The petitioners, arrayed as A1 to A4, A6 to A9 and All, seek to quash the complaint in C.C No. 198 of 2009 on the file of the Learned Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Nagercoil, filed by the Respondent.
2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners, learned counsel for the respondent and the learned Amicus Curiae. Bias:
3. Bias is a condition or a state of mind which impairs the concept of impartiality in a decision making process. It might arise in an administrative, executive, quasi judicial or judicial decision making. Such a bias occurs due to pre-determination or pre-disposition leading to a decision moving in one direction, sans impartiality. Thus bias strikes at the very basis of a decision, which is supposed to be fair.
4. As bias emanates from the mind of a person, proof of it is at times very difficult. Therefore, a litigant has been given the lesser burden of establishing before the Court that there exists a real likelihood of bias or reasonable suspicion of it. The test is not existence of the bias as an authority may act in good faith, but such an action is liable to be questioned on the ground of real likelihood of bias or reasonable suspicion of it. This is for the reason that a mind may honestly think and act keeping fairness in mind, but such a decision which flows from it might lead to an element of bias unconsciously.
5. Bias is synonymous with prejudice. Robert Ingersoll defined prejudice in the following manner:
“Prejudice is the spider of the mind. It is the womb of injustice.”
When an apparent bias transforms itself into a womb of injustice then, it has to be struck down by the Courts.
6. Bias can be divided into three parts. They are:
(i) Pecuniary Bias
(ii) Personal Bias and
(iii) Official Bias.
7. We are primarily concerned with personal and official bias. Bias may also occur by a combination of these two. When an authority, plays a role being predominant in nature, cannot thereafter take a different role leading to a positive or potential conflict with the earlier one. This mixture of two roles would create either likelihood of bias or reasonable apprehension of bias. The source of the potential bias has to be a personal interest for it to be potentially objectionable in law.
8. The Courts have evolved the principles governing bias i.e, real likelihood of bias test and reasonable suspicion test. For the real likelihood of bias test, the paramount consideration is from the point of view of a fair minded informed observer. Insofar as the reasonable suspicion test is concerned, the test is from the point of view of a reasonable common mind. Though the Courts have evolved these two principles, in effect there is little difference between the two. A fair minded man also has to be reasonable and vice versa. What is reasonable is a quality that has to be attributed to a fair minded informed person. Similarly, a reasonable member of the public has to exhibit fairness. After all the principles governing natural justice are ingrained in the conscious of a man, thus the words “reasonable man” and a “fair minded man” are interchangeable to be applied to the facts of a particular case by the Court while testing a possible existence of a bias. The concept of informed observer is one which is developed by the Courts. It is not as if a reasonable member of the public is neither complacent nor unduly sensitive or suspicious as held by Kirby J in Johnson v. Johnson, (2000) 200 CLR 488, 509. A reasonable man is not a rustic, but reasonably informed. The word “well informed” has to be seen in the context of worldly knowledge which a reasonable man is also expected to possess. To put it differently, a high degree of intellect is not required. Ultimately it is for the Court to decide whether there exists a likelihood or reasonable apprehension of bias warranting interference. The background of bias has to be very reasonable suspicion of bias or a real likelihood of bias. In fact these two concepts are prefix to bias. The Courts are required not to delve into the actual bias but to find the likelihood or a reasonable existence of it. Therefore, real bias is not a relevant inquiry especially when the same cannot be established with ease. Thus a reasonable apprehension of bias and real likelihood of bias are surrogates for bias. This is also for the reason that apart from rule of law and fairness, there can be an unconscious bias exists though not intended.
9. Pre-determination and pre-disposition are two facets of bias. An alleged predetermination or predisposition has to be highlighted from an apparent bias. An apparent bias has to be found out from the point of view of either a reasonable mind or a fair minded informed observer as discussed above. Thus, the Court has to sit in the armed chair as a fair minded man who otherwise could be called a reasonable man and determine whether there exists a real bias. Therefore, a Court is required to transform itself to such a man and then decide. This is the common law principle, which has been evolved by the Courts. There is very little difference between a real likelihood and a reasonable suspicion of bias in practice. It is ultimately for the Courts to decide that there exists a bias or not. After all, the test of likelihood or reasonable suspicion is a mere instrument in identifying an element of bias.
10. Coming to an official bias, it can transform into legal malice at times but not in every case. To decide as to whether there exists a likelihood or reasonable suspicion of bias, the test shall not be unacceptably high considering the concept and proof of bias.
11. An apparent bias can be identified with the relative ease in pecuniary and personal as against official. Deciphering an official bias is an arduous job for a Court. That is the reason why the tests of likelihood or reasonable suspicion of bias is required to be used.
12. In P.D Dinakaran v. Hon'ble Judges Inquiry Committee ((2011) 8 MLJ 331 (SC)), the Apex Court after considering the judgments of the foreign Courts as well as our High Courts summed up the principles of bias by applying the test of real likelihood from the point of fair minded informed observer. The following paragraph would be apposite:
“71. The principles which emerge from the aforesaid decisions are that no man can be a judge in his own cause and justice should not only be done, but manifestly be seen to be done. Scales should not only be held even but they must not be seen to be inclined. A person having interest in the subject-matter of cause is precluded from acting as a Judge. To disqualify a person from adjudicating on the ground of interest in the subject-matter of lis, the test of real likelihood of the bias is to be applied. In other words, one has to enquire as to whether there is real danger of bias on the part of the person against whom such apprehension is expressed in the sense that he might favour or disfavour a party. In each case, the court has to consider whether a fair-minded and informed person, having considered all the facts would reasonably apprehend that the Judge would not act impartially. To put it differently, the test would be whether a reasonably intelligent man fully apprised of all the facts would have a serious apprehension of bias. In cases of non-pecuniary bias, the “real likelihood” test has been preferred over the “reasonable suspicion” test and the courts have consistently held that in deciding the question of bias one has to take into consideration human probabilities and ordinary course of human conduct. We may add that real likelihood of bias should appear not only from the materials ascertained by the complaining party, but also from such other facts which it could have readily ascertained and easily verified by making reasonable inquiries.”
Regarding the test of real likelihood of bias, it was none the less held what is important is real danger of bias on the part of the person against whom such apprehension is expressed. It was also held that human probabilities and ordinary course of human conduct are the parameters to be taken in mind while indulging in such test.
13. In State of Gujarat v. R.A Mehta, (2013) 1 MLJ 362 (SC), while dealing with the doctrine of bias, the Apex Court held that reasonable suspicion that there is likelihood of bias affecting decision would be sufficient to invoke the doctrine of bias. Therefore, in effect the test of likelihood of bias or reasonable apprehension of bias are interchangeable in nature and consequently, the parameters required for such a test will also be construed to be the same.
Fairness and Rule of Law:
14. Instrumentality of a State and its officials must conform to the Rule of Law leading to fairness in action. It has been well established that fairness is a facet of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Such a fairness in action is also mandatorily to be followed in a criminal investigation. A right to a fair investigation is not only a constitutional right but a natural right as well. In Sathyavani Ponrani v. Samuel Raj, 2010-2-L.W. (Crl.) 792; 2010 (4) CTC 833, while dealing with fair investigation, this Court has held that the same is mandatory under Articles 14, 21 and 39 of the Constitution of India. The following paragraphs would be apposite:
“66. Free and Fair Investigation and Trial is enshrined in Article 14, 21 and 39-A of the Constitution of India. It is the duty of the state to ensure that every citizen of the country should have the free and fair investigation and trial. The preamble and the constitution are compulsive and not facultative, in that free access to the form of justice is integral to the core right to equality, regarded as a basic feature of our Constitution. Therefore such a right is a constitutional right as well as a fundamental right. Such a right cannot be confined only to the accused but also to the victim depending upon the facts of the case. Therefore such a right is not only a constitutional right but also a human right. Any procedure which comes in a way of a party in getting a fair trial would in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.
67. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat [(2004) 4 SCC 158] has observed as follows:
“36. The principles of rule of law and due process are closely linked with human rights protection. Such rights can be protected effectively when a citizen has recourse to the courts of law. It has to be unmistakably understood that a trial which is primarily aimed at ascertaining the truth has to be fair to all concerned. There can be no analytical, all-comprehensive or exhaustive definition of the concept of a fair trial, and it may have to be determined in seemingly infinite variety of actual situations with the ultimate object in mind viz. whether something that was done or said either before or at the trial deprived the quality of fairness to a degree where a miscarriage of justice has resulted. It will not be correct to say that it is only the accused who must be fairly dealt with. That would be turning a Nelson's eye to the needs of the society at large and the victims or their family members and relatives. Each one has an inbuilt right to be dealt with fairly in a criminal trial. Denial of a fair trial is as much injustice to the accused as is to the victim and the society. Fair trial obviously would mean a trial before an impartial judge, a fair prosecutor and atmosphere of judicial calm. Fair trial means a trial in which bias or prejudice for or against the accused, the witnesses, or the cause which is being tried is eliminated. If the witnesses get threatened or are forced to give false evidence that also would not result in a fair trial. The failure to hear material witnesses is certainly denial of fair trial.”
68. Similarly in Tashi Delek Gaming Solutions Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [(2006) 1 SCC 442), the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as follows:
“37. If the agent was to be prosecuted for violation of the term of the notification, he could challenge the validity thereof. A fortiori, a quia timet application would also be maintainable. A person must be held to have access to justice if his right in any manner whether to carry on business is infringed or there is a threat to his liberty. Access to justice is a human right.
38. In Dwarka Prasad Agarwal v. B.D Agarwal [2003-4-L.W. 263; (2003) 6 SCC 230] this Court opined: (SCC pp. 245-46, para 38) “A party cannot be made to suffer adversely either indirectly or directly by reason of an order passed by any court of law which is not binding on him. The very basis upon which a judicial process can be resorted to is reasonableness and fairness in a trial. Under our Constitution as also the international treaties and conventions, the right to get a fair trial is a basic fundamental/human right. Any procedure which comes in the way of a party in getting a fair trial would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal is part of Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950 [see Clark (Procurator Fiscal, Kirkcaldy) v. Kelly [(2003) 1 All ER 1106 (PC)].”
69. In Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab [(2009) 1 SCC 441], the Hon'ble Apex Court was pleased to observe that the right to fair investigation and trial is applicable to the accused as well as the victim and such a right to a victim is provided under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court is extracted hereunder: “28. An accused is entitled to a fair investigation. Fair investigation and fair trial are concomitant to preservation of fundamental right of an accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. But the State has a larger obligation i.e to maintain law and order, public order and preservation of peace and harmony in the society. A victim of a crime, thus, is equally entitled to a fair investigation. When serious allegations were made against a former Minister of the State, save and except the cases of political revenge amounting to malice, it is for the State to entrust one or the other agency for the purpose of investigating into the matter. The State for achieving the said object at any point of time may consider handing over of investigation to any other agency including a Central agency which has acquired specialisation in such cases.”
15. In Azija Begum v. State of Maharashtra, 2012-1-L.W. (Crl.) 485; (2012) 3 SCC 126, the Apex Court has held as follows:
‘13. The issue is akin to ensuring an equal access to justice. A fair and proper investigation is always conducive to the ends of justice and for establishing the rule of law and maintaining proper balance in law and order.”
16. In Subramanian Swamy v. CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682, the Apex Court has ruled that any investigation into crime should be fair and should not be tainted. It has been further held that Rule of Law is a facet of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
17. In Dayal Singh v. State of Uttaranchal, (2012) 8 SCC 263, the Supreme Court has held that the Court is bound to record any deliberate dereliction of duty, designed defective investigation, intentional acts of omission and commission.
18. Therefore, fairness in an action leading to upholding rule of law is a sine qua non of a criminal investigation.
Defective Investigation:
19. Law is quite settled that a defective investigation per se cannot be a ground to declare the innocence of an accused. After all, the role of the Court is to find the truth as every trial is journey towards it. Thus, merely because an investigation is defective and that too on a technical ground, a person charged with an offence cannot be acquitted as a matter of course (See Dayal Singh v. State of Uttaranchal, (2012) 8 SCC 263, State of Gujarat v. R.A Mehta, (2013) 1 MLJ 362 (SC) and Hem Raj S/O Moti Ram v. State Of Haryana, (2014) 2 SCC 395.
Investigator's Bias:
20. An investigator is the kingpin of criminal justice delivery system. (See Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. CBI, (2013) 6 SCC 348).
21. A bias attributed on the part of the investigator may lead to a deception leading to injustice. A duty is imposed upon the investigator to give an impression that it has been done without an element of unfairness or ulterior motive. He must dispel a possible suspicion to the genuineness of the investigation done. An attempt of an investigation officer is to make a genuine endeavour to bring out the truth.
22. Considering the same, the Apex Court in Babubhai v. State of Gujarat (2010-1-L.W. (Crl.) 654; (2010) 12 SCC 254) has held as follows:
“32. The investigation into a criminal offence must be free from objectionable features or infirmities which may legitimately lead to a grievance on the part of the accused that investigation was unfair and carried out with an ulterior motive. It is also the duty of the investigating officer to conduct the investigation avoiding any kind of mischief and harassment to any of the accused. The investigating officer should be fair and conscious so as to rule out any possibility of fabrication of evidence and his impartial conduct must dispel any suspicion as to its genuineness. The investigating officer “is not merely to bolster up a prosecution case with such evidence as may enable the court to record a conviction but to bring out the real unvarnished truth”. (R.P Kapur v. State Of Punjab., AIR 1960 SC 866, Jamuna Chaudhary v. State of Bihar, (1974) 3 SCC 774, para 11 and Mahmood v. State Of U.P , (1976) 1 SCC 542)”
23. Considering the duty of a investigator to conduct a proper investigation, the Apex Court in Manohar Lal Sharma v. Principal Secretary ((2014) 2 SCC 532), made its observation in the following paragraph.
“A proper investigation into crime is one of the essentials of the criminal justice system and an integral facet of rule of law. The investigation by the police under the Code has to be fair, impartial and uninfluenced by external influences.”
Procedure qua a cognizable offence:
24. A First Information Report deals with the cognizance of offences. It can be given either by the complainant or any other person in knowledge of the commission of such offence. The object is to set the Criminal Law into motion. It only enables an officer in charge to commence the investigation qua the crime reported to him. Section 154 of the code, prescribes the mode of recording of information either oral or by written by the officer in charge. Under Section 156 Cr. P.C such an officer is empowered to investigate and cognates the offence. A receipt of an information of offence is not a condition precedent for investigation. Section 157 of the Code deals with prescription for an investigation which can be initiated either by the information or otherwise. Therefore an in-charge police officer can kick start his investigation on information or otherwise. (See State Of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi., AIR 1964 SC 221) Therefore, there is no bar for such an officer to lodge, register and investigate the case.
25. However, the question for consideration is as to whether there would occur a real likelihood or reasonable suspicion of it when an officer, who registers the case, proceed to investigate the case. In this connection, it has to be noted that Section 154 Cr. P.C deals with only an informant. In a case registered under Section 151 of the Cr. P.C, it is only the State, which assumes the role of a prosecutor. Thus, Section 154(2) of the Cr. P.C, provides for giving a copy of the information to the “informant” alone and not to the “complainant”. A complaint as defined under Section 2(d) of the Cr. P.C, is to be given to the Magistrate and on receipt of the same, he/she would be examined by the Court under Section 200 Cr. P.C, in a complaint case. Thus, the words “informant” and the “complainant” are not interchangeable. The following paragraph in Ganesha v. Sharanappa (2014-1-L.W. (Crl.) 665; (2014) 1 SCC 87) would be appropriate.
“Before we part with the case, we may observe a common error creeping in many of the judgments including the present one. No distinction is made while using the words ‘informant’ and ‘complainant’. In many of the judgments, the person giving the report under Section 154 of the Code is described as the ‘complainant’ or the ‘de facto complainant’ instead of ‘informant’, assuming that the State is the complainant. These are not words of literature. In a case registered under Section 154 of the Code, the State is the prosecutor and the person whose information is the cause for lodging the report is the informant. This is obvious from sub-section (2) of Section 154 of the Code which, inter alia, provides for giving a copy of the information to the ‘informant’ and not to the ‘complainant’. However the complainant is the person who lodges the complaint. The word ‘complaint’ is defined under Section 2(d) of the Code to mean any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate and the person who makes the allegation is the complainant, which would be evident from Section 200 of the Code, which provides for examination of the complainant in a complaint-case. Therefore, these words carry different meanings and are not interchangeable. In short, the person giving information, which leads to lodging of the report under Section 154 of the Code is the informant and the person who files the complaint is the complainant.”
26. The Code thus does not bar an informant being a police officer. Therefore, the test of bias would come into play depending upon the roles of the Investigation Officer. If the Investigation Officer has involved himself over two distinct and different roles, then certainly the concept of bias would step in. For example, if the Investigation Officer himself is an eyewitness to the occurrence, though he can register a case, he cannot investigate the same further. In other words, an eyewitness to the occurrence cannot don the role of investigator too. He cannot be allowed to wear two hats at the same time. The concept of official and personal bias would come into play, though an officer is expected to act in a fair manner. There may not be any actual bias, but one of reasonable suspicion or likelihood of bias. However, when an officer receives information either orally or otherwise, he is merely registering the cognizable offence, thereafter proceeds to investigate. The recording by the officer is his official duty as that of the investigation. There is no twin contra roles involved. Similar is the case of an officer registering an F.I.R suo motu based upon a source information. Such registration qua an offence is on a reasonable suspicion. Cases of such a nature would not attract the concept of bias. After all in all official action fairness is presumed.
Precedents:
27. Now, let us analyse the decision rendered by the Apex Court in this regard. In Bhagwan Singh v. State Of Rajasthan ., (1976) 1 SCC 15, the allegation was an offer of bribe made. The officer who made the allegation himself took the task of investigation. Therefore, the Apex Court rightly held that on the principle governing bias and fairness in action, the investigation cannot be given the approval of the Court. Similarly in Megha Singh v. State Of Haryana, (1996) 11 SCC 709, P.W 3 intercepted the accused and recovered arms and thereafter, registered the case and proceeded with the investigation. As admitted, he was the person who apprehended the accused and registered and investigated the case and there was no other independent witness examined except the evidence of P.Ws 2 and 3. The Apex Court rightly held that the complainant should not have proceeded with the investigation, as it impinges upon the impartial investigation. Incidentally, P.W 2 also accompanied P.W 3, being a Police Officer. In State v. V. Jayapaul, (2004) 5 SCC 223, the facts are to the effect that the F.I.R was registered based upon the information received. Thereafter, the said officer proceeded to investigate. On those facts, the Apex Court was pleased to distinguish the earlier decisions and held that there is no bias involved. In State v. V. Jayapaul, (2004) 5 SCC 223, the decisions in Bhagwan Singh v. State Of Rajasthan ., (1976) 1 SCC 15 and Megha Singh v. State Of Haryana, (1996) 11 SCC 709 were considered and held as follows:
“6. Though there is no such statutory bar, the premise on which the High Court quashed the proceedings was that the investigation by the same officer who “lodged” the FIR would prejudice the accused inasmuch as the investigating officer cannot be expected to act fairly and objectively. We find no principle or binding authority to hold that the moment the competent police officer, on the basis of information received, makes out an FIR incorporating his name as the informant, he forfeits his right to investigate. If at all, such investigation could only be assailed on the ground of bias or real likelihood of bias on the part of the investigating officer. The question of bias would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and it is not proper to lay down a broad and unqualified proposition, in the manner in which it has been done by the High Court, that whenever a police officer proceeds to investigate after registering the FIR on his own, the investigation would necessarily be unfair or biased. In the present case, the police officer received certain discreet information, which, according to his assessment, warranted a probe and therefore made up his mind to investigate. The formality of preparing the FIR in which he records the factum of having received the information about the suspected commission of the offence and then taking up the investigation after registering the crime, does not, by any semblance of reasoning, vitiate the investigation on the ground of bias or the like factor. If the reason which weighed with the High Court could be a ground to quash the prosecution, the powers of investigation conferred on the police officers would be unduly hampered for no good reason. What is expected to be done by the police officers in the normal course of discharge of their official duties will then be vulnerable to attack.”
28. Therefore, the said decision clearly lays down the position of law between an eyewitness becoming an informer, and an officer receiving information, registering the case and then proceeding further.
29. In S. Jeevanantham v. State, (2004) 5 SCC 230, again the Apex Court has gone into these cases discussed supra. Even in that case an information was received, thereafter, it was recorded and in pursuant to the same, P.W 8 seized the contraband articles and went through with the investigation. The Apex Court rightly held that there is no element of bias involved.
30. In Bhaskar Ramappa Madar v. State of Karnataka, (2009) 11 SCC 690, again the Apex Court was pleased to distinguish the earlier decision and held that merely because the case is registered by P.W 17 on the information given by A1, who lodged the report, it cannot be stated that the investigation is biased.
31. In State v. N.S Gnaneswaran, (2013) 1 MLJ (Crl) 294 (SC), the Apex Court dealt with the case in which an F.I.R was registered based upon an information. Accordingly, no bias was found.
32. Considering the above, this Court is of the considered view that there is no conflict of views in the above said pronouncements, as in the subsequent pronouncements, the earlier decisions have been clearly distinguished on facts. Thus, there is absolutely no bar for a police officer to register the case either suo motu or on an information and then proceed to investigate into the same, in which case, the principles governing bias would not get attracted. If an officer being an eyewitness to an occurrence, which leads to filing of a final report, such an officer shall not proceed with the investigation on the concept of real likelihood or reasonable apprehension of bias. However, such investigation and the Final Report, though void, will not have the effect of nullifying the First Information Report recorded. In other words, it is well open to the Courts to direct investigation to proceed afresh to be done by some other officer other than informant who also incidentally happened to be the eyewitness to the offence alleged.
Case on hand:
33. Coming to the case on hand, the allegation against the petitioners and others is that they along with other people unauthorizedly entered into the railway station, squatted on the tracks causing detention for 15 minutes by shouting slogans in support of their demands, such as to repair the railway route as announced in the Budget and non plying of trains between Nagercoil and Coimbatore. Accordingly, they were arrested and a case has been registered in Crime No. 1134 of 2007 under Section 151 Cr. P.C by the Inspector of Police, Kottar Police Station. Subsequently, further action was dropped. Thereafter, a complaint has been filed by the respondent in Crime No. 648 of 2007 for the alleged offences under Sections 147, 145(b) and 174(a) of Railways Act, 1989. The said complaint has been taken cognizance of. Challenging the same, the present petition has been filed.
34. Section 145 of Railways Act, 1989 deals with nuisance, for which punishment of a fine of Rs. 100/- has been prescribed. Section 147 deals with trespass, which prescribes a punishment of imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or fine of Rs. 1,000/- or both has been prescribed. As per the proviso, there shall not be any punishment less than Rs. 500/- except for special and adequate reasons. Similarly, Section 174 deals with the obstructing the running of a train for the said offence. For the said offence a maximum punishment of 2 years has been prescribed. Under Section 179 of the Railways Act, 1989, for the offences as mentioned above, an authorised officer can arrest a person concerned even without warrant. He may also make an inquiry into the commission of offence mentioned under Section 179(2). Thereafter, he may file a complaint to the competent Court, if an offence is said to have been committed. Section 180-B deals with the powers of officer authorised to inquire. Accordingly, while making inquiry an authorised officer had the following powers:
“(i) summon and enforce the attendance of any person and record his statement;
(ii) require the discovery and production of any document;
(iii) requisition any public record or copy thereof from any office, authority or person;
(iv) enter and search any premises or person and seize any property or document which may be relevant to the subject matter of the inquiry.”
Though the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that there is an element of bias, this Court, on facts, does not find the submission warranting acceptance. Admittedly, the respondent, who gave the complaint, is the authorised officer, who did the investigation. He merely received the statements from the officials and filed the complaint. He is not an eye witness to the occurrence alleged. The earlier complaint was closed only for the offence under Section 151 Cr. P.C Therefore, this court does not find any double jeopardy or bias, more so, when the power is available to the respondent to initiate action.
36. However, this Court finds considerable force in the other submission made. As discussed above, the authorised officer merely recorded the statement of few railway officials. What was required was an inquiry into the alleged offence. The said inquiry is for the purpose of the authorised officer being satisfied that an offence has been committed. Admittedly, neither the petitioners nor the other accused have been called for inquiry. Such a power is very much available to the respondent, including the power of arrest under Section 180 and further inquiry under Section 180-B of the Act. Unfortunately, no such attempt has been made. Further, only 12 persons have been arrayed as accused, though the materials would show that there are 150 to 200 involved. The occurrence was on 01.12.2007 and the complaint was made only on 15.07.2008
37. Considering the same, this Court is of the view that in the interest of justice, the proceedings pending in C.C No. 198 of 2009 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Nagercoil, is required to be quashed. Accordingly, the same is quashed and the Criminal Original Petition is allowed. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed. This Court places on record the assistance of the Counsels who were present in the Court.
VCJ/VCS
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