Ainslie, J.:— This suit is brought by the plaintiff against Mussamut Khanum and her daughter Mussamut Abbasee Begum to recover 37,018-10-9 on a bond dated 19th September 1868 for 20,000, bearing interest at 15 per cent. per annum which has accumulated until it now amounts to Rs. 17,018-10-9, such bond having been executed by the first defendant, during the minority of her daughter, on her own account and as guardian of her daughter.
The bond contains a pledge of a five-sixth share of thirty-two villages, formerly belonging to Aga Wajid Ali Khan, the husband Umda Khanum and father of Abbasee Begum, being the share which, under the Mahomedan law of inheritance, has descended, the two defendants jointly, after deducting a one-sixth share taken by his mother Umda Begum. The bond recites that the moneys were due to Duli Chand under four decrees, all bearing date the 12th May of 1862, in respect of debts due by Aga Wajid Ali; that the executant and her daughter were liable for amount in proportion to their shares in the estate; and that the said decrees had been put in force, and the property of the executant had been attached and advertised for sale. The amount to Duli Chand is not stated. It further recites that there existed other pressing necessities such as payment of Government revenue and sundry other rents, and defraying the expenses of law suits instituted for recovery of arrears due from defaulters, goes on to state that the said decrees and charges had been paid out of the money borrowed. It also contains an assignment Rs. 733 per annum, from 1266 to 1285, out of Rs. 1,400 the rent payable by one Himmutram in respect of a lease of Mouzah Banyawan, in part payment of the amount of the interest.
The answer of the appealing defendant, Mussamut Abbassee Begum is that at the date of the bond she was already married; her husband, being then of full age, was her proper and legal guardian that her mother never obtained legal authority to act as guardian; or the sanction of the Civil Court to the mortgage; she has derived no benefit from the transaction; that the allegation in the bond are false; and that her father's estate yielded a clear annual income of Rs. 5,000.
The Subordinate Judge gave one judgment in this and three other suits in which about Rs. 36,000 was claimed under three other bonds of 1869, 1870 and 1871 respectively. In these last he absolved Abbasee Begum, holding Umda Khanum personal liable. In this suit he held that, although by the mahomed law, a mother is not the guardian of the estate of a minor child, yet as a matter of fact Umda Khanum had acted as of her daughter from the death of Wajid Ali in 1858, when Abbasee was an infant of a few months old up to the time when she attained her majority, and that during this period years neither Abbasee's husband nor any one else ever questioned her authority, and that as late as the 16th December 1874 Abbasee, through her pleader, alleged in the Magistrate's Court that she was still a minor, and that her property was under the management of her mother. He also found that at the date of the bond there were debts chargeable to the estate of Wajid Ali Khan which Umda had to pay, and that there were also marriage expenses of Abbasee, and the expenses of unavoidable to be defrayed. In the course of his judgment the subordinate Judge refers to a proceeding taken for the purpose of the estate of Abbasee Begum under the charge of the Wards, which he says was abandoned, the management being left to the mother. This paper is not of much importance as it bears date nine days before Act XL of 1858 was passed. The fact of the Court of Wards did not then choose to interfere really alter the position of the mother as a guardian de facto has abstained from taking out a certificate under act XL 1858.
Abbasee Begum appeals against the decree of the lower Court so far as it affects her, and denies her mother's right money on mortgage of the estate at any time, and more especially after her own marriage; and contends that it is evident, facts appearing on the record, that she derived no benefit mother's acts, but, on the contrary, will be seriously prejudice if they are allowed to have effect against her.
The right, under the Mahomedan law, of a mother to guardianship of her minor daughter was discussed at the of this appeal, but into this question we need not enter. We quite concur with the Subordinate Judge in holding it fully proved that, as a matter of fact, no other person that Umda Khanum did, up to 1868 and for years after, pretend to undertake the management of Abbasee Begum's property as her guardian.
It is unnecessary to go to the Mahomedan law to ascertain how ??? was justified in dealing with Umda Khanum in respect of her daughter's interests. Act XL of 1858 had been or nearly ten years when this transaction occurred, and the power of a guardian de facto to manage property of his ward must be determined with reference to this Act.
This question has been settled by several decisions in which it has been ruled that, since the passing of Act XL of 1858, no greater powers can be exercised by a de facto guardian who has not legally completed his right to manage a minor's estate than exercised by a guardian duly appointed under that Act. Court of Wards on behalf of Kisho Pershad Singh v. Kuppulam Singh, 19 W.R, 164, 10 B.L.R, 364; Surut Chunder Chatterjee v. Raj Kissen Mookerjee, 24 W.R, 46, 15 B.L.R, 350; and Debi Dutt Sahu v. Suboola Bibee, Ind L.R 2 Cal., 283. The first was a case under the Lunacy Act, XXXV of 1858, but the words of section 14 of that Act the same as those of section 18 of Act XL of 1858 this case was relied upon by the Court in the second case cited.
The bond of 1868 by the mother, so far as it purports to create a mortgage of the daughter's share in the estate of Aga Wajid valid. The case of Hunooman Pershad Panday v. Munraj Koowur, 6 Moore's Indian Appeal, 393, and other cases were relied on by the respondent. That case was decided on appeal to Her in Council before the passing of the Act of 1858, and, like many other cases of completed alienations to be found in in the repart, was a suit by a minor after attaining majority to acts of his guardian by which his (the minor's) property had been charged with a mortgage and given over into the hadns of mortgagee. The position of the person contesting his guardian completed acts, and asking the aid of the Court to property back from the holder for the time being, is from that of one who resists the giving effect to that which is one its face opposed to a specific provision of law. When property has actually passed and cannot be recovered without invoking the aid of the Court, the plaintiff puts himself into the hands of the Court, and must take his remedy on such terms as the Court may impose, on a consideration of the equities arising in the case. But if we allow the plaintiff in this case to her mortgage, as on a valid mortgage of the minor's share, we shall in effect declare that section 18 of Act XL of 1858 as it limits a guardian's power, is inoperative, and may be safely ignored by any one who chooses to bargain for the minor's property in contravention of its provisions.
But it is said that if it be held that the bond is invalid as it creates a mortgage of the minor's share of the properties named therein, it can be treated as a simple bond for money lent and that, inasmuch as that money was lent to and the benefit of it was taken by Abbasee Begum, she is liable to be sued on it. Assuming that the conditions respecting the mortgage can be struck out, the case of the plaintiff would still fail. The plaintiff contends that, under the words of section 18 of Act XL of 1858, “Every person to whom a certificate shall have been granted, under the provisions of this Act, may exercise the same in the management of the estate as might have been exercised by the proprietor if not a minor”—the mother was empowered to borrow money for the benefit of the estate. It may be conceded for the purposes of this appeal that the mother, not duly appointed under the Act, could legally exercise the powers which would have been conferred on her by a certificate under the Act. It does not appear to us that these word give the mother any power to contract debts on behalf minor.
The words must be read with the context, and, so read, they evidently mean that such properties as come to the hands of the guardian may be dealt with as the minor, if of age, deal with them, subject to the restrictions declared futher on; and that such liabilities to or by the estate as may be outstanding at the time, are within the power of the guardian. But the power to charge the estate with a new debt without sanction of the Court, is clearly restrained by the last clause of the section. Now, if there is no power to charge the estate, how could the mother contract for the daughter should pay a sum of money on a given day, so as to make the contract one on which the plaintiff can sue the daughter. Unless it is the daughter's contract no suit will lie against her on ???
I will assume that the signature on the bond is sufficient to bind the daughter, if it was in the power of the mother to bind her, and that it is a bond to which the daughter's signature has been affixed by her mother. But the daughter was a child of ten years of age and was incompetent to contract. See Contract Act, IX of 1872, section 11. This is not new law. The Act, in a great part, only reduces to the form of a single enactment rules long acknowledged it purports to be an Act to define and amend certain part of the law relating to contracts, and, save as so amending, it does not alter pre-existing rules. In fact the respondent has cited and relied on this Act.
There is no authority that I know of for saying that one person may borrow money in the name of or on behalf of another a bond in that others name, when that other is a person may is wholly incompetent to contract for himself. If a contract is to be made by one to bind another who cannot bind himself, it can only be under some express authority and such authority is not to be found in section 18, Act XL of 1858. We were referred to section 65 of the contract Act; but although the expression “any person,” therein used, is general it is limited by the words “under such agreement or contract,” so as to apply to those who derive advantage, as parties, directly from the contract, and not to every one who may, however remotely, have gained some advantage in consequence of a contract entered into by others. The fourth in which this section occurs, deals with rights of parties; to a contracts; and there is a distinct chapter, the fifth, dealing rights and liabilities of persons not directly contracting which arise under certain circumstances, and resemble the ??? liabilities created by the contract.
The learned pleader for the respondent called our attention to sections 68 to 70 of this chapter. As to section 68, it is only necessary to observe that it deals with a specific class of claims for the price of necessaries of life supplied to one incapable of contracting. Section 69 cannot possibly apply, as there community of interest in the payment of Wajid Ali debts between the plaintiff and Abbasee Begum. Section 70 is equally inapplicable. Nothing was delivered to the therefore, if this section can apply at all, it must be by virtue of the words “where a person lawfully does anything for another.” The contention may be thus stated that plaintiff lawfully delivered money to Umda Khanum for the use of Abbasee Begum who enjoyed the benefit of such delivery, and that consequently she (Abbasee) is bound to compensate the plaintiff. But I think this statement is not sufficient to bring the case the section. It is not necessary that the person claiming compensation should have done an act with his own hands; but Umda Khanum here was not the plaintiff's agent to apply the money lent to the benefit of the minor, nor did the plaintiff attempt to see that the money really went to the use of the minor. She did nothing for the minor, as required in the section; she simply put Umda Khanum into a position in which, if so minded, she, Umda, might apply the money to the benefit minor.
Whether Abbasee is indebted to Umda in respect of any portion of the Rs. 20,000, taken by Umda from the plaintiff, be known until the accounts of Umda's management daughter's estate are taken. It appears that Umda Khanum recovered large sums, Rs. 25,000 or more, under decrees obtained against Duli Chand, and there undoubtedly was a substantial income from the estate of Wajid Ali Khan to be account. This account cannot be taken in this suit at the instance of the lender of the Rs. 20,000, and her remedy must be confined ??? decree against the person with whom she entered into a loan transaction. The appeal must, therefore, be allowed with costs. So much of the decree as affects Abbasee Begum is reversed and the suit, as against her, is dismissed with costs.