JUDGMENT Nainar Sundaram, J.

This writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge in W.P No. 3500 of 1982. That writ petition was preferred by the respondent herein as petitioner therein, questioning the show cause notice dated 11.3.1982 issued by the appellant herein, who is the respondent in the writ petition, for exercising suo motu powers of revision under the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act 26 of 1948, hereinafter referred to as “the Act”. It is convenient for us it we refer to the parties in this judgment of ours as per their nomenclature in the writ petition, In view of the fact that the only question that was sought to be resolved before the learned single Judge and again before us is as to whether the respondent is vested with suo motu power of revision under S. 5(2) of the Act, it is not necessary to traverse upon the factual features. Suffice it to state that what the respondent has ventured to do is only suo motu power of revision under the cover of S. 5(2) of the Act. S. 5(2) of the Act reads as follows:

“Every Settlement Officer shall be subordinate to the Director and shall be guided by such lawful instructions as he may issue from time to time; and the Director shall also have power to cancel or revise any of the orders, acts or proceedings of the Settlement Officer, other then those in respect of which an appeal lies to the Tribunal.”

A bare reading of S. 5(2) of the Act does not give any indication as to whether the power to cancel or revise, conferred on the respondent could be exercised on application or suo motu, S. 67 of the Act embodies the rule-making power and Clause (b) of Sub-S. (2) of S. 67 contemplates framing of rules with regard to the procedure to be followed by the Tribunals, Special Tribunal, authorities and officers appointed or having jurisdiction under the Act. Rules have been framed and published in the Fort St. George Gazette dated 5.2.1983 pursuant to this power read with sub-S. (2) of the S. 5 of the Act; as well as Clauses (c) and (d) of S. 7 of the Act with which we are not concerned. Rule 1 alone is relevant and it reads as follows:—

“(1) Any person who objects to any of the orders, acts or proceedings of a Settlement Officer, other than those in respect of which an appeal lies to the Tribunal may prefer a revision petition to the Director.

(2) Any such petition shall be preferred within one month from the date on which these Rules are published in the Fort St. George Gazette or within two months from the date of communication of the order or proceeding of the Settlement Officer, whichever of the dates aforesaid is the latest:

Provided that the Director may admit a petition preferred after the period aforesaid if he is satisfied that the petitioner had sufficient cause for not preferring the petition within the said period.”

Thus, we find that the procedure to be followed by the Director under S. 5(2) of the Act has been settled by the Rules, Sub-Rule(1) of the Rule speaks about any person objecting to any of the orders, acts or proceedings of a Settlement Officer other than those in respect of which an appeal lies to the Tribunal preferring a revision petition to the Director. Sub-Rule(2) of rule 1 lays down that any such petition shall be preferred within one month from the date on which those Rules are published in the Fort St. George Gazette or within two months from the date of communication of the order or proceedings of the Settlement Officer, whichever of the dates aforesaid is the latest. The Proviso empowers the Director to admit a petition preferred after the period aforesaid if he is satisfied that the petitioner had sufficient cause for not preferring the petition within the said period. It must be made clear at this juncture itself that we are not concerned with the question of limitation which may arise when a petition for revision is preferred and as to how far the Director could exercise the power of condonation of delay under the cover of this Proviso. We are on the primary ground as to whether the Director could venture to exercise suo motu power of revision under S. 5(2) of the Act.

2. The principle well settled and uniformly followed by courts is when a statutory authority is conferred with a power, that power stands defined, circumscribed and limited by the very provisions in and by which the power is conferred and it is not permissible for him to travel beyond them. With regard to acts done, pursuant to statutory powers, it is always recognised that whatever is not expressly given, or by necessary implication, must be deemed to have been prohibited. The play of power given to an authority under the statute is limited to the four corners of its conferment. So also the power given to an authority must be exercised strictly in accordance with the mode provided and laid down by the statute. It is not possible to enter into a field of presumptions or assumptions. Clothing a power for an authority must be only through legislation, either principal or subordinate. Here we find a case, where with reference to the exercise of power under S. 5(2) of the Act, there has been a delineation of the same by the rules framed pursuant to power under S. 67(2)(b) of the Act, we must take it that is the only way and method in and by which the power of revision under S. 5(2) of the Act is available for the Director and he cannot travel beyond that. Rules framed under the statute are ancillary and they subserve the purpose of the statute. Rules framed under the statute must be treated for all purposes of construction of powers or obligations, as if they are in the statute itself and are to be of the same effect as if adumbrated in the statute itself.

3. While S. 5(2) conferring the power of revision, is silent as to the method and manner, by which the power of revision could be invoked and exercised by the Director. Rule 1 exemplifies it. It speaks about a person objecting to orders, acts or proceedings concerned, preferring a revision petition to the Director. S. 5(2) by its express terms has not spoken about a suo motu power of revision for the Director. In contrast, our attention was drawn by Mr. U.N.R Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, to other provisions in the Act itself, wherein expressly suo motu powers have been conferred on the authorities under the Act vide S. 39(4-a) for the Director regarding determination of basic annual sum and of total compensation; S. 39(6) for the Board of Revenue over the order or proceeding of the Director.

4. We, judges, in our endeavour to solve a problem presented before us, are not supposed to search for the true intention of the legislature beyond the language used by it. The only repository of Legislature's intention is the language it has used. While examining the language, judges always presume that the Legislature is well acquainted with the accepted vocabulary of legislative bodies and so known what words are required and considered apt to effect a particular result. If it has not made a provision or used words from which a particular result can properly be found, Judges will not be in order and justified in finding it, on the simple ground, a contrary result would cause hardship to one or the other of the parties. Buller, J. in Jones v. Smart 1785 I.T.R 44 said cansees omissus can in no case be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make laws”. These principles, which have been recognised and followed by pronouncements of courts all through this country and elsewhere, tells us that it is not for the respondent to assume a suo motu power of revision when there has not been conferring of such power by the specific terms of the Act and the rules framed thereunder. Assessed thus, we could not have any ambiguity in our mind that the respondent lacked suo motu power of revision.

5. However, Mr. K. Ravirajapandian, learned Additional Government Pleader, appearing for the respondent, would endeavour to submit that such a restricted construction of the provisions of the Act and the Rules is not warranted and he wants us to give a liberal construction so as to spell out for the respondent suo motu powers of revision. In this connection, the learned Additional Government pleader drew our attention to a pronouncement of a Bench of this court in The Board of Revenue, Madras v. K.G Prema Kalyani and others W.A No. 458 of 1971, Judgement dated 3.10.1972. In that case, the learned single Judge, who heard the matter initially was concerned with the exercise of power of revision by the Board of Revenue under S. 7(c) of the Act for which there is no period of limitation prescribed. Yet, the learned single Judge ventured to pose for himself a question as to whether the Board could revise an order, after lapse of long time and he answered it by stating that a line should be drawn at the conclusion or the Settlement Proceedings under S. 22 of the Act. This view of the learned single Judge was not accepted by the Bench and the Bench opined that when the Legislature did not think fit to provide for limitation for exercise of the power under S. 7(c) of the Act, the Court cannot take upon itself to prescribe the period of limitation. It is true there is an observation that the exercise of the power could as well be suo motu as the Board might choose. But, we cannot take that as the ratio decidendi of the pronouncement because on facts the Bench was not at all called upon to decide that question specifically.

6. Next our attention was drawn by the learned Additional Government Pleader to the pronouncement of a Bench of this court in Karuppannan Servai v. The State of Madras 1972 85 L.W 71. Far from supporting him, that pronouncement militates against the line of thinking by him. There, it has been countenance that whenever a suo motu power is vested, there is a specific provision vesting such suo motu power.

7. Our attention was also drawn by the learned Additional Government Pleader to the pronouncement of a Bench of this Court in Usuvathum Hasan Muslim Sangam v. The Board of Revenue 1984 Writ L.R 85. Here again, we find that this decision could not be cited as an authority for a proposition which we are called upon to answer. The matter was proceeded with on an assumption that the Board of Revenue could invoke suo motu power of revision under S. 7 of the Act and the Bench held that even then, the order passed could not be deemed to have been validly passed as the condition precedent for invoking the jurisdiction, namely, issuance of a show cause, was not complied with. Another pronouncement to which our attention was drawn by the learned Additional Government pleader is the one found in David Pillai v. The Settlement Officer, Madurai and others W.A No. 1296 of 1986. Judgement dated 18.7.1989. That Writ Appeal was directed against the decision of one of us (Nainar Sundaram, J.) in W.P No. 5146 of 1980, order dated 20.10.1986 There, the question of condonation of delay alone came up for consideration and there was a decline to interfere with the order made by the Director condoning the delay. This order was confirmed by the Bench and while doing so, the discussion has treaded into the field of the scope of the power of revision of the Director Under S. 5(2) of the Act. The learned Judges of the Bench had no occasion to specifically deal with this question and answer it one way or the other and we cannot take it that any principle covering this question has been settled by the Bench in that pronouncement.

8. An attempt was made by the learned Additional Government Pleader to draw a parity between S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and S. 5(2) of the Act. We may not be in order at all to look into this provision, namely, S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and take into consideration the pronouncements under that provision for the purpose of elucidating the scope of the power and the method of exercise of the power under S. 5(2) of the Act. The Act has formed a complete Code along with the Rules framed thereunder and the provisions of the Act and the Rules alone must speak about the scope of the power of revision and the method and the modality in and by which the power of revision could be exercised. Furthermore, the scope and the very language of the two provisions are different, and there is no justification for drawing any parity between the two. It is not possible to travel beyond what has been settled by the statutory provision with regard to conferment, exercise and method of exercise of revisional powers of the Director. Hence, we find no merit in this Writ Appeal, directed against the order of the learned single Judge and we dismiss it. No costs.

RR/VCS