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  • Procedure Code, Section 50).
  • Procedure Code, Section 13);
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

A suit for redemption of certain mortgaged property was instituted in 1856/1858 by the manager (Visram) of a Hindu joint family; a decree in that earlier suit was obtained but never executed. Later, another member of the same joint family (the present plaintiff), who had been a minor when the earlier suit was instituted, brought a subsequent suit for redemption in respect of the same property. The District Judge found as a fact that the present plaintiff had been duly represented in the former suit, but held that a new cause of action had arisen because the earlier decree did not direct foreclosure and, having not been executed, the mortgagor/mortgagee relationship continued. The matter proceeded on appeal and was considered by several judges who expressed differing views before a final opinion was delivered.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a second suit for redemption brought by a member of a joint family (who was a minor at the time of the earlier suit) is maintainable where an earlier suit for redemption was brought by the family's manager and resulted in a decree that was not executed.
  2. What is the effect of the earlier (1856) judgment on persons subject to it — i.e., does it operate as res judicata in respect of later suits by other members of the same joint family?
  3. Whether the particular plaintiff in the later suit is bound by the earlier decree (i.e., whether he was effectively represented by the manager who sued in 1856).

Arguments of the Parties

Position Argued in Support of the Present Plaintiff's Ability to Sue

  • The present plaintiff was not a party to the former suit and therefore could not have executed the decree obtained in that suit.
  • The omission by the manager/plaintiff in the former suit to execute the decree (because he obtained it in his own name) should not be held to affect the present plaintiff's independent right to redeem the property.

Position Argued Against Maintainability (That the Present Plaintiff Is Bound by the Former Suit)

  • The earlier suit, brought by the manager of the joint family, effectively represented the interests of the family, and the present plaintiff (then an infant) was therefore bound by that decree.
  • Principles of res judicata and the historical practice that acts by a manager bound the Hindu family prevent relitigation of the same cause of action; allowing a new suit would subject the mortgagee to repeated actions.
  • The decree in the earlier suit declared the mortgagor entitled to possession on payment of a sum and, by reason of default in executing that decree within the time for execution (no time fixed), the order for redemption must be taken as operating as a judgment of foreclosure; thus no fresh suit for the same relief should be allowed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sheikh Golam, Hossein v. Alla Rukhee Beebee N.W.P.H.C. Rep. 1871 p. 62 Cited for the proposition that, by reason of default in payment and absence of execution, an order for redemption operates as a judgment of foreclosure. Referred to by the court (through Kemball's view) to support the conclusion that the earlier decree, by default, should be treated as a foreclosure judgment and so bar another suit for redemption.
Anrudh Sing v. Sheo Prasad I.L.R. 4 All. 481 Referenced along with Sheikh Golam to support the same point regarding the effect of default on a redemption decree. Used to reinforce the view that a decree for redemption not executed and followed by default cannot be the basis for a fresh suit.
Lockyer v. Ferryman L.R. 2 Ap. Ca. (Lord Selborne) Articulates the principle of res judicata: the same matter shall not be agitated again on the original ground. Quoted by the court to state the leading principle that the original cause of action is gone where res judicata applies and can only be restored by removing that bar.
Kisan Nandram v. Anandram Bachaji 10 Bom. H.V.C. Rep. 433 Authority for the rule that a decree-holder must obtain satisfaction of his decree by execution and not by bringing another suit. Cited as support for the proposition that a new suit cannot be brought on the original cause of action once there is a decree in favour of the family.
Fakirapa v. Pandurangapa I.L.R. 6 Bom. 7 Similar principle to Kisan Nandram: execution, not a fresh suit, is the remedy to satisfy a decree. Relied upon to emphasize the legislative and judicial policy against repeated litigation on the same grounds.
Jowala Buksh v. Dharum Singh 10 Moc. I.A. p. 530 Illustrates that the name of a single family member recorded in the land register might stand for all family members without affecting their inter se rights. Used by the court to show the historical practice that the acts of a manager could bind the family and thus support binding absent members.
Mussumut Cheetha v. Baboo Miheen Lall 11 Moo. I.A. 369 Authority noting the identification of a manager's actions with family interests. Relied upon to indicate that suits by or against a manager were commonly taken to represent the family as a whole under the former practice.
Umrithnath Chowdhry v. Goureenath Chowdhry 13 Moo. I.A. 542 Further support for the proposition that a manager's acts in relation to family property were treated as binding on the family. Cited to substantiate the historical practice that managers were presumed to represent family interests in transactions and litigation.
Dada valad Ravji v. Bhau valad Ganu (Printed Judgments for 1870 p. 11) Shows that a lessee from a managing member must account to him and must be maintained in possession against other individual members. Used to illustrate the practical consequence of treating a manager's acts as representing the family.
Toondun Singh v. Baboo Bokhnarain Singh 22 Cal. W.R. Civ. Rul. 199 Indicates that a purchaser under Act I of 1845 bought from the manager in his own name but other members could nevertheless sue to enforce their rights. Relied upon to show that the manager-as-representative principle operated even where statutory provisions existed about purchasers and representation.
Jogendra Deb Roy's case 14 Moo. I.A. 376 Recognizes the historical practice of not specifying in detail that a manager sued both for himself and on behalf of the family. Used to demonstrate that prior practice assumed the manager's suit bound the family and this practice was not condemned by earlier authorities.
Mayaram Sevaram v. Jayvantrav Pandurang (Printed Judgments for 1874 p. 41) One of the decisions proceeding on the identification of the family with the member conducting the suit. Cited for the proposition that other cases have proceeded on the assumption that the manager represented the family.
Narayan v. Pandurang 1 L.R. 5 Bom. 685 Another case proceeding on identification of family members with the litigant manager. Used to reinforce that judicial practice favoured treating manager-conducted suits as binding absent members.
Vyankatrav v. Mahadev (Printed Judgments for 1882 p. 226) Illustrates the then-current stricter rule requiring that a plaintiff suing as a representative must set out that character (contrast with earlier practice). Cited by the court to show how present (later) procedure differs from the laxer practice prevailing in 1856 and to explain why omission in 1856 did not necessarily prevent binding effect.
Palk v. Clinton 12 Ves. (referred to) Authority on the indivisibility of the right to redeem and that one joint tenant may recover the whole mortgaged property by paying the whole debt. Applied to support the view that the right to redeem is indivisible and that litigation brought by one joint owner concerning the whole debt protects the mortgagee from repeated suits.
Henley v. Stone 3 Beav. 355 Shows the general English rule that co-owners usually must join in a suit concerning joint property; a partial interest-holder commonly cannot redeem without making others parties. Used to analogize English law principles to the Hindu joint family context and to argue against repeated suits by separated co-owners.
Co. Litt.; Story Eq. Pl. (various sections cited) General equity and common-law principles on joinder, rights of co-owners, and redemption by one interest-holder. Invoked to explain the broader doctrinal basis for treating the redemption right as indivisible and to justify protecting mortgagees from multiple suits.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in distinct steps and through contrasting judicial views recorded in the opinion.

1. Two preliminary questions were framed explicitly: (a) the effect of the earlier (1856) judgment on persons subject to it; and (b) whether the plaintiff in the present suit was subject to that judgment.

2. On the first question, the court (following the view stated by Kemball, J., and later adopted by West, J.) applied the principle of res judicata: where a matter has been finally decided, the original cause of action is gone and cannot be re-agitated on the same grounds. The court quoted Lockyer v. Ferryman to state that res judicata prevents re-opening the original ground and relied on Indian authorities to show that the policy of the law is to prevent continued litigation on the same cause.

3. The court examined the remedial avenue for a decree-holder and emphasized that, under Anglo-Indian law, satisfaction of a decree must be obtained by execution rather than by commencing a fresh suit on the same cause. Authorities cited (e.g., Kisan Nandram and Fakirapa) were used to support this established rule and the legislative purpose of avoiding repeated litigation.

4. Turning to the second question (whether the present plaintiff was bound), the court conducted a historical and factual inquiry into practice as it stood in 1856. It observed that at that time procedural strictness about asserting representative capacity was not observed with the same formality as in later years. The court noted a series of authorities and practical illustrations showing that acts done by a family manager were generally treated as binding on the family where honestly intended for the family's benefit.

5. The court gave weight to the fact that the present plaintiff had been an infant at the time of the earlier suit and that there was no suggestion of fraud or collusion. Under the historical practice prevailing in 1856, the manager's suit, though prosecuted in his individual name, was commonly taken to represent the joint family's interests; hence the infant member was effectively represented and bound.

6. The court also reasoned doctrinally about the nature of the right to redeem: it treated redemption as an indivisible jural right of the family (or joint owners), observing that one joint tenant suing for the whole protects the mortgagee from repeated suits by other joint tenants. The court relied on English and Roman law analogies as well as equity principles to sustain this view.

7. Applying these principles to the facts, the court concluded that the present suit raised the same cause of action as the earlier suit for redemption; the plaintiff was effectively bound by the earlier decree and therefore was barred from maintaining the new suit. The court rejected the District Judge's conclusion that a new cause of action had arisen merely because the earlier decree was not executed or did not direct foreclosure in express terms.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appellate court reversed the decrees of the courts below and dismissed the present plaintiff's claim (the court ordered costs to the respondent throughout).

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the plaintiff in the later suit is barred by the earlier decree and cannot maintain the subsequent suit for redemption; the lower courts' decrees in favour of the plaintiff were reversed.
  • The court applied and affirmed existing doctrines — notably res judicata, the rule that a decree-holder must seek satisfaction by execution rather than by repeated suits, and the historical principle that a Hindu joint-family manager's litigation could bind the family members where the manager honestly acted for the family's benefit. The opinion applied these established principles to the facts rather than announcing a novel legal rule; no new precedent beyond this application is presented in the opinion text.

Costs were awarded to the respondent throughout as recorded in the opinion.

    Gan Savant Bal Savant And Anr. v. Narayan Dhond Savant

    1. It appears that a suit was brought, and decree obtained, by the manager of a joint family in 1858 for redemption of certain property, but the decree was not executed. Subsequently the present suit for redemption in respect of the very came property was brought by another member of the joint family who was a minor when the former suit was instituted, and the question is, this second suit maintainable? The District Judge found, as a fact, that the present plaintiff was duly represented in the former suit, but was of opinion that a new cause of action had arisen, as the decree in the former suit did not direct foreclosure; and the decree never having been executed, the status of mortgagor and mortgagee continued between the parties.

    2. But I think the District Judge was wrong: see Full-Bench ruling--Sheikh Golam, Hossein v. Alla Rukhee Beebee N.W.P.H.C. Rep. 1871 p. 62--referred to in Anrudh Sing v. Sheo Prasad I.L.R. 4 All. 481. By reason of the default in payment of the money declared to be due within the time prescribed by law for the execution of decrees (no time having been fixed in the decree), the order for redemption must be taken to have operated as, a judgment of foreclosure. The decree declared the mortgagor entitled to obtain possession of the mortgaged property on payment of a particular sum, and if he failed to discharge that debt, he cannot be allowed to harass the mortgagee by another suit for the same purpose.

    3. I would, therefore, reverse the decrees of the Courts below, and reject the claim with costs throughout.

    Pinhey, J.

    4. I am of opinion that the decree of the District Court is right, and should be confirmed. The present plaintiff was not a party to the former suit, and could not have executed the decree passed therein. The omission of the plaintiff in the former suit to execute the decree, which he obtained for himself and not for the present plaintiff, cannot, affect the right of plaintiff to redeem the property.

    5. The case was subsequently argued before West, J.

    August 6.--Judgment was now delivered by West, J.

    6. In this case two questions arise for decision: the first is as to the effect of the judgment of 1856 on those subject to it; the second is, as to whether the plaintiff in this case is subject to it.

    7. On the former question I agree with the view stated by Kemball, J. It follows from the leading principle of res judicata that the same matter shall not be agitated again on the original ground so as to imperil the stability of the decision formerly given.

    "Where there is res judicata the original cause, of action is gone, and can only be restored by getting rid of the res judicata"
    --(per Lord Selborne in Lockyer v. Ferryman L.R. 2 Ap. Ca. at p. 528.The existence of a decree in a plaintiff's favour may seem not to be, a good reason for depriving him of a right to sue, and under, the Roman law the plea of res judicata could be met by a replication of res secundum se judicata (Dig. Lib. 44, Ti. 2, Fr. 9., S. 1.) Under the English law also a judgment, it is said, is a bar only when it has negatived the right--per Bramwell; L.J., in Poyser v. Minors L.R. 7 Q.B.D. at p. 338; but this holds generally only when the cause of action in the second suit has arisen on the same original right at a different time from, the first, or the first action went off on a mere technical defect. Under the Anglo-Indian law it has long been recognized that a decree-holder must obtain satisfaction of his decree by execution, not by another suit-- Kisan Nandram v. Anandram Bachaji 10 Bom. H.V.C. Rep. 433; Fakirapa v. Pandurangapa I.L.R. 6 Bom. 7. A new suit cannot be brought either on the original cause of action, or, save in special cases, on the decree in which that cause has become merged. The object of the Legislature has been to prevent continued litigation on the same grounds, and this would obviously.be defeated by allowing a decree-holder to abstain from putting his decree in force, and proceed again on the same cause as before.

    8. The second question is one of some difficulty. As the law stands now, a plaintiff suing in a representative character must set it forth, and show that he is qualified to fill it (Civil Procedure Code, Section 50). When a right is claimed in common for the plaintiff and others, all persons interested may be deemed to be claimants, and thus bound by the result of the suit (Civil Procedure Code, Section 13); but here there was no allegation of, a representative character; Visram was the eldest brother and manager for the family, of which the present plaintiff, was an infant member, but he sued simply in his own name along with a representative of another branch. On the other hand, the present strictness and elaboration of procedure did not prevail in 1856. It was a generally received doctrine that the acts of a manager bound a Hindu family so long as they were honestly intended for its benefit, or were such as might reasonably be deemed to have that character. The name of a single member of a Hindu family recorded in the land register of the Government might stand for all--Jowala Buksh v. Dharum Singh 10 Moc. I.A. at p.530--without affecting their rights inter se--Mussumut Cheetha v. Baboo Miheen Lall 11 Moo. I.A. 369; Umrithnath Chowdhry v. Goureenath Chowdhry 13 Moo. I.A. 542. A lessee from a managing member was obliged to account to him for the rent--Dada valad Ravji v. Bhau valad Ganu Printed Judgments for 1870 p. 11--and conversely must be maintained in possession against other individual members, A purchase made under Act I of 1845 by a manager in his own name enabled the other members to sue to enforce their rights notwithstanding the provision in section 21 that no purchaser shall be ousted on the ground that the purchase was made on behalf of another--Toondun Singh v. Baboo Bokhnarain Singh. 22 cal. W.R. Civ. Rul. 199 The Hindu family was, in fact, considered as a corporation whose interests were necessarily centered in the manager; while the manager, as the chief member of the family, was understood to represent the common interests whenever these were subject to be affected by transactions in which he engaged, even in his own sole name. Union and undivided interests being the rule, the presumption was that a manager was acting for the family, unless it were made out that he acted, and professed to act, for himself alone.

    9. This was the case equally with regard to litigation as to other transactions. In a suit filed by, or against, a Hindu as manager it was seldom, or never, according to the former practice, set forth 'specifically that he sued, or was sued, both on his own behalf and on behalf of the family. The intimacy of union was such that this was taken for granted. The practice is recognised, and not condemned, in Jogendra Deb Roy's case 14 Moo. I. A 376 and many decisions, like those in Mayaram Sevaram v. Jayvantrav Pandurang Printed Judgments for 1874 p. 41 and Narayan v. Pandurang 1 L.R. 5 Bom. 685 have proceeded on an identification of the other members of a Hindu family with the one who has conducted a suit on their behalf. Where the other members are infants at the time of the suit, that, no doubt, is a reason for scrutinizing the matter with more than usual care in order to protect them against fraud, but here fraud is not suggested; the, suit for redemption was, no doubt, brought by Visram in perfectly good faith, his own interests being concerned equally with that of his infant brother. His capacity to represent the family was not impaired by any collusive artifice to its prejudice, and the practice having been such as it was in 1856, the mere omission to specify the present plaintiff as a party did not prevent his being bound by the suit in which he was effectively represented by Visram. At present Visram would have to set forth the minor brother's name--Vyankatrav v. Mahadev printed Judgments for 1882 p. 226 but the law of 1856 was less exacting in particulars.

    10. It was contended that as Visram might sue alone to redeem the mortgage in 1856, it should not be assumed that he sued as a manager so as to make his infant brother a virtual plaintiff. But as a member and manager his acts in relation to the common estate should be presumed to be on behalf of 'the family rather than for the purpose of creating a distinct adverse interest for himself without partition. As part owner of the equity of redemption and manager for the co-owners, he would have an interest adverse to that which he would acquire by becoming quasi assignee of the mortgage. It does not appear that he desired this latter position, or had any funds with which to realize it otherwise he would have redeemed in accordance with the decree. It is his omission to redeem which now stands in his and his brother's way,

    11. Under the English law the co-owners must all usually join in a suit Co. Litt., 1806, 195b; Story Eq PI § 159 with respect to their joint property. One joint tenant may recover the whole mortgaged property by paying the whole debt, but not his own share, and the same general principle must now be regarded as the law in India See L.R., 3 I.A., at p. 26. This is so even in the case of assignees of a mortgagor suing to redeem (Story Eq. Pl, § 183). Visram before partition could not sue for his own part alone. He was bound to sue for redemption of the whole, and the whole Having thus been put into litigation it does not seem that in the absence of collusion, the mortgagee should not be protected against another joint tenant suing on the same cause of action; Even after a partition it may be doubted whether on principle, a mortgagee should be exposed to repeated suits by the individual separated co-sharers. The right to redeem is an indivisible jural object fisher on Mortgages, § 1166.-Palk v. Clinton 12.Ves. at pp. 59, 60. Jur Ch. VIII see. 5--on which any one of the family may proceed against the mortgagee; and as the whole can be sought in one suit, the mortgagee creditor Would, according |to Roman law, be protected by one suit against any other Ev.'Poth. Vol. I 561; Sav. the English law prescribes generally that one having but a partial interest cannot redeem without making the others interested parties to the suit--Henley v. Stone 3 Beav- 355; II Spence Eq, and if an exception was allowed in the case of a member of a joint Hindu family, that must have been either after the analogy of the English cases of joint tenants of the equity of redemption, or else (which is almost the same thing) on account of the assumed identity of interest amongst the several members of the united family See Co. Litt. 1860 Sections 19, 35. From neither point of view can a justification be seen for subjecting the mortgagee to repeated litigation on the same cause of action. However the matter be approached) it aloes not seem that while Visram was allowed to sue alone (allowed, that is, by the established practice, not by mere error or through fraud on his part); the other members of the family could sue afterwards on the same ground It does not appear how there could be a different cause of action in the present suit from the one previously sued on the right was in each case a right to recover the property on paying off the mortgage-debt. This became a judgment in favour of the family by the former suit, and the present plaintiff must needs have profited by the execution of the decree in that suit Conversely, he is barred when he sues again; though the former decree has, through neglect, now become incapable of execution. The decrees of the Courts below are, therefore reversed. Costs respondent throughout.

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    Gan Savant Bal Savant And Anr. v. Narayan Dhond Savant
    (Aug 6, 1883)