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  • Article 137 of the Limitation Act.2. Revision
  • Indian Succession act or Limitation Act.4.
  • Article 137 of the Limitation Act
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citation codes
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  • Article 137 of the Limitation Act.2. Revision
  • Indian Succession act or Limitation Act.4.
  • Article 137 of the Limitation Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The revision petitioner is the third defendant in O.S. No. 10 of 1987 before the Additional District Court, Trichur. The matter arises from I.A. 551 of 1990 in which the Additional District Judge allowed the respondent's application to amend the plaint. The suit was originally filed as O.P. No. 2 of 1980 seeking grant of probate with the will annexed. The revision petitioner contested that petition and the matter was converted into an Original Suit. The respondent sought amendment of the plaint to alter the relief prayed for — replacing a prayer for grant of probate with one for grant of letters of administration. The Additional District Judge allowed the amendment, overruling the revision petitioner's objection that the suit was barred by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. The revision petitioner challenged that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a proceeding for grant of probate or letters of administration is barred by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act where the application is made more than three years after the death of the testator.
  2. Whether amendment of the plaint to change the relief from grant of probate to grant of letters of administration should have been disallowed as futile on the ground of time-bar.

Arguments of the Parties

Revision Petitioner's Arguments

  • The suit is barred by limitation because the respondent did not file within three years of the death of the testator as provided under Article 137 of the Limitation Act; therefore the amendment should not have been permitted.
  • Counsel relied on Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma ((1976) 4 SCC 634 : AIR 1977 S.C. 282) to argue that Article 137 applies to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil court, and thus limitation would apply to probate/letters of administration proceedings.

Respondent's Arguments

  • There is no period of limitation prescribed for the grant of probate or letters of administration either under the Indian Succession Act or the Limitation Act; hence Article 137 should not be held to bar such proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma ((1976) 4 SCC 634 : AIR 1977 S.C. 282) Counsel relied on this case to contend that Article 137 of the Limitation Act applies to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil court (i.e., that Article 137 would govern limitation in such proceedings). The court distinguished the case on its facts: it involved a claim where the date of cutting of trees was well known and thus the cause of action and accrual of right were ascertainable, justifying application of a three-year limitation; that factual scenario differs from probate/administration applications where knowledge of the will or right to apply may arise later.
Vasudev Daulatram Sadarangani… Plaintiff; v. Sajni Prem Lalwani… Defendant. (AIR 1983 Bombay 268) The court in that case held that under the Limitation Act no period is prescribed within which an application for probate, letters of administration or succession certificate must be made, and such applications cannot be rejected at the threshold as time-barred by invoking Article 137. The present court relied on this holding to support the view that a fixed starting point for limitation cannot be identified in probate/letters of administration matters, and that the right to apply accrues day to day so the cause of action arises continuously while the will remains unprobated.
Ramanand Thakur v. Parmanand Thakur (AIR 1982 Patna 87) Authority on the proposition that probate/letters of administration applications are not subject to a fixed limitation under Article 137 in the way ordinary civil claims are. The court treated this decision as authoritative support for the position that such proceedings are not time-barred under Article 137.
(1990-1-L.W. 337) Division Bench of the Madras High Court The Division Bench held that Article 137 of the Limitation Act will not apply to proceedings filed for grant of probate or letters of administration with or without the will annexed. The court cited this decision as recent authority reinforcing the settled legal position that Article 137 does not apply to probate/administration proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed whether Article 137 of the Limitation Act could be invoked to hold a probate or letters of administration application time-barred. It observed that under the Limitation Act no period is prescribed for filing a petition for probate, letters of administration, or succession certificate. Because no starting point for limitation can be uniformly identified in such matters, there is no basis to hold that a particular time within which proceedings must be initiated exists.

The court distinguished the Kerala State Electricity Board case on facts: that case concerned a claim where the operative date (cutting of trees) was known and therefore the cause of action and accrual of right were ascertainable, justifying application of the three-year limitation. By contrast, in probate or letters of administration proceedings an applicant may learn of the existence of a will long after the testator's death; therefore the right to apply may accrue at different times and, as the court put it, accrues "day to day" so long as the will remains unprobated.

The court relied on earlier authorities (including Vasudev Daulatram Sadarangani and Ramanand Thakur, and a Division Bench of the Madras High Court) which held that Article 137 will not apply to probate/administration proceedings and that such applications cannot be rejected at the threshold as time-barred under Article 137. The court acknowledged that delay must be explained and that unexplained delay may cast suspicion on the will, but held that such delay does not equate to the application being barred under Article 137 because it may be impossible to determine when the right to apply accrued.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition is dismissed; the amendment of the plaint was properly allowed and the suit is not barred by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act.

Implications: The direct effect is that the Additional District Judge's order permitting amendment (to seek letters of administration instead of probate) stands and the revision against that order fails. The court required only that delay, if any, be explained and noted that unexplained delay may raise suspicion about the will, but it did not hold that probate/letters of administration proceedings are barred by Article 137. The opinion does not purport to create a new legal doctrine beyond reaffirming the existing line of authorities cited; no broader implications beyond the immediate effect on the parties are discussed in the opinion.

Costs: The court ordered no costs.

    Francis v. Antony

    1. Revision petitioner is the third defendant in O.S 10 of 1987 of the Additional District Court, Trichur. He challenges the order. In I.A 551 of 1990 allowing amendment of the plaint. Thesuit was originally filed as O.P 2 of 1980 for the grant ofprobate along with the will attached thereto. As the revision petitioner contested the petition, it was converted as an Original Suit. Respondent (plaintiff) wanted amendment of the plaint to alter the prayer as one for grant of letters of administration instead of grant of probate. The Additional District Judge allowed the petition overruling the objection of the revision petitioner that the suit is barred by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act.

    2. Revision Petitioner contended that as the suit is barred by limitation as the respondent did not file it within three years of the death of the testator as provided under Article 137 of the Limitation Act the amendment should not have been allowed.

    3. Respondent's contention is that for the grant of probate or letters of administration no period of limitation is provided either under the Indian Succession act or Limitation Act.

    4. Counsel for the revision petitioner relied on Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P Kunhaliumma ((1976) 4 SCC 634 : AIR 1977 S.C 282) and contended that Article 137 of the Limitation Act would apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil court and that being the law there is no merit in the contention of the respondent that for probate and letters of administration proceedings there is no period of limitation. That was a case where compensation was claimed for the trees out and removed from the property by the Kerala State Electricity Board. The date of cutting was well known to the petitioner who claimed enhanced compensation. So necessarily he ought to have made the claim within three years as held by the Supreme Court. In a probate or letters of administration proceedings it may not be known to the applicant about the existence of a will immediately after the death of the testator. There may be a case where the applicant became aware of the existence of the will long after the death of the testator. It is indeed difficult to hold that proceedings for probate or letters of administration should be initiated within three years of the death of the testator or else it would be barred.

    5. Under the Limitation Act no period is prescribed for filing a petition for probate or letters of administration or succession certificate. There is no basis to hold that within a particular time one has to initiate proceedings for probate or letters of administration. Depending upon facts and circumstances of each case the right to apply for probate or letters of administration might become necessary even beyond three years from the date of the death of the testator. One such instance may be when a party came to know of the will long after the testator's death. Whenever there is delay it has to be explained. Though delay may cause suspicion about the will, it cannot be held that the application is barred by limitation under Article 137 as it may not be possible to find out as to when the right to apply accrued.

    6. In Vasudev Daulatram Sadarangani…Plaintiff; v. Sajni Prem Lalwani…Defendant. (AIR 1983 Bombay 268) the Court held that under the Limitation Act no period is advisedly prescribed within which an application for probate, letters of administration or succession certificate must be made. Thus an application for probate or letters of administration cannot be rejected at the threshold as time-barred by invoking Article 137. As it may not be possible to find out as to when the right to apply accrued in an application for grant of probate or letters of administration, there cannot be any starting point of the period of limitation. The right to apply for a probate accrues from day to day so long as the will remains unprobated. As the right to apply accrues every day and the cause of action for an application for probate arises every moment so long as the will remains unprobated, revision petitioner's contention that the suit is barred by limitation is not tenable. Ramanand Thakur v. Parmanand Thakur (AIR 1982 Patna 87) of the Division bench of Patna High Court is an authoritative decision on this point. In a recent decision (1990-1-L.W. 337) a Division bench of the Madras High Court held that Article 137 of the Limitation Act will not apply to proceedings filed for grant of probate or letters of administration with or without the will annexed. In view of the settled legal position, there is no merit in the contention of the revision petitioner that the suit is barred by limitation and hence the amendment of pleadings will be a sheer exercise in futility.

    7. There is no merit in the C.R.P.C.R.P is dismissed. No costs.

    8. Dismissed.

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    Comments

    Francis v. Antony
    (Nov 16, 1990)