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citation codes
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Acts
  • Act and the Rules. Section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 22 Rule 4 read with Rule 11 of the Code of Civil
  • SECTION 108 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Rule 4 of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT 1958
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 of Order 22, Code of Civil
  • rule 22 of she Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959,
  • SECTION 111 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • section 2 (11) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Rule 4 of Order 22, Code of Civil Procedure,"
  • Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act
  • S. 108 (c) of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • rule 4 of Order- 22, Civil Procedure Code"
  • applications (U/s 14 of the 1958 Act
  • SECTION 37 CONTRACT ACT
  • section 14 (1) of the 1953 Act.
  • U/s 14 (1) of 1958 Act. ( 16 ) THE
  • Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952.
  • Section 14 of the 1958 Act,
  • U/s 14 (1) of the 1958 Act
  • S. 14 (1) of the 1958 Act
  • Sub-section (1) of S. 14
  • LIMITATION ACT 1963
  • U/s 14 of 1958 Act,
  • S. 2 (1) of 1958 Act,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Act and the Rules. Section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 22 Rule 4 read with Rule 11 of the Code of Civil
  • SECTION 108 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Rule 4 of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT 1958
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 of Order 22, Code of Civil
  • rule 22 of she Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959,
  • SECTION 111 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • section 2 (11) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Rule 4 of Order 22, Code of Civil Procedure,"
  • Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act
  • S. 108 (c) of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • rule 4 of Order- 22, Civil Procedure Code"
  • applications (U/s 14 of the 1958 Act
  • SECTION 37 CONTRACT ACT
  • section 14 (1) of the 1953 Act.
  • U/s 14 (1) of 1958 Act. ( 16 ) THE
  • Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952.
  • Section 14 of the 1958 Act,
  • U/s 14 (1) of the 1958 Act
  • S. 14 (1) of the 1958 Act
  • Sub-section (1) of S. 14
  • LIMITATION ACT 1963
  • U/s 14 of 1958 Act,
  • S. 2 (1) of 1958 Act,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The present appeals arise from two eviction applications filed by Shri Kedar Nath, the predecessor in interest of the appellants, under Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 ("the Act"). These applications sought eviction of tenants from two separate premises on grounds including non-payment of rent, sub-letting without consent, misuse of premises, non-residence, and substantial damage. The contractual tenancies had been terminated prior to filing by service of notices to quit.

During the pendency of proceedings before the Additional Rent Controller, the tenants died. Their legal representatives were brought on record and amended petitions filed. In one case, sub-tenants were also impleaded as respondents. The Additional Rent Controller dismissed the petitions holding that the landlord-tenant relationship no longer subsisted and the petitions were not maintainable under the Act. The Rent Control Tribunal concurred and dismissed the appeals. The landlord then filed these appeals before this Court.

While the appeals were pending, the landlord died. Applications were filed by his legal representatives to be impleaded in his place, which were allowed. The appeals were referred to a larger Bench due to divergent views on the applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963, to such applications. The matter was further directed to be heard by the same Full Bench considering related appeals and precedents.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether eviction proceedings initiated under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, after termination of contractual tenancy, can be continued after the tenant’s death.
  2. Whether an eviction order can be passed against the legal representatives of a deceased tenant.
  3. The scope of the Controller’s jurisdiction to proceed with eviction applications post the tenant’s death.
  4. The applicability of procedural provisions such as Order 22 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure to eviction proceedings under the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The obligation of the tenant to deliver possession upon termination of lease devolves on his legal representatives after death, and the landlord’s right to recover possession is unaffected by the tenant’s death.
  • The right to sue based on the statutory tenancy survives in favor of the landlord against the tenant’s legal representatives.
  • The Controller’s jurisdiction to entertain, continue, and dispose of eviction proceedings remains intact after the tenant’s death.
  • The Full Bench decision in K. G. Malhotra’s case requires reconsideration as it conflicts with the Supreme Court’s majority judgment in South Asia Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Sarup Singh.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Reliance on the Full Bench judgment in K. G. Malhotra’s case, which held that eviction applications under the 1958 Act do not survive the tenant’s death and must be terminated.
  • The legal representatives do not inherit the tenancy rights or statutory protection and thus the Controller lacks jurisdiction over them.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
South Asia Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Sarup Singh and Ors., AIR 1966 SC 346 Supreme Court held that eviction orders can be passed against all persons in occupation, not only the tenant. The Court relied on this precedent to hold that eviction proceedings could continue against legal representatives post tenant’s death.
K. G. Malhotra v. Vijay Kumar, 1973 RLR 366 (Full Bench) Held eviction applications under the 1958 Act do not survive tenant’s death and must be dismissed. The Court disagreed with this precedent, finding it inconsistent with Supreme Court authority and the statutory scheme.
Official Trustees v. Seshinder Nath Chatterjee, AIR 1969 SC 823 Controller’s jurisdiction arises on application made in prescribed manner and includes hearing and deciding the controversy. Used to explain the scope of the Controller’s powers in eviction proceedings under the Act.
Ibrahimbhoy v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1958 202 Right to sue is the right to seek relief and survives death unless personal to deceased. Supported the proposition that landlord’s right to sue survives against legal representatives.
Girijanandin Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhry, AIR 1967 SC 1124 Action personalia moritur cum persona applies narrowly; rights not personal survive to legal representatives. Reinforced survival of landlord’s claim against legal representatives.
Andhra Bank Ltd. v. Srinivasan and others, AIR 1962 SC 232 Legal representatives can be sued and jurisdiction continues against them notwithstanding their foreign residence. Used to reject arguments that jurisdiction is lost against foreign legal representatives.
C. Chatterjee and others v. Sr. Krishna Tandon and another, AIR 1971 SC 2625 Right to proceed with appeal survives death; legal representatives must be made parties and appeal proceeds. Applied to eviction appeals pending on tenant’s death, confirming continuation against legal representatives.
Om Prakash Gupta v. Dr. Rattan Singh, 1963 PLR 546 Controller has jurisdiction to decide independent title claims raised by legal representatives. Clarified that legal representatives may defend on independent title, subject to civil court review.
Mangal Chand v. Gurbaksh Singh, AIR 1972 Delhi 56 Held eviction application abates on tenant’s death per Rule 4 of Order 22, CPC. The Court rejected this view as incorrect in the context of the 1958 Act.
Gulli v. Sawan and others, AIR 1924 Lahore 45 Legal representative is appointed to enable suit to proceed; original rights and disabilities govern. Supported continuation of proceedings against legal representatives.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining the nature of tenancy and the statutory scheme under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. It recognized that contractual tenancies had been terminated and the tenants’ statutory protection under Section 14(1) had ceased. Upon the tenants’ death, possession passed to their legal representatives, who did not inherit tenancy rights or statutory protection but represented the estate holding possession.

The Court analyzed the concept of legal representatives as defined under the Code of Civil Procedure, emphasizing that they represent the deceased’s estate and are accountable for the property held. It rejected the view that eviction applications abate upon tenant’s death, holding instead that the right to sue survives against legal representatives. The Court found the Full Bench’s earlier conclusions in K. G. Malhotra’s case to be unsound and inconsistent with Supreme Court authority.

Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the Court held that the Controller’s jurisdiction continues after the tenant’s death to entertain and decide eviction applications against legal representatives. The proviso to Section 14(1) empowers the Controller to order recovery of possession upon proof of specified grounds, without limiting the order only to tenants. The Court emphasized that the Controller’s jurisdiction and the landlord’s right to recover possession are not defeated by the tenant’s death.

The Court further explained that legal representatives may defend on grounds appropriate to their representative character but cannot raise defences personal to the deceased. If the legal representatives assert an independent title, the Controller can decide the issue, subject to civil court review.

The Court also clarified that the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings before the Controller and that procedural rules such as Order 22 Rule 4 of the CPC require legal representatives to be brought on record and the proceedings to continue.

In sum, the Court concluded that eviction proceedings under Section 14(1) of the 1958 Act can be continued against the legal representatives of deceased tenants, and eviction orders can be passed against them if the landlord establishes one or more of the grounds specified in the proviso.

Holding and Implications

The appeals were allowed, holding that eviction proceedings under Section 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, initiated against tenants whose contractual tenancies had been terminated, can be continued after the tenant’s death against their legal representatives, and eviction orders can be passed against them.

This decision confirms that the landlord’s right to recover possession survives the tenant’s death and that the Controller’s jurisdiction to proceed with eviction applications remains intact. Legal representatives must be brought on record and may defend only on representative grounds. The ruling clarifies the interplay between statutory tenancy rights, succession, and eviction proceedings, rejecting prior contrary views from the Full Bench in K. G. Malhotra’s case. No new precedent beyond the direct effect on the parties was indicated.

    Kedar Nath v. Ram Nath Etc

    P.N. KHANNA, J.

    ( 1 ) THE main question that has arisen in these 2 S. A. O. No. 6 and 54 of 1968 is :

    Can the proceeding under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, herein called the Act

    initiated for the eviction of a tenant, after terminating his contractual tenancy, be

    continued after his death and eviction order be passed against his legal

    representatives ?

    ( 2 ) SHRI Kedar Nath, the predecessor in interest of the present appellants in both

    appeals filed 2 separate eviction applications, U/s 14 of the Act, against his tenants,

    who held two separate premises on lease under him. The contractual tenancies in

    both cases, had been terminated earlier, by service of notices to quit. In one

    proceeding, which has given rise to SAO 6 of 1968, the tenant was Naubat Ram,

    and the grounds on which eviction was sought were non-payment of an ears of rent,

    after service of notice of demand referred to in clause (a) of the proviso to S. 14 (1)

    of the Act, sub-letting without landlord's consent (Cl. (b) of the said proviso) and

    misuser of the premises (Cl. (c) of the proviso ). In the other which has given rise to

    SAO 54 of 1968, the tenants were Prabhu and Maman Lal, and the grounds for

    eviction besides the aforementioned 3 grounds were non-residence of the tenant in

    the premises (cl. (d) of the proviso) and substantial damage to the premises (Cl. J)

    of the proviso ). The tenants in both the premises died while proceedings were

    pending before the Additional Rent Controller. Their legal representatives who did

    not dispute their character as such, were brought on record and amended petitions

    were filed. In SAO 54 of 1968, besides the legal representatives of the deceased,

    their sub-tenants were also impleaded as respondents no. 5 to 7.

    ( 3 ) IN the amended petitions it was further contended that the legal

    representatives of the deceased tenants had not inharited the tenancy rights,

    because the tenancies were 'statutory' and personal to the tenants in nature and the

    legal representatives had therefore no right to remain in possession. The Additional

    Controller was of the view that as the relationship of landlord and tenant was no

    longer alleged to subsist between the parties, the petitions were not maintainable

    under the 1958 Act. He, therefore, dismissed both the petitions. The Rent Control

    Tribunal concurred with this view, further holding that the right to sue did not

    survive and dismissed the appeals. Against the orders of the Tribunal these 2

    appeals were filed in this Court by Sh. Kidar Nath, the landlord.

    ( 4 ) WHILE the appeals were pending Kidar Nath died on 10. 4. 71. On 20. 8. 71,

    two applications were filed by his legal representatives to have the abatement set

    aside and to be impleaded in his place and for condonation of delay in filing the

    applications. S. N. Shanker.. before whom these applications came up referred both

    the appeals to larger Bench, as he found divergence of views of this court on the

    question of applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 to such applications. The matter

    came before a Bench consisting of S. N. Andley C.. and T. P. S. Chawla,. , who

    allowed the applications and brought the legal representatives, hereinafter

    collectively referred to as the landlord, on record. On merits they noticed that similar

    questions had been referred for decision to a larger Bench in another appeal. They,

    therefore, directed these 2 appeals to be placed before the same Bench which was

    to hear the other appeal. The matters came up before a Division Bench who noticed

    that in one of the appeals, the sub-tenants were parties to the eviction petition,

    alongwith the legal representatives of the deceased tenant. Reliance was placed on

    behalf of the appellants landlord on South Asia Industries P. Ltd. Vs. Sarup Singh

    and Ors. AIR. 1966. S. C. 346. It was contended that some of the observations in

    the Full Bench decision of this Court in K. G. Malhotra Vs. Vijay Kumar 1973.

    Rajdhani Law Reporter. 366, were irreconcilable with the majority judgment of the

    Supreme Court. As the said judgment had neither been REFERRED TO nor

    considered by the Full Bench in K. G. Malhotra's case, the D. B. directed these

    appeals to be placed before the same Full Bench. It was urged on behalf of the

    appellants that the decision in K. G. Malhotra's case required reconsideration in view

    of the Supreme Court judgement in the case of South Asia Industries P. Ltd It was

    for this reason that these appeals have been placed before this larger Bench.

    ( 5 ) IT may be pointed out that in the case of K. G. Malhotra eviction had been

    claimed under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. But the said Act had been

    repealed. As most of the cases coming up before this court were being heard under

    the 1958 Act, it was considered useful by the Full Bench to examine the questions

    involved in relation to the 1958 Act also. It was under these circumstances that

    provisions of 1958 Act were examined and opinion expressed in relation thereto.

    ( 6 ) MR. T. C. B. M. Lal, learned counsel for appellant has raised 2 main contentions

    before us : (1) That duty of the tenant on the determination of lease to put the

    lessor into possession of the property devolves, on the tenant's death, on his legal

    representatives and the landlord's right to get back possession is not affected in way

    by the death of the tenant. The right to sue on the basis of the statutory tenancy

    which has been determined, survives in favour of the landlord against the tenant's

    legal representatives, and (2) That the jurisdiction of the Controller to entertain,

    proceed with and finally dispose of the proceedings, which were initiated before

    him by the landlords is not affected by the death of the tenant during its pendency.

    ( 7 ) ACCORDING to him the conclusions drawn in K. G. Malhotra's case, which were

    relied upon by the legal representatives of the deceased tenants, against the

    landlord's claim, both before the Division Bench and the Full Bench and now before

    us, require reconsideration as they come in conflict with the majority view of the

    supreme Court in South Asia Industries case. In the latter case the view was that it

    was not the tenant alone against whom an order could be passed by the Controller

    for recovery of possession of the premises. Order could be passed against all

    persons in occupation. The judgment of the Supreme Court, therefore, indicated

    that there was nothing to prevent an order for recovery of possession being passed

    against the legal representatives. We will examine this judgment in greater detail a

    little later. We would first deal with the judgment of the Full Bench in K. G.

    Malhotra's case which according to Mr. H. K. L. Sabharwal, the learned counsel as

    amicus curias, on behalf of the respondents, in no way comes in conflict with the

    views expressed by the Supreme Court and lays down correct law.

    ( 8 ) V. S. Deshpande. , who spoke for the Full Bench in that case was of the view

    that if eviction was claimed in a suit in an ordinary court under 1952 Act then on the

    death of the tenant, "the suit, though triable by the same court, would change from

    a suit based on tenancy to a suit based on title. "but on the death of a statutory

    tenant, an "application for eviction U/s 14 of 1958 Act would not proceed further. "

    The landlord would have to file a separate suit based on title in a court having

    general jurisdiction, as the legal representatives do not inherit the tenancy or the

    statutory protection. The learned Judge, then considered the question as to how an

    application U/s 14 (1) of the 1958 Act, was to proceed on the death of the tenant

    and concluded :

    ( 9 ) "the question is how is such an application to proceed upon the death of the

    tenant. The landlord may not apply within the prescribed time to bring the legal

    representatives on the record. In such a case, the application abates as provided by

    order. But if the landlord makes an application to bring the legal representatives on

    the record, they will have to be brought on the record as the right to sue survives. If

    the legal representatives plead an independent title, then also the Controller would

    have to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction to inquire into the independent

    title. On the other hand, if the legal representatives admit that the deceased tenant

    was statutory tenant and have no defence to make except such defence as was

    Personal to the deceased tenant, then though the general right to sue survives to

    the landlord to pursue his remedy on the basis of title in a civil court, the right to

    pursue the application under the 1958 Act does not survive and the Controller has to

    terminate the proceedings. "the observation in Mangal Chand's case that the

    application for eviction would have abated on the death of Mangal Chand in

    accordance with the principles of rule 4 of Order- 22, Civil Procedure Code" was

    obviously made in such case only in which both the landlord and the legal

    representatives are agreed that the contractual tenancy has been terminated and

    representatives have no defence to make which was not personal to the deceased

    tenant. Even so, we would not prefer to say that the application for eviction abates

    under the 1958 Act For, the right of the landlord to obtain possession from the legal

    representatives in a Civil Court survives to him. We would, therefore, prefer to say

    that the application for eviction cannot be continued against the legal

    representatives and would have to be dismissed by the Controller in view of the

    agreement between the pleadings of the landlord and the legal representatives on

    this point. This does not mean that a subsequent suit on the same cause of action

    could not be filed as would happen after the abatement of a suit under the Civil

    Procedure Code. On the contrary, the landlord would have right to file a civil suit

    on the basis of title precisely because of the death of the statutory tenant during the

    pendency of the proceedings before the Controller. We would not, therefore, call the

    termination of the proceedings before the Controller as an abatement. The

    Controller may, therefore, dismiss the application for eviction on the ground that he

    has ceased to possess the jurisdiction to entertain it on the death of the statutory

    tenant. Such an order would have to be passed in the presence of the proposed

    legal representatives. But it would have to be passed after bringing them on record.

    ( 10 ) WE must say with profound respect that the approach of the Full Bench to the

    question before it was not sound and we have not been able to persuade ourselves

    to agree with its conclusions.

    ( 11 ) WHEN a lease is granted by the landlord to the tenant, which in terms of S.

    t05 of Transfer of Property Act, is a transfer of a right to enjoy immovable property,

    possession of the property is delivered 10 the latter. The landlord by virtue of S. 108

    (c) of the Transfer of Property Act, in the absence of a contract or a local usage to

    the contrary, is deemed to have contracted with the tenant, that if the latter pays

    the rent reserved by the lease and performs the contracts binding on him, he can

    hold the property during the term of the lease without interruption. The benefit or

    such contract according to the section, is annexed to and goes with the tenants

    interest and as such can be enforced by every person in whom that interest in whole

    or in part from time to time vests. On the determination of the lease, whether on

    the expiry of a notice or on the happening of any other event mentioned in section

    111 of the Transfer of Property Act, the tenant loses the right to enjoy the property.

    The tenant, then, if he continues in possession, is just holding over and is bound

    under clause (q) of section 108 of Transfer of Property Act to put the lessor into

    possession of the property. The landlord becomes entitled to recover possession and

    if such a tenant resists, to seek the assistance of the court for that purpose.

    ( 12 ) IT is at this stage that the 1958 Act steps in and by its section 50 provides

    that no civil court shall entertain any suit or proceeding in so for as it relates, inter

    alia, to eviction of any tenant from any premises or to any other matter which the

    Controller is empowered by or under that Act to decide. This, however, does not

    prevent a civil court from entertaining any suit or proceeding for the decision of any

    question of title to any premises U/s 50 (4 ). The jurisdiction, thus taken away from

    the civil court, is vested in the Controller, but only to a limited extent as prescribed.

    The Controller is an authority, which has been created by the 1958 Act. Its S 35

    authorizes the Central Government to appoint Controller and Additional Controllers

    "to exercise the power conferred, and perform the duties imposed" on them by or

    under the Act. Various sections of the Act then give him diverse powers. To

    illustrate, section 36 gives him power, inter alia, to summon and enforce attendance

    of any person and examine him on oath; section 37 enables him to follow as far as

    may be, the practice and procedure of a court of small causes section 40 gives him

    power to correct, clerical or arithmetical or accidental slips or omissions in any

    order; section 42 makes his order passed in appeal executable as if it was a decree

    of a civil court and section 41 confers on him certain magisterial power. So far as

    eviction is concerned, the power is given to the Controller by the provision to S. 14

    (1) of the Act. The relevant part is : "notwithstanding anything to the contrary

    contained in any other law or contract no order or decree for the recovery of

    possession of any premises shall be made by any court or controller in favour of the

    land- lord against the tenant. PROVIDED that the Controller may, on an application

    made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of the

    premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely then are

    enumerated the said grounds in clauses (a) to (1 ). The Controller, thus, can make

    an order for the recovery of the premises only under given circumstances, that is

    only if one or more of the grounds specified in the proviso exist. He gets jurisdiction,

    which according to the Supreme Court in Official Trustees V. Seshinder Nath

    Chatterjee AIR. 1969. S. C. 823, include the authority to hear and decide the

    particular controversy that has arisen between the parties, "when an application is

    made to him in the prescribed manner". This application must disclose one or more

    grounds from out of those given in the said clauses (a) to (1), which if proved, will

    enable him to order which he is empowered to pass. The Controller will have

    jurisdiction, on the basis of the petitioner's allegations, to entertain his application,

    to ascertain the essential points involved in the case, to determine if the said preconditions exist and ultimately to pronounce upon them If the Controller finds that

    any of the circumstances mentioned in clauses (a) to (1) of the said proviso exists,

    he will exercise the powers specifically vested in him of making an order for the

    recovery of the premises. If, on the other hand, he finds that those circumstances

    do not exist, then still exercising jurisdiction over the matter, he will decide by

    dismissing the application on the ground that he has no power to make order which

    the landlord requested him to make, The jurisdiction is exercised by the Controller,

    on the basis of the allegations in the petition, and not on what the respondent may

    say in defence, while an order is made by him only if the making of it is within the

    limits of power conferred on him.

    ( 13 ) THE above legal position can be viewed from another angle. S. 14 (1) creates

    a bar to the passing of an order for the recovery of possession of the premises,

    notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract. The

    proviso to the sub-section then lists certain circumstances, in clauses (a) to (1) in

    the nature of exceptions, on the existence of which the said bar is lifted, to enable

    the passing of an order for recovery of premises by the Controller, on whom power

    has specifically been conferred for the propose. The tenant continues to hold

    possession of premises by virtue of the protection given to him by S. 14 (1), if he is

    not covered by any of the clauses (a) to (1) of the proviso. Every application U/s 14

    pre-supposes that (a) the person against whom it is made,. e. the respondent,

    though once a tenant is no longer entitled to the tenancy rights or the right to enjoy

    the premises under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, and (b) the

    respondent no longer is entitled to the statutory protection, which was available to

    him under the first part of S. 14 (1 ).

    ( 14 ) COMING to the facts of the present case, the landlord alleged that contractual

    tenancies had been terminated, and that the grounds mentioned in the proviso to S.

    14 (1) of the 1958 Act were available to him as the tenants in both cases had

    committed more than one specified defaults. The bar created by S. 14 (1) against

    the passing of an order for possession of the premises which was a personal

    protection to the tenant, was alleged to have been lifted. During the pendency of

    the said applications, before the Controller, the tenant died. The possession of the

    premises, which, according to the landlord's allegations, was unprotected in the

    hands of the tenants fell into the hands of the legal representatives. They did not

    enter into possession as trespassers to begin with, but happened to be legal

    representatives of the deceased and came into possession as such, representing the

    estate of the deceased. By virtue of their so coming into possession of the premises

    the obligation of the tenants to hand over the possession of the premises back to

    the landlord also passed over to them.

    ( 15 ) A question was raised at the bar, as to whether respondent in SAO 6 of 1968

    and respondents no. 1 to 4 in SAO 54 of 1968 can be said to be legal

    representatives of the deceased tenants for the purposes of application U/s 14 of

    1958 Act, as they have not inherited the statutory protection which the tenants

    enjoyed. It is true that the statutory protection from eviction provided by the first

    part of S. 14 (1) is personal to the tenant. The heirs of the deceased tenant

    according to 1958 Act, as it stands today, do not acquire the status of tenants.

    According to S. 2 (1) of 1958 Act, unless the context otherwise requires, "tenant

    means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises

    is or but for a special contract would be payable and includes a sub-tenant and also

    any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy but shall

    not include any person against whom any order or decree for eviction has been

    made. " The rent is not payable, as such, by the legal representatives on their behalf

    and they are, therefore, not the tenants; nor are they entitled under the provisions

    of 1958 Act to the protection from eviction which the deceased enjoyed. But, that

    does not imply that they are not legal representatives of the deceased tenant even

    for the purpose of proceeding U/s 14 (1) of 1958 Act.

    ( 16 ) THE expression legal representative has acquired in law, a definite

    connotation, which is embodied in the definition in section 2 (11) of the Code of Civil

    Procedure. It means. according to that definition, a person, who in law, represents

    the estate of the deceased person and includes any person who intermeddles with

    that estate and where a person sues or is sued in a representative character, is the

    person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued.

    Although, the Code as such is not applicable to the proceedings before the

    Controller, yet he follows the practice and procedure of a court of Small Causes as

    far as may be and on other matters he is guided by its provisions. Accordingly, any

    person who represents the deceased after his death and in whose hands the

    property or estate of the deceased fails, or who claims or is interested in that estate

    as a representative of the deceased, will be the legal representative of the

    deceased. Normally, this estate will come into the hands of legatee or an heir of the

    deceased, and he will, therefore, be the legal representative of the deceased in

    respect of the properly of the deceased. He is the person, who in law would

    represent the estate. The status of legal representative devolves on the person

    concerned by reason of the death of the person, whose estate he holds and

    represents. The term 'intermeddler' likewise denotes a person who intermeddles

    with the estate of the deceased in such a way as to indicate an intention or an

    ostensible intention in him to exercise the functions of a representative of the

    deceased. A trespasser or any other person who may claim title in himself adversely

    to the estate of the deceased, accordingly, would not be his legal representative.

    For, he does not get any estate of the deceased by reason of his death. Nor can he

    be said to represent the estate of the deceased. He would then be asserting his own

    claim. The 1958 Act does not provide anything contrary to this concept of a legal

    representative.

    ( 17 ) THE respondents concerned, in the present appeals, who are wives and

    children of the deceased tenants, and have come into possession of the premises in

    dispute, whether by themselves or through the sub tenants inducted by the

    deceased tenants, have not acquired possession by any over act or under any

    independent title. They can be said to have just come into possession of the

    premises, whatever its nature may be (whether unprotected or otherwise ).

    Possession just passed to their hands on the death of the tenants and they claimed

    to have the right to continue in possession as the heir or successors of the deceased

    tenants. They, therefore, are holding possession of the premises as representing the

    estate of the deceased tenants and are, therefore, legal representatives of the

    deceased tenants. We are, accordingly, unable to agree with V. S. Deshpande. ,

    speaking for the full Bench in K. G. Malhotra's case, he observed ". . . under the

    1958 Act only a a person inheriting the tenancy and/or the statutory protection of

    the deceased tenant would be regarded as legal representative",. and when he gave

    expression to similar views in Nathu Khan V. Mohd Ismail, AIR 1973 Delhi 212. In

    fact, there would be no question of any person inheriting the tenancy because there

    was no tenancy in existence, which could be inherited in a case like this. Even the

    deceased were ex-tenants and did not have tenancy rights or any other interest in

    the premises, contractual tenancies according the landlord's allegations, having been

    terminated earlier There would also be no question of inheriting the statutory

    protection, as there was no such protection, available even to the deceased.

    According to the allegations of the landlord, more than one grounds referred to in

    clause (a) to (1) of the proviso to section 14 (1) were available to him and the

    deceased tenants had ceased to enjoy the statutory protection. All that fell into the

    hands of the legal representatives, from the deceased tenants on their death was

    the possession of the premises, which had to be made over to the landlord. It is this

    possession, still existing in their hands, which the landlord claims and it is for this

    purpose that they represent the estate of the deceased and are accountable to the

    landlord. They are thus in every sense of the expression legal representatives of the

    deceased. In the present case, the respondents concerned, in any case, have not

    challenged their status as legal representatives of the deceased tenants.

    ( 18 ) THE question next arises whether the right to sue on the basis of the

    application under Section 14 of the 1958 Act, which was pending before the

    Controller at the time of the tenant's death, survives in favour of the landlord,

    against the legal representatives of the deceased. The answer is clearly in the

    affirmative. The right to sue, after all, is nothing but the right to seek relief (see

    Ibrahimbhoy V. State of Gujarat, AIR 1958 202 at 207), A petitioner may claim by

    way of relief recovery of money or property from the respondent. On the latter's

    death, the petitioner has a right to follow the subject matter of the litigation in the

    hands of the legal representatives. The general rule is that all rights of actions and

    demands whatever existing in favour or against a person at the time of his death

    which are not personal to the deceased, would survive to or against his legal

    representative. Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act is more or less to this effect

    and specifying certain exception provides that causes of action for defamation,

    assault as defined in the Indian Penal Code, or other personal injuries not causing

    the death of the party and in cases where after the death of the partly the relief

    sought could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory, do not survive.

    Section 37 of the Contract Act has also the same effect and lays down that

    "promises bind the representatives of the promisers in case of death of such

    promisors before performance, unless a contrary intention appears from the

    contract". According to rule 22 of she Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959, the Controller

    and the Rent Tribunal are, as far as possible, to be guided by provisions of the Code

    of Civil Procedure, on all questions relating to procedure not specifically provided by

    the Act and the Rules. Section 146 of the Code of Civil Procedure lay down that

    "where any proceeding may be taken or application may be made by or against any

    person then me proceeding may be taken or application may be made by or against

    any person claiming under him. " The Supreme Court in Girijanandin Devi and other

    v. Bijendra Narain Choudhry, AIR 1967 Sec 1124 (Para 14) observed, ''the Maxim

    action personalia moritur cum persons a personal action dies with a person has a

    limited application. It operates in a Limited class of actions ex-delicto such as actions

    for damages for defamation, assault or other personal injuries not causing the death

    of the party where the relief granted could not be enjoyed or granting it would by

    ougatory. An action for an amount is not an action for damages ex delicto, and does

    not fail within the enumerated classes Nor is it such that the relief claimed being

    personal could not be enjoyed after death, or granting it would be nugatory. Death

    of the person liable to render an account for property received by him does not,

    therefore. aflecti the liability on his estate. "

    ( 19 ) THE applications for recovery of possession of the premises in dispute, out of

    which the present appeals have arisen, were not actions for damages ex delicro.

    They did not fall within the enumerated classes, nor were they such that the relief

    claimed was personal to the deceased tenants and could not be enjoyed after their

    death or granting it would be nugatory. Such would have been the case, if the relief

    claimed had been in respect of an obligation of the deceased which was personal to

    him as would be the obligation of a painter to paint a picture, for example. The right

    of the deceased tenants to statutory protection from eviction from the premises was

    personal to them, but their termination of the statutory protection, was not

    personal. The claim of the landlord for possession of the premises was not

    extinguished with the death of the tenants. The premises are still in existence and

    their possession is in the hands of the legal representatives, who can be directed to

    hand it over to the landlord. The death of the tenants, who were liable to put the

    landlord into possession, of the premises, which they had earlier acquired, would

    not. therefore, affect the liability of their estate. The landlord still can follow his

    claim for recovery of the premises, in the hands of the legal representatives of the

    deceased tenants. Accordingly, his right to sue survives against them. Mr. Sabharwal

    contended that even if the right to sue had survived in favour of the landlord and

    against the legal representatives, it would not be enforced by the Controller, who

    had no power to pass an order against any person other than a tenant. The legal

    representatives, according to him, were not the tenants : and, therefore, not

    amenable to the Controller's jurisdiction. This contention is not well founded.

    Although in section 14 (1) The language employed speaks of a ban against on order

    or decroc for recovery of possession in favour of the landlord against a tenant, yet

    the power of the Controller to make an order for recovery of the premises is

    contained in the proviso which is wide in scope. It provides, in. unequivocal terms

    that the Controller may, on an application made to him, in the prescribed manner,

    make an order for the recovery of the premises on one or more of the" specified

    grounds. It does not say against whom this order can or cannot be made. There are

    no such limits to the Controller's power The interpretation put by Mr. Sabharwal

    suggesting that this power is limited to making an order against a tenant only has

    no justification. A similar argument was advanced in South Asia Industries private

    Limited Vs. Sarup Singh and others, AIR 1966 SC 345, which case had arisen also

    out of an application for eviction under section 14 (1) of the 1953 Act. Repelling this

    argument. Mr. Justice A. K. Sarkar, who delivered the leading judgement of the

    majority, with whom Mr. Justice Bachawat agreed in a separate concurring

    judgment, observed :"i am unable to accept this argument. The proviso expressly

    states that an order for ejectment can be made on one or more of the following

    ground and then sets the grounds out in the different clauses that follow, one of

    which we are concerned. The clauses, therefore, set out the circumstances in which

    the operative part of the proviso is set in motion, that is, the circumstances in which

    an order for recovery of possession may be made, If this is so, as 1 think, it is, the

    clauses could not have been intended to indicate the person against whom an order

    for recovery of possession could he made. Their purpose was entirely different. I am

    not suggesting that an order for recovery of possession against the assigning tenant

    cannot be made. AH that I say is that the clauses do not intend to indicate the

    persons against whom an order for recovery of possession can be made and so it

    can. not be argued that the order cannot be made against any other. " (underlining

    ours) Mr. Sabharwal contended that that case was for eviction under clause (b)

    against a sub-tenant and not against a legal representatives. Here also sub-tenants

    are parties in SAO 6 of 1968. But, this hardly makes any difference. In the case

    before the Supreme Court, the tenant was a company incorporated under the

    Companies Act. During the pendency of the proceeding, the company was

    completely wound up and became extinct. Its name was struck off from the record,

    leaving the sub tenant as the only respondent. The ground for eviction claimed was,

    of course, under clause (b), but the observations of the Supreme Court were general

    and were intended to cover all cases for recovery of possession under Section

    14c1 ). Mr. Justice Sarkar observed :"i observe that the object of the first part of

    Sub-section (1) of S. 14 is to ban all recovery of possession of tenanted premises by

    a landlord and that of the proviso is to lift that ban in specified cases. The object of

    the proviso is then to enable the landlord to recover possession in any of the

    specified cases. Assume that the present is a case where the landlord became

    entitled to recover possession under Cl. (b) of the proviso. Clearly then the statute

    intended the landlord to recover possession. It would be our duty to give effect to

    that intention unless the language used made it plainly impossible. I have earlier

    said that the language used does not compel the view that the only person against

    whom an order for recovery of possession can be made is the tenant assigning or

    sub-letting without the landlord's consent. That being so, orders against all persons

    in occupation, must have been contemplated so that the landlord might without

    further trouble recover possession. Further I find it impossible to hold that the

    language used indicates an intention that when a right has accrued to a landlord to

    recover possession, that right would be taken away from him when the tenant

    assigning has become extinct without leaving a successor, an event which is only

    accidental and certainly rare. A court would be fully justified in holding that in such a

    case, it was intended that ah order for recovery of possession can be made against

    the assignee alone for that would enable the object of the statute which was to

    enable the landlord to recover possession, to be achieved. An interpretation which

    defeats the object of the statute is, of course, not permissible. "

    ( 20 ) EVEN the dissenting view expressed by Mudholkar. limited its dissent to a

    case where the tenant became totally extinct as happened on the winding up of the

    company, which was the tenant in that case, without leaving any legal

    representative. But, if the tenant died leaving legal representatives, (as has

    happened in the instant case), the learned judge saw no objection to bringing on

    record his said legal representatives. Mudholkar J observed :"where during the

    pendency of the proceeding before the Rent Controller the tenant dies or makes an

    assignment of whatever interest he may still have left in the demised premises, no

    difficulty would arise, because his legal representative or assignee could be brought

    on record in his place. "

    ( 21 ) THIS was a case from Delhi under this very 1958 Act. This judgment of the

    Supreme Court, therefore, is directly on the point involved and clinches this issue. It

    is patent that once any of the circumstances mentioned in clauses (a) to (1) to the

    proviso to sub-section (i) of section 14 are shown to exist, the legal representative

    will not escape, from the jurisdiction of the Controller who will continue to have

    power even after the tenant's death to pass an order for recovery of the premises in

    favour of the landlord against whosoever claiming under the tenant, may be in

    possession. V. S Deshpande J, we must say with respect, was therefore, in error

    when speaking for the Bench in K. G. Malhotra's case, he observed; If the statutory

    tenant dies before an order for eviction is passed the basis of the claim of the

    landlord for eviction has to shift from the proviso to section 14 (1) to that of his

    general title. The application for eviction cannot, proceed further. . . . . . . . though

    the general right to sue survives to the landlord to pursue his remedy on the basis

    of title in a civil. court, the right to pursue the application under the 1958 Act does

    not survive and the Controller has to terminate the proceedings. , His observations

    in the case of Mangal Chand v. Gurbaksh Singh, AIR 1972 Delhi 56. to the effect

    that "the application for eviction would have abated on the death of Mangal Chand

    in accordance with the principle of Rule 4 of Order 22, Code of Civil Procedure,"

    even as explained by him in K. G. Malhotra's case, cannot be supported and we are

    unable to subscribe to the said view. The Controller cannot dismiss the application

    for eviction on the death of the statutory tenant, by saying that he has ceased to

    possess jurisdiction. We are of the opinion that he does not lose jurisdiction.

    ( 22 ) A legal representative is appointed merely in order that the suit or the

    proceeding might proceed and a decision be arrived at. It is the original parties

    rights and disabilities that have to be considered and the mere fact that the legal

    representative could not personally claim that right or could not personally be

    subjected to that disability, is not sufficient to render the proceeding initiated by the

    petitioner liable to dismissal. (See Gulli V. Sawan and. others, AIR 1924 Lahore 45 ).

    It is the obligation of the deceased tenant, therefore, that has to be considered and

    not that of his heirs, who have been brought on record as legal representatives and

    in whose hands the possession of the property now is. That being so, an order for

    the recovery of the premises, if made by the Controller against the legal

    representative can be duly executed. The relief granted by the Controller after the

    death of the tenant against the legal representatives would not become nugatory. In

    Andhra Bank Limited V Srinivasan and others, AIR 1962 S. C 232, the legal

    representatives of a deceased defendant were non-resident foreigners. Placing

    reliance on the judgment of the Privy Council in Gurdial Singh V. Raja of Faridkote,

    21 Ind. App. 171, an arrangement was advanced that a decree pronounced in

    absentem by a foreign court, to the jurisdiction of which the defendants have not in

    any way submitted themselves is by international law an absolute nullity.

    ( 23 ) THE court was, therefore, in these circumstances, said to have lost

    jurisdiction, against the legal representatives, who were foreigners and not

    submitting to its jurisdiction, on the death of the defendant. The Supreme Court,

    while rejecting this argument, referred with approval to the following passage in

    Salmond's 'jurisprudence' (11th Ed. P. 482. INHERITANCE is in some sort a legal and

    fictitious continuation of the personality of the dead man, for the representative is in

    some sort identified by the law with him whom he represents. The rights which the

    dead man can no longer own or exercise and fulfill in the person of a living

    substitute. To this extent, and in this fashion, it may be said that the legal

    personality of a man survives his natural personality, until his obligations being duly

    performed and his property duly disposed of his representation among the living is

    no longer called for. "

    ( 24 ) ON the basis of the above statement, the Supreme Court

    observed :"essentially and in substance and for the purpose of jurisdiction the suits

    brought by the appellant against Raja Bahadur did not alter their character even

    after his death and continued to be suits substantially against his estate as

    represented by his legal representatives. If that be the true legal position, there

    would be no scope for urging that the court which was competent to try the suits as

    originally filed ceased to be competent and try them because the legal

    representatives of the deceased Raja Bahadur were non-resident foreigners.

    ( 25 ) THE above observations of the Supreme Court show that V. S. Deshpande.

    was not right when he said that if the statutory a tenant, dies before an order for

    eviction is passed the basis of the claim of the landlord for eviction has to shift form

    the proviso to Section 14 (1) to that of his general title". The Supreme Court further

    observed; in such a case if one of the defendants dies and his legal representatives

    happen to be non-resident foreigners the procedural step taken to bring them on

    record is intended to enable them to defend the suit in their character as legal

    representatives and on behalf of the deceased defendants and so the jurisdiction of

    the court continues unaffected and the competence of the suit as originally filed

    remains unimpaired In form it is a personal action against the legal representative,

    but in substance it is an action continued against them as the legal representatives

    in which the extent of their liability is ultimately decided by the extent of the assets

    of the deceased as held by them".

    ( 26 ) IN the present case, therefore, the legal representatives of the deceased

    tenants could be and were rightly brought on record to enable them to defend the

    proceeding on behalf of the deceased tenants. Jurisdiction of the Controller to deal

    with the applications continued unaffected and the competence of the application as

    originally filed remained unimpaired. Although in form it may appear to be a

    personal action against the legal representatives, in substance it is an action

    continued against them as legal representatives and the extent of their liability is

    ultimately decided by the extent of the assets or the estate of the deceased held by

    them. Such assets or the estate in the present case is the premises in dispute in

    their hands. Their liability, therefore, would extend to their putting the landlord back

    into possession of the said premises. If, therefore, any of the circumstances

    specified in the proviso to Section 14 (1) is found to exist, the Controller would

    make an order for recovery of the premises after bringing the legal representatives

    on record on the death of the tenants and for that purpose would continue the

    proceeding till final decision. This is precisely. what Rule 4 of Order 22 of the Code

    of Civil Procedure requires. For, when the right to sue- survives, as it does in this

    case, the Controller on an application, "shall cause the legal representative of the

    deceased defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit (emphasis

    supplied ). The suit (the application in this case) has thus to be proceeded with and

    is not to be dismissed on the ground that the legal representatives did not inherit

    the tenancy rights or the protection from eviction.

    ( 27 ) WE may pause here to dispose of another point, which though not involved in

    the present appeals, has been mentioned in a passage in the Full Bench Judgment

    in K. G. Malhotras case, which may possibly cause some misunderstanding. The said

    passage, as already noticed, reads "the landlord may not apply within the prescribed

    time to bring the legal representatives on record. In such a case the application

    abates as provided by Order 22. We must say with respect that we cannot agree

    with this observation. This question came up for consideration before the Division

    Bence consisting or S. N. Andly C.. , and T. P. S. Chawla. in Subhash Chander v

    Rehmat Ullah. ILR 1973 (1) Delhi 181, and it was held that the Limitation Act does

    not apply to proceedings before the Controller. We are in respectful agreement with

    the said view of the Division Bench.

    ( 28 ) THE Supreme Court in. C. Chaterjee and others v. Sr. Krishna Tandon and

    another, AIR 1971 SC 2625, was of the opinion that the landlord's right to proceed

    with the appeal (in that case the tenant died during the pendency of the appeal),

    with a view to obtain possession of his premises, did survive under Order 22 Rule 4

    read with Rule 11 of the Code of Civil procedure. The Supreme Court

    observed:"where the right to sue or prosecute appeal, survives, the appellant is

    bound to cause the legal representatives of the deceased respondent to be made a

    party and proceed with the appeal".

    ( 29 ) UNDER sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 of Order 22, Code of Civil procedure, any

    person so made a party can make any defence appropriate to his character, as legal

    representatives of the deceased defendants. The Supreme Court in. S Chatterjee's

    case hold that all contentions, which could be urged by the deceased could be urged

    by his legal representatives "except only those which were personal to the

    deceased". The Supreme Court observed :"the only contentions that they (legal

    representatives) could put forward in the appeal were the contentions appropriate to

    their representative character and not one. which was personal to the deceased.

    The contention based on the ground of bonafide requirements by the landlord was

    personal to the statutory tenant and on his death the same is not open to his legal

    representatives. . . . . . "

    ( 30 ) IF the legal representatives set up their own independent title this would not

    be in their capacity as legal representatives of the deceased or representing his

    estate. They would then be parties to the proceeding in their dual capacity, viz. in

    their capacity as legal representatives of the deceased tenant and in their other

    capacity claimed by them independently of the deceased. And if the landlord denies

    the latter capacity, the Controller would have jurisdiction, to decide, incidentally,

    their claim on merits, in order to determine whether the contention of the landlord

    that they had the capacity as legal representatives only, was correct. The decision of

    the Controller on the independent claim set up by the legal representatives, of

    course, be subject to final review by civil court if that court is moved. This is what

    the Supreme Court observed in Om prakash Gupta Vs. Dr. Rattan Singh 1963. PLR.

    546.

    ( 31 ) TO sum up, the relief the landlord claimed in his application U/s 14 against his

    ten ants, whose tenancies had already been determined and who ware alleged to

    have lost the protection of S. 14 of the 1958 Act, could thus be claimed on their

    death against their legal representatives. The right to sue on the basis of the

    applications (U/s 14 of the 1958 Act which were pending before the Controller,

    therefore, survived in favour of the landlord and against the respondents no. 1 to 4

    of SAO 54 of 1968, who were rightly held to be legal representatives of the

    deceased tenants; and were correctly brought on record as such. The jurisdiction of

    the Controller to deal with the said applications after the death of tenants remained

    unaffected. The proceedings U/s 14 (1) of the 1958 Act have to be continued

    against the said legal representatives. Since the power of the Controller to pass an

    order for recovery of possession depends upon the existence of one or more of the

    conditions specified in clause (a) to (1) of the proviso to S. 14 (1), the landlord has

    to establish that they do exist. In answer thereto, the legal representatives who

    have been brought on record may put forward such contentions as are appropriate

    to their representatives character, but not the contentions which were personal to

    the deceased tenants. They would, of course, be entitled to support their aforesaid

    contentions by such evidence, as they may be able to adduce. If the Controller finds

    that one or more of the aforesaid conditions exist, nothing would prevent him from

    passing an order for recovery of the premises in favour of the landlord against the

    legal representatives. In case the Controller comes to the finding that the landlord

    has not been able to establish any of the grounds which are mentioned in clauses

    (a) to (b) of the proviso to S. 14 (1), then he would have no power to pass an order

    for recovery of possession for the reason that the conditions on which his power to

    order for recovery of possession rests, do not exist. The landlord may then file, if

    advised, a regular suit for possession in the civil court, which would be on different

    cause of action.

    ( 32 ) BEFORE parting with these appeals, we must express our appreciation for the

    valuable assistance given to us by Mr H. K. L. Sabharwal, who at our request argued

    the appeals on behalf of the respondents amicus curiae.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Kedar Nath v. Ram Nath Etc
    (Oct 9, 1973)