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  • Workmen's Compensation Act. Loreburn, L.C.
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  • Workmen's Compensation Act. Loreburn, L.C.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal from an order of the Additional Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Madras, which refused to award compensation to the appellant (the widow) on the ground that her husband, Devarajan, did not die as a result of an accident "arising out of and in the course of his employment" under the respondent, the Madras Port Trust (represented by its Chairman).

Relevant factual chronology (as stated in the opinion): Devarajan was employed as a lascar on a Madras Port Trust dredger under the supervision of Mr. Watts (the Dredge Master/Engineer). On 6 June 1961, Devarajan reported for duty and left his token at the counter. At about 6:30 p.m., Mr. Watts asked Devarajan to go to Mr. Watts' house in St. Thomas Mount to fetch his night dinner. Devarajan cycled to Mr. Watts' house, collected the dinner, and while returning to the Port Trust was struck by a lorry and killed instantly.

The widow filed an application before the Additional Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation seeking compensation. The Chairman of the Madras Port Trust opposed the claim on the sole ground that the death did not arise out of and in the course of employment. Evidence was led about customary practices in the dredge operation and deposition of other lascars that the Dredge Master habitually sent lascars to fetch food and to perform tasks outside normal lascar duties. The Additional Commissioner, after reviewing case law cited to him, found that bringing food for the master was not a duty and that there was no causal connection with employment; consequently compensation was refused. The widow appealed that decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the deceased, Devarajan, died as a result of an accident "arising out of and in the course of his employment" with the Madras Port Trust.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Widow's) Position

  • The widow applied for compensation on the basis that Devarajan's death resulted from an accident that occurred while he was performing an act that, in practice and custom, formed part of his employment duties (fetching food for the Dredge Master during working hours).
  • Evidence relied on included testimony that the Dredge Master habitually directed lascars to fetch food and perform other tasks outside the Port Trust premises during working hours, and that Devarajan had performed such errands since joining the Port Trust.

Respondent's (Madras Port Trust / Chairman's) Position

  • The Chairman opposed the claim on the ground that Devarajan did not die as a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, i.e., that fetching food for the Dredge Master was not a duty of the lascar and lacked sufficient connection to employment to be compensable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
More v. Manchester Liners Ltd. (1910) A.C. 498 Formulated three inquiries for "in the course of employment": (1) was he doing things reasonably done while employed; (2) did the accident occur within the employment time; (3) did it occur at a place where he may reasonably be while in employment. The court invoked these inquiries as part of the analytical framework for deciding whether the act of fetching dinner fell within the time, place and activity scope of employment.
Riley v. Hollandand Sons, Ltd. (1911) 1 K.B. 1029 Clarified that "in the course of employment" is not limited to industrial labour and involves questions about temporary quitting of service and doing work outside appointed places or duties. The court used this principle to examine whether the lascar's act of fetching food, though not part of formal duties, could still be within the course of employment given the circumstances and practices.
Krause v. Swartwood (cited via Larson) Example where an employee requested to take lunch at a restaurant at employer's request; injury there was compensable. Cited as an example supporting the proposition that employer-requested errands or deviations that become customary or integral to employment may bring an injury within the course of employment.
Skolick v. Elgin Chair Inc. (cited via Larson) Office employee asked to deposit employer cheques en route to work — injury on route was held compensable. Used as illustrative authority that a special errand connected to employment may make a journey compensable.
Kristianson v. Lahman (cited via Larson) Cook asked to pick up medicines en route to work; injury on direct route was compensable. Demonstrated that errands requested by employer may be integral to employment for compensation purposes.
Mins v. Mehi Bottling Co. (cited via Larson) Employee's deviation to help rescue others was held a deviation; compensation denied; court noted regularity of practice matters in including a trip within employment. Cited to show limits — deviations may defeat compensation, but regularity/custom can be decisive to include the trip within the course of employment.
Statham v. Galloway (109 L.T.J. 133) (cited in Harvard Law Review passage) Authority supporting that discipline may require a servant to obey orders of a superior even though unauthorised; thus obedience may place an act within a new "course of employment". Applied to support the proposition that lascars, who had no real choice but to obey, could be regarded as acting within the course of employment when they followed orders to fetch food.
The Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Srimathi Yamunabai, A.I.R. 1952 Bom 382 Held that "arising out of his employment" is wide enough to cover injuries not directly connected with employment if circumstances show the injury resulted from something peculiar to, or an incident of, the employment. Cited by the court to support a broader construction of arising out of employment, reinforcing that indirect or customary employer-related acts can be compensable.
Janakiammal v. Divisional Engineer Highways, Kozhikode (1956) II M.L.J. 19 Stated that employment must be considered in its nature, conditions and incidents and there must be some causative connection between the injury and something peculiar to the employment. Relied upon to emphasize the need to examine the nature and incidents of employment to find causative connection; used in concluding that fetching food was connected to conditions of the employment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the sole question as whether Devarajan's death resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The court's analysis proceeded in identifiable steps drawn from the evidence and the authorities cited:

  1. Legal framework: The court reviewed established judicial tests and commentary on the phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment" (including the three-part test from More v. Manchester Liners Ltd. and the discussion of the temporal and spatial limits of employment in Riley v. Hollandand Sons).
  2. Role of custom and incidental acts: The court recited authorities (and examples from Larson's compendium) showing that if an act done outside employer premises has become a customary or habitual practice of the employment (even if not formally part of an employee's duties), injuries arising from that act may be compensable. The court noted exceptions where deviations break the continuity but emphasised that regularity of practice can bring an activity within the course of employment.
  3. Effect of orders and obedience to superiors: The court drew upon commentary (and Statham v. Galloway as cited) that a servant may be justified in obeying a superior's order, and that discipline and the lack of real choice (obedience vs. dismissal) may render an unauthorised order effectively part of the course of employment for that worker.
  4. Evaluation of evidence specific to this case: The court reviewed testimonial evidence (including deposition of another lascar, Dorairaj) that:
    • the Dredge Master regularly sent lascars to fetch food and to perform tasks outside the Port Trust premises;
    • Devarajan had been engaged in fetching food for the master since joining the Port Trust; other lascars were similarly required and those who refused could be stopped from service (example of Abbas);
    • the Port Trust issued an office order (No. 38 dated 9 August 1961) after the accident prohibiting officers from employing Port Trust employees on private work unless sanctioned, and no earlier prohibition was shown to exist.
  5. Application of principles to facts: Applying the legal principles and precedents to these facts, the court found that:
    • The Dredge Master's instruction to fetch dinner occurred during Devarajan's working period and while he was at a place he could reasonably be during employment;
    • The practice of sending lascars for such errands had become established in that work environment and served to facilitate the master's ability to supervise work without interruption;
    • Given the lascars' lack of choice and the regularity of the practice, Devarajan's act in fetching and returning with dinner was an act performed in the course of employment even if formally unauthorised; the act had a sufficient causal connection to the conditions of employment.
  6. Conclusion from analysis: On these bases the court reversed the Additional Commissioner's conclusion and held that Devarajan's death resulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is allowed. The court held that the deceased, Devarajan, died as a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment with the Madras Port Trust.

Relief awarded and orders: Compensation was fixed at Rs. 2,100. There will be no order as to costs.

Implications: The direct effect of the decision is to reverse the Additional Commissioner's refusal to award compensation and to grant the widow payment of Rs. 2,100. The opinion grounds that result on established judicial principles concerning the course of employment, the significance of customary practices and obedience to superiors, and the presence of a sufficient causal connection to the employment. The opinion does not state that it establishes a novel legal precedent beyond applying accepted principles to the facts of this case.

Note: All content in this summary is drawn exclusively from the text of the provided opinion. No information has been added that does not appear in that opinion.

    Kamala v. Chairman, The Madras Port Trust, Madras

    This is an appeal against an order passed by the Additional Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Madras, refusing to award compensation to the appellant, on the ground that her husband Devarajan did not meet with his death as a result of an accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment under the respondent, the Madras Port Trust, represented by its Chairman.

    The short facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal are the following: Devarajan, the husband of the appellant, was a lascar in the Madras Port Trust Dredger under the supervision of one Mr. Watts, an Engineer. On the fateful day, namely 6th June, 1961, Devarajan reported to duty and also dropped his token at the counter. At about 6-30 p.m. on the same day, Mr. Watts, under whom the deceased was working, asked the deceased to go to his (Watts) house in St. Thomas Mount and fetch his night dinner. Accordingly, Devarajan went by cycle to the house of Mr. Watts, collected the dinner, and was returning to the Madras Port Trust, when he was knocked down by a lorry on the highways near St. Thomas Mount. He died on the spot.

    The widow of the deceased filed an application before the Additional Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Madras, and the Chairman of the Madras Port Trust opposed the application on the ground that Devarajan did not die as a result of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. Evidence was adduced that it was usual for the Dredge Master to send the lascars to fetch his food from his house outside the Madras Port Trust. It is also adduced in evidence that the Dredge Master used to direct the lascars to attend to duties other than the normal duties of a lascar such as painting, chipping, wire placing, etc. Durairaj, another lascar, deposed that the Dredge Master used to send him and also the deceased to do his personal work outside the Port Trust during the working hours. The Dredge Master used to send Devarajan to fetch his food after Devarajan reported to duty and be also had gone to the Dredge Master's house once or twice by train to fetch food for him.

    The Additional Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, after reviewing the case law cited before him came to the conclusion that the deceased was employed as a lascar to attend to work in the Madras Port Trust, that the act of bringing the food to his Master was not one of his duties as an employee of the Port Trust and that the act of the deceased could not have even casual connection with his employment in the Port Trust. Finally he held that the deceased Devarajan did not meet with his death as a result of an accident which arose out of and in the Gourse of his employment under the Port Trust. The widow of the deceased has filed the appeal.

    The only point, therefore that arises for consideration is whether the deceased died of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.

    The words “arising out of and in the course of employment” have been the subject matter of judicial interpretation, ever since the introduction of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

    Loreburn, L.C. in More v. Manchester Liners Ltd. 1910 A.C. 498 at 500. said:

    “The first inquiry is, was he doing any of the things which he might reasonably do while employed? The next inquiry is, did the accident occur within the time covered by the employment? The last enquiry is, did the accident occur at a place where he may reasonably be while in the employment?”

    The phrase “in the course of employment” presents two principal questions. The first concerns the period of employment. When does it begin and end, and, during this period, when is its continuity broken? The second raises the question as to how far the servant during the period of employment places himself outside thereof by doing that which he is not employed to do, or by doing his appointed work at a place other than that which his master has appointed for that purpose, or by deliberately adopting a method of performing the work other than that prescribed by his master or forbidden by him. According to Fletcher Moulton, L.J., in Riley v. Hollandand Sons, Ltd. (1911) 1 K.B., 1029 at 1033., “in the course of the employment” does not mean “in the course of industrial work”. The course of employment, therefore, is neither limited to the period of actual labour nor is it extended to include all acts necessitated by the workmen's employment. The only difficult question which arise are those concerning his temporarily quitting the service and his return thereto.

    Generally, where an employee has fixed hours and place of work, injuries occurring in the premises while he is going to and returning from the work before or after working hours, or at lunch time, is compensable. But if the injury occurs off the premises, it is not compensable subject to several exceptions. The rule excluding off-premises injuries during the journey to and from work does not apply, if the making of that journey, whether or not separately compensated for, is in itself a substantial part of the service for which the worker is employed. When employees are sent on special mission, their journey is an inherent part of the service, Sometimes, it may be a special errand. The trouble and the time taken of doing this special errand is sufficiently substantial to become an integral part of the service itself. A compensable injury must arise not only within the time and space limit of the employment, but also in the course f an activity related to the employment. An activity is related to the employment, if it carries out the employer's purposes or advances his interest directly or indirectly. Under the modern trend of decisions, even if the activity cannot be said in any sense to advance the employer's interest, it may still be in the course of employment if, in view of the nature of employment, environment, the characteristics of human nature, the custom and practices of the particular employment, the activity is in fact an inherent part of the condition of the employment. Sometimes the errand is made not in the performance of any duty but a brief service. But the brief service is equally essential to the successful carrying on of the employer's business. The Act does not expressly say that the employee must, at the time of the injury, have been benefiting that employer. It merely says that the Injury must have arisen in the course of the employment, so that if he can show that the particular activity, beneficial or not, was indeed a part of his employment either because of its general nature or because of the particular custom and practice in the individual eoncern, the statute is satisfied. Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Volume I contains a number of cases on this subject. At page 305 of the book, Larson has cited the case of Krause v. Swartwood 174 Minn 147 in which a physician's Secretary, who ordinarily lunched at home, was requested by her employer to take her lunch at a nearby restaurant because of his absence, and to have phone calls from the office transferred there. The lunch was to be paid for by the employer. The secretary suffered chemical poisoning from coffee made in a new urn at the restaurant, and compensation was awarded by the Supreme Court of Minnesota reversing the Industrial Commission's denial. In Skolick v. Elgin Chair Inc. 273 App. Div. 833., reported at page 248 of the book, an office employee had taken home some cheques of the employer at his request to deposit them on her way to work in the morning. She fell while proceeding towards the bank. Compensation was awarded. In another case reported on the same page of the book Kristianson v. Lahman, a cook was asked by her employer to pick up some medicines at the drug store on her way to work in the morning. While on the direct route between her house and her employer's residence, and before reaching the drug store, she slipped and fell. Compensation was awarded. But in another case reported at page 250, Mins v. Mehi Bottling Co., it was the employee's custom to post the outgoing mail in a mail box on his way home. Before he got to the mail box, he turned aside to help in the rescue of some laundry workers whose plant was being filled by escaping gas. Compensation was denied on the ground that this was a deviation; but the Court expressly stated that the employee was in the course of his employment as long as he stayed on the direct route. It was observed that the regularity of the practice was undoubtedly a substantial element in bringing the trip within the course of employment. A reading of these cases cited by Larsen in his Workmen's Compensation Law, Volume I, shows that, if there is a custom, which has come into practice for an employee to do a particular service outside the premises, irrespective of whether it is connected with the service or not, the injury arising in an accident while doing the service is compensable on the ground that it arose in the course of employment.

    In 25 Harward Law Review, there is an illuminating article at page 401 in the interpretation of the words “arising out of and in the course of employment”. The learned author, at page 418 of the review, says:

    Another important question is how far a servant is entitled to go outside his appointed sphere in obedience to the orders of a superior. Of course, if such superior has the power to fix the spheres of labour for the workman, a workman, by obeying them, merely passes is to a new “course of employment”, but even if he has not, it seems that the servant is justified if he honestly believes that such superior is authorised to employ him. Yet, if, as seems to be the case, the question of the servant's right to do work is different from that which he is employed to do depends upon whether it is to the master's interest that he should do so, it would appear that on the whole it is better to risk an occasional additional liability rather than that all discipline should be destroyed by requiring the servant to demand proof of his superior's right to give an order before obeying it, and there is much to be said in favour of the view expressed in Statham v. Galloway 109 L.T.J 133, that discipline requires a servant to obey orders of a superior though he knows they are unauthorised (underlining mine) indeed the workmen has usually no actual ehoice, save between obedience and immediate or future dismissal”.

    A similar situation has arisen here. Dorairaj, another lascar who has put in 14 years of service in the Port Trust, has deposed that the Drodge Master used to give the lascars orders to do various jobs outside the premises of the Port Trust and that the deceased used to fetch food for the Dredge Master. In cross-examination, this lascar said that besides the deceased Devaraj there were other lascars also who were asked to fetch food for the officer, that they were stopped from service, when they refused to fetch food and that one such lascar was one Abbas, who was stopped from service about four years ago. This witness as well as the appellant have deposed that ever since the deceased joined the Port Trust he used to carryfood for his Master from his house in St. Thomas Mount. Therefore, it is fairly clear that it had become the practice among the Dredge Masters to order the lascars to bring their food from their house outside the premises of the Port Trust. The lascars, on their part, had recognised it as part of their duties, at the same time knowing fully well that the said act was unuthorised. Indeed the lascars have no choice, save between obedience and immediate or future dismissal. As a matter of fact, the Port Trust Authorities, soon after the accident, issued an office Order No. 38 dated 9th August, 1961 (the accident was on 6th June, 1961) that no Port Trust employee was to be employed by an officer on private work unless with the specific sanction of the Chairman in writing. Learned Counsel for the Port Trust was not able to bring to my notice any order to the effect that there was previously any such order prohibiting the officers from sending their servants outside the premises in connection with their work. Therefore it is clear that, till this office Order No. 33 was issued on 9th August, 1961, the Dredge Masters were under the genuine impression that the lascars on duty could legitimately be asked to bring food from outside the premises, in order to enable them to supervise the work in the Port Trust without interruption. It should also be remembered that the act of the iascar in bringing the food for his master was only to facilitate the work of the master. The workman is actuated by a honest belief, however mistaken or wrong-headed it may be, that in that way, he would only facilitate the work of his master, and the workmen has no personal end to serve. In all these cases, as observed by Dixit, J. in The Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Srimathi Yamunabai A.I.R. 1952 Bom 382 the words “arising out of his employment” are wide enough so as to cover a case, where there may not necessarily be a direct connection between the injury caused as a result of an accident and the employment of the workmen, and there may be circumstances which would go to show that the workman received personal injury as a result of the accident arising out of his employment. As observed by Ramaswami, J. in Janakiammal v. Divisional Engineer Highways, Kozhikode (1956) II M.L.J. 19,

    What has to be considered is the employment as such, its nature, its conditions, its obligations and its incidents. It must appear that there is some causative connection between the injury and something peculiar to the employment The employee must, in order to bring his case within the Act, show that he was at the time of the injury engaged in the employer's business or in furthering that business and was not doing something for his own benefit or accommodation.”

    In the view I have taken of the circumstances of this case, it can be said that, when the Dredge Master, Mr. Watts ordered the deceased to bring his dinner from his house outside the premises of the Port Trust in order to enable him to do his work without interruption, that when the deceased, in pursuance of the order of his Master went to St. Thomas Mount, that when the deceased was returning back to Port Trust with the dinner of his master he met with an accident, (all these things happening during the lascar's working period), the workman died of an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The compensation is fixed at Rs. 2100. There will be no order as to costs.

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    Kamala v. Chairman, The Madras Port Trust, Madras
    (Nov 30, 1965)