Mookerjee, A.C.J:— (13th July 1920).— A preliminary objection has been taken to this appeal which is directed against two orders— one made by Greaves, J. on 23rd March 1920, the other by Rankin, J., on 8th April 1920 The appeal was not filed till 17th May 1920; that is 55 days after the first order and 39 days after the second order. The appellant has consequently to satisfy us that he is entitled to a deduction of time to such an extent as to bring down the period to the 20 days allowed by Article 151, Sch. 1, Lim. Act. For this purpose, the appellant has placed reliance upon Section 12(2) of the Lim. Act, which provides amongst others that;
“in computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from shall be excluded.”
2. The appellant argues that he has brought his case within the scope of this provision of the law.
3. In our opinion, there is no foundation for this contention. We need refer in detail to the dates only in so far as the earlier order is concerned. An application for copy of the order was not made till 29th April 1920: the copy was ready for delivery on 5th May following. A deduction of this period is obviously not sufficient for the purposes of the appeal. But the appellant contends that on 24th March he had made a requisition that the order might be drawn up and filed. We are of opinion that this application does not bring the case within sub-Section (2), Section 12 of the Lim. Act. As was pointed out in the case of Bechi v. Ahsanullah Khan (1), in computing the time to be excluded under Section 12 of the Lim. Act, from a period of limitation, “the time requisite for obtaining a copy” does not begin until an application for copies has been made. This view was adopted by this Court in the case of Harish Chandra Tewari v. Chandpur Company Limited (2) and is also supported by the decision in Pramatha Nath Roy v. W.A Lee (3). In fact it is plain that if an application for copy is made after the expiry of the 20 days prescribed by Article 151, reference to Section 12 of the Lim. Act, is of no avail to the appellant. This applies not merely to the earlier order but also to the later order of 8th April 1920. In respect of that order, no application for copy was made till 30th April, that is, after the expiry of 20 days. We are consequently of opinion that the appeal is barred by limitation and must be dismissed with costs. No special order as to costs will be made in this case.
Fletcher, J.:— I agree.
JUDGMENT
4. (23rd July 1920).—This is an application to review the judgment of this Court in an appeal from two orders made by Greaves, J., & Rankin, J., on 23rd March and 8th April 1920, respectively. The appeal was dismissed on 13th July lastr, on the ground that it was barred by limitation. We see no reason to resile from the view we took on that occasion. On the other hand, we are of opinion that the appeal was unquestionably out of time. The petitioner however asks us to vacate that order in so far as it dismisses his appeal and to substitute therefor an order under Section 5 of the Lim. Act. For this purpose, the petitioner has filed an affidavit by his attorney, which sets out in detail to various steps taken before the appeal was lodged and the reasons why he acted as he did. On these new materials, the petitioner has urged that if what was undoubtedly the practice of the Court for many years had not been changed, the appeal would have been treated as in time. The respondent, on the other hand, has contended that the practice was altered by virtue of the judgment of this Court in the case of Pramatha Nath Roy v. W.A Lee and that as that decision was pronounced at least a year before the present appeal was lodged, there is no good ground why the appellant should not have followed the new practice. It is plain however that the decision in Pramatha Nath Boy v. W.A Lee did not decisively settle the question which was decided by us on 13th July 1920. Chitty, J., no doubt took the view which was subsequently adopted by us but the Chief Justice in his judgment did not proceed exactly on that basis. It is further significant that notwithstanding the decision in Pramatha Nath Roy v. W.A Lee the officers of this Court have continued to follow the old practice (as they actually did in the present instance) to determine whether a memorandum of appeal was or was not presented in time. We are consequently not prepared to hold that there was any negligence on the part of the attorney for the plaintiff when he followed what was undoubtedly the practice of this Court for many years, and we are of opinion that this is a fit case for an order for enlargement of time under Section 5 of the Lim. Act. No universal formula can be framed to regulate the exercise of judicial discretion in this class of cases; but it may be stated generally that delay may well be excused when the appellant is misled by a doubtful point of practice or by a change of practice of the appellate Court; Horil Pattuck v. Ram Bhowanee (4), Sukh Dial v. Jey Singh (5), McNair & Co. v. ??? (6) and Baker v. Faber (7).
5. The result is that the application is granted in part. Our judgment, in so far as it held that the appeal was presented out of time will stand; but the order for dismissal will be vacated and the time for presentation of the appeal will be extended so as to remove the bar of limitation. This order is made on condition that the petitioner pays to the opposite party the costs of this application. The costs will be taxed separately but subject to such taxation, the petitioner must forthwith pay to the opposite parties Rs. 800 (Rs. 400 to each) on an undertaking given by their respective attorneys, Mr. Kally Nath Mitter and Mr. Pyne, that the money will be refunded if the Court otherwise order subsequently. The order for costs which was made on 13th July 1920 will stand unaffected by this order. The interim injunction will continue until the hearing of the appeal.
V.B/R.K
6. Order accordingly.