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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff filed a suit seeking a declaration that she was one of the heirs of the late Noor Mohammad and entitled to a share of his property. Defendant No. 1 was the adopted son and Defendant No. 2 the domestic son-in-law of the deceased. They contended that the entire property had been gifted to them by Noor Mohammad during his lifetime, thus excluding the plaintiff from inheritance. Defendants Nos. 3 and 4 supported this claim. During trial, defendants 1 and 2 and their witnesses stated that a deed of gift existed. The learned Munsif dismissed the plaintiff's suit on the ground that the plaintiff failed to produce the deed of gift. On appeal, the Assistant District Judge upheld the dismissal but accepted the defendants' plea that the gift was proved by oral evidence despite the absence of the deed. The present appeal challenges the admissibility of such oral evidence under Section 91 of the Evidence Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether oral evidence to prove the gift is admissible under Section 91 of the Evidence Act when a deed of gift exists.
  2. Whether a deed of gift under Mahomedan Law constitutes a "disposition of property" within the meaning of Section 91 of the Evidence Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The gift was created by a deed of gift, which is a disposition of property.
  • Under Section 91 of the Evidence Act, oral evidence to prove the gift is inadmissible when the terms have been reduced to a document.

Respondents' Arguments

  • This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hira Devi v. Official Assignee of Bombay, AIR 1958 SC 448 Section 91 of the Evidence Act embodies the best evidence rule, excluding oral evidence to prove contents of a document except where secondary evidence is admissible. The court held that this precedent supports the principle that if a document creates a disposition of property, oral evidence to prove its terms is inadmissible. However, under Mahomedan Law, a deed of gift does not itself create a valid gift without delivery of possession, so oral evidence to prove delivery is admissible and not barred by Section 91.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the applicability of Section 91 of the Evidence Act, which prohibits oral evidence to prove the terms of a contract, grant, or disposition of property once reduced to a document. The appellant argued that the gift deed constituted such a disposition, barring oral evidence. The court analyzed the essentials of a valid gift under Mahomedan Law, which requires (i) declaration of gift by the donor, (ii) acceptance by the donee, and (iii) delivery of possession. The court emphasized that a deed of gift alone does not create a valid gift without delivery of possession, which must be proved independently by oral evidence.

Therefore, the court concluded that a deed of gift under Mahomedan Law does not amount to a "disposition of property" within Section 91. Consequently, oral evidence to prove delivery of possession and thus the validity of the gift is admissible. The court further distinguished the Supreme Court precedent in Hira Devi, explaining that it does not negate the requirement of delivery under Mahomedan Law and does not bar oral evidence in this context.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed.

The court upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit, confirming that oral evidence to prove delivery of possession under Mahomedan Law is admissible despite the absence of the deed of gift. The decision clarifies that a deed of gift does not create a disposition of property under Section 91 of the Evidence Act in the context of Mahomedan Law gifts. The parties were directed to bear their own costs. No new precedent was established beyond the application of existing principles.

    Mt. Jabeda Khatun v. Moksed Ali

    1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the Assistant District Judge, Dhubri in Title Appeal No. 34 of 1966.

    2. The plaintiff brought a suit for declaration that she was one of the heirs of late Noor Mohammad and was entitled to share of the property left by her father. Defendant No. 1 was the “adopted son” and defendant No. 2 was the “domestic son-in-law” of late Noor Mohammad. They filed a written statement Their material plea was that the entire property had been gifted to them by late Noor Mohammad during his lifetime and therefore the plaintiff had nothing to Inherit from her father. Defendants Nos. 3 and 4 also filed written statements and supported the case of defendants 1 and 2.

    3. During trial defendants 1 and 2 (who will hereinafter be referred to as ‘the defendants’) and their witnesses stated that there was a deed of gift. The learned Munsif dismissed (decreed?) the plaintiff's suit on the ground that the plaintiff (defendants?) had failed to produce the deed of gift. On appeal by the plaintiff (defendants?) the Assistant District Judge dismissed the suit and accepted the plea of defendants on the ground that although the plaintiff (defendants?) failed to produce the deed of gift, the gift was proved by oral evidence. The only point raised before us by Shri K.P Sen learned counsel appearing for the appellant, is that in view of Section 91 of the Evidence Act the oral evidence of gift adduced by the defendants is not admissible.

    4. The material portion of Section 91 of the Evidence Act may be quoted.

    “91. When the terms of a contract, or of a grant or any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, …………… no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in Cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained.”

    5. Shri Sen submits that the gift is a disposition of property and as according to me defendants themselves the gift was created by a deed of gift, oral evidence was barred under Section 91 of the Evidence Act. The point to be decided, therefore, is whether the deed of gift under the Mahomedan Law creates disposition of property.

    6. Under the Mahomedan Law three things are necessary for the creation of a gift. They are—(i) a declaration of gift by the donor, (ii) an acceptance of the gift, express or implied, by or on behalf of the donee, and (iii) delivery of possession of the subject of the gift by the donor to the donee. A deed of gift is immaterial for creation of gift under the Mahomedan Law. A gift under the Mahomedan Law is not valid if the above-mentioned three essentials are not fulfilled, even if there be a deed of gift or even a registered deed of gift. In other words even if there be a declaration and acceptance of the gift, there will be no valid gift under the Mahomedan Law if there be no delivery of possession, even though there may be a registered deed of gift. Therefore, in the instant case, had the defendants produced the deed of gift, at best it would have proved a declaration of the gift by the donor and an acceptance thereof by the donee; but in addition, the defendants would have to lead independent oral evidence to prove delivery of possession, in order to prove a valid gift under the Mahomedan Law. That being the legal position a deed of gift under the Mahomedan Law does not create “a disposition of property” and therefore oral evidence led by the defendants to prove the gift is not hit by Section 91 of the Evidence Act.

    7. Interpreting Section 91 of the Evidence Act the Supreme Court in the case of Hira Devi v. Official Assignee of Bombay, reported in AIR 1958 SC 448 has held as follows:—

    “Section 91 is based on what is sometimes described as the ‘best evidence rule’. The best evidence about the contents of a document is the document itself and it is the production of the document that is required by Section 91 in proof of its contents. In a sense, the rule enunciated by Section 91 can be said to be an exclusive rule inasmuch as it excludes the admission of oral evidence for proving the contents of the document except in cases where secondary evidence is; allowed to be led under the relevant provisions of the Evidence Act.

    8. ………

    What Section 91 prohibits is the admission of oral evidence to prove the contents of the document. Whether or not the terms of a document could be varied by proof of an oral agreement is a matter which is not covered by Section 91 at all………”

    9. Shri Sen takes reliance on this decision. In our view this decision, of the Supreme Court does not help the appellant. What the Supreme Court has held is that if the document itself creates a contract or a grant or any other disposition of property, then the terms of that contract or grant or disposition of property, cannot be proved by oral evidence. But in the instant case, as we have held above, under the Mahomedan Law the contents of the document cannot prove a gift under the Mahomedan Law. The oral evidence led by the defendant is therefore not hit by Section 91 of the Evidence Act.

    10. In the result this appeal has no substance and is dismissed.

    11. But in the facts and circumstances of the case we leave the parties to bear their own costs.

    12. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Mt. Jabeda Khatun v. Moksed Ali
    (Jan 12, 1973)