and Muttusami Ayyar, J.
1. We are unable to say the Munsif has misconstrued the law.
2. The period of limitation for: an application of this nature commences to run from the date of the resistance, obstruction, or dispossession. The resistance, obstruction, or dispossession referred to can hardly be any other resistance, &c, than that mentioned as forming the subject of the complaint. This is the plain interpretation of the terms of the Act, nor is the construction unreasonable, for a Court exercising ordinary care would not issue a second warrant for delivery of possession after an earlier warrant had been returned unexecuted by reason of obstruction, unless the decree-holder had at once taken action to question the propriety of the obstruction, or there had been some change of circumstances. On the other hand, if it be held limitation is to be computed from the date of first obstruction, the provision would take no count of cases in which an abstraction at the time justifiable subsequently ceases to be so. We overrule the objection and dismiss the application with costs.