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  • S.11(2) (c) of the Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act 1965
  • S.12 (3) of the Rent Control Act
  • S.12 of the Rent Control Act,
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • S.11(2) (c) of the Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act 1965
  • S.12 (3) of the Rent Control Act
  • S.12 of the Rent Control Act,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

A landlord instituted eviction proceedings in the Rent Control Court, Trichur, alleging that rent was in arrears. The Rent Control Court ordered the tenant to pay all admitted arrears on or before 20 September 1971 and specified that, on default, an order for possession under S.12 would be passed. Time for payment was extended, but the tenant did not comply. On 25 October 1971 the Rent Control Court passed an order for possession under S.12(3) of the Act.

Within thirty days the tenant filed two applications: I.A. 4142 of 1971 seeking to set aside the possession order, and I.A. 4143 of 1971 seeking that the tendered (admitted) arrears be received. The Rent Control Court dismissed I.A. 4142 on the ground that an order under S.12(3) cannot be set aside merely because the admitted arrears were deposited after the order; it also declined to receive the arrears tendered with I.A. 4143 and dismissed that application.

The tenant's appeals against those dismissals were rejected by the Appellate Authority. On further revision, the District Court (Revisional Court), Trichur, allowed the revision, set aside the orders of the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority, and remanded the applications to the Rent Control Court for fresh disposal with directions that the time for depositing the arrears be extended. The landlord (aggrieved) preferred the present revision petition to the High Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an order for possession passed under S.12(3) of the Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, 1965 can be set aside or vacated by the tenant depositing admitted arrears of rent after the making of that order.
  2. Whether the Revisional Authority (District Court) had jurisdiction or competence to set aside the orders passed under S.12(3) and to direct an extension of time to deposit arrears (i.e., whether the power available under S.11 extends to S.12 or to the Revisional Authority).
  3. Whether S.12(3) of the Act is discriminatory or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution (as argued by the tenant/respondent).
  4. Whether there is an impermissible difference in treatment between the powers exercisable by the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority in relation to S.12(3).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent / Tenant's Arguments

  • The tenant sought to set aside the S.12(3) possession order on the ground that the admitted arrears had been deposited subsequent to the passing of the order (I.A. 4142 of 1971).
  • The tenant also tendered the admitted arrears and applied that the deposit be received by the Court (I.A. 4143 of 1971).
  • The tenant (respondent) contended that S.12(3) was discriminatory and violated Article 14 of the Constitution, arguing that the Section penalised an honest admission of arrears while enabling a dishonest tenant who denies arrears to later obtain relief under S.11; in short, the Section allegedly encouraged dishonesty and penalised honesty.
  • The respondent argued that because the power under S.12(3) was conferred on the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority but not expressly on the Revisional Authority, that omission rendered the provision discriminatory.

Appellant / Landlord

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the appellant's legal arguments beyond the fact that the landlord was aggrieved by the Revisional Court's order and preferred the present revision petition to challenge the Revisional Court's decision.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kurien v. Saramma Chacko (1964 KLT. 1) The power under S.11(2)(c) can be exercised by the Appellate Authority and also by the Revisional Authority. The Court cited this to highlight the distinction between S.11 and S.12 and to show that the exerciseability of S.11 by higher authorities does not automatically equate to similar treatment of S.12.
K. P. Mohammed v. Madhavi Amma (1963 KLT. 688) Held that orders of eviction passed under S.12(3) are not amenable to correction under S.11(2)(b); S.11 and S.12 provide for different contingencies. Applied as authority that an S.12(3) order cannot be vacated under S.11, supporting the conclusion that subsequent deposit of arrears does not entitle the tenant to vacate an S.12(3) order.
T. B. Mohanan v. Kanakaraja Pillai (1970 KLT. 1024) An order passed under S.12 of the Rent Control Act cannot be reopened or vacated by tendering the rent subsequent to the passing of the said order. Relied on to reinforce the position that subsequent payment after an S.12(3) order does not undo the consequence of that order.
Raman Sahadevan v. R. Kesavan Nair (1973 KLT. 37) A Division Bench considered whether an order under S.12(3) is executable by the Rent Control Court; it held that it was executable and for execution may be equated with an order under S.11. The Revisional Court had relied on this decision to treat S.12(3) as being in effect the same as S.11 for purposes of available remedies. The present Court distinguished it, noting that Raman Sahadevan dealt with executability and did not decide that an S.12(3) order may be vacated by subsequent payment; thus it was not authority for the Revisional Court's conclusion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by setting out and comparing the statutory schemes in S.11(2)(c) and S.12(1)–(3) of the Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, 1965. It emphasised the distinct purposes of the two sections:

  • S.11(2)(c) operates to relieve a tenant against forfeiture by permitting deposit of arrears within a period fixed by the Rent Control Court (or such further period as the Court may allow), and it has been held (Kurien v. Saramma Chacko) that the Appellate and Revisional Authorities can exercise the power under that provision.
  • S.12, however, serves a different function: it makes deposit of admitted arrears a condition precedent to a tenant's right to contest eviction proceedings or to prefer an appeal, and S.12(3) provides for stopping further proceedings and directing possession in case of failure to comply.

On the core question whether an S.12(3) order may be vacated by tendering arrears subsequent to the order, the Court relied on earlier decisions (K. P. Mohammed v. Madhavi Amma and T. B. Mohanan v. Kanakaraja Pillai) that hold an S.12(3) order is not amenable to correction under S.11 and cannot be reopened by later tender of the rent. These authorities were treated as clear support against the Revisional Court's approach.

The Court examined the Revisional Court's reliance on Raman Sahadevan v. R. Kesavan Nair (1973 KLT. 37). It observed that the Division Bench in that case considered the limited question of whether an S.12(3) order is executable by the Rent Control Court and concluded that it was. The present Court found that this did not amount to authority for vacating S.12(3) consequences by subsequent payment; at most Raman Sahadevan addressed executability and not the distinct remedial consequences under S.12.

The Court therefore concluded that even if, for execution purposes, an S.12(3) order could be equated with an S.11 order, that equivalence does not support the proposition that the consequences enjoined by S.12(3) for failure to deposit admitted arrears can be undone by later payment. The prior decisions cited were regarded as sufficient to support this conclusion.

On the constitutional challenge under Article 14 that S.12(3) is discriminatory, the Court rejected the contention. It held that the differing consequences of S.11 and S.12 do not constitute impermissible discrimination because the two sections serve fundamentally different purposes—one to relieve against forfeiture and the other as a procedural condition precedent to defense and appeal. The Court also dismissed the argument that it was discriminatory for the Revisional Authority not to have the same powers as the Appellate Authority in relation to S.12(3), noting that there is a legitimate difference between the powers of an Appellate Authority and those of a Revisional Authority.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision petition is allowed. The Court set aside the order of the Revisional Authority and restored the order of the Appellate Authority, awarding costs to the landlord (appellant).

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The Revisional Court's direction to remand and to extend time for deposit of arrears was set aside; the Appellate Authority's dismissal (upholding the Rent Control Court's refusal to receive post-order deposits and refusal to vacate the S.12(3) order) was restored.
  • The tenant's attempts to vacate or reopen the S.12(3) possession order by depositing arrears after that order was made were rejected by the High Court as inconsistent with the statutory scheme and controlling precedents cited in the opinion.

Broader implications: The Court relied on existing precedents to resolve the issue and grounded its decision in the statutory distinction between S.11 and S.12. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel rule beyond applying those precedents to the facts of this case.


Source: Summary derived exclusively from the provided legal opinion text. No additional facts or reasoning have been inferred beyond what appears in that opinion.

    M. Venugopalan v. Raphael

    1. This revision petition preferred by a landlord arises out of certain proceedings instituted by him in the Rent Control Court, Trichur, claiming eviction of a building belonging to him on the ground that rent had been kept in arrear. The Rent Control Court passed orders directing the tenant to pay all admitted arrears on or before the 20th September 1971. It was made clear that on default of deposit, within the specified period, an order for possession under S.12 (2) of the Act, will be passed. The order was not complied with, despite the tact that time for payment was extended. Therefore, the Rent Control Court passed an order for possession under S.12(3) of the Act. This was on 25-10-1971. Within thirty days of the said order, the tenant filed I. A: 4143 of 1971 to receive what was claimed to be the admitted arrears; and I. A. 4142 of 1971 to set aside the order for possession passed on 25-10-1971. The Rent Control Court dismissed 1. A. 4142 of 1971 holding that an order under S.12(3), cannot be set aside or vacated on the mere ground that the admitted arrears of rent had been deposited subsequent to the order. It declined to receive the arrears of rent tendered along with the I. A. 4143 of 1971, and accordingly dismissed the same. The appeals preferred by the tenant against these orders were dismissed by the appellate authority. On further revision, the Revisional Court, namely the District Court, Trichur, allowed the revision and set aside the orders of the Rent Control Court and of the Appellate Authority and remanded I. A. Nos. 4142 of 1971 and 4143 of 1971 back to the Rent Control Court for fresh disposal directing that the time for making deposit of the arrears of rent, will be extended by the Rent Control Court. The aggrieved landlord has preferred this revision petition.

    2. S.11(2) (c) of the Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act 1965 reads:

    "11 (2) (c): The order of the Rent Control Court directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building shall not be executed before the expiry of one month from the date of such order or such further period as the Rent Control Court may in its discretion allow; and if the tenant deposits the arrears of rent with interest and cost of proceedings, within the said period of one month or such further period, as the case may be it shall vacate that order."

    Under the above provision, a tenant against whom a decree for eviction has been passed by the Rent Control Court on the ground that rent had been kept in arrears, is allowed relief against the forfeiture of the tenancy incurred by nonpayment of rent, by depositing the arrears decreed, within a certain period. It has been ruled by this Court in Kurien v. Saramma Chacko (1964 KLT. 1) that the power under S.11 (2)(c) can be exercised by the Appellate Authority and also by the Revisional Authority. S.12 of the Act provides for a totally different contingency. We may read Sub-sections (1) to (3) of the Section:

    "12. Payment of deposit of rent during the pendency of proceedings for eviction. (1) No tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made by a landlord under S.11, shall be entitled to contest the application before the Rent Control Court under that section, or to prefer an appeal under S.18 against any order made by the Rent Control Court on the application, unless he has paid or pays to the landlord, or deposit with the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due in respect of the building upto the date of payment or deposit and continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building until the termination of the proceedings before the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be.

    (2) The deposit under sub-section (1) shall be made within such time as the Court may fix and in such manner as may be prescribed and shall be accompanied by the fee prescribed for the service of notice referred to in sub-section. (4):

    Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the deposit of the arrears of rent shall not be less than four weeks from the date of the order and the time fixed for the deposit of rent which subsequently accrues due shall not be less than two weeks from the date on which the rent becomes due.

    (3) If any tenant fails to pay or to deposit the rent as aforesaid, the Rent Control Court or the Appellate Authority as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building."

    It will be noticed that the deposit of the admitted arrears enjoined by the above Section, is a condition precedent to the tenant entering on his defence and contesting the application for eviction, or an appeal filed therefrom. The scope and purpose of the deposit of arrears of rent, enjoined by S.12 is fundamentally different from the scope and the purpose of the deposits envisaged by S.11 of the Act.. In K. P. Mohammed v. Madhavi Amma (1963 KLT. 688) a Division Bench of this Court observed:

    7. Counsel contended that the opinion of the learned judge that orders for eviction passed under S.12 (3) of the Act cannot be vacated under S.11 (2) (b) requires reconsideration by us. S.11 and 12 of the Act are not dependent on each other. They provide for different contingencies though the consequence of the non-compliance of the mandates of either section is eviction. It must then follow that an order of eviction passed under S.12 (3) is not amenable to correction under S.11 (2) (b), which relates to orders of eviction passed under that sub-section i. e. S.11 (2) only. We are thus in agreement with the view of the learned judge on the matter."

    In T. B. Mohanan v. Kanakaraja Pillai (1970 KLT. 1024), a learned judge of this Court also observed that an order passed under S.12 of the Rent Control Act, cannot be reopened or vacated by tendering the rent subsequent to the passing of the said order. These decisions, we think, are clear enough authorities against the view taken by the Revisional Court in the order now under challenge. But that Court seems to have found that the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Raman Sahadevan… v. R. Kesavan Nair…. (1973 KLT. 37) was direct authority for the position that an order passed under S.12(3) of the Act is really an order passed under S.11. From this, the Revisional Court jumped to the conclusion that if the power under S.11 were available to an Appellate Authority, the power under S.12 (3) should also be available to that Authority. We are unable to accept this view as correct. The limited question that was considered and that arose for determination in the Division Bench ruling in 1973 KLT. 37 was whether an order under S.12 (3) of the Act was executable by the Rent Control Court. It was held by the Division Bench that it was. That question is not actually or directly before us, and we need not express any opinion on the same. But even assuming that for purpose of execution an order under S.12 (3) can be equated with, and treated as the same as, one under S.11 of the Act, we are unable to hold that the consequence enjoined by an order under S.12 (3) for failure to deposit the admitted arrears in time can be vacated or obliterated by payment at any subsequent stages or periods; and we think that the decisions we have referred to earlier in 1963 KLT. 688 and 1970 KLT.1024 are sufficient authorities for this position. We are therefore unable to sustain the order of the Revisional Court,

    3. Counsel for the respondent then attempted the argument that S.12 (3) of the Act, is itself discriminatory and violative of Art.14 of the Constitution. C. M. P. 5004 of 1974 was filed challenging the vires of S.12 (3) of the Act, and the said application was allowed by us. Notice was issued to the Advocate-General, and the Government Pleader was present at the hearing. Counsel for the respondent contended that the Section really had the effect of encouraging dishonesty and penalising an honest tenant. For, if a tenant honestly chose to admit that rent was in arrear, he had necessarily to perform the obligations enjoined by S.12(1) of the Act, and pay the penalty of being visited by the consequence provided by S.12 (3) for default of compliance; whereas.if he dishonestly chose to dispute that arrears of rent were due, and eventually a decree for eviction were passed against him, he could take advantage of the provisions of S.11 (3) of the Act, before the Rent Control Court and before the Appellate Authority and even the Revisional Authority. It was argued that this benefit was unavailable in the case of the obligation enjoined by S.12 of the Act. We do not think this constitutes discrimination. As we said earlier, the scope and the purpose of the two sections, are fundamentally different. The one is meant to relieve against forfeiture, and the other, as a condition precedent to be performed by the tenant before entering on his defence. The law itself does not encourage or put a premium on dishonesty, although those inclined to be dishonest may make use of its provisions to suit their purpose. We see, in the circumstances, no case of discrimination.

    4. It was then contended that the power under S.12 (3) is conceded only to the Rent Control Court and to the Appellate Authority, but not to the Revisional Authority and therefore on this ground again the provision is discriminatory. We are unable to appreciate this argument as advanced by the Counsel for the respondent in this revision petition, who is himself a tenant. That apart, we should also think that there is a difference between the powers of the Appellate Authority and those of the Revisional Authority.

    5. We reject the contention of Counsel for the respondent that S.12 (3) of the Rent Control Act is discriminatory and violative of Art.14 of the Constitution for the reasons urged.

    6. On the merits, we allow this revision petition, set aside the order of the Revisional Authority and restore that of the Appellate Authority with costs.

    Allowed.

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    Comments

    M. Venugopalan v. Raphael
    (May 28, 1974)