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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Order 23, Rule 1 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 80 (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of Order 33, rule 15 of the Code.
  • section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act.
  • sub-rule (3). The position of sub-rule (2)
  • SECTION 14 LIMITATION ACT
  • sub-rule (2) of Order 23, rule 1,
  • Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code
  • sub-rule (2) and, sub-rule (3)
  • Order 23, Rule 1 (2).
  • Order 33, Rule 15,
  • sub-rule (1)
  • sub-rule (2)
  • sub-rule (3).
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order 23, Rule 1 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 80 (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • provisions of Order 33, rule 15 of the Code.
  • section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act.
  • sub-rule (3). The position of sub-rule (2)
  • SECTION 14 LIMITATION ACT
  • sub-rule (2) of Order 23, rule 1,
  • Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code
  • sub-rule (2) and, sub-rule (3)
  • Order 23, Rule 1 (2).
  • Order 33, Rule 15,
  • sub-rule (1)
  • sub-rule (2)
  • sub-rule (3).
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

M/s. Raja Traders instituted Civil Suit No. 6 of 1970 in the Court of the District Judge, Jagdalpur, against the Union of India concerning a transaction with the South Eastern Railway. The plaintiff discovered that a notice required under section 80(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure had been given to the Chief Commercial Superintendent (Claims) instead of the General Manager of the railway and applied for permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit on account of that formal defect. The defendants opposed that application.

On September 2, 1971 the trial Court permitted withdrawal with liberty to institute a fresh suit but ordered that "The fresh suit ... shall be maintainable only if the cost ordered above is paid up before filing of such suit." The earlier suit was dismissed as withdrawn and the plaintiff was ordered to bear costs.

A fresh suit was instituted on July 1, 1972 against the Union of India and M/s. Patny Transport & Company. The plaint referred to the withdrawal of Civil Suit No. 6 of 1970 and to service of notice, but the costs ordered by the earlier Court were not paid before or at the time of institution of the fresh suit.

On September 22, 1972 the second defendant raised a preliminary objection that the fresh suit was void ab initio because the plaintiff had not paid the costs directed in the earlier order and that payment after filing would not save the suit—further arguing that payment after limitation would render a later attempt too late. On October 28, 1972 the plaintiff applied for permission to deposit the costs and for condonation of delay; the second defendant opposed.

By order dated January 12, 1973 the trial Court accepted the objection, dismissed the suit, and rejected the plaintiff's applications to deposit costs and condone delay. It appears the Union of India (defendant No. 1) was not served with notice of the fresh suit.

The plaintiff sought revision under section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act. The matter reached Bhave J., who, noting divergence of judicial opinion and not treating the decision in Bhagirathi v. Baboo (31 NLR 266) as conclusive, referred the question to a larger Bench.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether non-payment of the costs (which were directed to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant when permission was granted under Order 23, Rule 1(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure for withdrawing from the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit) before filing a fresh suit renders the fresh suit non-tenable (void ab initio).
  2. Whether non-payment of such costs is only a procedural irregularity that does not affect the tenability of the fresh suit, irrespective of whether the costs are paid before or after the period of limitation has expired.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The fresh suit was not barred and the trial Court erred in holding it had no jurisdiction to try the fresh suit.
  • The fresh suit is independent of the earlier suit because another defendant was joined in the fresh suit.
  • Alternatively, the plaintiff should have been given the benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act (condonation of delay). (The reference was limited to the first point.)

Respondent's (Second Defendant's) Arguments

  • The plaintiff had not paid the costs of the earlier Civil Suit No. 6 of 1970, and payment of those costs was a condition precedent to the institution of the fresh suit.
  • The fresh suit, having been brought without payment of costs, was void ab initio.
  • Payment of costs after filing the fresh suit does not cure the defect, because when costs would be paid the period of limitation would have expired and the suit would then be barred; the date of presentation should be treated as the date on which the costs are paid.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abdul Aziz Molla v. Ebrahim Molla (ILR 31 Cal. 965) Earlier decision (1904) supporting the view that filing without complying with imposed terms is an irregularity and does not render the subsequent suit void ab initio. The Court noted that its present view was taken as early as this decision and concurred with that principle.
Narsing v. Nathuji (AIR 1929 Nag. 135) Followed the view that non-fulfilment of terms is an irregularity rather than a jurisdictional bar. The Court cited it as a subsequent authority that followed Abdul Aziz Molla and counted it among decisions supporting the Court's conclusion.
Deb Kumar Roy Choudhury v. Debnath Baroa Bipra (AIR 1920 Cal. 897) Another earlier decision taking the same view regarding irregularity (non-compliance not rendering suit void ab initio). The Court treated this decision as part of the line of authorities with which it respectfully concurred.
Mast Bam Ram Charan v. Deputy Commissioner, Bahraich (AIR 1968 All. 321) Decision that relied on the line of authorities treating non-compliance as irregularity. The Court noted that Mast Bam Ram Charan relied on the earlier decisions and counted it in support of the present view.
Mela v. Labhu (AIR 1955 Punjab 97) (opinion of Bishen Narain J.) Recommended procedural approach: stay proceedings until terms complied with; if not complied within reasonable time, reject the plaint but do not dismiss so as to bar a fresh suit. The Court expressly adopted the procedure recommended by Bishen Narain J. and directed that it should be followed.
(Kunwar) Jang Bahadur v. Bank of Upper India Ltd., Lucknow (AIR 1928 PC 162) Referenced for an underlying principle relevant to the issue (principle not restated in full in the opinion). The Court referred to the principle underlying this case as supportive of its approach.
Syed Qazi Muhammad Afzal v. Lachman Singh (AIR 1926 Patna 409) A contrary or somewhat different view: held that until the terms were complied with the first suit remained pending. The Court acknowledged this differing view but contrasted it with the line of authorities it adopted.
Bhagirathi v. Baboo and 2 others (31 NLR 266) Decision referred to in proceedings below (Bhave J. did not find Bose J.'s decision in this case to be conclusive). The opinion records that Bhave J. did not regard this decision as conclusive and therefore referred the matter to a larger Bench; the present Court did not treat it as determinative.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the statutory scheme of Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and distinguished between its sub-rules:

  • Under sub-rule (1) a plaintiff may withdraw a suit as of right but sub-rule (3) then precludes the plaintiff from instituting any fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter. That is an express statutory bar.
  • Under sub-rule (2) the Court may permit withdrawal with liberty to institute a fresh suit "on such terms as it thinks fit." The Court held that sub-rule (2) empowers the Court to impose terms (for example, payment of costs) that the plaintiff must fulfil, but sub-rule (2) does not itself contain an express provision precluding the plaintiff from instituting a fresh suit until those terms are fulfilled.
  • The Court emphasised the crucial distinction: an express statutory bar (as in sub-rule (3) linked to sub-rule (1)) is materially different from the imposition of terms under sub-rule (2). Absent an express statutory bar, the plaintiff's right to bring a suit cannot be taken away.
  • The Court compared sub-rule (2) with Order 33, Rule 15 (concerning suits by paupers), noting that under Order 33, Rule 15 the bar is explicit—an applicant is precluded from subsequently suing unless costs are first paid. By contrast, Order 23, Rule 1(2) contains no such express bar. That comparison supported the conclusion that non-fulfilment of the terms under sub-rule (2) does not affect the Court's jurisdiction to entertain the fresh suit; it creates only an irregularity in procedure.
  • On this basis the Court reasoned that a suit instituted without complying with the terms imposed under Order 23, Rule 1(2) is not void ab initio. Rather, the noncompliance is an irregularity which prevents the suit from proceeding until the irregularity is cured (i.e., until the terms are complied with). Crucially, the Court held that the date of institution of the suit is the date the suit was filed and not the date the irregularity is cured.
  • Applying the authorities (Abdul Aziz Molla, Narsing v. Nathuji, Deb Kumar Roy Choudhury, and others) the Court concurred with the line of decisions treating such noncompliance as procedural irregularity. The Court endorsed the procedural approach articulated by Bishen Narain J. in Mela v. Labhu: the appropriate exercise of discretion is to stay proceedings until the plaintiff fulfils the conditions, and if the plaintiff fails to do so within a reasonable time, the Court should reject the plaint (without creating a bar to a fresh suit within limitation).
  • The Court rejected the argument that an operative part of an earlier order specifying that a fresh suit "shall be maintainable only if the cost ordered above is paid up before filing of such suit" could operate to divest the later Court of jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The Court concluded that no order of a Court can take away the jurisdiction of the Court; such an interpretation would render that part of the earlier order itself without jurisdiction.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING:

Where a plaintiff is permitted to withdraw from a suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit within the meaning of Order 23, Rule 1(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure on certain terms, a fresh suit instituted without complying with those terms will not be void ab initio. Noncompliance with the terms will amount to an irregularity; the suit will not proceed further until the irregularity is cured, but the date of institution of the suit remains the date on which it was filed, not the date on which the irregularity is cured. The Court should normally stay proceedings until the plaintiff fulfils the required conditions; if the plaintiff fails to do so within a reasonable time the Court must reject the plaint (leaving the plaintiff free to file a fresh suit within limitation after fulfilling the conditions), but the Court should not dismiss the suit in a manner that would bar a fresh suit.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that a plaint filed without prior payment of costs (where payment was a term under Order 23, Rule 1(2)) is an irregularity, not a nullity; courts must ordinarily stay proceedings and allow the plaintiff an opportunity to cure the irregularity.
  • If the plaintiff cures the irregularity (pays the costs) after filing but within such time as to keep the suit within limitation, the suit is not to be treated as time-barred by reason solely of the delayed payment.
  • If the plaintiff does not cure the irregularity within a reasonable time, the proper course is rejection of the plaint rather than dismissal which would bar refiling; the plaintiff remains free to file a fresh suit within the period of limitation after compliance with the terms.
  • The Court expressly rejected the proposition that a lower court's operative direction could divest a later court of its jurisdiction; an order cannot curtail the statutory jurisdiction of the court.

The reference was answered and the case was to be placed before the single Bench for disposal, as recorded in the opinion.

    Raja Traders v. Union Of India

    (1.) THE question referred to this Bench is

    "whether nonpayment of the costs, (which were directed to be paid by the plaint to the defendant when permission was granted under Order 23, Rule 1 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure for withdrawing from the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit,) before filing of a fresh suit, renders the suit non tenable, or whether the non-payment of the costs is a mere irregularity and does not affect the tenability of the suit irrespective of the fact whether the costs were paid before or after the period of limitation has expired."
    (Parenthesis is mine).

    (2.) THE question is a composite one. While dealing with it we would endeavour to analyse and to give our answer with respect to each component.

    (3.) M/s. Raja Traders instituted a suit (Civil Suit No. 6 of 1970) on the small cause side in the Court of the District Judge, Jagdalpur. That suit was against the Union of India in respect of a transaction with the South Eastern railway. The plaintiff realising that a notice under section 80 (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure having not been given to the General Manager of the said railway, but was given to the Chief Commercial Superintendent (Claims) of the said Railway, applied for permission of the Court to withdraw from the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit on account of the above formal defect. The defendants opposed that application. The trial Court passed the following order:-

    "the plaintiff is permitted to withdraw from this suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of this suit. The plaintiff shall bear his own costs of this suit as well as that of the defendant so far incurred. The fresh suit of the plaintiff, if any, shall be maintainable only if the cost ordered above is paid up before filing of such suit. The suit of the plaintiff is dismissed as withdrawn."

    That order was passed on September 2, 1971. On July 1, 1972, the fresh suit was instituted against (1) Union of India, and (2) M/s. Patny Transport and company, Agent Transporters for South Eastern Railway, Jagdalpur, District bastar, Madhya Pradesh. In paragraph 7 of the plaint the fact of withdrawal of the suit with permission to institute a fresh suit (Civil Suit No 6 of 1970) is mentioned and it is also stated that the plaintiff served a legal notice to defendant No. 1, through the General Manager, South Eastern Railway and Central railway and also to defendant No. 2. However, costs were not paid to the defendant before or at the time of institution of the fresh suit. On September 22, 1972, the second defendant raised a preliminary objection and prayed for dismissal of the suit. His objection was that the plaintiff had not paid costs of the earlier Civil Suit No. 6 of 1970, which was a condition precedent for institution of the fresh suit. The fresh suit brought without payment of costs is void ab initio. Payment of costs after filing of the fresh suit does not save it. Moreover, now the payment of costs cannot be accepted as the time limit has already passed and the suit will be barred by limitation on the date on which payment of costs will be made. This suit will be supposed to be presented in the Court on the date on which the costs will be paid and the time of limitation for the suit has already elapsed.

    (4.) ON October 28, 1972, the plaintiff applied for permission to deposit the costs and also applied for condonation of the delay. These applications were opposed by the second defendant. By its order, dated January 12, 1973, the trial Court accepted the objection and dismissed the suit. In the same order the trial Court rejected the plaintiff's application for permission to deposit the costs and for condonation of delay. It appears that defendant No. 1 was not served with notice of the fresh suit.

    (5.) AGGRIEVED by dismissal of the suit, the plaintiff preferred this revision under section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act. It was placed before Bhave J. for hearing. He found that there was divergence of judicial opinion among different High Courts and he did not find the decision of Bose J. in Bhagirathi v. Baboo and 2 others (31 NLR 266.) as conclusive. He, therefore, referred the matter to a larger Bench.

    (6.) SHRI K. M. Agarwal, learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that the fresh suit was not barred and the trial Court was in error in thinking that it has no jurisdiction to try it; secondly, the new suit is independent of the earlier one, as in the fresh suit another defendant has been joined; and thirdly, in the alternative, the Court below ought to have given the plaintiff benefit of section 14 of the Limitation Act. We are not concerned with the last two points, as the reference is limited to the first.

    (7.) IT is clear from the scheme of Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code that the plaintiff can under sub-rule (1) as a matter of right, withdraw his suit without any permission of the Court. But, then he will be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter because of the bar enacted in sub-rule (3). The position of sub-rule (2) is different. Under this Rule the court is empowered to grant permission to the plaintiff to withdraw from the suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of the same subject-matter. While doing so, the Court may impose "such terms as it thinks fit". However, it is not further enacted in this sub-rule that the plaintiff shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit until the plaintiff fulfils those terms. The expression "on such terms as it thinks fit" merely empowers the Court to impose the terms which the plaintiff has to fulfil. The plaintiff is bound to fulfil those terms. Until and unless he complies with those terms, his suit will not proceed, but that is not the same thing as to say that he is precluded from instituting any fresh suit "in respect of such subject-matter" as is the language implied in sub-rule (3). In our opinion, this distinction is crucial.

    (8.) WHERE the Court has inherent jurisdiction to try a suit, the plaintiff can be precluded from bringing the suit only by an express provision enacting the bar. In the case of withdrawal under sub-clause (1), the plaintiff could not be precluded from bringing a fresh suit if sub-rule (3) were not enacted. There is no other provision of law by which the plaintiff can be precluded from bringing a fresh suit, in respect of the same cause of action.

    (9.) THE question is whether there is any bar to a suit, which is withdrawn under sub-rule (2) ? No such provision has been placed before us, nor are we aware of any. sub-rule (2) does not provide that the plaintiff shall be precluded from bringing a fresh suit until he satisfies the terms on which he was permitted to withdraw from the suit under sub-rule (2) and, sub-rule (3) in terms applies only to sub-rule (1) but it has no application to sub-rule (2) On this analysis it must be said that it is only when the plaintiff withdraws his suit under sub-rule (1), i. e. , without permission to bring a fresh suit, he is precluded from bringing a fresh suit.

    (10.) IN this context it is pertinent to turn to the provisions of Order 33, rule 15 of the Code. It enacts "an order refusing to allow the applicant to sue as a pauper shall be a bar to any subsequent application of the like nature by him in respect of the same right to sue; but the applicant shall be at liberty to institute a suit in the ordinary manner in respect of such right, provided that he first pays the costs (if any) incurred by the State Government and by the opposite party in opposing his application for leave to sue as a pauper. " (Italics by us). When this language is compared with that of sub-rule (2) of Order 23, rule 1, the distinction becomes prominent enough. Under Order 33, Rule 15, the bar is imposed, which precludes the plaintiff from bringing a suit, unless he first pays the costs under the rigour of that rule. But, there is no such impediment to the institution of a fresh suit envisaged in Order 23, Rule 1 (2). Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Court is not affected. The non-fulfilment of the terms does not stand in the way of the Court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It follows from this that non-performance of the terms imposed by the Court in the earlier suit while granting permission, will be a mere "irregularity", the effect of which will be that the suit will not proceed further until and unless the irregularity is cured, i. e. unless and until the terms are complied with, but, the existence of such irregularity does not render the suit void ab initio and, consequently, if the fresh suit on the date of its institution is within the limitation prescribed by the law for institution of the fresh suit, it will not be dismissed as time barred merely because when the terms were complied with the limitation prescribed by the law had run out. The view we take was also taken as back as in 1904 by Geidt and A. Mookerjee JJ. in Abdul Aziz Molla v. Ebrahim Molla (ILR 31 Cal. 965). That decision was followed in Narsing v. Nathuji (AIR 1929 Nag. 135). The same view was taken in Deb Kumar Roy Choudhury v. Debnath Baroa Bipra (AIR 1920 Cal. 897) which was relied on in Mast Bam Ram Charan v. Deputy Commissioner, Bahraich (AIR 1968 All. 321). We respectfully concur in the view taken in these decisions. In our opinion the procedure suggested by Bishen Narain J. in Mela v. Labhu (AIR 1955 Punjab 97) should be followed. It is in these terms:

    "therefore, if a suit is filed without payment of costs when liberty to file it has been given under Order 23, Rule 1 (2), then, in my opinion, it merely amounts to an irregularity in the initial procedure which does not affect the inherent jurisdiction and competence of the Court to entertain a suit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I am therefore of the opinion that in such circumstances the Court should exercise its discretion and stay the proceedings till the plaintiff fulfils the required conditions instead of rejecting the plaint immediately. Of course if the plaintiff fails to fulfil the conditions within a reasonable time, then the Court must reject the plaint leaving it open to the plaintiff to file a fresh suit within limitation if so advised after fulfilling the conditions, but the Court cannot dismiss the suit which would bar a fresh suit."

    See also the principle underlying in (Kunwar) Jang Bahadur v. Bank of Upper india, Ltd. Lucknow (AIR 1928 PC 162). A somewhat different view was taken in Syed Qazi muhammad Afzal v. Lachman Singh (AIR 1926 Patna 409), where it was held that until the terms are complied with, the first suit remains pending.

    (11.) IT was an argument that since in the operative part of the earlier suit, the Court had specifically ordered that the fresh suit would be maintainable only if the costs ordered above are paid up before the filing of a fresh suit, the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit unless costs were paid. We are of undoubted opinion that no order of a Court can take away the jurisdiction of the Court just as no order of the Court can either curtail or extend the limitation prescribed by the law. Therefore, the effect of the bar imposed by the court will be merely to the proceeding with the suit further, but not to its institution. That is the only reasonable way in which the last part of the order passed in the earlier suit can be reconciled ; otherwise if it is read as taking away or curtailing the jurisdiction of the Court, to that extent that order itself will be without jurisdiction.

    (12.) ON the above discussion, we answer the question referred to us as follows :

    "where the plaintiff is permitted to withdraw from a suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit within the meaning of Order 23, Rule 1 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure on certain terms, the plaintiff's suit, although instituted without complying with the terms, will not be ab initio void. The noncompliance with the terms will be an irregularity, for which the suit will not proceed further until the irregularity is cured, i. e. until the terms are complied with. However, the date of institution of the suit will be that on which it was instituted and not the date on which the irregularity is cured. The Court should exercise its discretion and stay the proceedings till the plaintiff fulfils the required conditions instead of rejecting the plaint immediately. Of course, if the plaintiff fails to fulfil the conditions within a reasonable time, then the Court must reject the plaint leaving it open to the plaintiff to file a fresh suit within limitation if so advised after fulfilling the conditions, but the court cannot dismiss the suit which would bar a fresh suit."

    Let the case be laid before the single Bench for disposal. Reference answered.

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    Comments

    Raja Traders v. Union Of India
    (Aug 27, 1976)