1. These two appeals arise from the award passed by the Motor Vehicles Claims Tribunal, Bangalore, in Misc. Case No. 107 of 1969.
2. One M. Krishnappa working as First Division Clerk in the office of the High Court of Mysore at Bangalore, was proceeding on his motorcycle No. MYQ 9649 from his village Modihalli, in order to go to Bangalore at about 8-30 a.m on 8-3-1969. He came to Hoodi Cross where there was a ‘Halt & Proceed’ Board. He stopped the motor cycle, looked towards his left and right and after finding that no vehicle was coming from either direction in the road leading from H.A.L to Bangalore he turned to his right, went towards the left side of the road and was proceeding on the left side of the road. Even before he reached the Madras-Bangalore road a bus bearing No. MYK 4157 belonging to Sri P. Moosa Saheb which was driven by Dastagir Saheb, came from the side of the H.A.L at a great speed behind him and dashed against the motor cycle and dragged the motor cycle for some distance, as a result of which, Krishnappa was thrown out of the motor cycle to his right side whereas the motor cycle was thrown out into a ditch on the left side of the road. As a result of this collision. Krishnappa sustained the following injuries, as spoken to by P.W 2. Dr. Irappa Reddy, and P.W 3 Dr. Shashikala:
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3. The medical evidence disclosed that there was fracture of the left clavical and the fracture of left tibia and fibula. These injuries, according to the medical evidence, were grievous in nature. Ext. F-4 is the Radiologist's report and Ext. P-5 is the Accident register. Their contents corroborate the evidence of the Doctors P.W 2 and P.W 3. It is also not disputed by the appellant that Krishnappa came by these injuries as a result of the above collision. The motor cycle and the bus were examined by the Inspector of Vehicles and he was of the opinion that the motor cycle had been damaged to a great extent and that the front grills of the bus had been damaged and therefore, he was of the view that the bus had dashed against the motor cycle from behind.
4. Krishnappa has sworn to the manner in which the incident took place. The defence of Dastagir Saheb and Moosa Saheb before the Tribunal was that the bus was going at a moderate speed on the left side of the road to reach Bangalore—Madras road and when it came near Hoodi cross. Krishnappa came with great speed from the right side from a side road connecting the main road and dashed against the bus right in the middle of the cross, as a result of which, Krishnappa and the motor cycle were overthrown resulting in injuries to Krishnappa and damage to the Motor cycle. In essence, the defence was that it was not due to negligence and rashness of Dastagir Saheb who was driving the motor bus that the accident took place, but it is entirely due to the fault of Krishnappa. On behalf of Krishnappa a number of witnesses have been examined in respect of the incident. Dastagir Saheb, the driver of the motor bus, has been examined in support of the defence of the owner of the vehicle. The Tribunal was of the view that the evidence on behalf of Krishnappa conclusively established that it was due to negligence and rashness on the part of Dastagir the incident took place and therefore, held that they were liable along with the insurer to pay the damages to Krishnappa.
5. The Tribunal having come to this conclusion awarded Rs. 875 towards special damages, Rs. 8,000 towards general damages and Rs. 2,000 for the damage caused to the motor cycle. The claim of Krishnappa before the Tribunal was Rs. 30,000. Aggrieved by this decision, the owner of the bus. Moosa Saheb and the insurer, viz., Madras Motor & General Insurance Company Ltd., have filed M.F.A No. 212/70 and Krishnappa has filed M.F.A No. 70. The two questions that arise for decision in these appeals, are (1) whether the finding of the Tribunal that on account of rash and negligent act of Dastagir Saheb the incident took place is correct or not? and (2) whether the compensation awarded by the Tribunal in the circumstances of the case is just and proper?
6. It is not disputed that Krishnappa injuries mentioned above. The medical evidence coasting of the evidence of P.W 2, Erappa Reddy and P.W 3, Dr. Shashikala establishes beyond doubt that Krishnappa sustained injuries referred to above on 8-3-1969 which necessitated him to be in the hospital for nearly three months far treatment.
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7. It is therefore clear that Krishnappa became permanently disabled as a consequence of the incident which took place on 8-3-69. New the question is whether Krishnappa himself was negligent, as contended by Dastagir Saheb, or whether it was due to rash and negligent act of Dastagir Saheb in driving the bus the incident took place, as ??? by Krishnappa. From the evidence it could be gathered that Krishnappa as stated him, must have come along the read leading to Hoodi and stopped the motor cycle finding a sign board there “halt & proceed” and then turned to his right and proceeded on the left side of the road for some distance, approximately about 80 feet, in order to reach the Madras-Bangalore read, we feel that Krishnappa could not have driven the motor cycle with high speed right at the cross of the two reads as alleged by Dastagir Saheb and could not have picked up again high speed and travelled about 80 feet after the collision. If he had dashed against the bus at the cross as alleged by Dastagir Saheb, the place of incident would have been just as that point and not 80 feet away towards Bangalore from the cross. Krishnappa stated that he was going with slow speed after taking a turn to the right on the left side of the road and according to him the bus driven by Dastagir Saheb came at great speed from behind and dashed against the motor cycle resulting in the accident. Immediately after the accident the police came to the spot and found that the collision was on the left side of the road at a distance of about 80 feet from the cross. The evidence of P.W 4. Head Constable, shows that the place of accident is about 70 feet ahead of junction where Bangalore—Hoskote road intersects, Devanagudi to Krishnarajapuram road. The evidence of PW. 5, one of the eye witneeses, is that the bus came from behind with great speed and dashed against the motor cycle which was proceeding on the left side of the road ahead of the junction towards Bangalore—Madras road and dashed against it from behind. The evidence of RW. 1, Dastagir Saheb, appears to be improbable and the accident could not have happened in the manner stated by him. If Krishnappa dashed against the bus at great speed at the junction the incident would have happened at the junction itself and it would be inconceivable that the motor cycle would have been thrown away 80 feet from there to a ditch lying to the left side of the road. Apart from the oral evidence which has not been shaken, the broad probabilities are as stated by Krishnappa himself. If that be so, the finding of the Tribunal that it was due to rashness and negligence of Dastagir Saheb that the incident took place, in our opinion, has to be confirmed.
8. The next question on which both the sides vehemently argued is in respect of the quantum of damages awarded by the Tribunal. Sundar Raj and Krishnaswamy urged that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to award compensation in respect of damage caused to the motor cycle. According to them, the Tribunal has jurisdiction only to grant compensation for the injuries to the person and not to the damages caused to the property, S. 110(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, as it stood at the time of the incident took place read as follows:
“S. 110(1). A state Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (hereinafter referred to as Claims Tribunals) for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles.”
9. Relying upon the words occurring in the above sub-sec. (1) of S. 110, viz., “for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons” it is contended that compensation could be awarded by the Tribunal only in respect of death or bodily injury to persons and not in respect of damage sufferred in respect of property. The language used clearly indicates that compensation on all heads payable on account of an accident involving death or bodily injury can be enquired into by the Tribunal and awarded. What is necessary to give jurisdiction to the Tribunal is that the accident should be one involving death or bodily injury to persons and not that compensation can be awarded only for death or bodily injury to persons. This view of ours finds support in the decision in Om Prakash v. National Fire & General Insurance Co., Ltd.(1). In that case their Lordships came to the conclusion that “Considering the entire scheme of Ss. 110 and 110A, to 110F of the Act, the following four propositions may be formulated”:
“(1) If no death or personal injury results in an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicles, the claim for compensation for loss suffered in property alone is not tenable before a Claims Tribunal. Such a claim is to be made in a Civil Court;
(2) If death or personal injury results in an accident arising out of the use of motor vehicles on the basis of express wordings used in these sections, the claim for compensation for such loss suffered has to be made before the Claims Tribunal and cannot be tried in a Civil Court;
(3) Loss or damage of property may be suffered by a person who has not been given a right to make an application under the provisions of S. 110F of the Act to the Claims Tribunal. In such a case, obviously no application lies to the Claims Tribunal and the only remedy will be in a Civil Court;
(4) Lastly, there may be cases of composite injuries in which in the accident arising out of the use of motor vehicles death or personal injury may have resulted and at the same time, there may be loss or damage suffered in the property by the person who has suffered personal injury or where death has resulted from the accident, loss may be sustained by the deceased or by his legal representative. If the claim for compensation is of such a composite nature for the injuries suffered bodily or on account of death together with the claim for compensation for loss or damage suffered in property, it is triable by the Claims Tribunal.”
10. The instant case falls within the last of the categories specified above. There is one more reason as to why it should be construed that in a case of an accident involving death or bodily injury to persons if the damage is caused to the property of that person as well as to the person, the Tribunal alone should hear and dispose of the claim as such and that the intention of the parliament must have been that there should not be more than one trial with regard to determination of liability for and assessment of damages to property and injuries to person. If the interpretation of the appellant is accepted, then in all cases of composite injuries involving both injury to person or death and injury to property there will be a need for two trials on the question of negligence leading to conflicting decisions. In order to set at rest that contingency, the Parliament in its wisdom has enacted S. 110, the language of which gives no room to any ambiguity. Therefore, we find no merit in the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents that the claims Tribunal had no jurisdiction to award compensation in respect of damage to property.
11. The next question relates to quantum of damages. The Tribunal has awarded compensation as stated earlier in all Rs. 10,875. This amount consists of three parts, viz., (1) Rs. 875 awarded by way of special damages for medical treatment and nursing; (2) Rs. 2,000 towards the damages caused to the motor cycle; and (3) Rs. 8,000 for general damages for the personal injury to Krishnappa. So far as the first item is concerned, the learned Counsel appearing for the Insurance Company and Moosa Saheb, the owner of the bus, did not dispute about the reasonableness of awarding so much of compensation by way of special damages. As regards the compensation of Rs. 2,000 awarded for the damages to the motor cycle, Sri Sundar Raj raised two contentions viz., (1) that Krishnappa himself in the claim application has not made any specific claim; nor has he given any indication therein that he was claiming compensation for the damage caused to the motor cycle; (2) even assuming that he had made a comprehensive caim, at any rate the Insurance Company was not liable to pay compensation in respect of damages caused to the property by reason of terms of the Insurance Policy and S. 95(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act.
12. Regarding the first contention, in the prescribed Form presented to the Tribunal this is what Krishnappa has stated as against column No. 21:
“21. Amount of compensation claimed. Rs. 30,000 (Thirty thousand).”
13. It should be mentioned here that the Form does not provide for different heads in respect of which compensation is claimable. There is only one column under which he could make a comprehensive claim for damages under all the heads in respect of which compensation could be claimed. We may mention at this stage that the Form prescribed under the Motor Vehicles Rules appears to us both inadequate and misleading. If the Rule making authority required that every head under which compensation should be claimed to be mentioned, the same thing should have been, indicated in the Form. Omission to do so, clearly indicates that the Rule making authority did not require the specification of all the heads under which compensation could be claimed by a person injured. The Rule making authority has provided only one column in the Form to state the total compensation claimed by the claimants. We may mention at this stage that this Court in a decision in Seethamma v. Benedict D'Sa(2) on this question has observed thus:
“The form prescribed by the Rules is to my mind both inadequate and misleading….So the prescribed form is a poor substitute for a plaint and there can be no rational reason for insistence on a pleading through its columns. A claim for compensation for death or injury which should be supported by a statement and proof of facts which create a right to it, should be allowed to be made through a property prepared pleading such as a plaint produced before the ordinary Courts, and, not through the obscure columns of an imperfect form such as the one prescribed by the Rules……..”
14. Similar view has been expressed by the High Court of Bombay in a decision in Bessarlal v. M.A Claims Tribunal(3). While dealing with the omission of the claimant to mention the name of the party who was liable for compensation, this is what the High Court of Bombay has observed:
“Provisions of S. 110A(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act and Rule 291 of the Rules made under S. 111A (Bombay) in connection with application for claims for compensation and the prescribed form No. Comp-A do not require any parties to be mentioned as opposite parties in the title of the application for claims for compensation. All the relevant facts are in this connection left to be ascertained by the Claims Tribunal which has been entrusted with the very serious duties of finding out all the parties who may be liable to pay compensation by recording evidence to be produced by the parties concerned.
Formal defect of failure to mention appropriate names of the parties who would be liable to pay ultimately compensation to the claimant was never intended to defeat the claims filed under the Act….”
15. We, therefore, feel that the Form should not be treated like a plaint and if any claim for compensation has been made, it is for the Tribunal to find out what compensation should be awarded on all heads for which the opposite party is responsible.
16. We, therefore, hold that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide and award compensation for the loss to the property also.
17. It is urged by Sundar Raj and Nabhirajiah, learned Counsel for the Insurer and the insured respectively, that there is no evidence on the basis of which the Tribunal could have awarded compensation for the damage caused to the motor cycle. PW. 4 the Head Constable, has given evidence in respect of the condition of the motor cycle immediately after the accident. His evidence shows that the motor cycle had been crushea and it was lying in a ditch on the left side of the road. Krishnappa has given evidence stating that he had purchased the motor cycle in question for Rs. 4,500 and due to the accident it became useless and beyond repair. Nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination to discredit the version given by these two witnesses. Under these circumstances, if the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the proper and appropriate compensation for the damages caused to the motor cycle is Rs. 2,000, we see no reason to interfere with that finding. Mr. Goulay, learned Counsel for the claimant, has also not shown that what is awarded is inadequate.
18. But, the learned Counsel appearing for Madras Motor and General Insurance Co., Ltd., however, urged that the Insurance Company was not liable to pay compensation for any damage caused to the property, in view of S. 95 and the terms of the Insurance Policy, and that it was payable by Moosa Saheb, the owner of the motor bus and Dastagir Saheb, the driver of the motor bus. We feel that in view of the law as it stood when the incident took place, the contention of the Insurance Company should be upheld with regard to general damages of Rs. 8,000 it is seriously contended by Sundar Raj and Nabhirajiah that the same is excessive. The Tribunal has come to the conclusion that taking into consideration the disability which is of a permanent nature to Krishnappa, a sum of Rs. 8,000 is just and proper by way of general damages. In cases where the question of determining general damages for injuries arises as in the present case, it is extremely difficult to lay down any precise rule as to the measure of ???. No doubt, as a general rule where injury is caused to one person by wrongful or negligent act of another, the compensation should be commensurate with the injury sustained. But, there are certain personal injuries for which no amount of pecuniary damages would afford adequate compensation. While on the other hand, the attempt to award full compensation might be attended with ruinous consequences to defendants who cannot always even with the utmost care protect themselves against the carelessness of persons in their employment, one has to take into account all the heads of damages in respect of which a person complaining of a personal injury is entitled to compensation. The damages which would be proper in the case of an injured man who is permanently disabled may well be much greater in certain circumstances than for deprivation of life. As we have stated earlier it is, therefore difficult to lay down any rule of law in respect of general damages that have to be awarded to persons injured. It is no doubt true that Courts have devised several methods by which they arrive at the compensation payable in such cases but it has to be observed that no method is absolutely satisfactory. The permanent disability as in this case is a very serious thing for a person who has to attend regularly to his official work. Although Krishnappa has not stated precisely the disadvantage that he would suffer chi account of the shortening of his leg, it is something which could be reasonably imagined. It appears to us that he cannot attend to his work without the aid of a vehicle. It also appears to us that he may not be able to avoid any impending danger if it becomes necessary to run to avoid such danger. In these circumstances, we think that the compensation of Rs. 8,000 awarded by the Tribunal on this head is just and proper.
19. For the reasons stated above, the appeal filed by Krishnappa viz., MFA. No. 262 of 1970, is dismissed. In MFA. No. 212 of 1970, we make the following modification, viz., that a sum of Rs. 8875 shall be paid by Madras Motor & General Insurance Co., Ltd., Dastagir Saheb and Moasa Saheb jointly and severally and Rs. 2,000 shall be paid by Moosa Saheb and Dastagir Saheb jointly and severally.
20. With this modification, the appeal is dismissed. No costs in both the appeals.