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  • Article 151, reference to Section 12 of the Lim. Act,
  • sub-Section (2), Section 12 of the Lim. Act.
  • Section 12(2) of the Lim. Act,
  • Article 151, Sch. 1, Lim. Act.
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  • Article 151, reference to Section 12 of the Lim. Act,
  • sub-Section (2), Section 12 of the Lim. Act.
  • Section 12(2) of the Lim. Act,
  • Article 151, Sch. 1, Lim. Act.
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from an appeal against two interlocutory orders made respectively on 23 March 1920 (by Greaves, J.) and 8 April 1920 (by Rankin, J.). The appeal was filed on 17 May 1920. A preliminary objection was raised that the appeal was time-barred under the limitation provisions applicable to appeals (Article 151, Schedule 1, Limitation Act). The appellant relied on Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act to exclude certain days in computing the period of limitation (specifically, exclusion of the day of judgment and "the time requisite for obtaining a copy" after an application for a copy). The Court initially dismissed the appeal as barred by limitation on 13 July 1920. A subsequent application (filed for review) sought to vacate that dismissal and have the Court exercise its discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to enlarge time, supported by an affidavit from the appellant's attorney explaining the steps taken and the grounds for delay.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellant could exclude time under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act (in particular, whether time "requisite for obtaining a copy" began earlier because of a requisition to draw up and file the order) so as to bring the appeal within the 20-day period prescribed by Article 151, Schedule 1, of the Limitation Act.
  2. Whether, in the exercise of the Court's discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the time for filing the appeal should be enlarged in light of the attorney's affidavit, the prevailing practice of the Court, and relevant authorities—despite the appeal having been presented out of time.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant relied on Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act that excludes "the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy" when computing limitation for appeals, submitting that this exclusion reduced the effective period so the appeal was within the 20-day limit of Article 151.
  • The appellant asserted that a requisition made on 24 March to have the order drawn up and filed should trigger the period excluded as "time requisite for obtaining a copy."
  • On review, the appellant submitted an affidavit from his attorney detailing the steps taken and urged that longstanding prior practice of the Court (which, if followed, would have treated the appeal as in time) had been changed, and that he had followed the older practice in good faith.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent argued that the appellant could not rely on Section 12(2) because the application for copies was made only on 29 April (and for the later order on 30 April), that is, after the 20-day period had expired; thus no exclusion under Section 12 could help the appellant.
  • On review, the respondent contended that the practice had been altered by the decision in Pramatha Nath Roy v. W.A. Lee and that this decision had been pronounced well before the present appeal, so the appellant should have followed the new practice rather than the old.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bechi v. Ahsanullah Khan (1) Holds that in computing time to be excluded under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, "the time requisite for obtaining a copy" does not begin until an application for copies has been made. The Court followed this principle and held that a requisition to draw up and file an order (earlier than a formal application for copy) did not start the exclusion period; therefore the appellant could not rely on Section 12(2) to save the appeal from being time-barred.
Harish Chandra Tewari v. Chandpur Company Limited (2) Adopted the view that the time requisite for obtaining a copy begins only from the date of application for the copy. Adopted by the Court as supporting authority for the interpretation of Section 12(2) relied upon in dismissing the preliminary contention on limitation.
Pramatha Nath Roy v. W.A. Lee (3) Held a view supportive of the interpretation that time for obtaining a copy begins on application; however, its precise reasoning was not entirely uniform among the judges. The Court treated this decision as supportive but observed that it did not decisively settle the question; the Chief Justice's reasoning differed in part and the Court noted that officers of the Court had continued to follow the old practice notwithstanding that decision.
Horil Pattuck v. Ram Bhowanee (4) Illustrative authority for the proposition that delay may be excused when a party is misled by a doubtful point of practice or by a change of practice of the appellate court. Cited by the Court in the review to justify exercising discretion under Section 5 to enlarge time where the appellant's attorney followed an older, long-standing practice.
Sukh Dial v. Jey Singh (5) Another example supporting the discretionary excusing of delay under similar circumstances of practice doubt or change. Cited alongside other cases as part of the general proposition justifying enlargement of time where the appellant was misled by practice.
McNair & Co. v. ??? (6) Listed among authorities indicating the circumstances in which delay may be excused (as phrased in the opinion). Cited as part of the general catalog of authorities; the opinion does not supply further detail about the decision in the present text.
Baker v. Faber (7) Another cited authority exemplifying situations in which the Court has excused delay for reasons of being misled by practice. Relied on by the Court as part of the established practice permitting enlargement of time in appropriate cases.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a two-stage analysis: first, it considered the preliminary objection that the appeal was barred by limitation; second, on a review application, it considered whether to exercise the equitable discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to enlarge time.

On the limitation point (initial decision, 13 July 1920):

  • The appeal was filed on 17 May 1920. This was 55 days after the earlier order of 23 March 1920 and 39 days after the later order of 8 April 1920—both beyond the 20 days allowed by Article 151 of the Limitation Act.
  • The appellant relied on Section 12(2) to exclude from computation the day of the order and "the time requisite for obtaining a copy." The Court interpreted Section 12(2) in light of precedent (notably Bechi v. Ahsanullah Khan and Harish Chandra Tewari). It held that the exclusion for "time requisite for obtaining a copy" begins only from the date on which an application for the copy is actually made.
  • Applying that rule to the facts, the Court found that for the earlier order no application for a copy was made until 29 April 1920 (copy ready 5 May), and for the later order no application was made until 30 April 1920—both dates falling after the expiry of the 20-day appeal period. A prior requisition made on 24 March to draw up and file the order did not count as an application that would trigger the exclusion period under Section 12(2).
  • Consequently, the Court concluded the appellant could not rely on Section 12(2) to reduce the effective period within which the appeal had to be filed, and the appeal was therefore barred by limitation. The appeal was dismissed with costs (no special order as to costs).

On the review application (23 July 1920):

  • The petitioner sought vacation of the dismissal and an order under Section 5 to enlarge the time for filing the appeal. He filed an affidavit from his attorney recounting the steps taken and explaining the conduct.
  • The petitioner argued that, had the historical practice of the Court (which had endured for many years) continued to be followed, the appeal would have been regarded as in time; the attorney had acted according to that older practice.
  • The respondent argued that the decision in Pramatha Nath Roy v. W.A. Lee had changed practice and that the petitioner should have followed the new approach. The Court examined that decision and observed that while one judge (Chitty, J.) expressed the view later adopted by this Court, the Chief Justice's judgment did not proceed exactly on that basis; moreover, court officers in practice had continued to act on the older approach in determining whether a memorandum of appeal was presented in time.
  • Given the continued adherence to the old practice by court officers and the lack of a decisive settling of the point by the prior decision, the Court was unwilling to find negligence on the part of the attorney who followed the long-established practice. The Court therefore concluded that this presented a fit case to exercise discretion under Section 5 to enlarge time.
  • The Court emphasized that no universal formula governs the exercise of such judicial discretion but stated generally that delay may be excused where a party is misled by a doubtful point of practice or by a change in practice of the appellate court, citing several authorities as examples.

Holding and Implications

Primary Ruling: The Court maintained the finding that the appeal was presented out of time (i.e., the appeal was "presented out of time" stands as a factual/legal finding).

Final Disposition: Nevertheless, the Court granted the review application in part and exercised its discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to enlarge the time for presentation of the appeal, thereby removing the bar of limitation. Accordingly, the earlier order dismissing the appeal was vacated for the limited purpose of permitting the appeal to be filed within the extended period.

Conditions and Immediate Consequences:

  • The order granting enlargement is conditional on the petitioner paying the costs of the review application to the opposite parties. The sums ordered are Rs. 800 in total (Rs. 400 to each respondent), to be paid forthwith on an undertaking by their attorneys that the money will be refunded if the Court later orders otherwise. The costs will be taxed separately; the earlier order for costs made on 13 July 1920 remains unaffected.
  • An interim injunction already in place will continue until the hearing of the appeal.

Implication regarding precedent: The Court did not purport to establish a new general rule of law; rather, it applied established principles on computation of limitation under Section 12(2) and exercised discretion under Section 5 in a particular factual context where an attorney had followed a long-standing court practice that had in practice continued despite an intervening decision.

Order: Application granted in part; dismissal vacated for the limited purpose of extending time under Section 5 subject to costs and conditions as set out above. Interim injunction to continue until hearing.

This summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion text and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

    Nibaran Chandra Dutt v. Martin And Co.

    Mookerjee, A.C.J:— (13th July 1920).— A preliminary objection has been taken to this appeal which is directed against two orders— one made by Greaves, J. on 23rd March 1920, the other by Rankin, J., on 8th April 1920 The appeal was not filed till 17th May 1920; that is 55 days after the first order and 39 days after the second order. The appellant has consequently to satisfy us that he is entitled to a deduction of time to such an extent as to bring down the period to the 20 days allowed by Article 151, Sch. 1, Lim. Act. For this purpose, the appellant has placed reliance upon Section 12(2) of the Lim. Act, which provides amongst others that;

    “in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from shall be excluded.”

    2. The appellant argues that he has brought his case within the scope of this provision of the law.

    3. In our opinion, there is no foundation for this contention. We need refer in detail to the dates only in so far as the earlier order is concerned. An application for copy of the order was not made till 29th April 1920: the copy was ready for delivery on 5th May following. A deduction of this period is obviously not sufficient for the purposes of the appeal. But the appellant contends that on 24th March he had made a requisition that the order might be drawn up and filed. We are of opinion that this application does not bring the case within sub-Section (2), Section 12 of the Lim. Act. As was pointed out in the case of Bechi v. Ahsanullah Khan (1), in computing the time to be excluded under Section 12 of the Lim. Act, from a period of limitation, “the time requisite for obtaining a copy” does not begin until an application for copies has been made. This view was adopted by this Court in the case of Harish Chandra Tewari v. Chandpur Company Limited (2) and is also supported by the decision in Pramatha Nath Roy v. W.A Lee (3). In fact it is plain that if an application for copy is made after the expiry of the 20 days prescribed by Article 151, reference to Section 12 of the Lim. Act, is of no avail to the appellant. This applies not merely to the earlier order but also to the later order of 8th April 1920. In respect of that order, no application for copy was made till 30th April, that is, after the expiry of 20 days. We are consequently of opinion that the appeal is barred by limitation and must be dismissed with costs. No special order as to costs will be made in this case.

    Fletcher, J.:— I agree.

    JUDGMENT

    4. (23rd July 1920).—This is an application to review the judgment of this Court in an appeal from two orders made by Greaves, J., & Rankin, J., on 23rd March and 8th April 1920, respectively. The appeal was dismissed on 13th July lastr, on the ground that it was barred by limitation. We see no reason to resile from the view we took on that occasion. On the other hand, we are of opinion that the appeal was unquestionably out of time. The petitioner however asks us to vacate that order in so far as it dismisses his appeal and to substitute therefor an order under Section 5 of the Lim. Act. For this purpose, the petitioner has filed an affidavit by his attorney, which sets out in detail to various steps taken before the appeal was lodged and the reasons why he acted as he did. On these new materials, the petitioner has urged that if what was undoubtedly the practice of the Court for many years had not been changed, the appeal would have been treated as in time. The respondent, on the other hand, has contended that the practice was altered by virtue of the judgment of this Court in the case of Pramatha Nath Roy v. W.A Lee and that as that decision was pronounced at least a year before the present appeal was lodged, there is no good ground why the appellant should not have followed the new practice. It is plain however that the decision in Pramatha Nath Boy v. W.A Lee did not decisively settle the question which was decided by us on 13th July 1920. Chitty, J., no doubt took the view which was subsequently adopted by us but the Chief Justice in his judgment did not proceed exactly on that basis. It is further significant that notwithstanding the decision in Pramatha Nath Roy v. W.A Lee the officers of this Court have continued to follow the old practice (as they actually did in the present instance) to determine whether a memorandum of appeal was or was not presented in time. We are consequently not prepared to hold that there was any negligence on the part of the attorney for the plaintiff when he followed what was undoubtedly the practice of this Court for many years, and we are of opinion that this is a fit case for an order for enlargement of time under Section 5 of the Lim. Act. No universal formula can be framed to regulate the exercise of judicial discretion in this class of cases; but it may be stated generally that delay may well be excused when the appellant is misled by a doubtful point of practice or by a change of practice of the appellate Court; Horil Pattuck v. Ram Bhowanee (4), Sukh Dial v. Jey Singh (5), McNair & Co. v. ??? (6) and Baker v. Faber (7).

    5. The result is that the application is granted in part. Our judgment, in so far as it held that the appeal was presented out of time will stand; but the order for dismissal will be vacated and the time for presentation of the appeal will be extended so as to remove the bar of limitation. This order is made on condition that the petitioner pays to the opposite party the costs of this application. The costs will be taxed separately but subject to such taxation, the petitioner must forthwith pay to the opposite parties Rs. 800 (Rs. 400 to each) on an undertaking given by their respective attorneys, Mr. Kally Nath Mitter and Mr. Pyne, that the money will be refunded if the Court otherwise order subsequently. The order for costs which was made on 13th July 1920 will stand unaffected by this order. The interim injunction will continue until the hearing of the appeal.

    V.B/R.K

    6. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Nibaran Chandra Dutt v. Martin And Co.
    (Jul 23, 1920)