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Equivalent Citations
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Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • order dated 24-6-1998, the appellate authority has rightly dismissed the appeal under Exception (b) to second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India.
  • Clause (3), Article of the Constitution of India
  • Section 377, Indian Penal Code (IPC)
  • Article 311 of the Constitution of India, Clause (2), proviso (b)
  • Proviso (b) appended to Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India
  • Section 34, Indian Penal Code (IPC)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • order dated 24-6-1998, the appellate authority has rightly dismissed the appeal under Exception (b) to second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India.
  • Clause (3), Article of the Constitution of India
  • Section 377, Indian Penal Code (IPC)
  • Article 311 of the Constitution of India, Clause (2), proviso (b)
  • Proviso (b) appended to Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India
  • Section 34, Indian Penal Code (IPC)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Constable Tarsem Singh of the 4th Commando Battalion, Patiala, was charge-sheeted for three incidents allegedly committed on 11-10-1997: (i) outraging the modesty of a woman and extorting money, (ii) committing an unnatural offence under Section 377 IPC against a migrant labourer, and (iii) threatening witnesses. On 6-11-1997 the Commandant dismissed the appellant from service without holding a formal departmental inquiry, invoking the exception contained in proviso (b) to Article 311(2) of the Constitution on the ground that witnesses would be intimidated.

The appellant’s statutory appeal was rejected on 24-6-1998, and a further revision to the Inspector General of Police was dismissed on 26-11-1999. A writ petition before the Punjab & Haryana High Court challenging these orders was dismissed on 20-1-2003. The present civil appeal challenges that High Court judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the disciplinary authorities were justified in dispensing with a formal departmental inquiry under proviso (b) to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India.
  2. Whether the dismissal order, based solely on a preliminary inquiry and unsupported by objective material, could withstand judicial scrutiny.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398 Dispensation of inquiry under Art. 311(2)(b) requires recorded reasons and must satisfy judicial review; finality under Art. 311(3) is not absolute. Used as the foundational constitutional benchmark to test whether the authorities had valid, objective grounds to bypass a departmental inquiry.
Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab (1991) 1 SCC 362 Even where Art. 311(2)(b) is invoked, courts can interfere if the decision is arbitrary, mala fide or a mere ruse to avoid an inquiry. Cited to underline that the disciplinary authority’s satisfaction is subject to judicial scrutiny; the Court found no supporting material, rendering the dismissal arbitrary.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court reaffirmed that the constitutional guarantee of an inquiry under Article 311(2) can be waived only for compelling reasons recorded in writing. It noted that:

  • The Commandant’s sole basis for dispensing with the inquiry was an unsubstantiated fear that witnesses would be intimidated.
  • No supporting documents or objective material were produced to justify such subjective satisfaction.
  • If a preliminary inquiry could be conducted, there was no logical impediment to holding a regular departmental inquiry compliant with natural justice.
  • Both the appellate authority and the Inspector General relied on the same unverified assumptions, failed to consider relevant factors, and provided no cogent reasons despite the High Court’s directive for a speaking order.
  • Applying the principles in Tulsiram Patel and Jaswant Singh, the Court held that the decision to invoke Article 311(2)(b) was arbitrary and unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed – Dismissal Order Set Aside; Appellant to be Reinstated.

The State is at liberty to institute a regular departmental inquiry within two months; payment of back wages will depend on the outcome of such inquiry. The judgment reinforces that dispensations under Article 311(2)(b) require demonstrable, objective grounds and are subject to strict judicial scrutiny, thereby safeguarding procedural fairness for government employees.

    Tarsem Singh v. State Of Punjab And Others

    Order

    1. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 20-1-2003 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana disposing of the writ petition filed by the appellant herein questioning the order of punishment dated 6-11-1997.

    2. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute.

    3. The appellant herein was charge-sheeted for commission of the following misconduct:

    “(1) On 11-10-1997 at about 10 p.m he along with his abovesaid accomplices entered the house of one Dara Singh s/o Madan Singh, resident of Mohalla Ram Bagh, City, Barnala and outraged the modesty of his wife by inflicting pinches on her body. They forcefully extracted rupees one hundred from Dara Singh. They threatened him of dire consequences if he made any complaint against them or deposed against them or helped in any criminal or departmental proceedings against them.
    (2) Constable Tarsem Singh No. 4C/371 on 11-10-1997 in between about 10/11 p.m along with his other two above colleagues caught hold of one Ravinder Kumar s/o Kamaleshwary Yadav r/o Bharai, District Purnia, Bihar, a migrant labourer, stuffed cloth in his mouth and had carnal intercourse with him against the law of nature. FIR No. 228 dated 13-10-1997 under Sections 377 and 34 IPC in PS Kotwali Barnala has been registered against him. This incident took place at grain market, Barnala.
    (3) He along with his other two accomplices further caused threats of dire consequences to anyone deposing against him in an enquiry/investigation which has further caused a scare amongst colleagues and citizens. That in the public and administrative interest the retention of the abovesaid Constable Tarsem Singh No. 4C/371 is considered wholly undesirable.”

    4. On the basis of the said allegations alone and without any further material, PPS, Commandant, 4th Commando Battalion, Bahadurgarh, Patiala, on arriving at a purported satisfaction that the appellant could win over aggrieved people as well as witnesses from giving evidence by threatening and other means, a formal departmental proceeding need not be initiated. The said authority further took into consideration report of a preliminary enquiry conducted through Mr Gurbachan Singh, DSP/Adjutant, 4th Commando Battalion, Bahadurgarh, Patiala and, on that basis opined, “There seems no need of a regular departmental enquiry against Tarsem Singh No. 4C/371”.

    5. The appellant was dismissed from service. An appeal thereagainst was preferred by the appellant. The appellate authority held:

    “I have carefully examined the pleas of the representation along with relevant record and find the same without any substance. Case FIR No. 228 dated 13-10-1997 under Sections 377/34 IPC, Police Station Kotwali Barnala stands registered against the appellant and his companions which is under investigation and will be sent to the court for judicial verdict in due course. The appellant is guilty of gravest acts of misconduct proving complete unfitness for police service and the punishment awarded to him is commensurate with the misconduct. I find no reasons to interfere with the orders already passed by the punishing authority and the appeal is rejected.”

    6. The appellant thereafter moved the Inspector General of Police, Commando Battalion, Bahadurgarh, Patiala, but he was not favoured with any response thereto. The appellant thereafter filed a writ petition being Civil Writ Petition No. 14467 of 1999 in the Punjab and Haryana High Court. By an order dated 12-10-1999, the High Court directed the said authority to pass an appropriate order and preferably a speaking order within one month from the production of the certified copy thereof. Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said direction, the Inspector General of Police, upon hearing the appellant in person, passed an order dated 26-11-1999 dismissing the said representation stating that:

    “From a perusal of the record of the case, I am satisfied that the nature of the misconducts committed by the petitioner which are proved from the statements of various persons recorded by Shri Gurbachan Singh DSP/Adjutant during the preliminary enquiry conducted by him under the orders of the Commandant are of a very grave and heinous nature and bring a bad name to the police force of the State on the whole, and there is every likelihood that none of the said witnesses may come forward to depose against the petitioner in a regular enquiry due to the fear of injury to their lives. Thus, I am of the considered view that in view of the abovesaid facts, it was not reasonably practical to hold a regular enquiry before passing the dismissal order by the Commandant and that the dismissal order dated 6-11-1997 passed by the Commandant, 4th Commando Battalion, Bahadurgarh, Patiala is perfectly in order and has been passed on the basis of the record available on the file and also by keeping in view that image of whole of the police force of the State shall be tarnished in a regular enquiry and also that the witnesses may not come forward to depose against the petitioner for fear of any injury or danger to their lives. The said order has been correctly passed under Exception (b) to second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Vide order dated 24-6-1998, the appellate authority has rightly dismissed the appeal. Hence, finding no force in the revision petition, I dismiss the same being without merit.”

    7. The writ petition filed by the appellant herein against the said order, as stated hereinbefore, was dismissed by the High Court.

    8. In a counter-affidavit filed by the respondent before us it is alleged:

    “Further, the misconduct/heinous crime committed by the petitioner was proved by the statements of various persons which were recorded by Shri Gurbachan Singh DSP/Adjutant during the preliminary enquiry conducted by him. The charges are of a very grave and heinous nature and bring a bad name to the police force of the State on the whole. Further, it was also noted that in every likelihood none of the said witnesses may come forward to depose against the petitioner, if a regular enquiry were to be conducted, due to fear of injury to their lives.”

    9. It is not disputed before us that in awarding the punishment of dismissal from service upon the appellant no formal enquiry was held purportedly on the ground that the same enquiry could be dispensed with, under proviso (b) appended to Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, which reads as under:

    “311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State.—(1)***
    (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges:
    Provided further that this clause shall not apply—
    (a)***
    (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry;”

    10. It is now a well-settled principle of law that a constitutional right conferred upon a delinquent cannot be dispensed with lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motive or merely in order to avoid the holding of an enquiry. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has taken us through certain documents for the purpose of showing that ultimately the police on investigation did not find any case against the appellant in respect of the purported FIR lodged against him under Section 377 IPC. However, it may not be necessary for us to go into the said question.

    11. We have noticed hereinbefore that the formal enquiry was dispensed with only on the ground that the appellant could win over aggrieved people as well as witnesses from giving evidence by threatening and other means. No material has been placed or disclosed either in the said order or before us to show that subjective satisfaction arrived at by the statutory authority was based upon objective criteria. The purported reason for dispensing with the departmental proceedings is not supported by any document. It is further evident that the said order of dismissal was passed, inter alia, on the ground that there was no need for a regular departmental enquiry relying on or on the basis of a preliminary enquiry. However, if a preliminary enquiry could be conducted, we fail to see any reason as to why a formal departmental enquiry could not have been initiated against the appellant. Reliance placed upon such a preliminary enquiry without complying with the minimal requirements of the principle of natural justice is against all canons of fair play and justice. The appellate authority, as noticed hereinbefore, in its order dated 24-6-1998 jumped to the conclusion that he was guilty of grave acts of misconduct proving complete unfitness for police service and the punishment awarded to him is commensurate with the misconduct although no material therefor was available on record. It is further evident that the appellate authority also misdirected himself in passing the said order insofar as he failed to take into consideration the relevant facts and based his decision on irrelevant factors.

    12. Even the Inspector General of Police in passing his order dated 26-11-1999, despite having been asked by the High Court to pass a speaking order, did not assign sufficient or cogent reason. He, like the appellate authority, also proceeded on the basis that the appellant was guilty of commission of offences which are grave and heinous in nature and bring a bad name to the police force of the State on the whole. None of the authorities mentioned hereinbefore proceeded on the relevant material for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that in the facts and circumstances of the case sufficient cause existed for dispensing with the formal enquiry. This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab (1991) 1 SCC 362, (1991) 15 ATC 729, AIR 1991 SC 385 wherein relying upon the judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court, inter alia, in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398, 1985 Supp (2) SCR 131, it was held: (Jaswant Singh case (1991) 1 SCC 362, (1991) 15 ATC 729, AIR 1991 SC 385)

    “Although Clause (3) of that article makes the decision of the disciplinary authority in this behalf final such finality can certainly be tested in a court of law and interfered with if the action is found to be arbitrary or mala fide or motivated by extraneous considerations or merely a ruse to dispense with the inquiry.”

    13. In that case also like the present one, the attention of the Court was not drawn to any material existing on the date of passing of the impugned order in support of the allegations contained in the order dispensing with the departmental enquiry.

    14. In view of the fact that no material had been placed by the respondents herein to satisfy the Court that it was necessary to dispense with a formal enquiry in terms of proviso (b) appended to Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, we are of the opinion that the impugned orders cannot be sustained and they are set aside accordingly. The appellant is directed to be reinstated in service. However, in view of our aforementioned findings, it would be open to the respondents to initiate a departmental enquiry against the appellant if they so desire. Payment of back wages shall abide by the result of such enquiry. Such an enquiry, if any, must be initiated as expeditiously as possible and not later than two months from the date of communication of this order.

    15. The appeal is allowed with aforesaid directions. No costs.

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    Tarsem Singh v. State Of Punjab And Others
    (Jan 25, 2006)