(Prayer: Petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying the High Court to revise a writ of certiorari calling for records of the Board of Revenue, Commissioner of Land Revenue, Land Reforms and Settlement of estates, Madras in B.P. Rt. 4578-L dated 15th September 1970 and quash the order therein.)
Janatha Talkies, Pallavaram, is a theatre exhibiting cinematographic shows. It was originally owned by one Batcha Sahib. He died on 25th August 1960. After his death, his widow and petitioners 1, 4 and 5 leased out the theatre along with another cinema house called Noorjahan Talkies in Saidapet in favour of the first respondent. The present petition, however, concerns itself with Janatha Talkies at Pallavaram, Saidapet Taluk, Chingleput District. According to the petitioners, and it may be stated that it is common ground, the lease of the theatre, building, talkie equipment, projectors, machineries, etc., leased out as above to the first respondent, expired by efflux of time on 3rd September 1970. When the first respondent applied for a renewal of the licence to exhibit the cinematographic shows in the theatre, the District Collector of Chingleput, by order dated 2nd September 1970, rejected the same on the ground that the first respondent did not prove lawful possession of the cinema theatre, beyond the date of the expiry of the lease. On appeal to the Board of Revenue, the order of the District Collector was set aside the Board dealt with both the merits as well as some questions of law as understood by it and ultimately come to the conclusion that the order of rejection of the application for licence to run the shows in the cinema theatre by the Collector was cot sustainable and granted such a renewal of the C form licence in favour of the first respondent in its order, the Board referred to certain decisions of our court and in particular W.P. 1640 and 1641 of 1968 and was of the view that the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960, was applicable and therefore the possession of the first respondent should be deered to be lawful, I may at once state that this it a wrong statement of law, as I would presently indicate. The Board also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Uttamchand v. Smt. Lalwani A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 716 and was of the view that the dominant intention was to lease out the cinema house with the site. Alternatively, however, it considered the issue whether the possession of the first respondent on and after the date of the expiry of the lease was lawful. Whilst reviewing this position, it observed that so long as the first respondent did not hand over the building and equipment to the petitioners voluntarily and so long as there was no order or court compelling the first respondent to surrender the building and equipment, such possession cannot be held to be unlawful. The Board also expressed that, be the provisions of the Cinematographic Act sad the rules are mainly intended to be applied in public interest, a proceeding taken under the said Act cannot be substituted for civil proceedings by parties for recovery of possession of their property. Ultimately the Board was of the view that it would be in public interest to recognise such possession of the first respondent as lawful possession and set aside the order of the Collector. It is as against this order, the present writ petition has been filed.
Mr. Parasaran, learned counsel for the petitioners, vehemently contends that in do sense the possession of the cinema house and the equipment annexed thereto and situate within the cinema house by the first respondent can be characterised as lawful possession within the meaning of Rule 13 of the Madras Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1157. Rule 13 provides that if an applicant for the licence Is not the owner of the site, building and equipment, he shall, to the satisfaction of the licensing authority, produce documentary evidence to show that he is in lawful possession of the site building and equipment. In this context, it is submitted that on and after the date of the expiry of the lease, the possession of the cinema house and the equipment with the first respondent is neither lawful nor authorised. If, therefore, such possession is not lawful possession within the meaning of Rule 13 of the rules, then the licensing authorities have no jurisdiction to grant a licence on apriori consideration and on the ground of public interest and equity. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, took up a preliminary objection which appears to be formidable that in cases where a quasi judicial Tribunal vested with the power to grant licence of the kind in question disposes of the proceedings before it in the light of the facts and circumstances disclosed before it, then such a discretion exercised by it, if it is a case of a grant, ought not to be lightly interfered with by this court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.
It may not be quite necessary for me to refer to the catena of decisions cited by Mr. Parassran, learned counsel for the petitioners, excepting to note them for completion. He referred to Om Prakash Gupta v. Commissioner of Police, Madras (1960) 2 M.L.J. 50 Yeshwant singh v. Jagadish Singh A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 620, Messrs Isherdas Sahib and Bros v. Rajeswara Rao (1968) 2 M.L.J. 233, W.P. 1640 and 1941 of 1968, Uttamchand v. Lalwani A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 716 and W.P. 572 of 1970. The principle is now well settled that in cases where a cinema house and the equipment tare compositely leased by the owner to a lessee, then sack composite lease is outside the purview of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960. In the decisions cited by the Board, the equipment did not belong to the applicant and therefore, Mr. Parasaran rightly pointed out that reliance on seen decision placed by the Board is not apt. But as I stated, from the judicial precedents sited by the learned counsel, the following propositions emerge:—
1.) It is the dominant intention of the parties which should prevail in interpreting whether a lease of a cinema theatre ‘with or without equipment) is a lease of the building simpliciter or a composite) lease of both the theatre and the ancillary equipment contained therein.
2.) If the leases of the theatre and the equipment are severable, then it is clear that the intention is as stated and recited in the deeds of lease; In such a case whatever may be said of the case of the building it cannot be said that after the expiry of the lease of the equipment, the possession of such equipment can be said to be lawful possession within the meaning of rule 13 of the rules.
3.) If the lease is a composite one, in the sense that the lease comprised of both the cinema house and the equipment, the lease is outside the purview of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960 and if the lease expired the lessee should be deemed to be in juridical possession of the composite subject matter, until duly evicted by a known process of law.
4.) In a case of a composite lease, if the quasi judicial tribunal vested with the authority and jurisdiction to grant a licence grants the same in a public interest, after being prima facie satisfied that the applicant is entitled to the possession of the theatre and the equipment, then this court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. will not ordinarily interfere, unless the order of the quasi judicial tribunal is manifestly perverse, unjust and unreasonable.
I may add one mere preposition—
(5) If such an alternative remedy has been availed of by the lesser in the sense that a regular civil action has been initiated for eviction of the lessee, who holds over and continues to remain in possession of the demised property beyond the period of the lease then it would be improper for this court to interfere and grant the permit in exercise of the jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution to interfere and create a stalemate in the matter of the exhibition of cinematographic films in such a theatre and practically keep the building and the equipment in cold storage, until the civil suit for eviction is disposed of.
Rajamannar C.J. In Om Prakash Gupta v. Commissioner of Police (1960) 2 M.L.J. 50 was considering a case where the licensing authority refused to issue a licence. In such circumstances, the learned Chief Justice expressed with great difficulty his inability to interfere with the discretion so exercised by the quasi judicial Tribunal, for he was of the view that the court would not be justified in directing the authority to issue a licence to the aggrieved party. But in the very same decision, relying upon the observations made by Balakrishan Ayyar J in W.P. No. 608 of 1959, which was approved later by a Division Bench of this Court, the learned Chief Justice observed as follows:
"If in this case, the licensing authority had actually renewed the licence in favour of the appellant, we would not have interfered?"
The learned Chief Justice observed that Balakrishna Ayyar J. pointed out that the only manner in which the lessors in such circumstances, could get possession would be by filing a suit in a competent civil court and that the owners could cot be allowed to by-pass the ordinary civil courts, while resorting to put pressure on the erstwhile tenant in an oblique way. In the instant case also, as in the other case, the lease in question is a composite one. The lessee is continuing in possession after the expiry of the lease. The lessors have filed a suit C.S. 99 of 1970 on the file of this court for eviction of the lessee. They have sought for the appointment of a Receiver as well. The proceedings are still pending and are reported to be ready for hearing as well. In these circumstances, and as pointed out by me in one of the propositions set out above, it would not be proper to exercise my discretion and make the rule nisi absolute as desired by the petitioners. As a matter of fact, the learned Chief Justice in Om Prukash Gupta v. Commissioner of Police, Madras (1960) 2 M.L.J. 50 has put this matter beyond controversy and in very strong language by stating that it the licensing authority had actually renewed the licence in favour of the aplicant, we would not have interfered. While therefore, respectfully adopting this principle, which is binding on me, I discharge the rule nisi and dismiss the writ petition. There will be no order as to costs.