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Case Number

Criminal Revision Appeal No. 262 of 1983

Attorney(S)

Raj Panjvani
Ram Panjwani
Advocates.

Judges

Mr. Justice J.D. Jain

Acts

Section 468, Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Act 1
Section 7 (1) (d) of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955
provision of sub-section (3) of Section 399
provisions of section 473 of the Code.
Section 406, Indian Penal Code,
Section 468 of the Code, 110
Section 399 (3) of the Code.

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (J. D. Jain J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was employed as an Investigator with the Trade Fair Authority of India (T.F.A.I.) in December 1980. The respondent, a railway employee on deputation to T.F.A.I., worked as its General Manager. On 19 January 1981 the petitioner lodged a complaint at Police Station Tilak Marg alleging that on 12 December 1980 the respondent insulted him using a caste-based slur ("Chure Das Puttar"), threatened to spoil his career and physically pushed him causing injury. A case was registered under Section 7(1)(d) of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955.

The police completed investigation and submitted the challan (charge-sheet) against the respondent on 12 January 1982. The respondent entered appearance and filed (14 April 1984) an application under Section 468, Code of Criminal Procedure, contending that the charge-sheet was barred by the one-year period of limitation and that no application for condonation of delay had been filed by the prosecution. The trial court sustained the objection, held the charge-sheet to be time-barred and discharged the respondent. The petitioner sought revision before the Sessions Judge, which was dismissed by order dated 28 February 1983. The present revision petition challenges that order.

The record shows no appearance for the petitioner in the High Court hearing; only the respondent's counsel was heard.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether this High Court should entertain the present revision petition in view of the bar in Section 399(3) CrPC, since the petitioner has already invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge and failed.
Whether the Magistrate correctly disallowed cognizance of the offence as barred by the period of limitation under Section 468 CrPC (one-year limitation for offences punishable with imprisonment up to one year), given that the offence was known to the aggrieved person at the time of commission.
Whether the court could or should have condoned the delay in filing the charge-sheet under Section 473 CrPC — i.e., whether the delay was properly explained or necessary to be condoned in the interests of justice.
Whether the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC can be invoked to entertain the petition despite the statutory bar in Section 399(3) CrPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments (as recorded)

The respondent's counsel raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the revision petition, relying on Section 399(3) CrPC which, it was submitted, bars further revision by the High Court where a revision application has already been made to and decided by the Sessions Judge in relation to the same person.
It was further contended that inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC cannot be invoked to evade the explicit prohibition in sub‑section (3) of Section 399 CrPC, and that inherent jurisdiction should be exercised only in exceptional cases of flagrant abuse of process or manifest miscarriage of justice.

Prosecution's Position (as recorded)

The prosecution resisted the respondent's limitation objection at the trial stage, but the record shows that the prosecution did not file any written reply to the respondent's application raising limitation.
No application for condonation of delay under Section 473 CrPC was filed by the prosecution and no reasons were placed on record to explain the delay in lodging the charge-sheet.

Petitioner's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the petitioner's legal arguments before the High Court; indeed, there was no appearance for the petitioner when the case was taken up and the record does not set out any written submissions by the petitioner in this Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Raj Kapoor and others v. State (Delhi Administration and others)	The principle that inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC are wide but should not be used to invade areas reserved for specific statutory provisions; inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly and only in compelling circumstances (abuse of process or manifest miscarriage of justice).	The court relied on this authority to hold that Section 482 cannot be used to bypass the clear prohibition in Section 399(3) CrPC and that inherent jurisdiction should be invoked only in exceptional cases; no such exceptional circumstance was found here.
State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh	The observation that the object of limitation provisions is consonant with fairness of trial (Article 21) and that prosecution must abide by the letter of law or risk failing on the ground of limitation.	The court invoked this precedent to underscore the importance of limitation rules and to justify refusing to condone delay when the prosecution offered no explanation and when fairness to the accused militated against continuing prosecution.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two sequential stages: first on maintainability and the scope of inherent jurisdiction, and second on the substantive limitation and condonation questions.

1. Maintainability and Section 482 v. Section 399(3) CrPC:

- The respondent's preliminary objection under Section 399(3) CrPC was accepted as having considerable merit. Section 399(3) provides that where revision is made before the Sessions Judge by or on behalf of a person, the Sessions Judge's decision is final and no further revision at the instance of that person shall be entertained by the High Court or any other court. The court observed that although the High Court retains inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, such jurisdiction must be exercised sparingly and cannot be used routinely to circumvent specific statutory bars.

- Relying on Raj Kapoor and others v. State, the court reiterated the settled position that Section 482 should not invade domains set aside for specific statutory powers, and will be exercised only where there is flagrant abuse of process or manifest miscarriage of justice. The court found no such exceptional circumstance or jurisdictional error in the impugned order and therefore concluded that the petition was liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.

2. Merits — Limitation under Section 468 CrPC and Condonation under Section 473 CrPC:

- The court held that Section 468 CrPC (the limitation provision for offences punishable with imprisonment not exceeding one year) forbids taking cognizance after the expiry of the prescribed period. In offences of this category, cognizance must generally be taken within one year of the commission of the offence or within one year of knowledge of the offence by the aggrieved person (or identification of the culprit), whichever is earlier.

- In the present case the aggrieved person (the petitioner) knew of the offence at the time of its commission (12 December 1980); accordingly the cognizance window expired on or before 12 December 1981. The police challan was filed on 12 January 1982, i.e. after the one-year period, and therefore the charge-sheet was clearly time‑barred.

- The court then considered whether delay could be condoned under Section 473 CrPC, which permits cognizance after the period of limitation if the delay is properly explained or necessary in the interests of justice. The court described this power as discretionary and to be exercised judicially; condonation is not to be granted as a matter of course and requires sufficient cause.

- The prosecution had not filed any application for condonation nor offered any written explanation for the delay; no reasons were placed before the court explaining why the investigating agency failed to file the charge-sheet within time. Given that the opposite party (the respondent) acquires a valuable right by the lapse of limitation, the court observed that such a right cannot be taken away except under the statutory provision (Section 473), and that the interests of justice must clearly outweigh that right before condonation can be granted.

- The court further noted evidentiary considerations recorded in the police challan: the eye-witnesses cited by the petitioner did not support his version and the prosecution was effectively relying on the petitioner's lone testimony. Given the weak evidentiary position, the court considered it likely that prosecution might fail and that condoning delay to pursue a prosecution with such prospects would not be in the interests of justice.

- The court therefore concluded that there was no sufficient explanation for the delay and no compelling interest of justice that would justify condonation under Section 473; accordingly the Magistrate's decision to discharge the respondent as time‑barred was correct.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court's final decision was to dismiss the revision petition. The operative conclusion in the opinion is:

Revision petition dismissed.

Implications:

The Sessions Judge's order (which had dismissed the petitioner's revision) and the Magistrate's order discharging the respondent on the ground of limitation stand affirmed by this Court. In practical effect, the respondent remains discharged because the police challan was time‑barred and the court found no basis to condone the delay.
No new legal precedent or expansive interpretation of law is laid down by this opinion beyond the application of established principles: (a) that Section 399(3) CrPC can bar further revision to the High Court where revision to the Sessions Judge has been invoked and decided, and (b) that limitation under Section 468 CrPC must be respected unless Section 473 CrPC provides a satisfactory statutory basis for condonation. The court expressly relied on existing authorities and applied established tests for exercise of inherent jurisdiction and condonation.

This summary is strictly confined to the contents of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal holdings beyond those expressly recorded in the text.

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Banarsi Ram v. N.N. Vasudev

J. D. JAIN J.

(1) THIS revision petition is directed against order dated 28th February 1983 of an Additional Sessions Judge dismissing the revision petition filed by the petitioner against order dated 17th May 1982 of a Metropolitan Magistrate whereby he dropped the prosecution of the respondent and discharged him on the ground that the challan put in by the police against the respondent was barred by time and there was no ground for condonation of delay.

(2) SUCCINCTLY the facts of this case are that the petitioner was employed as an Investigator in the Trade Fair Authority of India (for short T. F. A. I) at the relevant time, viz. December 1980. The respondent, who is a rail way employee, too was on deputation with T. F. A. I. and was working as its General Manager. On 19th January 1981 the petitioner lodged a complaint with the Station House, Officer, Police Station Tilak Marg that on 12th December 1980 at about 4. 15 p m he was called by the respondent in his office and he made certain inquiry. During the course of their talk the respondent got flared upon the petitioner refusing to comply with the wishes of the respondent and make a complaint against one K. N. Pun, as desired. The respondent then contemptuously called the petitioner Chure Das Puttar (son of a weeper). He also threatened to spoil his career. The petitioner protested but he was physically pushed (Jut by the respondent with such force that he dashed against the chair in front and sustained injury.

(3) A case under Section 7 (1) (d) of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 was registered against the respondent on the basis of the said complaint. The said offence consists of insult or attempt to insult, on the ground of 'untouchability' a member of a scheduled caste.

(4) ON completion of investigation the police put in the challan against the respondent for his prosecution for the said offence on 12th January 1982. On entering appearance he made an application dated 14th April, 1984 purporting to be under Section 468, Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Act 1 to the effect that the court could not take cognizance of the offence because the charge-sheet had been filed by the police after the expiry of period of limitation namely, one year and there was no application by the prosecution for condonation of delay.

(5) THE prosecution resisted the application but did not file any written reply thereto. The trial court sustained the objection and held that the charge sheet had been filed after the expiry of prescribed period of limitation and discharged the respondent. The petitioner went in revision but as stated above met with no success.

(6) THERE is no appearance on behalf of the petitioner. The case reached yesterday but no one appeared on behalf of the petitioner even yesterday. I have, therefore, heard the counsel for the respondent and perused the record myself.

(7) THE learned counsel for the respondent has, at the outset, raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of this revision petition. He contends that the petitioner having already invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge and having failed there, he is barred from filing a second revision petition in the High Court in view of the clear prohibition contained in Section 399 (3) of the Code. He further submits that inherent powers under Section 482 cannot be exercised to evade explicit provision of sub-section (3) of Section 399 which lays down that where an application for revision is made by or on behalf of any person before the Sessions Judge the decision of the Sessions Judge thereon in relation to such person shall be final and no further proceeding by way of revision at the instance of such person shall be entertained by the High Court or any other court. I find considerable merit in this contention ill view of the clear interdict contained in this sub-section. It is true that the High Court may interfere in exercise of this inherent jurisdiction (as distinguished from revisional jurisdiction) in appropriate cases but it is well settled that inherent jurisdiction must be exercised aparingly and only in such cases where the court finds that there has been a flagrant abuse of process of law or manifest miscarriage of justice. In Raj Kapoor and others v. State (Delhi Administration and others, the Supreme Court observed that: The opening words of Section 482 contradict this contention because nothing in the Code not even Section 397 can affect the amplitude of the inherent power preserved in so many terms by the lanugage of Section 482. Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law: when a specific provision is made easy resort to inherent power is not right except under compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent power should not invade areas set apart for specific power under the same Code. The Supreme Court enunciated the legal position still further saying: In short there is no total ban on the exercise of inherent power where abuse of the process of the court or other extraordinary situation excites the courts jurisdiction. The limitation is self restraint, nothing more.

(8) IT is thus crystal clear that inherent power of the court under Section 482 is to be invoked only in exceptional circumstances, for instance if glaring injustice stares the court in face and there is manifest miscarriage of justice, but apparently no such contigency exists in the instant case and the impugned order does not suffer from any jurisdictional error or legal infirmity so as to warrant interference by this court in exercise of its inherent power. Hence, the revision petition is liable to be dismissed on this short ground.

(9) COMING to the merits of the case, there can be no two opinions that in view of the prohibition contained in Section 468 of the Code, 110 court can take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2) thereof after the expiry of the period of limitation. In cases of offence where the maximum punishment to be awarded does not exceed imprisonment for one year, the court can take cognizance within one year of the commission of the offence or when the offence comes to the knowledge of the aggrieved person if not know earlier on when the identity of the culprit, if not know previously, it known to the person aggrieved by the offence, or to the police officer making -investigation into the offence whichever is earlier. (See Section 469), In the instant case, the commission of offence was known to the aggrieved person at the very time of his commission and as such the court could take cognizance of the offence within one year of the same. i. e. on or before 12th of December, 1981. However, as stated above, the police challan was put in on 12th January 1982. As such it was clearly barred by time.

(10) THE next question for consideration is whether there is any ground for condonation of delay/extension of period of limitation under section 473 of the code. the said section empowers the court to take cognizance of an offence even after the expiry of period of limitation if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been (i) properly explained, or (ii) that it is necessary so to do in the interests of justice. Evidently the power vested in the court by virtue of this Section in discretionary. It is well settled that the discretion has to be exercised judicially so as to advance the cause of equity and justice. Thus, delay is not to be condoned as a matter of course and there must exist sufficient cause for condonation of delay. As stated above, no application was ever made by the prosecution for condonation of delay. No reasons were assigned even by way of reply to the application of the respondent in which the objection regarding limitation was raised. One is, therefore, left guessing as to why the investigating agency failed to file the charge-sheet in time. Needless to say that once the period of limitation is over the opposite party acquires a valuable right and that right cannot be taken away except under law which in this case would mean provisions of section 473 of the Code. Reference in this context may be made to State Of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh., wherein it was observed that: The object which the statute seeks to subserve is clearly in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that any prosecution whether by the State of a private complainant must abide by the letter of law or take the risk of the prosecution failing on the ground of limitation.

(11) IT may be noticed that the accused in the aforesaid case was charged under Section 406, Indian Penal Code, for misappropriating the amounts deposited with him as a cashier of a cooperative society. But still the prosecution against him being barred by limitation, his conviction as well as sentence as also the entire proceedings culminating in his conviction were held to be honest. Compared to the gravity of the offence in the said case involving as it did embezzlement of public money the gravened of the charge in the instant case dwindles into insignificance, I have said so while pondering over the question whether it is necessary to condone the delay in the instant case in the interests of justice. Needless to say that before the other party can be deprived of a valuable right, viz, immunity from prosecution by lapse of time, the interests of justice must out-weigh other considerations such as limitation before the court would be justified in condoning the delay and taking cognizance of the offence. It may not be out of place to mention here that according to the police challan itself the eve witnesses cited by the petitioner in his complaint did not lend support to his version and, therefore, the prosecution was content to rely on the lone testimony of the petitioner. It is no wonder that in such a contingency the prosecution of the respondent may end in smoke and it may simply result in his persecution. Surely, it will not be in the interest of justice to resort to such a hazardous course.

(12) TO sum up, therefore I find no merit in this revision petition. It is accordingly dismissed. Revision petition dismissed.

Banarsi Ram v. N.N. Vasudev

Structured Summary of the Opinion (J. D. Jain J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments (as recorded)

Prosecution's Position (as recorded)

Petitioner's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Banarsi Ram v. N.N. Vasudev

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