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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Mr. Palpandian for Himmatmal Mardia for Petitioner
  • Mr. B.T Seshadri & Mr. Mohan Parasaran for Respondents.
Judges
  • Somasundaram, J.
Acts
  • S. 10(3) (a) (iii) and S. 10(3) (c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, XVIII of 1960, hereinafter called the Act.
  • S. 10(3) (a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act.
  • S. 12 (1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961
  • S. 12(1)(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961
  • S. 4 of the Partnership Act,
  • Rent Control) Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Mr. Palpandian for Himmatmal Mardia for Petitioner
  • Mr. B.T Seshadri & Mr. Mohan Parasaran for Respondents.
Judges
  • Somasundaram, J.
Acts
  • S. 10(3) (a) (iii) and S. 10(3) (c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, XVIII of 1960, hereinafter called the Act.
  • S. 10(3) (a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act.
  • S. 12 (1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961
  • S. 12(1)(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961
  • S. 4 of the Partnership Act,
  • Rent Control) Act
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Civil Revision Petitions arising from R.C.O.P. No. 312 of 1984)

Factual and Procedural Background

The landlord (petitioner in R.C.O.P. No. 312 of 1984) sought eviction of two tenants (the first and second respondents in that original petition) under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) and S. 10(3)(c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (the Act). The facts, as pleaded by the landlord, are that he owns premises at No. 20 Murugappan Street, Madras, where the first and second respondents occupy small ground-floor shops on monthly rents of Rs. 175 and Rs. 30 respectively. The landlord stated that he (and members of his family) are conducting business there: the landlord as proprietor of "Wire House" and his son and wife as "Damani Brothers". The landlord's son and daughter-in-law conduct business (“Southern Capacitors”) at No. 13 Errabalu Street in premises not owned by the family. The landlord averred that he previously carried on business at No. 100 Broadway in a much larger area (about 1,600 sq. ft.) but, having been forced to vacate that location, had shifted into a car-shed portion at No. 20 Murugappan Street measuring about 300 sq. ft., which was inadequate to accommodate his business and that of his family; thus he bona fide required the respondents' portions for business accommodation.

The Rent Controller, after evidence, held a single petition under the cited subsections to be maintainable, declined eviction under S.10(3)(a)(iii) insofar as the landlord had not proved the partnership "Southern Capacitors", but found the landlord's requirement for additional accommodation for his own business and for "Damani Brothers" to be bona fide and ordered eviction. The tenants appealed: R.C.A. Nos. 143 and 145 of 1988 (first and second respondents) and the landlord filed R.C.A. No. 255 of 1988 against the finding on S.10(3)(a)(iii). The Appellate Authority heard the appeals together, dismissed the tenants' appeals and allowed R.C.A. No. 255, holding the landlord entitled to eviction under S.10(3)(a)(iii) as well. The tenants then filed the present civil revision petitions challenging the Appellate Authority's judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner bona fide requires the petition premises for the business of his son and daughter-in-law under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act?
  2. Whether the petitioner's requirement of the premises for additional accommodation (for his own business and that of his wife and son) is bona fide?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Case (landlord)

  • The landlord asserted he and his family conduct businesses that require additional space: the landlord as proprietor of "Wire House"; his son and wife as "Damani Brothers"; and his son and daughter-in-law as "Southern Capacitors" (the latter at No. 13 Errabalu Street in premises not owned by the family).
  • The landlord relied on documentary evidence (registration certificates, assessment orders, partnership deeds, rent receipts, bank certificate, lease deeds and other exhibits) to show the partnership status and the inadequate size of his present premises (300 sq. ft.) compared to former premises (1,600 sq. ft.).
  • The landlord maintained that the requirement of respondents' occupied portions was bona fide both to accommodate the partnership (son and daughter-in-law) and to provide additional accommodation for the landlord's and his wife/son's businesses.

First Respondent's Arguments (tenant occupying a shop on ground floor)

  • Contended that a single petition for eviction under S.10(3)(a)(iii) and S.10(3)(c) is not maintainable.
  • Argued that the landlord's requirement for his own business and for the business of his son and daughter-in-law was not bona fide.
  • Asserted the landlord's son and daughter-in-law had other non-residential buildings of their own.
  • Claimed eviction would cause irreparable loss and hardship outweighing any advantage to the landlord; submitted substantial investment and stock in the shop and reliance on the textile trade in the area.

Second Respondent's Arguments (tenant running cycle shop)

  • Contended he has run a cycle shop in the premises for around three decades and depends on it for livelihood, occupying only about 117 sq. ft.
  • Argued eviction would cause irreparable hardship outweighing the landlord's advantage.
  • Counsel also argued that "member of his family" (S.2(6A)) does not include daughter-in-law, and therefore eviction could not be sought for her benefit.

Additional contentions raised in proceedings

  • Counsel for respondents argued the landlord's son and daughter-in-law were not shown to be active (not sleeping) partners and that their non-examination was a serious infirmity.
  • Counsel suggested the landlord had suppressed occupation of a larger area than claimed, undermining bona fides.
  • Counsel contended the partnership could not be shifted without consent of other partners (a point not raised in the counter and therefore not relied upon by the court).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Krishnan Nair and Another v. Ghouse Basha (A.I.R. 1987 SC 2199) Whether a landlord can obtain eviction under S.10(3)(a)(iii) to accommodate a partnership business in which a member of the landlord's family is a partner; held in the affirmative where family members are directly and substantially involved. The court relied on this Supreme Court decision to hold that the petitioner is entitled to maintain an application under S.10(3)(a)(iii) to accommodate the partnership business where the landlord's son and daughter-in-law are partners and actively involved.
Sanghavi & Sons v. Ambalal Tribuwan Das (A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1026) Interpreted the phrase "his business" (in a provision in pari materia) by reference to the object and setting of the statute. Used as supporting authority for treating the family-member partnership situation within the scope of S.10(3)(a)(iii) by analogy to the interpretation of similar language in other rent-control statutes.
Aisha Thnajiysa A. v. Messrs. Lalchand Kewalram (1989-2-L.W. 123, Full Bench) Held that an eviction petition under S.10(3)(a)(iii) can be filed to accommodate a partnership firm in which landlord's family members are partners, provided those family members are active (not sleeping) partners with substantial interest. The court cited and applied the Full Bench's restatement: members of the landlord's family in the partnership must be actively and substantially involved — supporting the Appellate Authority's finding that the son and daughter-in-law were not sleeping partners.
Jayaram v. Ramalinga (1973 TLNJ 393) Contains observations running contra to the proposition that family-member partners can ground eviction under the relevant provision. The opinion notes that any observations in that case running contra were overruled by the later Full Bench authority cited; it therefore treated Jayaram as not authoritative on that point.
Danmull v. Syed Ali (AIR 1969 Mad. 214) Earlier decision on related subject matter (context of family member in business). The court upheld Danmull subject to the qualification that family members must not be sleeping partners; cited in support of the settled position with that qualification.
D.N. Sanguavi v. A.T. Das Discussed factual aspects of partnership involvement/occupation relevant to whether partner would occupy the suit accommodation. Cited in the context of whether consent of other partners is required and in examining whether a partner or family-member partner would actually occupy the premises; used in discussing the evidentiary burden.
K. Balakrishna Rao v. Haji Abdulla (1980 1 SCC 321) Explained that a definition clause does not necessarily apply in all contexts; opening clause of s.2 indicates defined meanings apply "unless the context otherwise requires". Applied to interpret "member of his family" in S.2(6A) of the Act, supporting a context-sensitive meaning that could include daughter-in-law for the purposes of eviction under S.10(3)(a)(iii).
Asha Bibi v. Habissa Sahie (AIR 1957 Madras 583) Discussed the popular/broad meaning of "family" including relations by blood or marriage (e.g., daughter-in-law). The court approved and relied on these observations to construe "member of his family" as potentially including daughter-in-law for the purposes of the Act.
M/s. Children's Choice v. G.K. Adiseshiah (1982 1 MLJ 411) Authority cited by respondent's counsel in support of arguments on hardship (relative disadvantage caused by eviction). Counsel relied on it; the court noted the reliance when discussing the tenants' claims of hardship but applied the established tests from higher authority to the facts.
Mst. Bega Begum & others v. Abdul Ahamed Khan (A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 262) Supreme Court guidance on assessing relative hardship: each party must prove relative advantages/disadvantages; inability to get similar accommodation anywhere in the city is weighty; onus not entirely on landlord to show tenants' disadvantages are remediable. The court applied these principles to find the tenants failed to prove relative hardship; noted tenants made no effort to secure alternate accommodation and therefore could not show hardship outweighing landlord's advantage.
Decision of this court reported at 1979-II-MLJ 405 Discussed the relative-hardship test and cited Mst. Bega Begum principles. Used by the court to evaluate relative hardship; applied to conclude that absence of attempts by tenants to find alternative accommodation weakened their hardship claim.
Unreported judgment: C.R.P. No. 1908 of 1983 dated 15.12.1989 Relied upon by respondent's counsel to argue non-examination of partners undermines bona fides. The court distinguished that unreported decision on facts, observing that in the present case P.W.1 gave knowledge-based evidence about the partnership and had represented the firm before Sales-Tax authorities.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court structured its analysis around two principal questions stated in the case: (1) entitlement to eviction under S.10(3)(a)(iii) for accommodating the landlord's son and daughter-in-law's partnership business, and (2) bona fides of the requirement for additional accommodation for the landlord's own business and that of his wife and son.

On S.10(3)(a)(iii) the court set out the statutory conditions that must be satisfied (as enumerated in the opinion): (i) the premises must be non-residential; (ii) the petitioner or family members carry on business in a building not belonging to them; (iii) they do not occupy any non-residential building of their own for such business; and (iv) the claim is bona fide. The court found the first three conditions satisfied on the evidence: the premises are non-residential; documents (Exs. P11, P12, P22, P19 series, P28–P31) established that the son and daughter-in-law carried on business as Southern Capacitors at No. 13 Errabalu Street (a building shown to belong to a third party), and those documents showed the son and daughter-in-law were partners with a 50% share.

The court then addressed whether the family members were active partners (not sleeping partners). It relied on the Supreme Court decision in Krishnan Nair and the Full Bench decision in Aisha Thnajiysa to apply the principle that eviction under S.10(3)(a)(iii) is available where family members are "directly and substantially involved" in the partnership business. The court held that the partnership deeds and additional documentary evidence did not indicate the son and daughter-in-law were sleeping partners; moreover, the respondents had not pleaded that they were sleeping partners. Consequently, the Appellate Authority's conclusion that they were active partners was upheld.

The court rejected the argument that non-examination of the son and daughter-in-law rendered the landlord's case infirm. It distinguished the unreported decision relied upon by respondents and noted that P.W.1 (who was examined) was the brother of S.R. Damani and husband of Pushpa Damani, had represented the firm before Sales-Tax authorities, and possessed knowledge about the partnership and business; thus his evidence covered the relevant matters.

On the contention that partner consent was required before shifting the partnership business to the petition premises, the court observed that the point had not been raised in the tenants' counter; therefore the landlord was not obliged to prove consent of other partners in the proceedings, citing relevant judicial observations which support that approach.

On whether "member of his family" includes a daughter-in-law, the court adopted a context-sensitive approach to the statutory definition in S.2(6A). Relying on K. Balakrishna Rao, Asha Bibi and appellate authority reasoning, the court concluded that the word "family" is flexible, can be given a broad/popular sense, and in the present context could include the daughter-in-law; eviction could therefore be sought for her benefit under S.10(3)(a)(iii).

Regarding the requirement for additional accommodation (for "Wire House" and "Damani Brothers"), the court accepted the landlord's evidence that he previously occupied a larger business premises at No. 100 Broadway (about 1,600 sq. ft.) and had been compelled to shift to a much smaller 300 sq. ft. car-shed portion at No. 20 Murugappan Street, which he shared with his wife and son. Documentary exhibits (partnership deed Ex. P14, bank certificate Ex. P10, lease deeds Exs. P7 and P8, and other evidence) corroborated these facts. The court considered the unchallenged testimony of P.W.1 that portions occupied by the respondents and the landlord's current share of about 300 sq. ft. were not disputed in cross-examination and no contrary pleading alleged occupation of a larger area by the landlord. On these grounds both the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority were held to have rightly found the landlord's requirement for additional accommodation bona fide.

On relative hardship, the court applied the Supreme Court guidance (Mst. Bega Begum) that each party must prove the relative advantages or disadvantages and that inability to get similar accommodation anywhere in the city is weighty. The court found respondents had not attempted to get alternate accommodation or pleaded difficulty finding similar accommodation in the area; specific evidence was lacking. Therefore, it concluded the hardship to respondents if evicted would not outweigh the advantage to the landlord. The court noted the tenants' claims of investment and stock but held that absent attempts to find alternatives their hardship claim carried less weight.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The civil revision petitions are dismissed. The findings of the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority (including entitlement to eviction under S.10(3)(a)(iii) for accommodating the partnership business of the landlord's son and daughter-in-law and the bona fide need for additional accommodation for the landlord's own business and that of his wife and son) are upheld. In the circumstances, there is no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The eviction order made in R.C.O.P. No. 312 of 1984 (as affirmed on appeal) stands; the landlord's entitlement to obtain possession under S.10(3)(a)(iii) and for additional accommodation is sustained in this case.
  • The court applied and relied upon existing authorities to interpret S.10(3)(a)(iii) and the statutory definition of "member of his family"; it did not purport to create a new legal principle beyond the application and clarification of those precedents.

No other orders or broader declaratory pronouncements were made in the opinion beyond upholding the findings below and dismissing the civil revision petitions.

Show full summary ...

    Madhurani Gupta And Another v. Shairu Bux Damani And Another

    1. The petitioner in C.R.P. Nos. 1647 and 1648 of 1990 is the first respondent in R.C.O.P. No. 312 of 1984 on the file of the 9th Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras. The petitioner in C.R.P. Nos. 1650 and 1651 and 1990 is the second respondent in R.C.O.P. No. 312/84. The respondent in all the civil revision petitions is the petitioner in R.C.O.P. No. 312 of 1984. For the sake of convenience the parties are referred to in this order as per the nomenclature given to them in the Rent Control Original Petition.

    2. The petitioner is the landlord and he filed R.C.O.P. No. 312 of 1984 under S. 10(3) (a) (iii) and S. 10(3) (c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, XVIII of 1960, hereinafter called the Act. The case of the petitioner is as follows:

    The petitioner is the owner and landlord of the premises bearing door No. 20, Murugappan Street, Madras-79 and the first respondent is a tenant occupying a shop for business purposes in the ground floor of premises No. 20, Murugappan Street on a monthly rent of Rs. 175/- and the second respondent is also a tenant under the petitioner occupying a shop for the business purposes in premises No. 20 referred above in the ground floor on a monthly rent of Rs. 30/-. The petitioner is carrying on the business under the name and style of “Wire House” as proprietor thereof in the car shed in premises No. 20, Murugappan Street. The petitioner's son and wife are carrying on the business under the name and style of “Damani Brothers” also in the petition premises in an adjoining small place in the car shed. The petitioner's another son and daughter-in-law are carrying on business at No. 13, Errabalu Street Madras-1. The petitioner was originally carrying on business at No. 100, Broadway, Madras-1 which had a plinth area of 1600 sit. 'As the lesson, of the said premises No. 100, Broadway wanted the petitioner to vacate and hand over vacant possession, the petitioner is forced to vacate the said premises and carry on his business in the car shed portion in the petition premises., The car shed portion wherein the petitioner is now carrying on business is just about 300 sq.ft. whereas in the original place of business at No. 100, Broadway he was carrying on business in about 1600 sit in area. The business of the petitioner's son and wife is also carried on in the same; place. The car shed portion measuring 300 sift, is not sufficient for both the business of the petitioner as well as the business of his wife and son, and the petitioner bona fide requires the petition mentioned premises in the occupation of the respondents for the occupation of the petitioner and his wife and son by way of additional accommodation. The petitioner's another son and daughter-in-law are doing business under the name and style of “Southern Capacitors” in No. 13, Errabalu Street which is a rented building and as the petitioner, his son and daughter-in-law did not own any building of their own, the portion in the respondents’ occupation in the petition premises is req uired for the purpose of business of his son and daughter-in-law which is being carried on in the building not of their own.

    3. The first respondent filed a counter contending as follows:— A single petition for eviction filed under S. 10(3) (a) (iii) and S. 10(3) (c) of the Act is not maintainable. The requirement of the petitioner for his business as well as for the business of his son and daughter-in-law is not bona fide . The petitioner's son and daughter-in-law are having other non-residential buildings of their own. If this respondent is evicted, she will be put to irreparable loss and hardship and that will outweigh the little advantage to the petitioner as this place is suitable only for textile business and most of the shops in that area are textile shops.

    The second respondent filed a counter contending that he is running a cycle shop in the petition premises for the past three decades, by which he is eking his livelihood. This respondent is in occupation of only 117 sit. Irreparable hardship will be caused to him in the event of his eviction from the petition mentioned premises which will outweigh the advantage to the petitioner.

    The Rent Controller, on a consideration of the evidence on record, found that a single petition under S. 10(3) (i) (iii) and 10(3) (a)(iii) and 10(3) (c) of the Act is maintainable. The Rent Controller further found that the petitioner is not entitled to an order of eviction under S. 10(3) (a)(iii) as he had not proved that his son and daughter-in-law carried on the partnership business under the name and style of “Southern Capacitors” However, the Rent Controller found the petitioner's requirement for additional accommodation for his business of his son and wife under the name and style of “Damani Brothers” is bona fide . Consequently the Rent Controller allowed R.C.O.P. No. 312 of 1984 and ordered eviction.

    4. As against the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller, the first respondent filed R.CA. No. 143 of 1988 before the Appellate Authority (8th Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras) and the second respondent filed R.C.A. No. 145 of 1988. As against the finding of the Rent Controller that the petitioner is not entitled to an order of eviction under 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Act, he filed R.C.A. No. 255 of 1988. The Appellate Authority heard all the Rent Control Appeals together and by a common judgment dismissed R.C.A. Nos. 143 and 145 of 1988 and allowed R.C.A. No. 255 of 1988. The Appellate Authority, while allowing R.C.A. No. 255 of 1988, found that the petitioner is also entitled to an order of eviction under S. 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Act. As against the judgment of the Appellate Authority in the above Rent Control Appeals, the respondents have filed the above civil revision petitions.

    5. Two questions which arise for consideration in these civil revision petitions are the following:

    Whether the petitioner bona fide requires the petition premises for the business of his son and daughter-in-law under S. 10(3)(a)(iii)of the Act?

    Whether the petitioner's requirement of the premises for additional accommodation is bona fide”

    6. Let us first examine the question whether the petitioner is entitled to an order of eviction under S. 10(3) (a)(iii) of the Act. According to S. 10(3) (a)(iii), a landlord, in order to obtain an order of eviction under that section has to satisfy the following conditions:

    (i) The petition-premises is non-residential in nature:.

    (ii) The petitioner or his family members are carrying on business in the building which does not belong to them:

    (iii) The petitioner or his family members are not occupying any non-residential building of their own for the purpose of such business: and

    (iv) The claim is bona fide.

    7. It is admitted that the premises in question is non-residential in nature. The evidence in this case discloses that the petitioner's son, S.R. Damani, and his daughter-in-law, Pushpa Damani, are carrying on business under the name and style of Southern Capacitors in No. 13, Er rabalu Street, Madras-1 which does not belong to them. Exs. P11 and P12 are the registration certificates of TNGST and C.S.T. relating to M/s. Southern Capacitors, Ex. P22 is the assessment order dated 13.1.1984 in respect of ‘Southern Capacitors”.

    Ex. P-19 series are rent receipts issued by one Lakshmi Estate which shows that the building bearing No. 13, Errabalu Street belonged to a third party and not to the petitioner's family. Exs. P-28 to P-31 marked as additional evidence before the Appellate Authority show that the petitioner's son and daughter-in-law are partners of “Southern Capacitors” and they are having 50% share in the partnership business and two other partners are having the other 50% share in the firm. The above documents clearly go to prove that the petitioner's son and daughter-in-law are partners of the firm “Southern Capacitors” and the firm is carrying on business in No. 13, Errabalu Street, Madras-1. There is also evidence to show that the petitioner or his family members are not occupying any non-residential building of their own for such business. The Supreme Court in Krishnan Nair and Another v. Ghouse Basha (A.I.R. 1987 SC 2199) considered the question whether the landlord is entitled to maintain on application under S. 10(3)(a) (iii) of the Act on the ground of requirement of premises for accommodating the partnership business where one of the members of the family is a partner. The Supreme Court, while answering the question in the affirmative, held as follows:—

    “Partnership, as is well settled, has a compendious way of describing these who constitute the firm under S. 4 of the Partnership Act, Now, if that is the position, in our opinion if a person carried on a business along with other partners and it was the other partner who actually carried on the business the position perhaps would have been entirely different. If the same were only sleeping partners that would have been different. On the contrary, here having regard to the past conduct of the sons and having regard to the shares this was their only application where sons were carrying on the business along with other partner. If that is the position in our opinion under S. 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Act as the, sons and members of the family carrying on the business in terms of the section will be entitled to the benefit of eviction”.

    In that case, their Lordships relied on the earlier decision reported in Sanghavi & Sons v. Ambalal Tribuwan Das (A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1026) where the meaning of the expression ‘his business’ under S. 12 (1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 came up for consideration. The said section is in pari-materia S. 10(3) (a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. In the said decision Sanghavi & Sons v. Ambalal Tribuwan das (A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 1026) it was held:

    “The meaning of the expression ‘his business’ in S. 12(1)(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961 is to be determined by examining the object of the Act and the setting of the phrase ‘his business’

    In Aisha Thnajiysa A. v. Messrs. Lalchand Kewalram (1989-2-L.W. 123 FB) a Full Bench of this Court dealing with the same question, following the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision referred above held as follows:

    “Thus, on a careful analysis of the ratio laid down in the above quested decisions and in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court reported in Krishnan Nair v. Ghouse Basha (A.I.R. 1987 SC 2199), we hold that the petition for eviction can be filed under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act to accommodate a partnership firm in which the members of the landlord's family are partners along with the strangers. But, however, in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in the above quoted case, we wish to make it clear that the members of the landlord's family in the partnership firm must be directly and substantially involved in the partnership business considering the extent of their interest in the business, i.e., the shares they have in the partnership business and the part they play, i.e., active partners but not sleeping partners. Any observation found in Jayaram v. Ramalinga (1973 TLNJ 393 ) running contra to what we have expressed above stands, overruled and we uphold the decision in Danmull v. Syed Ali (AIR 1969 Mad. 214), subject to the above qualification that the members of the landlord's family in the partnership firm should not be sleeping partner”.

    The above decisions clearly go to show that the petitioner is entitled to maintain an application under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act on the ground of requirement of premises for accommodating the partnership business where one of his sons and daughter-in-law are partners.

    8. Mr. Pal Pandian, learned counsel for the first respondent would contend that the petitioner has not proved that his son and daughter-in-law, who are the partners of Southern Capacitors” are active partners, carrying on a partnership business and that they are not sleeping partners. There is no merit in the above contention of the learned counsel. The recitals in the partnership deeds Exs. P30 and P31 do not show that the son and daughter-in-law of the petitioner are sleeping partners and that they are having 50% share in the partnership business. Further there is no plea in the counter filed by the respondents that the son and daughter-in-law, who are partners of Southern Capacitors' are only sleeping partners. The Authority has rightly hold that the petitioner's son and daughter-in-law are not sleeping partners of the firm Southern Capacitors.

    9. It was next contended by Mr. Pal Pandian that the son and daughter-in-law of the petitioner for whose benefit the eviction is sought for are not examined as witnesses and their non-examination is a serious infirmity which detracts from the bona fides of the requirement of the petitioner. In support of this contention learned counsel relied on an unreported judgment of this court in C.R.P. No. 1988 of 1983 dated 15.12.1989. The above decision, can be distinguished on facts. In C.R.P. No. 1908 of 1983 the learned Judge found that the person who was examined as P.W. 1 knows practically nothing about the tenancy in favour of the respondent in that case as well as the bona fides of the requirement, But, that is not the position here. P.W. 1 in this case is the brother of the partner S.R. Damani and the husband of the other partner Pushpa Damani. P.W. 1 speaks about the business carried on by the firm ‘Southern Capacitors’, 13, Errabalu Street, Madras-1. His evidence also shows that he represented the firm ‘Southern Capacitors’ before the Sales-Tax Authorities and he knows about business carried on by the partnership firm Southern Capacitors. Learned counsel for the respondents would further submit that the consent of the other partners of ‘Southern Capacitors’ had not been obtained for shifting the partnership business from No. 13, Errabalu Street and the partnership business cannot be shifted to the petition premises without the consent of the other partners and this is also an infirmity which militates against the petitioner's case that the requirement of the petition premises for the partnership business is bona fide . This contention of the learned counsel for the respondents cannot be countenanced, because, such a plea was not raised in the counter filed by the respondents. When such a point was not raised in the counter, there is no necessity on the part of the petitioner to prove that the consent of other partners for shifting the business had been already obtained. Mr. Mohan, Chief Justice, in Aishath Hajiya v. M/s. Lalchand Kewalram (1989-2-L.W. 123) after the Full Bench answered the reference and while disposing of the civil revision petition on merits, pursuant to the order made by the Full Bench, dealing with the question of obtaining the partner's consent, held as follows:

    “The next question is whether the consent of the other partner is required. In D.N. Sanguavi v. A.T. Das, in paragraph 10, it is observed as follows:

    “In neither of these two passages nor anywhere else in the evidence he has stated that on the terms of the partnership business or even that he would also occupy the suit accommodation along with his partners on obtaining possession from the appellants”

    In this case it is admitted by Mr. Raghavan, that this was not raised in the counter. However, he would say that it is for the petitioner to prove that she had obtained consent. Therefore, where that was not so stated in the petition, the tenant was not called upon to raise this issue. I am unable to accept this because unless this was put in issue, there was no necessity on the part of the landlady to say that the consent had been contained already and the other partner has also consented”.

    10. Mr. Mohan Parasaran, learned counsel for the second respondent would contend that according to S. 2(6A) of the Act, ‘member of his family’ in relation to a landlord means his spouse, son, daughter, grand-children, or dependent parent. The above definition of ‘member of his family ‘in S. 2 (6A) does not include a daughter-in-law and, therefore, eviction cannot be sought for by the petitioner for the benefit of his daughter-in-law also. I am unable to accept this contention of the learned counsel for the second respondent. The question as to the meaning to be given to the expression ‘member of his family’ will depend upon the context in which the word is used. The word ‘family’ is one of great flexibility; sometimes the word ‘family’ in a broad sense would mean all those who are connected by blood relationship or marriage and, therefore, are to be considered as belonging to the family. The word ‘family’ may be taken as the collective body of persons living in one house or under one head or manager and m ay take within its fold a household consisting of parents, sons, daughter-in-law and their children. A Division Bench of this court in Angamuthu Animal v. K.V. Muthu (1984 1 MLJ 170 ) interpreting S. 2 (6A) of the Act has held as follows:

    “In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires ‘member of his family’ in relation to a landlord means his spouse, son, daughter, grand-child or dependent parent”. The opening clause in S. 2 clearly indicates that the definition will apply only when the context to the situation does not call for any other meaning being given to the words defined in the section. Therefore, ‘members of the family’ in relation to a landlord defined in S. 2(6A) cannot be said always to take in only the persons mentioned therein viz., the spouse, son, daughter, grand child or dependent parent. If the context so required it is certainly permissible for the Court to hold that ‘ any other person” would also fall within the meaning of the expression ‘member of his family’ in relation to a landlord. As pointed out by Mr. Srinivasan it cannot be said that the daughter-in-law of a person is not a mother of the family of the landlord. A daughter-in-law is not a person enumerated in S. 2(6-A.). However, it must be open to a lan dlord to maintain a petition for eviction of a tenant for the needs of his widowed daughter-in-law. The opening clause in S. 2 of the Act has come up for consideration before the Supreme Court in K. Balakrishna Rao v. Haji Abdulla.( 1980 1 SCC 321) There the Supreme Court dealing with the definition clause in the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act observed as follows:

    A definition clause does not necessarily in any statute apply in all possible contexts in which the word which is defined may be found therein. The opening clause of s. 2 of the principle act itself suggests that any expression defined in that section should be given the meaning assigned to it therein unless the context otherwise requires.

    The Division Bench approved the following observations of this court in the decision Asha Bibi v. Habissa Sahie ‘. (AIR 1957 Madras 583)

    “Technically the word family may be taken to mean the collective body of persons who live in one house and under one head or manager and includes within its fold a household consisting of parents, children and servants and as the case may be lodgers or boarders. Under the Musalman Wakf Validating Act, it is intended to be used in a broad and popular sense. Popularly however the term indicates persons descended from one common progenitor and having a common lineage. It will take in both agnates and cognates and relations by blood or marriage. The nephews of the settlor are in this sense the members of his family. Similarly daughter-in-law, the son of a half brother or the son of a half-sister.

    From the above discussion it follows that a daughter-in-law of a person is a member of the family of the landlord for the purpose of S. 2(6A) of the Act and eviction can be sought for, for her benefit also under S. 10(3) (a) (iii). On the basis of evidence on record the Appellate Authority rightly held that the requirement of the petitioner for the purpose of the partnership business of his son and daughter-in-law is bona fide and entitled to an order of eviction under S. 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Act.

    11. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the requirement of the petition premises for the additional accommodation of the petitioner is bona fide . The case of the petitioner is that additional accommodation is required for the purpose of business of the petitioner under the name and style of “Wire House” and for the business of his wife and son under the name and style of “Damani Brothers”. Ex. P.-14 is the partnership deed entered into between the petitioner's son and wife for the purpose of carrying on business as agents, distributors, contractors, suppliers. Manufacturers, Importers and Exporters under the name and style of M/s Damani Brothers”. Exs. P-5, P-6 and P-10 relate to the business of “Wire House”. Ex. P-10 certificate issued by the bank authorities shows that the petitioner is the proprietor of M/s. Wire house and the same is being carried on from door No. 20, Murugappa Steet, Madras-1. It is also admitted by the respondent as R.W.I, that the petitioner is doing business in a portion of the petition-premises. The evidence in this case also discloses that the petitioner's business was originally carried on in No. 100, Broadway, Mad ras-1 in an area measuring about 1600 s.ft. which was vacated and handed over to the owner and that he had to come and occupy the car shed in No. 20, Murugappa Street, which is only 300 s.ft. The evidence in this case also shows that the petitioner has to share this 300 sit with M/s. Damani Brothers consisting of his wife and son for their business and the petitioner finds it difficult to accommodate both the businesses in such a small area. ExsP-S and Ex. 6 show that the place of business for M/s. Wire House was originally No. 100. Broadway, Madras-1 and now No. 20, Murugappa Street. Exs. P-7 and P-8 are the lease deeds in respect of No. 100, Broadway and the letter acknowledging the taking delivery of vacant possession of No. 100, Broadway by the lesser in the year 1983. By reliable evidence has proved that he was doing business earlier in a place having plinth area of 1600 sit and the same he had to vacate and come to occupy the portion having only 300 sit and as such the present place is not sufficient to accommodate his usiness and the business of his son and wife. The above circumstance shows that the requirement of the petitioner to have additional accommodation is bona fide.

    12. Learned counsel for the respondents would contend that the case of the petitioner is that the petitioner's business “Wire House” and the business of the petitioner's son and wife “Damani Brother” are carried on in the car shed measuring 300 s.ft. But, the evidence in this case discloses that the ground floor of the door No. 20, Murugappa street, measuring 300 s.ft., excepting the portions occupied by the respondents is in the occupation of the petitioners, that the petitioner has suppressed the fact th at he is in occupation at a larger area and not merely 300 s.ft. and all these go to prove that the petitioner's requirement of the premises in question either for additional accommodation or for the business of his son and daughter-in-law is not bona fide. There is no merit in this contention of the learned counsel for the respondents. The case of the petitioner in para 4 of the petition is that he is carrying on business under the name and style of 'Wire House in the car shed in premises No. 20, Murugappa Street. The petitioner's son and his wife are carrying on business under the name and style of ‘Damani Brothers’ also in the petition-premises in an adjoining small place in the car shed. The evidence of P.W. 1 that the area measuring 400 s.ft. is in the occupation of the respondents that the petitioner is in possession of 300 s.ft. and the remaining portion in the ground floor of door No. 20 Murugappa Street is occupied by the compound wall, lavatories, well, motor room, pump set etc., is not challenged in the cross-examination. Further, the respondents have not stated in their counter that the petitioner is actually is possession of a larger area in the petition-premises. Again it has to be remembered that the evidence in this case discloses that originally till 1983 the petitioner was carrying on business at No. 100, Broadway, Madras-1 in a portion measuring 1600 sit and he shifted his business to a portion of the petition premises measuring 300 s.ft and the portion in the occupation of the petitioner which is not sufficient to carry on his bus mess and the business of his wife and son. Taking into consideration the evidence available record the Rent controller as well as the Appellate Authority have rightly held that the petitioner bona fide requires the petition premises for additional accommodation for the purpose of the bus mess carried on by the petitioner and the business of his son and wife.

    13. The next question that has to be con sidered is whether the hardship that will because to the respondents in the event of the landlord eviction being passed will outweigh the advantage that will accrue to the petitioner. Mr. Paul Pandian, learned counsel for the first respondent would contend that he was carrying on business in textiles in the petition premises since 1972, and he developed his business in textiles in the said premises and has spent Rs. 26,000/- for furnishing the shop and that the respondent has got stock over Rs. 5,00,000/- and the outstanding to be collected is said to be Rs. 3,00,.000/- and that he had invested a huge sum of Rs. 21,00,000/- and that if he is evicted from the shop he will be put to hardship which will outweigh the advantage that will accrue to the petitioners. In support of his contention learned counsel relied on the decision reported in M/s. Children’s Choice v. G.K Adiseshiah . (1982 1 M.L.J. 411)

    14. Mr. Mohan Parasaran contended that the second respondent has been running a cycle shop in the petition premises. He and his son are eking out their livelihood and if evicted he will be put to great hardship. In the counter filed by the respondents they have not specifically pleaded that it is difficult to get alternate accommodation in the same area. R.W. 1 in his evidence has not even spoken to the fact that it is difficult to get alternate accommodation in the same area. The second respondent in his evidence says that it is difficult to find other places to carry on his business. But, he has stated in his evidence that he had not made any effort to find alternate accommodation. It is clear from the evidence that the respondents have not made any attempt to secure alternate accommodation in the same area or in any other place for the purpose of carrying on their business. The petitioner has produced Exs. P-26 and P-27 to substantiate his case that the first respondent is carrying on textile business in another place in the Elephant Gate area. This court in the decision reported in 1979-II-MLJ 405, dealing with the question of relative hardship held as follows:

    “Learned counsel for the petitioner invited my attention to the judgment of the supreme Court reported in Mst. Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahamed Khan (Decsd) by Lrs. and others . (A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 262) The Supreme Court has pointed out that in deciding the aspect of relative hardship each party has to prove the relative advantages or disadvantages and that the entire onus cannot be thrown on the landed to prove that lesser disadvantages will be suffered by the tenants and that they were remediable. The considerations to be taken into account in assessing to relative hardship have also been set out and in particular it has been pointed out that the inability to get similar accommodation anywhere in the city would be weighty consideration, but that to insist on getting alternative accommodation of a similar nature in the same locality will be asking for the impossible.

    Applying these tests it is clear in the instant case that the respondents have not made any attempt whatsoever to secure alternate accommodation and having failed to do so they cannot be heard to complain that they are under a disadvantage by reason of the eviction order against them which will outweigh the advantage to the landlord and therefore, the application for eviction should be rejected. A consideration of the circumstances as revealed by the evidence disclosed that the tenants will not suffer a ny disadvantage by an order of eviction being passed against them since they can always shift their business to similar accommodation and the securing of other accommodation cannot be considered to be hardship that would outweigh the advantage to the landlord by an order of eviction in his favour”.

    On the basis of evidence available on record the Rent Controller as well as he Appellate Authority have rightly found that the requirement of the petition premises in the occupation of the respondents by the petitioner for additional accommodation is bona fide and that the hardship that will be caused to the respondents by the order of eviction will not outweigh the advantage to the petitioner. There is no infirmity in the findings of the authorities below warranting interference in these revisions. There are no merits in the civil revision petitions and they are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly the civil revision petitions are dismissed, but, in the circumstances, there is no order as to costs.

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