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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petition challenges the Trial Court's order dated 27.09.2010 (Annex.8) passed in Civil Suit No. 7/2005. The dispute is between two brothers. The plaintiff-respondent filed a suit for specific performance and perpetual injunction alleging that the property described in the plaint was purchased by him but the sale deed had been executed in the name of the defendant-petitioner because an eviction suit relating to shop No. 7 (against the parties' father) was pending. The plaintiff alleged an oral agreement that the defendant would execute a sale deed in his favour after the other suit was decided, and that an agreement dated 27.01.1984 was executed to that effect. The plaintiff asserted he was in possession and had paid for the purchase.

The defendant-petitioner denied the suit, claimed to have purchased the property from his own income, denied execution of the alleged agreement of 27.01.1984 (calling it fabricated), and further contended that the agreement was inadmissible for want of registration under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908.

The Trial Court framed issues, heard evidence and originally decreed the suit. The Appellate Court, by order dated 06.10.2009 (Annex.4), found deficiencies in issue-framing (including on admissibility and on plaintiff's readiness and willingness), set aside the judgment and decree, and remanded the matter directing the Trial Court to frame proper issues and to permit additional evidence if sought.

After remand, amended issues were framed (including an issue numbered 6 concerning admissibility of the agreement). On 12.02.2010 the defendant moved an application under Section 17 of the Registration Act requesting that issue No. 6 (admissibility of the agreement dated 27.01.1984) be decided first. The Trial Court considered the application and, by the impugned order dated 27.09.2010, rejected the defendant's objection to admissibility, observing that the agreement pre-dated the 1989 amendment and that the document had already been exhibited in evidence and the defendant had cross-examined.

The defendant approached the Court by way of the present writ petition challenging the Trial Court's order of 27.09.2010.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the agreement dated 27.01.1984 was compulsorily registrable under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 and thus inadmissible in evidence for want of registration.
  2. Whether an objection to admissibility of a document for want of registration can be raised after the document has already been exhibited and the objecting party has cross-examined (i.e., the temporal propriety of raising the Section 17 objection).
  3. Whether the Trial Court erred in deciding the admissibility of the document while dealing with the application (seeking that issue No. 6 be decided first) rather than keeping to the procedural posture requested by the defendant.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner-Defendant's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The petitioner contended that the agreement dated 27.01.1984 was compulsorily registrable under Section 17(b) of the Registration Act and therefore inadmissible in evidence for want of registration.
  • The petitioner argued that his application dated 12.02.2010 only sought a decision on issue No. 6 before further evidence, but the Trial Court, while dealing with that application, proceeded to hold the document admissible and thereby rendered issue No. 6 redundant.
  • The petitioner submitted that the Trial Court erred in rejecting the application on the ground that the agreement had already been exhibited and admitted in evidence, because the issue regarding admissibility had been framed only on 14.12.2009 (after the earlier exhibition) and therefore the earlier evidence could not preclude raising the admissibility question after remand.
  • The petitioner argued that the Trial Court misconstrued Section 17(b) by failing to appreciate that the alleged agreement purported to create or declare rights in the respondent and to extinguish the petitioner's rights, thereby making it compulsorily registerable.
  • The petitioner relied on several decisions (listed in the record) to support the submission that the document was registerable and inadmissible without registration.

Plaintiff-Respondent's Allegations and Positions (as presented in the opinion)

  • The plaintiff alleged that he purchased the property, that the sale deed was executed in the defendant's name only because of a pending eviction suit, and that there was an oral agreement and a written agreement dated 27.01.1984 that the defendant would execute a sale deed in the plaintiff's favour after conclusion of the other suit.
  • The plaintiff alleged he was in possession of the property from the date of purchase and had paid everything in relation to the purchase.
  • The record indicates that, when the application under Section 17 was argued before the Trial Court, the parties advanced their arguments on the merits of the admissibility question (i.e., they argued whether the document was admissible and whether it was registerable under Section 17).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kashinath Bhaskar Datar v. Bhaskar Vishweshwar Karve: AIR 1952 SC 153 Cited as an instance of cases where documents were held to be purporting to create or extinguish interests in immovable property (relevant to registerability under the Registration Act). The Court observed that decisions such as this dealt with documents purporting to create or extinguish rights; it distinguished those facts from the present case where the document was described as an agreement and not shown in the record to be creating/extinguishing rights in immovable property.
Mt. Haliman v. Md. Manir: AIR 1971 Patna 385 Cited as another decision involving documents purporting to create or extinguish interests in immovable property (relevant to registration issues). The Court grouped this authority with Kashinath and Dhobani Sahu and distinguished their factual matrix from the present case, noting the present document was an agreement not shown to create or extinguish rights.
Land Acquisition Zone Officer, Talcher - Sambalpur Rail Link, Angul v. Dhobani Sahu: 2007 (59) AIC 404 (Ori. H.C.) Cited as a case involving documents that purported to create or extinguish interests in immovable property. The Court treated this decision alongside the other state- and apex-court decisions and held that those cases were distinguishable on facts because the present document was an agreement not shown to change the proprietary rights directly.
Naladhar Mahapatra v. Seva Dibya: AIR 1991 Orissa 166 Cited for the proposition (and as a vehicle reference) that a party cannot object to admissibility of a document which has been marked exhibit without having raised an objection at the time of exhibition; and it refers to the Supreme Court decision of P.C. Purushothama Reddiar. The Court relied on Naladhar Mahapatra to support the principle that an objection to admissibility cannot be raised after the document has been exhibited without objection; the Court also noted that other observations in Naladhar do not contradict the Supreme Court's principles.
P.C. Purushothama Reddiar: AIR 1972 SC 608 Authoritative Supreme Court principle that it is not open for a party to object to the admissibility of a document which has been marked exhibit without objection by such party. The Court relied on this Supreme Court principle (as cited in Naladhar Mahapatra) to hold that the petitioner could not raise the Section 17 objection after the document had already been exhibited and the proceedings had advanced.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court considered the record, the submissions of the parties and the authorities relied upon and reached the following analytical conclusions:

  1. Procedural posture and Trial Court's approach: Although the petitioner had sought only a decision on issue No. 6 before further evidence, the Trial Court allowed argument on the substantive question involved in issue No. 6 while hearing the application. Given that the parties argued on the merits of the admissibility question during that hearing, the Court held that it would have been an "empty formality" to decide the procedural application first and then separately hear the same question on issue No. 6. Thus the Trial Court's simultaneous consideration of the application and the substantive admissibility question could not be characterized as wholly unjustified or wholly without jurisdiction.
  2. Timing of objection to admissibility: The Court emphasized the settled principle that an objection to admissibility for want of registration cannot be raised by a party after the relevant document has been exhibited in evidence without any objection at the time of exhibition. The Court relied on Naladhar Mahapatra and the Supreme Court authority in P.C. Purushothama Reddiar to support this proposition.
  3. Distinguishing precedents dealing with creation/extinguishment of rights: The Court observed that some authorities cited by the petitioner (Kashinath Bhaskar Datar, Mt. Haliman, Dhobani Sahu) involved documents that purported to create or extinguish interests in immovable property; those cases concerned compulsory registration in a different factual context. The Court found the present document to be an agreement which, as placed in the record, was not shown to be one that by itself created or extinguished rights in immovable property, and therefore distinguished those precedents.
  4. Effect of remand and existing evidence: The Court noted that the document had been exhibited long back in the proceedings and that, even though the matter was remanded and an issue on admissibility was framed later, the remand did not wipe out the existing evidence. The petitioner ought to have raised the objection at the time of exhibition; a mere cursory reference in the written statement did not entitle the petitioner to raise the admissibility objection afresh after remand when no objection had been taken at the point of exhibition.
  5. Conclusion on legality of the impugned order: On the totality of these considerations, the Court concluded that the impugned order did not suffer from jurisdictional error nor did it result in a failure of justice. The Court therefore found no ground to interfere with the Trial Court's order in the exercise of writ jurisdiction.
  6. Limitation on the Court's pronouncement: The Court expressly clarified that it had not pronounced on the merits of the suit itself and that none of its observations (nor those in the impugned order) would have a bearing on the merits which the Trial Court must decide in accordance with law.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED

Holding: The writ petition challenging the Trial Court's order dated 27.09.2010 is dismissed. The Court declined to interfere with the Trial Court's decision rejecting the defendant's objection under Section 17 of the Registration Act and holding the agreement admissible in evidence on the grounds stated.

Direct consequences: The impugned order of the Trial Court stands; the Trial Court retains jurisdiction to continue the trial subject to its duties in law. The High Court made clear that it has not decided the substantive merits of the suit and that neither its observations nor the impugned order shall affect the ultimate adjudication on merits by the Trial Court.

Broader implications: The opinion contains no pronouncement purporting to lay down a new principle of law; it rests on application of existing principles concerning the timing of objections to admissibility of exhibits and on factual distinctions from authorities cited. No broader precedent beyond the evaluation and application of those established principles is announced in this order.

This summary is prepared exclusively from the content of the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond those expressly stated in the text.

    Prem Kumar Dagar v. Kailash Chandra Dagar

    BY THE COURT:

    This writ petition is directed against the order dated 27.09.2010 (Annex.8) as passed in Civil Suit No. 7/2005 whereby, while dealing with the suit after remand, the learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Jodhpur City, Jodhpur has considered the application moved by the defendant-petitioner under Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 (‘the Act’) and has rejected the objection about admissibility of the disputed document, an agreement dated 27.01.1984, with the observations that the requirement of compulsory registration of such agreement came to be incorporated in the Act by the amendment of the year 1989 whereas the agreement in question was of the year 1984 and then, the agreement in question had already been exhibited in evidence and the defendant had already carried out cross-examination.

    The dispute herein is between the brothers. The plaintiff-respondent has filed the suit for specific performance and perpetual injunction essentially on the allegations that the property described in paragraph-1 of the plaint was purchased him but as the suit for eviction in relation to another property comprised in shop No. 7 was pending against the father of the parties, the sale deed was got executed in the name of the petitioner-defendant because of such suit. The plaintiff alleged that the parties entered into an oral agreement for execution of the sale document in relation to the property in question by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff after decision of the said suit; and then, an agreement dated 27.01.1984 was also executed to the effect that after termination of the proceedings in other suit relating to shop No. 7, the defendant would execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff also alleged himself being in possession of the property in question from the date of purchase and himself alone having paid everything for purchase of the property.

    The plaintiff alleged that the said suit in relation to shop No. 7 has come to an end but the defendant was not executing the sale deed of the suit property in his favour, and on the contrary, had issued an advertisement proposing to sell the suit property though it belongs to the plaintiff and there has been agreement executed in favour of the plaintiff on 27.01.1984 On such nature averments, the plaintiff prayed for specific performance and for perpetual injunction.

    The defendant-petitioner denied the suit in toto and asserted that the property in question had been purchased by him from his own income. The petitioner denied execution of the alleged agreement dated 27.01.1984 and stated the same to be a fabricated document. The petitioner, of course, took an averment that the agreement was not admissible in evidence for want of registration.

    The learned Trial Court framed the issues essentially with reference to the relief claimed in the plaint and after taking evidence and hearing the parties decreed the suit.

    However, the learned Appellate Court, in its order dated 06.10.2009 (Annex.4), found that the Trial Court had not framed proper issues in the matter where execution of the agreement was in dispute and other objections were also raised regarding admissibility of the document. The Appellate Court found that the Trial Court did not frame the issue on the question of readiness and willingness of the plaintiff either. The Appellate Court, therefore, proceeded to set aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and remanded the matter with the directions that the Trial Court shall frame proper issues and shall give opportunity to the parties for leading evidence, if sought to be adduced in addition to the evidence already led, and then shall decide the matter on merits. The Appellate Court directed as under:-

    After remand, the Trial Court is said to have framed the followings as amended issues in the matter:-

    After framing of such issues, the defendant-petitioner proceeded to move an application on 12.02.2010 (Annex.6) with reference to Section 17 of the Act and submitted that the alleged agreement dated 27.01.1984 had been exhibited in affidavit as Ex.1 but the defendant has objection that such document was compulsorily registrable under Section 17 of the Act and was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration. The petitioner, therefore, prayed that issue No. 6 relating to admissibility of the agreement be decided at the first and before taking the evidence of the plaintiff.

    The application aforesaid has been considered by the learned Trial Court by the impugned order dated 27.09.2010 The learned Trial Court took note of the arguments of the parties including the arguments on the question of admissibility of the document and proceeded to reject the objection of the petitioner with the following observations and findings:-

    Aggrieved by the order aforesaid, the petitioner has filed this writ petition. The learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously argued that the procedure as adopted by the learned Trial Court has caused prejudice to the petitioner inasmuch as by the application dated 12.02.2010 (Annex.6), the petitioner only prayed for decision on issue No. 6 before evidence but while dealing with this application, the learned Trial Court has proceeded to hold the document admissible in evidence and thereby, the issue No. 6 is rendered redundant. It is also submitted that the learned Trial Court has been in error in rejecting the application of the petitioner on the premise that agreement has already been exhibited and admitted in evidence while failing to consider that the issue regarding admissibility was framed for the first time only on 14.12.2009 Thus, according to the learned counsel, the evidence previously recorded could not debar the petitioner from raising the question of admissibility of the document for want of registration. It is also submitted that the learned Trial Court has misconstrued the provisions of Section 17 (b) of the Registration Act and has failed to consider that the alleged agreement clearly purports to create and declare the rights in the respondent and to extinguish the petitioner's right, title and interest in the disputed property. It is submitted that such document being compulsorily registerable, the question ought to have been decided in favour of the petitioner. The learned counsel has referred to and relied upon the decisions in Kashinath Bhaskar Datar v. Bhaskar Vishweshwar Karve : AIR 1952 SC 153, Mt. Haliman v. Md. Manir: AIR 1971 Patna 385, Land Acquisition Zone Officer, Talcher - Sambalpur Rail Link, Angul v. Dhobani Sahu: 2007 (59) AIC 404 (Ori.H.C), and Naladhar Mahapatra v. Seva Dibya: AIR 1991 Orissa 166.

    Having given a thoughtful consideration to the submissions made and having examined the record, this Court is not persuaded to consider interference in the impugned order dated 27.09.2010

    True though it is that the petitioner moved the application only seeking orders for decision on issue No. 6 at the first and by the impugned order, the learned Trial Court has decided the question involved in issue No. 6 itself but then, in the given set of facts and circumstances, the approach of the learned Trial Court cannot be said to be wholly unjustified or wholly without jurisdiction. The substance of the matter had been that the petitioner wanted to assert that the document in question was inadmissible for want of registration; and so had been the frame of issue No. 6. Now, while arguing on the application, the parties also advanced their arguments on the merits of the question involved in issue No. 6. In the given position, it would have been an empty formality if the learned Trial Court would have first decided the application and then posted the matter for hearing separately on issue No. 6. In fact, from the contents of the order impugned, it is but apparent that the question involved in issue No. 6 was itself allowed to be argued before the Court; and hence, so far the prayer for decision on issue No. 6 at the first was concerned, that stood impliedly granted. The learned Trial Court has simultaneously considered the question involved in issue No. 6 itself and has pronounced the order that the question of admissibility was not available to be raised as the document had already been exhibited in evidence; and that the agreement being of the year 1984, the amendment of the year 1989 would not apply. The argument on the matter of form as raised on behalf of the petitioner does not relate to substance of the matter; and the impugned order does not call for interference on such grounds.

    So far the merits of the case are concerned, this Court is clearly of opinion that the Trial Court has the jurisdiction to rule on admissibility of the document but then, the question of admissibility ought to have been raised at the time when the document was produced in evidence. It remains trite that the objection regarding admissibility cannot be raised by a party after the document has been exhibited without any objection at the time of exhibition. The decision in Naladhar Mahapatra's case (supra) as referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner itself refers to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P.C Purushothama Reddiar: AIR 1972 SC 608 that it is not open for a party to object to the admissibility of the document which has been marked exhibit without any objection by such party. The other observations as made in Naladhar Mahapatra's case (supra) cannot be read as laying down any principle contrary to the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The decisions in Kashinath Bhaskar Datar, Mt. Haliman and Dhobani Sahu (supra) had been of the cases where the documents in question were purporting to create or extinguish interest in the immoveable property. In the present case, the document in question is said to be an agreement and that by itself is not said to be creating or extinguishing the rights in immoveable property.

    In any case, it is but apparent that the document had long back been exhibited in evidence. In fact, after it was exhibited, the matter was decided by the Trial Court. The matter is now being considered by the Trial Court after remand but then, even in the remand order, the learned Appellate Court, despite making other observations, has only permitted taking of additional evidence. When in the existing evidence, the document had already been exhibited, merely because the matter had been remanded and issue on admissibility had been framed later, the existing evidence cannot be considered to have wiped out. In fact, such an objection was required to be raised by the petitioner at the very point of time when the document was being exhibited. Merely because such objection was suggested cursorily in the written statement, the petitioner-defendant could not have been acceded the liberty to raise objection on admissibility in the second round of litigation after remand though having not raised at the relevant time. Even on merits, as noticed, the objection remains baseless.

    Viewed in its totality, the impugned order neither suffers from any jurisdictional error nor leads to failure of justice. No case for interference in the writ jurisdiction is made out and this writ petition is required to be dismissed.

    However, it is made clear that this Court has, otherwise, not pronounced on the merits of the case either way and no observation in this order or in the impugned order dated 27.09.2010 shall have bearing on the merits of the case that shall be considered and decided by the learned Trial Court in accordance with law.

    With the observations foregoing, the petition stands dismissed.

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    Comments

    Prem Kumar Dagar v. Kailash Chandra Dagar
    (Jul 29, 2011)