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Acts
  • Section 12 also in Section 14, that the inclusion of Section 12 in Section 14
  • section in the Madhya Pradesh Act, Section 13 of the Madhya Pradesh Act
  • KERALA BUILDINGS LEASE AND RENT CONTROL ACT
  • SECTION 13 DELHI AND AJMER RENT CONTROL ACT
  • provisions of Act 2 of 1965 as amended by Act 7 of 1966
  • Section 13(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act
  • Section 11 or Section 13 or Section 19 or Section 33
  • Act 8 of 1968. Originally, President's Act 2 of 1965
  • sub-section (3) of Section 12, the Rent Control Court
  • Act 2 of 1965 as amended by Act 7 of 1966 an Act
  • Section 11 of our Act, the Rent Control Court
  • Section 12 from Section 14 by Act 8 of 1968.)
  • provisions of Section 11 and Section 12(3),
  • Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act
  • Section 12(1), the Rent Control Court
  • Section 10 of Act 7 of 1966
  • Section 10 in Act 7 of 1966
  • sub-section (3) of Section 12
  • Act 7 of 1966, Section 12
  • Section 13 in Section 14
  • Section 12(3) of our Act,
  • Ajmer Rent Control Act,
  • Madhya Pradesh Act,
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Section 12 also in Section 14, that the inclusion of Section 12 in Section 14
  • section in the Madhya Pradesh Act, Section 13 of the Madhya Pradesh Act
  • KERALA BUILDINGS LEASE AND RENT CONTROL ACT
  • SECTION 13 DELHI AND AJMER RENT CONTROL ACT
  • provisions of Act 2 of 1965 as amended by Act 7 of 1966
  • Section 13(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act
  • Section 11 or Section 13 or Section 19 or Section 33
  • Act 8 of 1968. Originally, President's Act 2 of 1965
  • sub-section (3) of Section 12, the Rent Control Court
  • Act 2 of 1965 as amended by Act 7 of 1966 an Act
  • Section 11 of our Act, the Rent Control Court
  • Section 12 from Section 14 by Act 8 of 1968.)
  • provisions of Section 11 and Section 12(3),
  • Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act
  • Section 12(1), the Rent Control Court
  • Section 10 of Act 7 of 1966
  • Section 10 in Act 7 of 1966
  • sub-section (3) of Section 12
  • Act 7 of 1966, Section 12
  • Section 13 in Section 14
  • Section 12(3) of our Act,
  • Ajmer Rent Control Act,
  • Madhya Pradesh Act,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (delivered by Raghavan, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent filed an application seeking eviction of the petitioner from a building under Section 11(4)(iv) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The Rent Control Court directed the petitioner to pay admitted arrears of rent and the rent accruing during the pendency of the proceeding as contemplated by Section 12(1) of the Act. The petitioner failed to deposit the arrears. As a consequence, under sub-section (3) of Section 12 the Rent Control Court passed an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. The respondent sought execution of that order. The petitioner objected to execution on the ground that the order was not executable. The objection was overruled by both lower Courts. The petitioner filed a civil revision petition in this Court. A single Judge of this Court considered the question to be sufficiently important to refer it to a Division Bench.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an order passed under Section 12(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is an executable order.
  2. Whether the omission/deletion of a reference to Section 12 from Section 14 (after amendments by Act 7 of 1966 and repeal/amendment by Act 8 of 1968) had the legal effect of rendering an order under Section 12(3) un-executable.
  3. What is the effect of a repealing or statute-law-revision Act (as explained in precedent) on amendments already incorporated into a main Act?
  4. Whether the line of Supreme Court decisions under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act (e.g., Bahadur Singh, Srimathi Kaushalya Devi, Ferozi Lal Jain) establish that a decree like the one sought to be executed here is a nullity and therefore not executable.
  5. Whether, even upon failure to deposit arrears under Section 12(1), the Rent Control Court must first examine the substantive grounds for eviction under Section 11 before passing an eviction order under Section 12(3).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Section 14 of the Act does not list an order under Section 12 as an executable order; Section 14 mentions orders under Section 11, Section 13, Section 19 and Section 33. Therefore, an order under Section 12 is not executable.
  • On a proper construction, an order under Section 12(3) is really an order under Section 11, but the explicit omission of Section 12 from Section 14 (particularly after legislative changes) indicates intention that Section 12 orders remain un-executable.
  • When Section 14 was amended by Act 7 of 1966 to include Section 12, and that specific mention of Section 12 was deleted by Act 8 of 1968, the Legislature must have intended to render orders under Section 12 un-executable.
  • The petitioner drew attention to Section 10 of Act 7 of 1966 not being repealed and argued that legislative intent should not be read to produce the effect relied upon by the Court.
  • Reliance was placed on several Supreme Court decisions (Bahadur Singh; Srimathi Kaushalya Devi; Ferozi Lal Jain) suggesting that decrees of the kind sought to be executed could be nullities and therefore not executable.

Respondent's Position (as presented in the opinion)

  • The respondent applied for and obtained an eviction order (pursuant to Sections 11 and 12 scheme) and sought execution of the order directing possession.
  • Lower Courts overruled the petitioner's objection to executability and permitted execution; the respondent relied on those orders in seeking enforcement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jethanand Betab v. The State of Delhi, AIR 1960 SC 89 Explains the effect of repealing or statute-law-revision Acts: such Acts are largely "editorial" — designed to remove dead matter and do not alter amendments already incorporated into the main Act; repeals of amending Acts do not undo the amendments already planted in the parent Act. The Court relied on this principle to hold that the repeal of the amending President's Acts by Act 8 of 1968 did not negate amendments already incorporated into the main Act; hence omission of Section 12 from Section 14 by Act 8 of 1968 did not render Section 12 orders un-executable.
Khuda Bux v. Manager, Caledonian Press, AIR 1954 Cal 484 (quoted in Jethanand Betab) Statute-law-revision Acts (in England) are for "legislative spring-cleaning": they expurgate amending Acts and are not intended to make substantive changes in law; such repeals are guarded by saving clauses. Quoted (through Jethanand Betab) to support the proposition that repealing an amending Act does not affect the substantive amendment already incorporated into the parent Act; used to interpret the effect of Act 8 of 1968.
Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass ((1969) 1 SCWR 51) Under Section 13(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act a decree for recovery of possession could not be passed unless the Court was satisfied that one of the grounds mentioned in the proviso existed; absent such satisfaction a decree for eviction is impermissible. The Court distinguished that decision on the basis that the language of Section 13(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Act materially differs from Section 12(3) of the Kerala Act; hence Bahadur Singh did not control the present case.
Srimathi Kaushalya Devi & Others v. Shri K.L. Bansal ((1969) 1 SCWR 56 : (1969) 1 SCC 59 : AIR 1970 SC 838) Applied the same principle as in Bahadur Singh to a compromise decree under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act: without considering the grounds in the proviso, no decree for eviction could be validly passed. The Court treated this decision as inapplicable for the same reasons it distinguished Bahadur Singh—difference in statutory language and scheme.
Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal ((1970) 3 SCC 181 : AIR 1970 SC 794) Considered Section 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act in relation to compromise decrees; affirmed the principle that grounds in proviso must be considered before an eviction decree could be validly passed. The Court noted the decision but found it inapplicable for the Kerala Act because Section 12(3) of the Kerala Act imposes different consequences (it mandates stoppage of proceedings and orders possession on non-payment of arrears).
Smt. Krishnabai Babulal Mishra v. Smt. Laxmibai, AIR 1970 Madh Pra 280 Under Section 13 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, where a tenant fails to deposit arrears the Court "may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and, shall proceed with the hearing of the suit" — meaning the court must still look into the grounds for eviction when proceeding. The Court relied on the contrast in language to conclude this decision could not assist the petitioner because under the Kerala Act the Court is required to stop further proceedings and order possession on failure to deposit arrears, rather than proceed with a trial of the grounds.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds in a sequence of analytical steps rooted in statutory construction and the effect of amending and repealing Acts:

  1. Construction of Sections 11, 12 and 14: The Court analysed Section 11 (which confers power to pass orders in eviction) together with Section 12(1) and Section 12(3). Section 12(1) requires the tenant, while eviction proceedings are pending, to deposit admitted arrears and arrears accruing during the proceeding; failure to do so precludes the tenant from contesting. Section 12(3) uses mandatory language ("shall") obliging the Court to stop further proceedings and to make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession. On a proper construction of Sections 11 and 12(3), an order under Section 12(3) is effectively an order under Section 11.
  2. Effect of omission from Section 14 and legislative history: The petitioner relied on the fact that Section 14 originally did not list orders under Section 12 as executable, and that Section 12 had briefly been mentioned in Section 14 by Act 7 of 1966 but that mention was deleted by Act 8 of 1968. The Court rejected the contention that deletion indicated an intention to make Section 12 orders un-executable. Instead, it read the deletion as corrective or otiose: the inclusion of Section 12 in Section 14 by Act 7 of 1966 was unnecessary since orders under Section 12 are in substance orders under Section 11. Thus the subsequent deletion (Act 8 of 1968) did not effect a substantive change rendering such orders un-executable.
  3. Principle governing repealing/statute-law-revision Acts: To resolve the significance of Acts 2 of 1965, 7 of 1966 and 8 of 1968, the Court relied on authority (Jethanand Betab and Khuda Bux) explaining that statute-law-revision or repealing Acts commonly remove spent amending Acts and do not disturb the substantive amendments already incorporated into the parent Act. The Court applied that principle to conclude that repealing the amending (President's) Act did not undo the substantive law embodied in the main Act.
  4. Specific construction of Acts 2/7/8 sequence: The Court noted the legislative history—President's Act 2 of 1965, amended by President's Act 7 of 1966, followed by Act 8 of 1968 passed by the Legislature which converted the earlier President's Act into an Act of the Legislature and repealed unnecessary amending provisions. The Court read Act 8 of 1968 as converting and retaining provisions meant to survive (for example Section 10 of Act 7 of 1966, which was a substantive new provision rather than an amending provision) but excising amending provisions that had already done their work.
  5. Distinction from Delhi/Ajmer and Madhya Pradesh authorities: The Court examined the Supreme Court decisions cited by the petitioner (Bahadur Singh, Srimathi Kaushalya Devi, Ferozi Lal Jain) and the Madhya Pradesh decision (Krishnabai Babulal Mishra) and concluded they were distinguishable because the statutory language in those Acts required the Court to be satisfied of specific grounds or to proceed with hearing the suit after striking out the defence. In contrast, Section 12(3) of the Kerala Act mandates stopping further proceedings and ordering possession where arrears are not deposited; the scheme of the Kerala Act is consequently different and self-contained.
  6. Conclusion from scheme and language: Given the mandatory language of Section 12(3) and the statutory scheme (Sections 11 and 12 read together), the Court concluded that upon the tenant's failure to deposit the arrears as required by Section 12(1), the proceeding comes to an end and an order putting the landlord in possession must be given. Therefore, the order made under Section 12(3) is executable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The civil revision petition is DISMISSED. The Court affirmed that an order passed under Section 12(3) (directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession when arrears are not deposited) is an executable order, and the lower Courts were correct to overrule the petitioner's objection to execution. The Court also ordered dismissal with costs.

Implications:

  • Immediate effect on the parties: The order of the Rent Control Court directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession is executable and the civil revision petition challenging that executability is dismissed; the petitioner was ordered to pay costs.
  • Broader implications: The opinion reasons that the deletion of an amending Act's provisions by a later repealing/statute-law-revision Act does not necessarily undo substantive amendments already incorporated in the principal Act. The Court distinguished earlier authorities under different statutory schemes. The opinion does not purport to announce a novel legal rule beyond the application of these existing principles to the facts; no broader precedent-extending holding beyond the decision's application to the statutory provisions in question is explicitly asserted in the text.

Judge delivering the opinion: Raghavan, C.J.

    Raman Sahadevan v. R. Kesavan Nair .

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Raghavan, C.J:— The respondent filed an application for evicting the petitioner from a building under Section 11(4)(iv) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act And the petitioner was directed to pay the arrears of rent and the rent accruing due pending the proceeding as contemplated by Section 12(1) of the Act, The petitioner failed to deposit the arrears; and consequently, as contemplated by sub-section (3) of Section 12, the Rent Control Court passed an order “directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building”. This order was sought to be executed by the respondent, when objection was taken by the petitioner that the order was not executable. The objection has been overruled by both the lower Courts, and hence the civil revision petition. A learned Judge of this Court considered the question to be of importance so as to be considered by a Division Bench and referred the matter to a Division Bench.

    2. The first contention urged by the counsel of the petitioner is that in S. 14 of the Act an order passed under Section 12 is not mentioned as an order executable, the orders passed under Section 11 or Section 13 or Section 19 or Section 33 alone having been included there. (We have excluded the appellate and revisional orders.) On a proper construction of the provisions of Section 11 and Section 12(3), it has to be said that an order passed under Section 12(3) is really an order passed under Section 11. Therefore, the absence of mention of Section 13 in Section 14 is of no consequence such mention is unnecessary.

    3. But the counsel has pointed out that in Section 14, when it was amended by Act 7 of 1966, Section 12 was also mentioned; and has argued that, when that was deleted under Act 8 of 1968, the intention of the Legislature must have been that such an order, an order under Section 12, should remain unexecutable. This could never have been the intention of the Legislature which made a provision authorising (rather compelling) the Rent Control Court to pass sin order in eviction: the intention of the Legislature could never have been that such an order should not be executed, having provided for such an order: then, why was such an order provided for? The position appears to be that the Legislature, when it passed Act 8 of 1968, realised the mistake committed in Act 7 of 1966, which included Section 12 also in Section 14, that the inclusion of Section 12 in Section 14 was otiose, since an order passed under Section 12 was really an order passed under Section 11. (This will become clearer in another part of this judgment, where we discuss the purpose of a repealing Act—the purpose is to remove inconsistencies also.) We may also reiterate that Section 11 is mentioned in Section 14, so that an order passed under Section 11 is executable.

    4. The next contention is that the effect of Act 8 of 1968 was to make such an order un-executable. We may, at this stage, point out a few facts leading to the passing of Act 8 of 1968. Originally, President's Act 2 of 1965 was passed; and subsequently, President's Act 7 of 1966 was passed amending the provisions of the earlier Act, Still later came Act 8 of 1968 passed by the Legislature; and by this Act, some or the provisions of Act 2 of 1965 as amended by Act 7 of 1966 were repealed. The contention now urged is that, by such repeal, the executability of an order like the one before us was also taken away.

    5. In this connection, we have to consider the effect of a repealing Act In Jethanand Betab v. The State of Delhi, AIR 1960 SC 89, Subba Rao J. approvingly quoted the ‘neat’ expression of Chakravartti C.J, of the Calcutta High Court in Khuda Bux v. Manager, Caledonian Press, AIR 1954 Cal 484. The passage from the judgment of Chakravartti C.J runs:

    “Such Acts have no legislative effect, but are designed for editorial revision, being intended only to excise dead matter from the statute book and to reduce its volume. Mostly, they expurgate amending Acts, because having imparted the amendments to the main Acts, those Acts have served their purpose and have no further reason for their existence. At times, inconsistencies are also removed by repealing and amending Acts. The only objects of such Acts which in England are called Statute Law Revision Acts, is legislative spring-cleaning and they are not intended to make any change in the law. Even so, they are guarded by saving clauses drawn with elaborate care….

    6. In our opinion, the purpose of an amending Act is to plant the necessary amendments in the parent or the main Act, and once such planting has been effected, the planting Act (the amending Act), having served its purpose, need not any more remain there to tend the plant, as it were: the plant has taken root in the main Act, and thereafter, the amending Act has only to be repealed: and if an amending Act is so repealed by a repealing Act, the repeal does not affect the plant, the amendment already planted in the main Act, Subba Rao J., in following the above observation of Chakravartti C.J, has said that the main object of the repealing Act (called in England a Statute Law Revision Act) is only to strike out the unnecessary Acts and excise dead matter from the statute book in order to lighten the burden of the ever-increasing spate of legislation and to remove confusion from the public mind—is only to expurgate the amending Act which had served its purpose. Of course, the repealing Act takes care to remove inconsistencies, if there are any. (See the dropping of the reference to Section 12 from Section 14 by Act 8 of 1968.) Therefore, the repeal or an amending Act does not affect the amendments which have already been brought into the main Act.

    7. Then we revert to the effect of Act 8 of 1968, The counsel of the petitioner has pointed out that Section 10 of Act 7 of 1966 was not repealed, so that the intention of the Legislature in dropping the other sections should not have the effect pointed out by us supra. We do not think that this contention is quite happy. What was done by Act 8 of 1968 was, first, to make Act 2 of 1965 as amended by Act 7 of 1966 an Act of the Legislature—to convert it from an Act of the President into an Act of the Legislature. Thereafter, the amending provisions, which had served their purpose, e.g, Sections 2 to 9, were dropped. Section 10 in Act 7 of 1966 was not an amending provision: it was not a provision planted in the main Act: it was a new provision added in Act 7 of 1966, so that, if that provision had to be retained as a provision enacted by the Legislature, it had necessarily to be retained. And that was what was done by Act 8 of 1968. Therefore, the contention of the counsel of the petitioner on this ground has also no force.

    8. The counsel of the petitioner has drawn our attention to some observations in some decisions of the Supreme Court, which, the counsel has claimed, have the effect or laying down that a decree like the one which is sought to be executed in the case before us is a nullity. The first decision is Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat Dass ((1969) 1 SCWR 51), where the Supreme Court was considering Section 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act Section 13(1) provided that, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or any contract no decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises should be passed by any Court in favour of the landlord against any tenant. Then followed a proviso which provided that nothing in the sub-section should apply to any suit or other proceeding for such recovery of possession if the Court was satisfied that one of the grounds mentioned in the proviso existed. (The proviso contained several grounds.) Evidently, under this sub-section, the Court gets jurisdiction to pass an order in eviction only if it is satisfied that one of the grounds mentioned in the proviso exists. What happened in that case was that an award, to which the landlord himself was not a party, was passed, under the Arbitration Act, allowing eviction of the tenant from the premises; and that, on the basis of the award, a decree was also passed. And it was that decree that was sought to be executed. It is clear that, under Section 13(1) of the Act, such a decree could not have been passed, because the jurisdiction of the Court to pass a decree in eviction was only on its being satisfied that one of the grounds mentioned in the proviso existed: without considering the grounds, the Court could not have passed a decree in eviction. And this was what was pointed out by the Supreme Court in that case. The next decision is Srimathi Kaushalya Devi & Others v. Shri K.L Bansal , (1969) 1 SCWR 56 : ((1969) 1 SCC 59 : AIR 1970 SC 838). This was also a case under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, In that case, the decree sought to be executed was a compromise decree; and the Supreme Court pointed out that the same reasoning given by it in the earlier decision applied to this case as well, namely, that, without considering the grounds mentioned in the proviso, no decree for eviction could have been passed. Lastly, the decision in Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal, (1970) 3 SCC 181 : (AIR 1970 SC 794) has also been brought to our notice, which again, we may point out, considered Section 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, In that case also, the decree sought to be executed was a compromise decree; and therefore, the reasoning given in the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court applied to that case as well.

    9. Now, let us consider the scheme of our Act in the light of these three decisions of the Supreme Court. Under Section 11 of our Act, the Rent Control Court is given power to pass orders in eviction on certain grounds; and when a petition for eviction is filed and a proceeding for eviction is pending, Section 12(1) provides that the tenant should pay the admitted arrears of rent already accrued and the arrears accruing pending the proceeding, and if he fails to do so, he is precluded from contesting the proceeding. And sub-section (3) of Section 12 obliges the Court (the word used is ‘shall’) to ‘stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building’. The contention of the counsel of the petitioner is that, even if the tenant fails to deposit the arrears as contemplated by Section 12(1), the Rent Control Court should consider whether the ground alleged in the petition for eviction as contemplated by Section 11 existed before it passes an order in eviction. The language of Section 13(1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act is materially different from Section 12(3) of our Act, The counsel has also drawn our attention, in this connection, to the decision in Smt. Krishnabai Babulal Mishra v. Smt. Laxmibai, AIR 1970 Madh Pra 280, where the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act has been considered by the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The difference in language of the relevant provision in our Act will presently be brought into relief, when we just refer to the language of the relevant section in the Madhya Pradesh Act, Section 13 of the Madhya Pradesh Act provides that, when the tenant fails to deposit the arrears, “the Court may order the defence against eviction to be struck out and, shall proceed with the hearing of the suit”. (The underlining is ours.) It is clear that, under the Madhya Pradesh Act, the Court is bound to proceed with the hearing of the suit, though the Court has the power to strike out the defence of the tenant which means that in proceeding with the suit, the Court must look into the grounds on which eviction is sought in our Act, the language is very different e.g, that on the tenants failure to deposit the arrears, the Court shall “stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building”: there is no question of the proceeding going further, as is the case under the Madhya Pradesh Act, whereunder the suit has to be tried, or under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act whereunder the grounds under the proviso have to be considered. The scheme of our Act is quite clear that pending the proceeding for eviction, the tenant is bound to deposit the admitted arrears already accrued and the arrears accruing during the pendency of the proceeding. And if he fails to do so, the proceeding comes to an end; and the landlord should be given an order putting him in possession of the building. Therefore, the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court cannot also help the petitioner.

    10. We dismiss the civil revision petition with costs.

    11. Petition dismissed.

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    Comments

    Raman Sahadevan v. R. Kesavan Nair .
    (Oct 24, 1972)