P.K Mohanti, J.:— The petitioner seeks issuance of an appropriate writ for quashing the proceeding in the Industrial Dispute Case No. 52 of 1977, pending before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Orissa.
2. The petitioner is a registered co-operative society and has been functioning as an all India news agency having its head office at Mandi House, New Delhi, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi Government. Opposite party 4, Prasanta Kumar Patnaik, was appointed as a probationary journalist under the petitioner on a monthly pay of Rs. 200 and was posted at Bhubaneswar. His services having been terminated he raised an industrial dispute which was referred by the Government of Orissa for adjudication by the Labour Court under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act and accordingly Industrial Dispute Case No. 52 of 1977, was started. The petitioner submitted his show-cause before the Labour Court raising a preliminary objection that the appropriate Government as contemplated by S. 2 (a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was the Delhi Government and not the Orissa Government and that the latter had no jurisdiction to refer the dispute for adjudication by its Labour Court. The objection was overruled by the Labour Court by its order, dated 19 January 1978, (annexure 7). The petitioner has filed this writ application challenging the legality of the proceeding in the Industrial Dispute Case No. 52 of 1977. The contention is that the petitioner is an all India news agency having its headquarters at New Delhi and though it has representatives in different places there is no other office to exercise control over its employees in any other State. It is further contended that the conditions of service of opposite party 4 are directly controlled by the petitioner and that the cause of action for the dispute arose at Delhi. Accordingly it is contended that the Government of Orissa was not the appropriate Government within the meaning of S. 2 (a) of the Industrial Disputes Act to refer the dispute to this Labour Court for adjudication.
3. Opposite party 4 filed counter contending that though the petitioner has its head office at Delhi it has a branch office at Cuttack which disburses his salary and is authorized to function independently. It is also contended that the order terminating the services of opposite party 4 was served on him at Bhubaneswar and, accordingly, the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Government of Orissa.
4. The question for consideration in this writ application is whether the Government of Orissa was the appropriate Government to refer the industrial dispute between the parties for adjudication by its Labour Court.
5. The term “appropriate Government” is defined in S. 2 (a) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The definition is not very helpful for determining the appropriate State Government. But S. 10 (1) of the Act does contemplate that the appropriate Government would be that Government in whose jurisdiction industrial dispute arises or is apprehended when it says that
“where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time by order in writing”
make a reference.
6. The proper test to determine “appropriate Government” in relation to an industrial dispute is to see where the dispute substantially arose. If a workman is working in a separate establishment, the dispute can be taken to arise only at the place where the establishment exists. The mere fact that the head office exercises administrative control over the workmen does not confer jurisdiction on the Government, within whose territorial jurisdiction the head office is located, to make a reference under S. 10.
7. The Supreme Court in Workmen of Sri Ranga Vilas Motors (Private), Ltd. v. Sri Ranga Vilas Motors (Private), Ltd. [A.I.R 1967 S.C 1040], has laid down the tests for determination of the appropriate Government in relation to an industrial dispute. The facts of that case are on all fours with the facts of the present case. In that case, the workman working at Bangalore branch of a company having its head office at Krishnagiri, Madras State, was transferred by the orders of the head office. The workman did not obey the said orders of transfer. Subsequently, the workman was removed from service for disobeying the orders of transfer. In relation to the order removing him from service a reference under S. 10 (1) (c) of the Act was made by the State of Mysore. The question arose whether the State of Mysore had jurisdiction to refer the dispute. The Supreme Court, after referring to the principles laid down in its earlier decision in Indian Cable Company, Ltd. v. Their workmen [1962-I L.L.J 409], laid down that the dispute in that case arose at Bangalore were the concerned employee was working at the time of the transfer and that as such the Mysore State within whose jurisdiction the dispute arose is the appropriate State to refer the dispute. The relevant observations of their Lordships (at page 1043) are quoted below:
“… The order of transfer, it is true, was made in Krishnagiri at the head office, but the order was to operate on a workman working in Banagalore. In our view, the High Court was right in holding that the proper question to raise is: Where did the dispute arise? Ordinarily, if there is a separate establishment and the workman is working in that establishment, the dispute would arise at that place. As the High Court observed, there should clearly be some nexus between the dispute and the territory of the State and not necessarily between the territory of the State and the industry concerning which the dispute arose.”
8. In Indian Cable Company, Ltd. v. Their workmen [1962-I L.L.J 409], referred to above, it was the contention of the company that after the closure of the branch office at Ambala it had no place of business in the State of Punjab and in consequence thereof, the Government of Punjab had no jurisdiction to make a reference. The Court held that the Punjab Government would be competent to make the reference if the cause of action had arisen wholly or in part within that State. As the validity of the closure of branch had itself been in dispute, the cause of action must undoubtedly be held to have arisen within that State and the reference would be competent.
9. In Hindustan Aeronautics, Ltd. v. Their workmen [1975-II L.L.N 235], the dispute arose between the Barrackpore branch of the company and its workmen. An argument was raised that the Barrackpore branch being under the control of Bangalore division office of the company the West Bengal Government was not competent to make a reference. This argument was repelled by the Supreme Court with the following observations in Para. 5 at page 238:
“… It may be assumed that the Barrackpore branch was under the control of the Bangalore division of the company. Yet it was a separate branch engaged in an industry of repairs of aircrafts or the like at Barrackpore. For the purposes of the Act and on the facts of this case the Barrackpore branch was an industry carried on bv the company as a separate unit. The workers were receiving their pay packages at Barrackpore and were under the control of the officers of the company stationed there. If there was any disturbance of industrial peace at Barrackpore where a considerable number of workmen were working the appropriate Government concerned in the maintenance of the industrial peace was the West Bengal Government. The grievance of the workmen of Barrackpore were their own and the cause of action in relation to the industrial dispute in question arose there. The reference, therefore, for adjudication of such a dispute by the Governor of West Bengal was good and valid…”
10. Now, let us apply the principles laid down by the Supreme Court to the facts of the instant ease. It is not disputed that opposite party 4 was posted at Bhubaneswar and he was served with the order of termination of service at that place. The petitioner clearly admitted in his show-cause (annexure 4) filed before the District Labour Officer, Puri, that it has an office at Cuttack and Sri K.N Gour was the editor-in-charge of that office. It was further admitted that the order transferring opposite party 4 from Bhubaneswar to New Delhi was served through the “Cuttack office.” The order, dated 19 January 1978, of the Labour Court also shows that the petitioner did not deny the fact that the services of opposite party 4 were terminated while he was employed in the office at Bhubaneswar and that he was receiving his pay through the Cuttack office (vide annexure 7). That there was a branch office of the petitioner at Cuttack is also evident from its letters in a annexures A and B which were addressed to opposite party 4. In annexure A it is stated:
“Hindustan Samachar is celebrating Silver Jubilee this year throughout the country. Cuttack office should also celebrate it.”
In annexure B it is stated that the editor-in-charge of Hindustan Samachar at Cuttack had been directed to relieve opposite party 4 to join at New Delhi on transfer. This clearly shows that there is a separate establishment at Cuttack and opposite party 4 was under the control of the editor-in-charge of the Cuttack office. It is also evident from another letter, dated 4 April 1975 (annexure C), that opposite party 4 was getting his salary from the “Cuttack office.” Therein it is stated as follows:
“We had advised out Cuttack office to clear your salary dues and you must have received the payment by now.”
11. Admittedly, a telephone in the name of the petitioner is also installed at Cuttack. Thus there are abundant materials on the record to warrant a finding that the petitioner has a branch office at Cuttack and the dispute substantially arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Government of Orissa.
12. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner placed strong reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Lipton, Ltd. v. Their employees [A.I.R 1959 S.C 676], for the proposition that in the case of workmen who are paid their salary and controlled by an office of a company, an industrial dispute wholly arises at the place where the office is situated irrespective of the fact that the workman works at a place which is outside the limits of that State. In that case the dispute arose between Lipton, Ltd., London, having an office at Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi, and its employees of the Delhi office, who had formed a union. Some of the employees were employed outside Delhi. The union raised an industrial dispute which was referred to the Additional Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, by the Delhi Government. There was nothing to indicate that the employees of Lipton, Ltd., posted outside the Delhi State were under any kind of control by any branch office. It is also significant to note that the question of jurisdiction was not seriously pressed before their Lordships. The contention that the Delhi Government was not competent to make the reference was disposed of by the Supreme Court in the following terms:
“… It may be made clear, however, at this stage that one of the points taken before Industrial Tribunal on behalf of the Lipton, Ltd., was that the Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make an award in respect of employees of the Delhi office who were employed outside the State of Delhi. This point of jurisdiction was decided against the appellant and the Industrial Tribunal pointed out that all the workmen of the Delhi office, whether they worked in Delhi or not, received their salaries from the Delhi office; they were controlled from the Delhi office in the matter of leave, transfer, supervision, etc., and, therefore, the Delhi State Government was the appropriate Government within the meaning of S. 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, relating to the dispute which arose between the Lipton, Ltd., and the union and under S. 18 of the said Act the award made by the Tribunal was binding on all persons employed in the Delhi office. The Appellate Tribunal upheld the decision of the Industrial Tribunal on this point and though this question of jurisdiction was raised in the appeals before us, it was not seriously pressed by the learned Attorney-General. We are of the view that the Industrial Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate on the dispute between the Lipton, Ltd. and its workmen of the Delhi office.”
13. The aforementioned observations do not, in our opinion, serve as an authority for the proposition that the reference of the dispute must of necessity be made by the State within the territory of which the head office of the company is located. The important points to be noticed are that
(1) the dispute had in fact been raised at Delhi by the union which represented the worker;
(2) that though the employees were working in States outside the Delhi State, they had to depend upon the Delhi office practically for all purposes including payment of salaries; and
(3) that the question of determination of appropriate Government to refer the dispute was not seriously pressed before their Lordships.
14. On the materials placed before us, we hold that the petitioner has a branch office at Cuttack which was in charge of an editor, that opposite party 4 was being paid his salary through the Cuttack office, that the editor-in-charge of the Cuttack office was exercising some control over him and that the order of termination of service was served on opposite party 4 through Cuttack office while he was employed at Bhubaneswar. The fact that the final administrative control was vested in the head office at Delhi and that the order of termination of service was made by the head office will no make Delhi the place where the dispute arose. The nexus should be between the dispute and the territory of the State and dispute arose within the limits of the Government of Orissa consequent upon the termination of the services of opposite party 4. The Government of Orissa is, therefore, the appropriate Government to refer the dispute under S. 10 of the Act for adjudication by the Labour Court.
15. There is no merit in this writ application and it is accordingly dismissed with costs, the hearing fee being assessed at Rs. 100.
16. S. Acharya, J.:— I agree.