This second appeal by the first defendant arises out of a suit for declaration of title to the suit property and for recovery of possession of the same with mesne profits. The suit property, a house in Needamangalam, Thanjavur District, admittedly belonged to the joint family of two brothers, Sevu Pillai and Ponna Pillai. The property had been purchased in the name of Sevu Pillai. Sevu Pillai died in 1908 leaving behind only two daughters; Sampoornathammal and Thailammai. Sampoornathammal died in 1960 leaving her surviving Seetharama Pillai, the present appellant. Ponna Pillai, the other brother also died in 1933 without male issue leaving him surviving his daughter Visalakshmi. It appears from the record that Seetharama Pillai, the appellant, was brought up by Ponna Pillai as his foster son. There is a reference to a will left by Ponna Pillai but there is no legal evidence of its terms. On 12th May, 1934 misunderstandings had arisen between the appellant, Visalakshi and Thailammai. A family arrangement was admittedly entered into between them. The terms of this family arrangement are to be found in the registration copy Ex. A-8, of the deed of family arrangement. This deed after referring to the relationship of the parties and setting out the fact that the appellant was brought up in the family of Ponna Pillai as his foster son mentions the cropping up of misunderstandings between the parties and its settlement by mediators to avoid litigation. The deed refers to the fact that Ponna Pillai had executed a will on 15th March, 1930 but had not registered it, and that the settlement was arrived at after perusing the unregistered will and other document. Under the document, briefly, it is provided that Visalakshi and Thailammai who were widows should enjoy the suit property for their lifetime without powers of alienation under any circumstance and that after their lifetime the appellant should take the property absolutely with full powers of alienation. Thailammai died sometime in 1940 and Visalakshi died on 17th June, 1962. The second defendant in the suit entered in the property as a lessee from Visalakshi during her lifetime and under the terms of the family arrangement on her death the first defendant, the appellant, became entitled to possession of the property.
The plaintiff has come to file this suit for possession of the suit property against defendants 1 and 2 claiming under a court auction purchase in execution of a decree obtained against the appellant. One Govindan Chetty and Somasundaram Pillai for moneys due by the appellant on dealings with their firm between 1930 and 1933, obtained a simple money decree against him in S.C.S. No. 618 of 1935 on the file of the Sub-Court, Tiruvarur. The decree was transmitted to the District Munsif's Court, Mannargudi for execution and there, in E.P. No. 255 of 1938 the suit property was attached and the right, title and interest of the appellant was put up for auction and purchased by the decree-holder. Ex. A-6 is a registration copy of the sale certificate dated 23rd February, 1939. The decree-holders took symbolic delivery on 7th October, 1939 as evidenced by Exhibit A-7. The plaintiff under Exhibits A-1 and A-2 obtained title to the suit property from the court auction purchasers. Exhibit A-1 dated 7th July, 1947 is a registered sale deed by Govindan Chetty, purchaser at court auction, to the plaintiff and Exhibit A-2 is a release by Somasundaram Pillai, the other member of the firm with which the appellant had dealings which led to the decree. On the coming to an end of the life estate of Visalakshi, the plaintiff as the purchaser of the right, title and interest of the first defendant in the suit property claims possession of the suit property. Ex facie one sees no defence to this action for possession. But the first defendant has raised a number of contentions evidently because the property has gone up in value in the meanwhile. The plaintiff's title is by virtue of the judicial sale in 1939 of the first defendant's interest in the suit property subject to the specific life estates in the property which the widow Visalakshi had. All the defences raised have failed in both the courts below but some of them are repeated and strenuously contended for here again. It is argued that during the lifetime of the widows even under the family settlement the first defendant had only a spes successions and had no proprietary interest in the property. Resting on that assumption, it is claimed that by virtue of S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, Visalakshi became the full owner of the property and that in the circumstances, the Court auction sale could confer no interest in the property to the plaintiff. Another attack on the plaintiff's title, and that with considerable vehemance, is the plea that the very decree which led to the sale is a nullity, and that therefore the sale was equally a nullity. It is said that the claim against the first defendant was in respect of dealings had by him with the partnership firm of Govinda Chetty and Somasundaram Pillai, and as it was an unregistered partnership, the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and pass a decree thereon. The defence of want of registration of the firm was not specifically taken in the written statement. It was raised at the trial and sought to be buttressed up by a certificate from the Registrar of Firms that during the years 1 933-1935 there was no firm by name “M.S.M. Govindan Chetty, Koradachery”. The substantial factual defence in the written statement was besides denying liability and pleading the minority of the first defendant at the relevant period, a plea of discharge of the liability.
The first contention is hopelessly devoid of merits. The validity of the settlement deed is not questioned. It is admitted that it is a settlement of family disputes. The document specifically states so. As I said at the outset we do not have any legal evidence of the contests of the will. But the fact remains that rights under the will had been pressed by one or other of the parties. The parties take the property in terms of the family settlement evidenced by Ex. A-8; and the rights of the parties have to be determined according to its terms. The two widows, Visalakshi and Thailammai have been conferred under the settlement only a right of residence in the suit house for their respective lifetimes, they themselves carrying out the repairs to the house and paying the local taxes. The appellant and his heirs become entitled to the property absolutely with full powers of alienation after the lifetime of the widows. It is significant that a sum of Rs. 200 is paid by the widows to the appellant for him to find residence elsewhere during their lifetime. To provide against any claim from him to occupy the house during their lifetime they pay consideration and a specific term is inserted that during the lifetime of the widows, the appellant shall not enter the house, and that if he did so, he would be liable under the Indian Penal Code. The prohibition against alienation by the widow, is absolute. Indubitably all rights in the property except what had been reserved for the widows necessarily vested in the appellant. The language of the instrument is plain and unambiguous. Even during the lifetime of the widows the appellant had a transmissible interest in the property. Only the possession and enjoyment of the property by him was postponed, the possession and enjoyment being given to the widows. The interest in the property which had been given to the widows for their lives accrued to him on their death under the instrument. During their lifetime he was a partial owner of the property in a sense, having been kept out of some of the proprietary rights. Those interests also accrue to him on the death of the widows, an event which necessarily has to happen. The interest which the appellant had in the property during their life time is proprietary in character and can be properly dealt with by him. It is a vested remainder over which he had a disposing power and so capable of being attached and sold in execution of a decree against him.
Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act can manifestly have no application to a case of this kind. Section 14 enlarges the limited ownership of a Hindu female under the personal law to full ownership. A Hindu female possessed of property in which but for the status she would have only a limited estate or what is commonly referred to as a Hindu Women's or “Widow's Estate”, by virtue of Section 14(1) becomes an absolute or ful owner of the property. The section extinguishes the limited estate of a Hindu widow under the personal law and confers on the widow all powers of disposition making her a fresh stock of descent. A widow's estate vested in possession in a Hindu widow under the Act becomes enlarged into a heritable and transmissible estate, without reversion to the heirs of the last male holder. Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act only removes disabilities imposed by the personal law of the Hindus as to the quality of the estate taken by a female Hindu in certain circumstances though the whole estate may be vested in her and she represents it completely. In the instant case it is Section 14(2) that applies. The family settlement which governed the rights of parties in the instant case does not declare the pre-existing title of Visalakshi as the holder of a woman's estate from her father. The family settlement was arrived at as a result of contesting claims to the properties put forward and rights under a will whose terms we are not aware of. The recitals in the document certainly bind the appellant; manifestly he put forward rights to the properties even during the lifetime of the widows. May be he claimed rights under the will. Whatever that may be it is well settled that in a family settlement each party takes a share in the property by virtue of the independent title which is admitted to that extent by the other parties. As observed by the Supreme Court in Madho Das v. Mukand Ram A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 481 at 490.
"It is well settled that a compromise or family settlement is based on the assumption that there is an antecedent title of some sort in the parties and the agreement acknowledges and defines what that title is, each party relinquishing all rights to property other than that falling to his share and recognising the right of the others as they had previously asserted it, and the portions allotted to them respectively It is assumed that the title claimed by the person receiving the property under the arrangement had always resided in him or in her so far as property falling to his or her share is concerned."
That being the principle governing a family settlements, Visalakshi must be deemed to have had even prior to the family settlement, only the rights recognised under the family settlement, and no more. After the family settlement it is not open to anyone to assert that they have any higher rights in the property. All parties to the settlement are bound by its terms. The defence based on the Hindu Succession Act therefore fails.
To take up the last contention based on S. 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act on which much stress was laid by learned counsel for the appellant, here again, I may say that even as a pure question of fact the Courts below are of the view that there was no prima facie proof of satisfactory evidence that the partnership of Govindan Chetty and Somasundaram Pillai was not registered, and that the small cause suit S.C.S. No. 618 of 1935, filed in the Sub Court, Tiruvarur, was barred by S. 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act. The learned District Judge has examined the factual aspect of the matter at considerable length having regard to the probabilities. The plea was not taken in the first instance, it was not taken in the written statement or even during the trial Belatedly, the plaintiff was asked to meet a defence based on a question of fact on a matter of the year 1935. The learned District Judge points out that the appellant had admitted that he did not know if the firm was a registered one or an unregistered one. There was no evidence that the business was being carried on in partnership on the date of the institution of the suit. The learned District Judge observes that it may be that the partnership had been dissolved before the institution of the suit. Reliance has been placed for the appellant on Exhibits A-1 and A-2 to show that the partnership must have been in existence at the time of the suit and for years thereafter. Pending delivery of judgment in the trial court, the appellant obtained from the Registrar of Firms a certificate that there was no firm by name “M.S.M. Govinda Chettiar”, Koradachery during the years 1933-1935. The learned District Judge quite properly observes that Govindan Chetty and Somasundaram Pillai might not have registered the partnership firm under that name. It is not made out that the appellant asked the Registrar of Firms to inform him if Govindan Chetty and Somasundaram Pillai had got themselves registered as a partnership firm. Even a copy of the letter which he addressed to the Registrar of Firms was not exhibited. Not withstanding the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence learned counsel would vehemently contend for declaring the nullity of the decree, as ex facie it is said the suit was instituted by a partnership. Learned Counsel contends that the Court should not take cognisance of an illegality when it is brought to its notice and that no court can take cognisance of a decree in a suit when S. 69(2) of the Partnership Act expressly forbade any court from entertaining a suit on or on behalf of an unregistered partnership firm. Learned Counsel contends that registration of the firm is a precondition to the valid institution of a suit by a firm to enforce a right arising from a contract and when the precondition has not been made out by the party relying on the proceedings, the court would not aid the party. Counsel would refer to authorities where it has been said that whether an illegality had been pleaded by the defendant or not if the evidence adduced by the plaintiff proved the illegality the court would not assist the plaintiff. Reference is made by learned Counsel to the decision in Balasore Textile Distribution Association v. Indian Union A.I.R. 1960 Orissa 119 where it is observed that inspite of pleadings being defective and the issue being too general and not specific the Court is entitled to examine the applicability of S. 69(2) of the Partnership Act, when the necessary facts have been admitted either by the plaintiff's witnesses or by the plaintiff's counsel and that in such a case the Court cannot be a party to the perpetration of an illegality. But that was a case where the objection was taken in the suit itself. Here we are having a collateral attack on a decree which had become final years back and plea of nullity of the judicial sale that followed the decree.
True it is a fundamental principle well established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and whenever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. The question which we have to examine here is whether the defect is such as to strike at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree. A Full Bench of this Court in Mohan Ram v. T.L. Sundaram Iyer A.I.R. 1960 Mad. 377 had to examine the question whether the executing Court can go behind a mortgage decree for sale of service inam land and permit objection to the saleability of the land on the ground it is a service inam land raised for the first time in the execution proceedings. After referring to the two great principles based on public policy, one the need for a finality of proceedings from which was evolved the ancillary principle that it is against public policy and good sense alike that the Court charged with the execution of a decree, a proceeding collateral to the judgment, should be allowed to question its validity and the other principle that where alienation of service inam lands is prohibited on grounds of public policy the executing court should stay its hands, they found the principles reconciled in the following approach:
"When the objection is that the land is inalienable service inam, the question of inalienability must appear on the face of the record and should not involve an investigation of absolutely fresh facts; in other words the executing court can go into the inalienable character of the service inam lands and their unsaleability only if the plaint, or written statement or issues or judgment etc., disclose the inalienability of the inam."
In his judgment, Anantanarayanan, J., as he then was observed (at page 384).
"With the greatest respect, I venture to suggest that the two principles of res judicata or constructive res judicata and of prohibited alienation of properties on grounds of public policy and the enacted law are upon different planes. The first principle inhibit the party and takes away the power of the Court to try the plea, in all contested cases raising a mixed question of fact and law (as the learned Chief Justice himself observes in this very context) by deeming a decision to the effect that the land was alienable. The second principle, is an over-riding principle really related to the conscience of the Court. Though a party may invoke the exercise of the power, the Court will exercise it only under exceptional circumstances, that is under the conditions enunciated by my learned brother. In this case the principles are reconcilable and no party can invite an executing court to embark on an enquiry into a controverted question of fact, with reference to material which is not upon the same footing as the decree sought to be executed, nor equally evident."
In the present case it is not an inherent want of jurisdiction in the court over the subject matter of the suit. S. 69(2) prohibits institution of suits by an unregistered firm. The section imposes certain disabilities on an unregistered firm. Sub S. (3) of the Section provides exceptions from S. 69(2) in certain cases, inter alia, a suit for the enforcement of any right of power to realise the property of a dissolved firm. The object of the section appears to be to protect the public against firms carrying on business under a name which does not disclose to the public the names of the actual partners.
Again the dealing in this case which gave rise to the suit appears to have been prior to 1st October, 1933 from which date only S. 69 came into office. Though the Partnership Act came into force on 1st October, 1932 it was expressly provided that S. 69 will come into force only on 1st October, 1933. Mr. R. Sitaraman, appearing for the respondent, submits that S. 69 of the Partnership Act will not bar a suit by an unregistered firm where the cause of action for the suit had accrued before S. 69 came into operation, having regard to S. 74 of the Act. Reference is made to the decision, Girdharilal Son & Co. v. Kappini Gowder and others (1938) II. M.L.J. 44. Learned Counsel submits that apart from the question whether the firm was registered or not and whether the firm was a dissolved one or not there is another aspect of the matter and if the cause of action had arisen prior to 1st October 1933 the bar of S. 69(2) did not apply. It is therefore said that even assuming that there was some evidence that there was no registration of the firm, merely because the firm was not registered the decree does not become a nullity. The Court could still have had jurisdiction on the subject matter of the suit, if the cause of action had arisen prior to 1st October, 1933.
In Ramu Mudali v. Shobagmul A.I.R. 1940 Madras 628 where objection on non registration of the partnership was taken in execution proceedings of the decree, Wadsworth J. doubted whether it can be said that a court has no jurisdiction to pass a decree in favour of an unregistered partnership. The learned Judge observed that the most that can be said was that in certain circumstances a suit by an unregistered partnership was liable to be dismissed in limini. In Govardhandas Tokerscy v. M. Abdul Rahiman 1944 II M.L.J. 636 a Division Bench of this Court observed that it is not easy to accept the view that the court is bound to dismiss a suit on the ground of non-registration of the firm suo motu even if no plea had been raised by any of the defendants in the suit.
The question whether an objection under S. 69(2) not taken in the suit could be raised at the execution stage has been considered in extenso by the Patna High Court in Kuldip v. Sheomangal A.I.R. 1957 Patna 4. It is observed therein:
"When such an objection is raised in the suit, it would be open to the trying Court to go into the question, and if it finds that really the plaintiff's firm is an unregistered firm, it will give effect to the plea in bar, and dismiss the plaintiff' suit. If, however, such a suit has been decreed by a Court, either in ignorance and in contravention of the provisions of S. 69(2), or, after overruling the objection of the defendants on such a ground, it cannot be said that the decree passed in such suit is a nullity. Such a decree at best could be only erroneous in law; but not a nullity."
I am inclined to agree with these observations. No question of public policy of the kind, involved in, say prohibitions of sale of service inam land, is involved with reference to the prohibition of institution of suits by an unregistered partnership. It is no doubt a provision intended for the benefit of the public; but obviously it is intended for those that have dealings with the partnership to ascertain without doubt if required, as to who the partners are. The object of S. 69(2) is to make sure that the general policy of the Legislature that all partnerships should be registered will be carried out. The imperative nature of the requirement is one thing; its effect on a decree passed is a matter for judicial assessment. It is said in the judgment in Kuldip v. Sheomangal A.I.R. 1957 Patna 4 that the disability created by sub-section 2 of section 69 of the Act is with regard to right to institute a suit and not with regard to the power of the court to pass a decree. The prohibition, it is said, is only to the institution of the suit. However looked at, the appellant cannot be permitted to attack the decree in S.C.S. No. 618 of 1935 and the judicial sale that followed it in 1938 on the ground that the small cause suit should have been dismissed in limini for want of registration of the partnership firm. Once, it has not been established, even if that is permissible in independent collateral proceedings more than two decades after the decree and sale that the partnership firm was unregistered, and secondly even if it was an unregistered firm the court could well have passed the decree if the dealings were prior to 1st October 1933. No objection was taken to the maintainability of the suit by the partners and the court is not bound suo motu to call upon the plaintiff to sustain his suit under S. 69(2) making out in the process that it does not stand exempted under S. 69(3) or by virtue of S. 74. The issue if raised would not have been purely one of law. If the objection under S. 69(2) had been taken in the suit the plaintiff could well have met under one or other available grounds. May be no appearance was entered and no such objection was taken as it was considered not available. The Court had inherent jurisdiction to grant a decree in the suit notwithstanding the fact that the suit was by an unregistered firm. Such a decree cannot be considered to be nullity.
The second appeal is devoid of merits and is therefore dismissed with costs of the first respondent. No leave.