. Needless to state that the said issues may be raised before the learned Arbitrator appointed in the case, who shall decide the same.

    To allay the apprehensions expressed by the parties and at the same time ensure that the business being conducted from the premises is not brought to a stand still during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings, the following orders are passed: -

    i. The petitioner shall deposit the keys of the premises no. 15A/2 (basement) Ajmal Khan Road, New Delhi-110005 with the Arbitrator on 28.04.2008. Similarly, the respondents shall deposit the keys of the premises no. 15A/16 (ground floor) Ajmal Khan Road, NewDelhi 110005 with the Arbitrator on the same day. Both the set of keys handed over to the Arbitrator shall be retained by him, till the disposal of the arbitration proceedings and be returned thereafter as deemed fit in terms of the award passed.

    ii. During the pendency of the arbitration proceedings, the petitioner, Mr. Gagandeep Singh is appointed as a Receiver in respect of premises No.15A/16 (ground floor), Ajmal Khan Road, NewDelhi-110005. Similarly, the respondents in OMP No.192/2008, Ms. Ravinder Kaur and Mr.Sahib Singh are appointed as Receivers, in respect of the premises no.15A/26 (basement), Ajmal Khan Road, New Delhi-110005. Both the parties shall maintain the accounts in respect of the goods of the partnership firm in the premises in their respective occupation, till the Arbitrator passes an award.

    iii. Neither party shall operate any independent account in respect of the goods of the partnership firm. The petitioner, Mr.Gagandeep Singh, confirms that an account opened by him with Bank of Baroda, as a Sole Proprietor shall not be operated by him till the arbitration proceedings are over.

    3

    With the consent of the respondent, keys of the two side shutters of premises no. 15A/16 Ajmal Khan Road, New Delhi- 110005 are handed over by the Local Commissioner to the petitioner, through counsel.

    It is left open to both the parties to approach the Arbitrator to seek permission to make withdrawals from the three bank accounts of the two partnership firms, out of which, two are maintained with the Bank of Baroda, Karol Bagh branch and one with the HDFC bank, Rajinder Nagar branch, for conducting day-to-day business.

    Both the petitions as also the pending applications are disposed of with the above orders. Needless to state that in case either of the parties needs any further interim measures in respect of the shop premises or the conduct of the business during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings, they shall be at liberty to approach the Arbitrator, as per law."

    4. After the matter was referred to learned Sole Arbitrator, Justice J.P. Singh (Retd.), disputes arose between the parties regarding smooth running of business from the suit premises. Accordingly, the plaintiff moved an application under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act filed before the Arbitral Tribunal, which inspected the two premises (including the suit property). The Tribunal prepared an inspection note on 30.08.2008 and thereafter directed parties to maintain status quo in respect of both the properties, by orders dated 12.11.2008 and 25.02.2009 on the basis of undertakings given by the parties.

    5. When disputes pertaining to the dissolution of the firm and issues of accounts of the partnership business were pending before the Tribunal, the plaintiff filed CS (OS) 1573/2012, in May, 2012, on the file of this Court, claiming the partition of the suit property. The plaintiff disclosed the pending

    4

    arbitration proceedings before the Tribunal, the order dated 24.04.2008 (of status quo and receivership) etc, in the suit. In the written statement filed by the Defendant/appellant, it was urged that the suit constituted an abuse of process of Court, since the parties were bound by the earlier status quo order of the Court in pursuance to the arbitration applications made before the Court. It was also stated that the partition of property during pendency of disputes pertaining to the partnership business was not feasible.

    6. On 26.02.2014, in the light of submissions and statement on behalf of the parties, the learned Single Judge made the following order, in the suit:

    "1. The learned counsel for the defendant has stated that so far as the plaintiff is concerned, he has 50 per cent interest in the shop in question and accordingly, there is no dispute regarding the shares of both the plaintiff and the defendant. However, it is submitted by him that as the defendant has been appointed as a receiver of the shop in question and the matter is pending before the learned arbitrator, the final decree to that effect may not be passed.

    2. I have considered the submission made by the learned counsel for the defendant as well as the learned counsel for the plaintiff. The case which has been set up by the plaintiff in the plaint is that on 12.10.1998 he had purchased 50 per cent share in the basement of property No. 15A/26 WEA. Ajmal Khan Road. Karol Bagh, New Delhi which is situated on a plot of land measuring 267 square yards. The defendant in his written statement has not denied this averment made by the plaintiff.

    3. In the light of the fact that there is no denial by the defendant in the written statement and the statement is made by the learned counsel at the bar, 1 feel this court can pass a preliminary decree of 50 per cent each of shares of the plaintiff and the defendant in respect of the suit property.

    4. Accordingly, a preliminary decree for 50 per cent of the

    5

    property in respect of the suit basement is passed in favour of the plaintiff."

    The learned Single Judge also directed appointment of a Local Commissioner to inspect the suit property and report to the Court, to facilitate a division of the property, so that a final decree could be drawn.

    7. After considering the Local Commissioner's report and hearing counsel for the parties, the learned single judge made the following order:

    6. Accordingly, a final decree is passed by giving physical possession of the 50% area of the basement of the shop no.15A/26, WEA, Ajmal Khan Road, Karol Bagh, New Delhi to each of the parties. The portion which is called as the back portion by the Local Commissioner is given to the defendant and the front portion as stated by the Local Commissioner is given to the plaintiff. Giving of these portions will however be done with a slight variation in view of the existing position as to possession, because, the back portion and the front portion are divided by a wall which is not exactly at the middle of the shop, The total length of the shop is 6r3" and the uniform breadth 33'9". Due to the existing wall, the portion which falls to the share of the defendant has a length of 33 ft. and the portion which falls to the share of the plaintiff has a lesser length of 28'3". Since each of the party has to have an equal length of 30 ft. 7-1/2 inches, therefore, the existing wall will have to be demolished and a fresh wall will have to be constructed exactly at the centre point of 61'3" i.e 30 ft7-1/2 inches. This new portion wall will be of 14 inches thick, and 7 inches of this wall will fall in the portion which is earmarked to the plaintiff and 7 inches of this wall will fall in the portion which will be earmarked to the defendant, and to the best possible approximation at the site position." The order further appointed another counsel as a Local Commissioner to oversee the demolition of the wall and issued consequential directions. By the second order dated 03.02.2016, the learned Single Judge clarified that the

    6

    rear portion of the suit property so described was really the front portion as it abutted the road.

    8. The appellant alleges - and her learned senior counsel, Mr. P.V. Kapoor, argues- that the impugned orders (i.e the preliminary decree dated 26.02.2014, the order dated 14.01.2016 and the subsequent order of 03.02.2016 are erroneous and unsustainable in law. It is argued that the learned Single Judge completely overlooked the circumstance that the arbitration application led to an unopposed order, especially the one dated 24.04.2008 which constituted both parties as receivers of the properties in their possession, pending adjudication before the arbitral tribunal. Learned senior counsel submitted that there being no dispute that the arbitration proceedings have not culminated in a final decision, it was an undisputed fact that the said interim orders bound the parties. The decree of partition was consequently drawn directly in the teeth of the said orders requiring maintenance of status quo, pending award. Learned counsel also relied on the subsequent orders and minutes of arbitration proceedings, as well as other orders made by the Court in the arbitration matter, to say that the parties understanding always was that disputes had to be finally resolved in arbitration. The interdiction by the civil court thus resulted in more fractious situations and prejudiced the valuable rights of the parties.

    9. Mr. Kapoor relied on Section 5 of the Arbitration Act to say that since the disputes inter se were referred to arbitration- even though they pertained to the question of partnership business, the Court should have desisted from making a decree. It was highlighted that the right to possession of the entire suit property, as opposed to the right to the property was a subject matter of

    7

    arbitration proceedings. Both issues were, therefore, linked and the Court should have desisted from making a decree which was likely to finally determine the rights of the parties. Counsel submitted that the bar to Section 5 of the Arbitration Act had the effect of invalidating the decree, as the civil court's jurisdiction was ousted. He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Kiran Singh and Others v. Chaman Paswan and others, AIR 1954 S.C. 340 and urged that the decree is a nullity and, therefore, unenforceable. In this regard, the order of the Arbitral Tribunal, dated 18.01.2011 to the following effect, is highlighted:

    "On finalization of accounts, what shall be the consequential distribution/shares in terms of share capital and proportion contained in the partnership Deed and what other directives are necessary to wind up the partnership firm in totality and effective date thereof"

    It is urged that in the circumstances the Arbitrator will decide the issue of dissolution of partnership business as also the question of possession of premises at the time of making the Award.

    10. Mr. Jagjit Singh, learned counsel for the plaintiff, urges that the present appeal is not maintainable. He relies on Section 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) and argues that once the defendant chose not to impugn the preliminary decree, he is foreclosed from challenging it at the stage of drawing of final decree. He argues that the subject matter of the arbitration is entirely different and highlights that the defendant never stated that the subject matter of the suit was covered by the reference, or was subject to arbitration. Furthermore, the defendant also did not deny that the plaintiff was owner of the suit property to the extent of 50%. In such event,

    8

    decree had to follow. Counsel denied that Section 5 of the Arbitration Act applied to the facts of this case.

    Analysis and conclusions

    11. Section 97 of the CPC, which, the plaintiff insists, constitutes a bar to the maintainability of the present appeal, reads as follows:

    "97. Appeal from final decree where no appeal from preliminary decree - Where any party aggrieved by a preliminary decree passed after the commencement of this Code does not appeal from such decree, he shall be precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree."

    The Supreme Court had occasion to deal with the finality statutorily imputed by reason of Section 97 in a number of judgments. In Mool Chand v Dy. Director Consolidation 1995 (5) SCC 631, it held as follows:

    "Thus, if an appeal is not filed against the preliminary decree and its correctness is not challenged, it becomes final and the party aggrieved thereby will not be permitted to challenge its correctness in an appeal against final decree. The Privy Council in Ahmed Musaji Saleji & Ors v Hashim Ebrahim Saleji & Ors, AIR (1915) PC 116, held that failure to appeal against a preliminary decree would operate as a bar to raising any objection to it in an appeal filed against final decree. Thus Court in Venkata Reddy v Pothi Reddy [1963] Supp. 2 SCR 616 = AIR (1963) SC 992, 993 has held that the impact of Section 97 is that the preliminary decree, so far as the matters covered by it are concerned, is regarded as embodying the final decision of the Court passing that decree. It observed as under:

    "A preliminary decree passed, whether it is in a mortgage suit or a partition suit, is not a tentative decree but must, in so far as the matters dealt with by it

    9

    are concerned, be regarded as embodying the final decision of the Court passing that decree,.........................". This decision was relied upon in Gyarsi Bai & Ors v Dhansukh Lal & Ors AIR (1965) SC 1055 in which it was observed as under:

    "It is true that a preliminary decree is final in respect of the matters to be decided before it is made. It is indisputable that in a mortgage suit there will be two decrees, namely preliminary decree and final decree, and that ordinarily the preliminary decree settles the rights of the parties and the final decree works out those rights."

    12. The only argument, which the appellant/defendant urged in reply to the plaintiff's reliance on Section 97, was that the provision does not preclude a challenge to a preliminary decree after a final decree is made, if the former is a nullity. Now, that, in the Court's opinion is begging consideration. Besides urging Section 5 of the Arbitration Act, the defendant has nothing to show how the suit properly lay, because there is no dispute that the parties own equal share in the suit property. It has not been pleaded or proved that there exists an arbitration agreement, which precludes the disputes that were urged in the partition suit, from the jurisdiction of the civil court; nor was there any document to show that the Court's jurisdiction in the given facts of the case, was ousted. Besides a bland assertion of nullity, there is no explanation why the preliminary decree was never challenged before the final decree. The mere reliance on the interim orders, which in essence worked out the equities of the parties, to arrive at a working solution pendente lite, as it were, did not displace the undoubted jurisdiction of civil courts over partition claims. Therefore, the explanation of the appellant is

    10

    without merit. The appeal is consequently not maintainable.

    13. Section 8 (1) of the Arbitration Act requires a judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an arbitration agreement, "if a party so applies not later than when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute", to refer the parties to arbitration. The other precondition to the said power is Section 8 (2), which provides that the application under sub-section (1) shall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the original Arbitration Agreement or a duly certified copy thereof. Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. Vs. Verma Transport Co (2006) 7 SCC 275 held that the application under Section 8 of the Act filed after the filing of the written statement was not maintainable. It was also observed that mere disclosure of Arbitration Agreement in the written statement and claiming that Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit would be of no consequence unless the written statement itself contains a prayer for referring the disputes for arbitration. Both the two preconditions were not satisfied in the present case: the written statement filed by the appellant nowhere stated that the dispute pertaining to partition was precluded, as it was arbitrable; furthermore, no arbitration agreement to this effect was ever disclosed. Most importantly the defendant appellant never sought the relief of reference of the disputes pertaining to partition, under Section 8. Such being the case, there was no impediment to the civil court from proceeding to pass the preliminary or final decree. Even otherwise, the Court is satisfied that the disputes before the arbitral tribunal covers an entirely different set of facts and involve the resolution of other entitlements, i.e. the accounts and other matters pertaining to business of the firm. That the plaintiff was 50%

    11

    owner of the suit property was never in dispute.

    14. Having regard to the above findings, this Court holds that this appeal is meritless; it is, therefore, dismissed. No costs.

    S. RAVINDRA BHAT

    (JUDGE)

    DEEPA SHARMA

    (JUDGE)

    APRIL 22, 2016

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