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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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  • Article 178 of the old Limitation Act corresponding to Article 181 of the present Act.
  • Article 179 of Schedule II to the Limitation Act.
  • Article 182 of the Limitation Act
  • Order 21, Rule 57
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Judges
Acts
  • Article 178 of the old Limitation Act corresponding to Article 181 of the present Act.
  • Article 179 of Schedule II to the Limitation Act.
  • Article 182 of the Limitation Act
  • Order 21, Rule 57
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondents obtained a decree in O.S. No. 77 of 1903 on 28 September 1903. An execution application (R.E.P. No. 323 of 1915) was filed on 11 March 1915 and was admitted as within time. On 21 July 1915 the Court ordered delivery of the properties to the decree-holders. Third parties objected to the delivery; the objection was removed and the third item was delivered on 27 March 1916 with an entry in the Court record stating "The 3rd item was delivered to the petitioners and the petition was recorded."

A suit was filed by the obstructors and a temporary injunction was granted against delivery of item 2; that suit was ultimately dismissed on 18 December 1916, after which the temporary injunction ceased to have effect. The respondents later filed another execution application on 3 September 1921 seeking delivery of item 2 from the 10th defendant. Both Lower Courts dismissed that later application as time-barred. Jackson, J., in C.M.S.A. No. 38 of 1923, held the application to be within time; the 10th defendant appealed to the Letters Patent Bench, leading to the present opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the decree-holders' execution application (filed 3 September 1921) is barred by limitation — in particular, whether it should be treated as a revival of the 1915 application and therefore had to be filed within three years of 18 December 1916 (the date when the obstruction was removed).
  2. Whether the decree in question is a joint decree (so that execution applications prosecuted against one defendant keep the decree alive as against all), or a several decree (so that applications against the 9th defendant do not save the bar of limitation as regards the 10th defendant).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (10th defendant)

  • The present application, filed nearly six years after the 1915 application, is barred by limitation; if it is to be treated as an application to revive the 1915 application, it should have been filed within three years of 18 December 1916 when the obstruction (the suit and temporary injunction) was removed.
  • The decree is not a joint decree because the decree directs the 9th and 10th defendants to pay mesne profits severally; thus, applications for execution against the 9th defendant in 1918 and 1920 do not save the limitation period as regards the 10th defendant.

Respondents' / Supporting Arguments

  • The 1915 execution application was not dismissed by the executing Court; the order that "the 3rd item was delivered to the petitioners and the petition was recorded" should not be treated as a dismissal of the application for execution.
  • Relying on existing authorities (including decisions holding that an execution petition struck off for "statistical purposes" remains pending), the respondents contended that the 1915 application remained pending and therefore there was no limitation bar to proceeding with it when the obstruction ended.
  • With respect to the nature of the decree, the respondents relied on the proposition that if any one relief in a decree is against defendants jointly, the decree is a joint decree; therefore the applications against the 9th defendant keep the right to execute against the 10th defendant alive.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Suppa Reddiar v. Avudai Ammal (1904) ILR 28 M 51 : 14 MLJ 401 (Full Bench) Held that if an execution application is improperly dismissed a subsequent application to revive or continue the application is governed by Article 178 of the old Limitation Act (corresponding to Article 181 of the present Act). The Court observed the case but treated it as distinguishable because, in the present matter, the 1915 application was not regarded as dismissed.
Chalavadi Kotiah v. Poloori Alimelammah (1907) ILR 31 M 71 : 18 MLJ 46 Where an executing Court dismissed an execution application without notice on the ground execution was stayed, the dismissal amounted only to removing the proceedings from the pending list; as long as proceedings are pending, the right to apply for continuance accrues day to day and is not barred until three years after proceedings cease to be pending. The Court relied on this principle to hold that the 1915 application remained pending and thus was not barred by limitation.
Subba Chariar v. Muthuveeran Pillai (1912) ILR 36 M 553 : 25 MLJ 545 Followed Chalavadi Kotiah; principle that a pending execution application means a subsequent application seeks continuation of pending proceedings rather than an application governed by Article 181. The Court cited this authority in support of the conclusion that the 1915 application was still pending.
Ayissa Umma v. Puthiyapurayil Kannachamkandi Abdulla (1923) MWN 670 Held that an order of dismissal of an execution petition for "statistical purposes" did not amount to a dismissal of the petition; the petition should be regarded as pending. The Court treated this decision as in point and used it to reinforce the view that a "statistical" striking off does not end the pending status of an execution application.
Subramania Chettiar v. Alagappa Chettiar by Agent Palaniappa Chettiar (1906) ILR 30 M 268 Held that where decree awards some relief jointly and other reliefs severally, an application to execute the relief given jointly keeps alive the right to execute the other parts under the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act (part 2 of paragraph 2, Explanation 1 to Article 179 of Schedule II). The Court relied on this authority to conclude the present decree was a joint decree (because at least one relief was joint) and that applications against one defendant kept the decree alive as to others.
Baroda Kinkar Chowdhnry v. Nabin Chandra Dutta (1909) 11 CLJ 83 Followed the Subramania Chettiar principle in a similar factual context. The Court noted this case as following Subramania Chettiar and used it to support the conclusion that the decree before it was a joint decree.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a two-part analysis: first on limitation and the procedural effect of the executing Court's order of 27 March 1916, and second on whether the decree was joint or several.

On limitation and the status of the 1915 application, the Court reasoned from the Code of Civil Procedure and precedent:

  • The Code requires that an execution application be disposed of on the merits where in order; if barred by limitation, if the decree is satisfied, or if the applicant lacks authority, the application must be dismissed unless the Court adjourns it for proper reasons.
  • There is no lawful procedure under the present Code for merely lodging, recording for "statistical purposes," striking off, or otherwise removing an execution petition from the list without disposing of it according to law. The executing Court must either dismiss or adjourn (Order 21, Rule 57 places a duty on the decree-holder to assist the Court and permits dismissal if the decree-holder defaults).
  • Where there is obstruction to execution (for example, a temporary injunction), the proper course is to adjourn the execution petition until the obstruction is removed; the period of obstruction does not itself create an automatic bar if the petition remains pending.
  • The Court reviewed authorities (Chalavadi Kotiah, Subba Chariar, Ayissa Umma) holding that orders which remove an execution petition from the pending list for administrative or statistical purposes do not amount to dismissals and that, so long as proceedings are treated as pending, the right to apply for continuance accrues day to day and is not barred until three years after proceedings cease to be pending.
  • Applying these principles, the Court concluded that the 1915 application was not dismissed; it remained pending and therefore there was no time bar to proceeding with execution when the obstruction ended.

On the nature of the decree (joint or several), the Court reasoned as follows:

  • The decree text included at least one relief against defendants jointly (possession of the plaint property recovered from defendants 9 and 10 together), while mesne profits were awarded severally to the plaintiffs against the 9th and 10th defendants.
  • Explanation 2 to Article 182 of the Limitation Act provides that where a decree or order has been passed jointly against more than one person, an application made against any one or more of them shall take effect against them all.
  • The Court adopted a literal interpretation of that Explanation and relied on Subramania Chettiar (and the subsequent Calcutta Bench decision, Baroda Kinkar) to hold that because at least one relief in the decree was joint, the decree should be treated as a joint decree overall.
  • Consequently, the applications for execution made against the 9th defendant in 1918 and 1920 operated to preserve the right to execute the decree against the 10th defendant as well; the present application against the 10th defendant was not barred by limitation on that ground.

The Court also expressed strong disapproval of the practice of striking off or lodging execution applications for statistical purposes and suggested that such administrative practices be discontinued. A concurring judge (Waller, J.) agreed with the conclusions but remarked on the unsatisfactory aspect of the authorities permitting a decree-holder who did not prosecute an application for many years to remain within time by virtue of holdings that an application struck off for administrative reasons remains pending; he suggested more definite adjournments (e.g., six-month periods) where execution petitions are held up by other proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Letters Patent Appeal is DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The Court held that the 1915 execution application was not dismissed and remained pending. As a result, the later execution application against the 10th defendant is not barred by limitation; the appeal by the 10th defendant fails and the decree-holders' execution rights remain enforceable as determined by the Court.
  • The Court reaffirmed existing authorities that an order removing an execution petition from the pending list for administrative/statistical reasons does not amount to a substantive dismissal, and applied those authorities to the facts before it.
  • Procedural note: The Court strongly disapproved of the practice of striking off execution petitions for statistical purposes and recommended that the practice be discontinued or that adjournments be granted for definite periods when execution petitions are held up by other proceedings. However, the opinion applies and follows existing precedent rather than announcing a novel rule of law.

    Pattannayya v. Pattayya Alias Krishnayya

    1. The only question in this appeal is whether the decree-holders' application for execution is barred by limitation. The facts are briefly these: The respondents herein obtained a decree in O.S. No. 77 of 1903 on 28th September, 1903. It is admitted that the application for execution in R.E.P. No. 323 of 1915 on 11th March, 1915, was within time. The Court ordered delivery of the properties to the decree-holders on 21st July, 1915. Third persons objected to the delivery. The objection was removed and item 3 was delivered to them on 27th March, 1916, and the Court passed an order on that day: "The 3rd item was delivered to the petitioners and the petition was recorded." A suit was filed by the obstructors and a temporary injunction was granted against the delivery of item 2. The suit was ultimately dismissed on 18th December, 1916 and consequently the temporary injunction ceased to be in force from that date. The respondents filed an execution application on 3rd September, 1921, and prayed for delivery of item 2 from the 10th defendant. Both the Lower Courts dismissed the application as being barred by time and Jackson, J. held in C.M.S.A. No. 38 of 1923 that the application was within time. Hence this appeal by the 10th defendant.

    2. The first contention is that the present application filed nearly six years after the application of 1915 is barred by limiitation and it is urged that if this application is to be treated as an application to revive the execution application of 1915, it should have been filed within three years of 18th December, 1916 when the obstruction to execution was removed. The order of the District Munsif on the application of 1915 is " the third item was delivered to the petitioners and--the petition was recorded." The question is whether this order amounts to a dismissal of the application. The present Code of Civil Procedure does not contemplate the passing of such an order. When an execution application is filed, if it is in order, it has to bo disposed of on the merits; if it is barred by limitation or if the decree has been satisfied, or if the applicant is not the decree-holder's assignee or his legal representative, or if the decree-holder does not help the Court in executing the decree, or omits to do anything which the Court directs him to do, the application will have to be dismissed unless for proper reasons the Court adjourns the application. If the decree-holder is not able to do a thing directed to be done within the time allowed by the Court, the Court has to give him further time. There is no provision of law by which the executing Court could lodge the petition or record it, or strike it off for what is commonly called the statistical purposes. The executing Court is bound to follow the procedure laid down in the Code and it cannot dismiss the application for the reason that it is long pending. If there is obstruction to the execution of the decree, the Court ought to adjourn the petition till the removal of the obstruction. It does not matter how long the obstruction continues. If a temporary injunction is issued against a Court executing a decree, the Court should stay its hands till the injunction is dissolved or till the suit in which it is granted is disposed of. If a permanent injunction is granted against the execution of the decree, then the application for execution will have to be dismissed. If the executing Court adjourns the petition from time to time it will enable the decree-holder to inform the Court as to the progress of the suit or proceeding in which the temporary injunction is granted and as soon as it is informed that the obstruction has been removed the Court should proceed to dispose of the application according to law. It is to prevent dilatory proceedings and the long pendency of execution applications that Order 21, Rule 57 has been enacted. It lays upon the decree-holder the duty of helping the Court to execute the decree in his favour and if by reason of the decree-holder's default the Court is unable to proceed further with the execution application, it shall either dismiss the application or, for sufficient reasons, adjourn the proceedings to a future date. Upon the dismissal of such an application the attachment shall cease. Under the old Code if the properties were once attached and the application for execution was subsequently dismissed, the attachment did not necessarily cease to have effect. If, instead of following: the procedure laid down by the Code, the executing Court orders that the

    3. Great reliance is placed by Mr. T.M. Krishnaswami Aiyar on Suppa Reddiar v. Avudai Ammal (1904) ILR 28 M 51:14 MLJ 401 (FB) where a Full Bench of this Court held that if an execution application is improperly dismissed a subsequent application to revive or continue the application is governed by Article 178 of the old Limitation Act corresponding to Article 181 of the present Act. This case is distinguishable from the present, for here the application of 1915 was not dismissed. In Chalavadi Kotiah v. Poloori Alimelammah (1907) ILR 31 M 71:18 MLJ 46 the executing Court dismissed an execution application without notice to the parties on the ground that the execution had been stayed by the order of the District Court. Miller and Munro, JJ. held that the order of dismissal amounted to no more than a direction to the officers of the Court to remove the proceedings from the pending list, and observed at page 76:

    That so long as proceedings initiated by the decree-holder are pending, his right to apply for their continuance accrues from day to day, i. e., on every day on which the Court does not suo motu continue them. The right to apply will then not be barred till three years have elapsed after the proceedings have ceased to be pending.

    4. In Subba Chariar v. Muthuveeran Pillai (1912) ILR 36 M 553:25 MLJ 545 Benson and Abdur Rahhn, JJ. follow the decision of Miller and Munro, JJ. in Chalavadi Kotiah v. Poloori Alimelammah(1907) ILR 31 M 71:18 MLJ 46 The principle of these cases is that if an execution application is pending, a subsequent application is not an application under Article 181 but an application asking the Court to continue the proceedings in a pending application. The decision in Ayissa Umma v. Puthiyapurayil Kannachamkandi Abdulla (1923) MWN 670 to which one of us was a party is in point. It was held in that case that an order of dismissal of an execution petition for statistical purposes did not amount to a dismissal of the petition but that the petition should be considered as pending. I hold that the application of 1915 is still pending, and therefore there is no bar to its being proceeded with.

    5. In this connection I must express my strong disapproval of the practice of striking off or lodging an execution application for statistical purposes. The sooner it is stopped the better it would be for the parties as well as for the Courts executing decrees.

    6. The next point urged is that the decree is not a joint decree and therefore the application of 1918 and of 1920 for execution against the 9th defendant do not save the bar of limitation so far as the 10th defendant is concerned. In view of my decision on the first point it is unnecessary to deal with this point at length. The relevant portion of the decree is as follows: , Plaintiffs do recover from defendants 9 and 10 possession of the plaint property with buildings thereon described below; plaintiffs do recover from the 9th defendant future rental, etc., and plaintiffs do recover from the 10th defendant future rental, etc.

    7. The argument is that inasmuch as the decree directs the 9th and 10th defendants to pay mesne profits severally, it is not a joint decree but a several decree, and the application for execution against the 9th defendant cannot be treated as an application in a joint decree. Where a defendant is directed to pay a certain sum to plaintiff and another defendant is directed to pay a similar sum or a different sum to the plaintiff, the decree is not a joint decree; but where a decree directs that A and B shall pay a certain sum to the plaintiff and further directs that A should pay another sum and that B should pay another sum and that A and B should bear their own costs, the decree is a joint decree against A and B. The decree is a joint decree if any one of the reliefs given in the decree is against the defendants jointly even though some other reliefs may be given against each defendant separately. Explanation 2 to Article 182 of the Limitation Act is in these terms:

    But where the decree or order has been passed jointly against more persons than one, the application, if made against any one or more of them, or against his or their representatives, shall take effect against them all.

    8. This Explanation should be literally interpreted and according to its terms the present decree is a joint decree. In Subramania Chettiar v. Alagappa Chettiar by Agent Palaniappa Chettiar (1906) ILR 30 M 268 it was held that where a decree awards mesne profits against A and B jointly and costs jointly against A, B and C, an application to execute the decree for mesne profits against A and B keeps alive the right to execute the decree for costs against C under part 2 of paragraph 2, Explanation 1 to Article 179 of Schedule II to the Limitation Act. This case was followed by a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Baroda Kinkar Chowdhnry v. Nabin Chandra Dutta (1909) 11 CLJ 83 The facts of that case are very similar to those of the present. The decree in this case is a joint decree and the present application against the 10th defendant is not barred by limitation by reason of the applications of 1918 and 1920. I find this point against the appellant.

    9. In the result the Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed with costs.

    Waller, J.

    10. On the first point I agree that, on the authorities no other conclusion is possible, though the position does seem to me to be highly unsatisfactory. If the decree-holder had presented an application directly after the close of the intervening litigation (as he should have been forced to do) and that application had been dismissed early in 1917, his present application would have been long out of time. Having done nothing to prosecute his first application for six years, he is, on the authorities, still in time.

    11. Something should, of course, be done to put an end to this method of adjourning execution applications sine die. If they are held up by some other proceedings, they should be adjourned either for definite periods of six months each, or till the date of the closing of the other proceedings.

    12. On the second point also I agree.

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    Pattannayya v. Pattayya Alias Krishnayya
    (Oct 9, 1925)