The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Sathasivam, J.:— Aggrieved by the order of the first respondent in G.O Ms. No. 995 Public (Special A) Department, dated 11 September 1996, dismissing him from service, the petitioner has filed the above writ petition to quash the same on various grounds.

2. The case of the petitioner is briefly stated hereunder:

According to him, he was directly appointed as District and Sessions Judge Grade D under G. O-Ms. No. 1129, dated 21 July 1987. After completion of probation and training, he was posted as First Additional District and Sessions Judge at Tirunelveli on 19 January 1989. While he was working as First Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli, he disposed off a civil appeal in A.S No. 40 of 1988 and a sessions case in S.C No. 105 of 1987 among other civil appeals and other sessions cases. Aggrieved by his judgment in A.S No. 40 of 1988, one Kunjammal lodged a complaint against him as if he demanded a bribe of Rs. 15,000 to render a favourable judgment and since she did not pay the said sum, he dismissed her appeal. Likewise being aggrieved by his judgment and sentence, one of the accused in S.C No. 105 of 1987, namely. Laser made a complaint that as if he demanded a sum of Rs. 25,000 for acquitting all the accused and only a sum of Rs. 10,000 was paid by one of the accused Laser and since he failed to pay the balance of Rs. 15,000, he convicted all the accused for life. Thereafter, an official memorandum was issued by the second respondent on 30 July 1992 asking him to submit his explanation in respect of certain allegations. He submitted his explanation denying all the allegations, however, without considering his explanation, a chargememo was issued on 5 March 1993 levelling five charges against him. On receipt of the chargememo, he submitted his explanation on 21 June 1993, and also submitted an additional written statement on 23 February 1994. Since every action against the judicial officer is to be taken only by the Full Court, a fresh decision was taken by the Administrative Committee appointed by the Full Court and the said committee issued a fresh chargememo on 31 August 1994. To the fresh chargememo, dated 31 August 1994, which is a repetition of the earlier chargememo, dated 5 January 1993 he submitted his explanation on 31 October 1994. Later on, the matter was enquired by Hon'ble Judges of this Court. After enquiry, the Hon'ble inquiring Judges held charges Nos. 1 and 2 alone were proved and other charges namely, charges Nos. 3 to 5 were not proved. The enquiry report was forwarded to him on 13 February 1996, and along with the enquiry report he was to submit his further representation within 2 weeks as to why the findings recorded should not be accepted and penalty as per rules imposed. It is further stated that because of certain personal problems particularly, due to his wife's illness, he requested more time for submission of his reply. On 12 July 1996, he received another memo basing on the report of the Principal District Judge, Thanjavur, as if he had made false representation for not filing the written statement within the time granted. Without granting further time, merely on the basis of the incorrect report of the Principal District Judge, Thanjavur, the Administrative Committee-I even on 27 April 1996, decided to accept the findings or the Enquiring Judges and the matter was placed before the Fun Court on 26 August 1996, and the Full Court also accepted the views of the Administrative Committee No. 1 and the matter was forwarded to the first respondent. The first respondent has since passed the order of dismissal accepting the recommendation of the High Court and the order dismissing him from service was issued in G.O Ms. No. 995 Public (Special A) Department, dated 11 September 1996, and he is challenging the said proceedings in this writ petition.

3. A detailed counter-affidavit has been filed by the second respondent-Registrar, High Court, Madras, wherein it is stated that the Special Officer, Vigilance Cell, High Court, Madras, conducted a detailed enquiry on the allegations of corruption made against the petitioner and submitted his report. The then Hon'ble Chief Justice had directed the registry to take departmental action against the petitioner on the allegations made against him. Subsequently, the then Hon'ble Acting Chief Justice appointed two Hon'ble Judges as Enquiring Judges to conduct a departmental enquiry against the officer/petitioner. On the said allegations, an explanation was called for from the officer. The officer submitted his explanation on 1 October 1992, and the same was considered. Since the explanation was not satisfactory, the Enquiring Judges framed five charges against the officer in proceedings, dated 5 January 1993. He was required to submit his written statement of defence. He submitted his written statement of defence on 21 June 1993, and also submitted additional written statement on 23 February 1994 to the charges framed against him. Then, as constituted by the Full Court, Administrative Committee-I considered the matter and five charges were framed against him in proceedings, dated 31 August 1994. The officer was required to submit his further written statement of defence or fresh written statement of defence. The officer submitted his further written statement of defence on 11 November 1994, and the same was considered by the said committee. The committee appointed Hon'ble Justice Sri J. Kanakaraj and Hon'ble Justice Sri D. Raju as Enquiring Judges to conduct the departmental enquiry against the officer. The Enquiring Judges conducted the enquiry and rendered findings holding that Charges Nos. 1 and 2 have been proved and Charges Nos. 3 to 5 have not been proved. The Administrative Committee-I in the meeting held on 9 February 1996, considered the findings and resolved to send a copy of the findings to the officer and to call for further representation from him and also require him to show-cause as to why the findings should not be accepted and the penalty as per Rules should no be imposed. Accordingly, the officer/petitioner was informed in Court's memo, dated 13 February 1996, and he was required to submit his further representation within 2 weeks from the date of receipt of the said official memorandum. The petitioner in his letter, dated 28 February 1996, has requested to grant 8 weeks further time to submit his further representation and the same was considered. Time was granted till 18 March 1996 as a last chance to submit his further representation. The petitioner in his letter, dated 16 March 1996, again requested 8 more weeks further time for the said purpose as his wife was hospitalised. Accordingly, he was granted further time finally till 15 April 1996. The petitioner in his letter, dated 15 April 1996, again requested extension of time by 8 weeks to submit his further representation as his wife was in the stage of coma. The Administrative Committee-I considered the matter and directed the Principal District Judge, Thanjavur, to submit a report regarding the complaint made by the petitioner. The Principal District Judge, Thanjavur, submitted his report, dated 7 May 1996, stating that from the reliable sources he learnt that the wife of the petitioner was not admitted in any hospital for any ailment and she was not in the stage of coma. The Administrative Committee-I in the meeting held on 17 June 1996 considered the said report and resolved to send a copy of the same to the petitioner to show-cause as to why one more charge should not be framed against him for a false representation in this enquiry and for not filing written statement of defence in another enquiry within the time granted and seeking time on false grounds. The committee also resolved to grant further time till 5 July 1996, as a last chance to file his further representation failing which the matter will be proceeded with on the assumption that the petitioner has no further representation to submit. The petitioner again in his letter, dated 4 July 1996, requested further time of four weeks to submit his representation. Inasmuch as this Court has granted 5 months further time to the petitioner and as a last chance, time was extended till 5 July 1996. But the petitioner was wantonly avoiding the submission of his further representation and the reasons adduced by him for seeking extension of time appeared to be imaginary. Hence the Administrative Committee-I in the meeting held on 24 July 1996, decided to proceed with the matter and considered after going through the records and findings of the Enquiring Judges, that the findings recorded on charge Nos. 1 and 2 framed against the officer/petitioner are well founded. Therefore, the committee after holding that charges Nos. 1 and 2 are proved beyond doubt, recommended to the Full Court, to approve the findings of the Enquiring Judges and impose the penalty of dismissal from service. Then the matter was placed before the Full Court in its meeting on 26 August 1996, and the Full Court considered the matter in detail and accepted the recommendation of the Administrative Committee-I. Accordingly, the decision of the Full Court was communicated to the Government for issuing necessary orders. The Government by the impugned Government order, issued orders dismissing him from service. It is further stated that the petitioner was given adequate opportunity to put forth his defence and taking note of the gravity of proved charges, the Full Court has taken a decision to dismiss the petitioner from service. The same was accepted by the Government.

4. The first respondent has also filed a counter-affidavit reiterating that the Government after careful and independent examination of the case along with the recommendations of this Court and records received from this Court, after following the procedure embodied in the Rules, issued the impugned order. It is further stated that necessary orders have been issued by the competent authority is the Governor of the State of Tamil Nadu. Since the charges levelled against the petitioner relate to corruption and corrupt practices and they are serious, in accordance with the provisions of Arts. 233, 234 and 235 of the Constitution of India, a considered decision has been taken to dismiss the petitioner, accordingly orders were issued, hence the punishment imposed on the petitioner is in commensurate with the charges levelled against him and it cannot be termed as excessive. It is further stated that there are adequate and credible materials against the petitioner and therefore it cannot be termed as a case of no evidence. With these averments, the first respondent prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.

5. In the light of the above pleadings, we have heard the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Additional Government Pleader for the respondents.

6. Though in the affidavit filed in support of the above writ petition, it is stated that the chargememo and the subsequent proceedings are liable to be quashed on the ground that the same were not issued by the Full Court, in view of the factual and settled legal position, the said question has not been argued, accordingly it is unnecessary to consider the same. Even otherwise we are satisfied with the proceedings of the enquiry by the two Hon'ble Enquiring Judges, the decision of the Administrative Committee-I constituted by the Full Court and the ultimate decision by the Full Court accepting the decision of the Administrative Committee-I and imposing the punishment of dismissal from service.

7. Sri K. Chandru, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, contended that with the available evidence and in the absence of any clinching evidence, the conclusion of the Enquiring Judges holding that charge Nos. 1 and 2 are proved cannot be sustained. He also contended that the enquiry committee have adopted different modes for Charges Nos. 1 and 2 and for Charge Nos. 3 to 5, hence the ultimate conclusion based on their report is liable to be set aside. On the other hand, learned Additional Government Pleader, after taking us through the entire proceedings including chargememo, explanation, enquiry proceedings, decision of the Full Court and the ultimate order of the Government dismissing the petitioner from service, would contend that the enquiry was conducted in accordance with the procedure and petitioner was given ample and adequate opportunity to defend his case. Inasmuch as the enquiry committee came to the conclusion regarding charges Nos. 1 and 2 based on the acceptable oral and documentary evidence and the same having been approved and accepted by the Full Court as well as the State Government, interference by this Court on the factual findings is very limited; hence he prayed for dismissal of the writ petition.

8. We have carefully considered the rival submissions.

9. It is seen from the proceedings that when the petitioner was working as First Additional District Judge at Tirunelveli, on the basis of complaints regarding corruption, the Special Officer, High Court Vigilance Cell after conducting a detailed enquiry, submitted his report to this Court. On the basis of the said report, departmental action was taken against the petitioner. Initially Hon'ble Justice Sri E.J Bellie and Hon'ble Justice Sri Abdul Hadi, were appointed as Enquiring Judges to conduct the enquiry against the petitioner. The officer/petitioner submitted his explanation on 1 October 1992. Since the explanation was not satisfactory, the Hon'ble Enquiring Judges framed 5 charges against the petitioner in proceedings, dated 5 January 1993. He was required to submit his written statement of defence and he has submitted his written statement on 21 June 1993 and also additional written statement on 23 February 1994 to the charges framed against him. Subsequently the Administrative Committee-I, constituted by the Full Court, considered the matter and 5 charges have been reframed in their proceedings, dated 31 August 1994. On the basis of the reframed charges, the petitioner was required to submit his further written statement of defence; accordingly he submitted his further written statement of defence on 11 November 1994. The committee appointed Hon'ble Justice Sri J. Kanakaraj and Hon'ble Justice Sri D. Raju as Enquiring Judges to conduct the departmental enquiry against the petitioner. In order to appreciate the rival contentions with regard to the enquiry proceedings, it is better to refer the charges levelled against the petitioner. Inasmuch as charges 1 and 2 alone were found proved against him, it is unnecessary to refer to the other charges. Charges Nos. 1 and 2 are as follows:

“Charge No. 1:

That you, while you were working as First Additional District Judge at Tirunelveli, you called the appellant Smt. Kunjamma in A.S No. 40 of 1988 which was pending on your file through your agent Sri Velusamy Pandian to your house and demanded a bribe of Rs. 15,000 for rendering a favourable judgment and that as she did not pay the demanded bribe you dismissed the appeal and thereby you are guilty of grave misconduct, corrupt practice, a conduct unbecoming of a Judge and wilful contravention of rule 20 of Government Servants' Conduct Rules.

Charge No. 2:

That you, while you were working as First Additional District Judge at Tirunelveli, demanded a sum of Rs. 25,000 as bribe from Sri Lazer, Son of Michael Nadar, one of the accused in Sessions Case No. 105 of 1987 that was pending on the file of the First Additional District Judge as bribe to acquit him and that you received Rs. 10,000 from him on 20 April 1989 and that since he did not pay the balance of Rs. 15,000 you pronounced judgment on 28 April 1989, convicting him to life imprisonment and thereby you are guilty of grave misconduct, corruption, a conduct unbecoming of a Judge and wilful contravention of rule 20 of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules.”

10. It is seen from the enquiry proceedings that in order to prove charge No. 1, the presenting officer examined one witness and marked 3 documents. The complainant Kuryamma alias Eliamma who is a resident of Shenkottah and Homeopathy practitioner was examined as P.W 1. In her evidence, she stated that she entered into a sale agreement for the purchase of a property comprising of houses and vacant site situated on the back side of Shenkottah Municipal Bus-stop with one Mariamma Iype in the month of June 1980 and she paid a sum of Rs. 21,000 towards sale consideration. The said Mariamma Iype did not execute the sale deed even after a period of one year. Hence she filed a suit for specific performance in O.S No. 90 of 1981, on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Tenkasi. The said suit was dismissed in the year 1988 and she had preferred an appeal in A.S No. 40 of 1988 on the file of the District Judge, Tirunelveli. The said case was transferred to First Additional District Court, Tirunelveli, and the petitioner herein was the Presiding Officer of that Court. According to her, the petitioner sent word through one Velusamy Pandian directing her to meet him and she personally went to the residence of the petitioner in State Bank Officer's colony at Maharaja Nagar and met him. She further deposed that the petitioner demanded a bribe of Rs. 15,000 for rendering a favourable judgment in her appeal, that he sent his agent A. Velusamy Pandian frequently, that she met the petitioner and pleaded with him about her inability to pay the bribe and that the petitioner finally delivered the judgment dismissing the appeal. She once again went to his residence and wept before him for having dismissed the appeal for non-payment of bribe amount and the petitioner consoled her and promissed to bear the expenses for preparing a second appeal. Exhibit P1 is the complaint sent by P.W 1 to the Additional Superintendent of Police of the Vigilance Cell. Exhibit P2 is the statement given by her before the Special Officer and. Exhibit P3 is the certified copy of the judgment in A.S No. 40 of 1988. After carefully analysing her evidence, the Hon'ble Enquiring Judges, in Para. 7 of their report have observed thus;

“We have elaborately adverted to the evidence of P.W 1 only to show that it is absolutely natural and she had not suppressed any incident which had happened throughout the period pendency of the appeal.”

Again, at the end of Para. 8, they observed thus:

“… we have already noticed that P.W 1 has given evidence in a very natural way and the sequence of the events narrated by her clearly suggests that she is speaking the truth. We have absolutely no doubt in our mind that her evidence has to be accepted and the delinquent officer is consequently found guilty of the first charge of demanding a bribe of Rs. 15,000 for rendering a favourable judgment in A.S No. 40 of 1988. He has clearly violated rule 20 of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules.”

Even though it is stated that with regard to charge No. 1 the complaint was made by one of the aggrieved persons and the same cannot be lightly accepted, after going through her statement in the initial complaint, statement before the Special Officer, Vigilance Cell and before the Enquiring Judges as P.W 1, we are satisfied that there is no acceptable reason to reject her testimony. On the other hand, the evidence of P.W 1 is natural, cogent, trust-worthy and it deserves acceptance.

11. In order to prove the second charge, the presenting officer examined to witnesses, namely, P.W 10 Adaikalam Fernando and P.W 12-Lazer. P.W 12-Lazer was an accused in Sessions Case No. 105 of 1987 on the file of the First Additional District Judge, Tirunelveli. P.W 12 in his statement before the Special Officer, Vigilance Cell, has stated that his Session Case S.C No. 105 of 1987 came up for trial before the petitioner and he met the petitioner at his residence through agent Velusamy Pandian and the petitioner demanded a sum of Rs. 25,000 as bribe for delivering a judgment in his favour. On 20 April 1989, he went to the residence of the petitioner and paid a sum of Rs. 10,000 and undertook to pay the remaining amount, however, he could not pay the balance amount. Hence the petitioner convicted him in the case. Even though the said Lazer has narrated the incident before the Special Officer, Vigilance Cell, subsequently he turned hostile. It is brought to our notice that the said Lazer after making a statement before the Special Officer, Vigilance Cell under Exhibit P2, had not disowned the said statement till the time of enquiry and only during the enquiry he retracted. The judgment of Sessions Case No. 105 of 1987 has been marked as Exhibit P20.

12. P.W 10 Adaikalam Fernando appeared as a counsel for witness Lazer and other accused in the said sessions case. The advocate Sri Adaikalam Fernando in his statement before the Special Officer and in the enquiry has stated that he was the counsel for all the accused in the sessions case and the trial was held before the petitioner. He further deposed that Lazer along with his brother came to his residence one or two days before the date of judgment and told him that the petitioner through his agent demanded money as bribe from him. He has further stated that he informed Lazer that the payment of bribe is left to the will of him (Lazer) and he would not interfere in that matter.

13. The statement of Adaikalam Fernando that Lazer informed him about the demand of bribe by the petitioner with regard to the said sessions case has to be considered in the light of the fact that the said Lazer who had made the complaint, had retracted. The Enquiring Judges, after considering various decisions, have concluded in Para. 13 in the following manner:

“… We have no hesitation in accepting the evidence of P.W 10 who categorically affirms that P.W 12 and his brother came and told him that the delinquent officer was demanding money for acquitting the accused. Nothing has been elicited against the evidence of P.W 10 and we accept his evidence. In other words, the evidence of P.W 10 taken along with the retracted statement of P.W 12 and the conduct of P.W 12 in avoiding enquiry on 4 November 1995, shows that the allegations contained in the second charge are true. In fine, we hold that the second charge against the delinquent officer that he demanded a bribe of Rs. 25,000 from P.W 12 and his brothers for acquitting them and he had received a sum of Rs. 10,000 and convicted them because he had not received the balance of Rs. 15,000, is proved.”

It is clear that even though P.W 12 had retracted his statement at a later time, as observed by the Enquiring Judges, the evidence of P.W 10 coupled with the retracted statement of P.W 12 and the way in which P.W 12 avoided enquiry, we do not find any valid reason to disagree with the conclusion.

14. Now we shall consider decisions referred to by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner as well as learned Additional Government Pleader for the respondents. Sri K. Chandru, learned Senior Counsel first referred to the decision of the Apex Court in Central Bank of India v. P.C Jain [A.I.R 1969 S.C 983]: The following observation of their Lordships is very much relied on:

“… It is true that, in numerous cases, it has been held that domestic tribunals, like an enquiry officer, are not bound by the technical rules about evidence contained in the Indian Evidence Act; but it has nowhere been laid down that even substantive rules, which would form part of principles of natural justice, also can be ignored by the domestic tribunals. The principle that a fact sought to be proved must be supported by statements made in the presence of the person against whom the enquiry is held and that statements made behind the back of the person charged are not to be treated as substantive evidence, is one of the basic principles which cannot be ignored on the mere ground that domestic tribunals are not bound by the technical rules of procedure contained in the Evidence Act. In fact, learned counsel for the appellant-bank was unable to point out any case at all where it may have been held by this Court or by any other Court that a domestic tribunal will be justified in recording its findings on the basis of hearsay evidence without having any direct or circumstantial evidence in support of those findings.”

15. The following observations of the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh reported in 1977 (2) L.L.N 50, were also pressed into service, in Para. 4, at page 52:

“It is well settled that in a domestic enquiry the strict and sophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act may not apply. All materials which are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative Tribunals must be careful in evaluating such materials and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition, it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fair play is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding, even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good. However, the Courts below misdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers who had come in and gone out should be chased and brought before the Tribunal before a valid finding could be recorded. The ‘residuum’ rule to which counsel for the respondent referred based upon certain passages from American Jurisprudence does not go to that extent, nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on such rigid requirement. The simple point is, was there some evidence or was there no evidence not in the sense of the technical rules governing regular Court proceedings but in a fair commonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absence of any evidence in support of a finding is certainly available for the Court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparent on the record…”

16. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that judicial officers, who are required to work in a difficult environment, and who are constantly exposed to the likelihood of false accusations by disappointed litigants should, in disciplinary matters be dean with great care and circumspection, and that the High Court should have special concern for protecting them against such false accusations. Counsel in this context invited the attention of the Court to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana [(1988) 3 S.C.C 370], and R.C Sood v. High Court of Judicature at Rajasthan [1999 (1) L.L.N 304].

17. While there can be no doubt about the need to protect every honest officer against false accusation, such duty to protect honest officers, however, does not imply that a dishonest officer should be allowed to go scot-free on the assumption all allegations made by a litigant against a judicial officer are necessarily untrue. On the other hand, in order to retain and promote public confidence in the administration of justice, it is essential that proven lack of integrity on the part of the judicial officers be dealt with severely where the evidence, brought on record at the domestic enquiry discloses lack of integrity. The litigant public must be protected from dishonest Presiding Officers as the continuance in office of such officers will not only jeopardise seriously the administration of justice, but will undermine public confidence in the impartiality and the integrity of the justice delivery system.

18. The further submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the Enquiring Judges had adopted dual standards, inasmuch as even while rejecting charges Nos. 3 to 5, they have held that charges Nos. 1 and 2 as proved, even though the persons who had deposed in relation to all the charges were disappointed litigants. Though superficially, this argument looks attractive, it overlooks the very fundamental fact that the witnesses who were examined before the Enquiring Judges with regard to charge Nos. 3 to 5 did not at all support the charges, and all of them went back on the statements they had given before the vigilance officer. In the absence of any evidence to substantiate the charge, the Enquiring Judges were duty bound to record a finding that those charges were not proved.

19. That, however, is not the case with regard to charges Nos. 1 and 2. With regard to charge No. 1, the witness has given evidence, though that witness was a litigant who had lost her case before the officer. Her evidence, which was recorded by the Enquiring Judges who had the opportunity to assess her demeanour, her sincerity and her credibility, has been found to be trustworthy. The Enquiring Judges had found that her evidence is clear, cogent and believable. It was certainly within the jurisdiction of the Enquiring Judges to believe, or not to believe the witness so long as such belief was based on relevant criteria. The present proceedings not being an appeal, no occasion arises for the reassessment of the evidence accepted by the Enquiring Judges. Such acceptance on their part can by no means be characterised as arbitrary. With regard to charge No. 2 though one of the persons who had initially given a statement before the Vigilance Officer with regard to the incident referred to in charge No. 2, went back on his statement at the enquiry, the Enquiring Judges had found the evidence given by his lawyer, who was a responsible member of the Bar, and who was examined as P.W 10, believable. Even if we were to hold that the Enquiring Judges were not justified in basing the finding of guilt with regard to charge No. 2 on the evidence given by the advocate, the finding of guilt recorded on charge No. 1 being one which is not vitiated by any illegality and being a finding properly recorded by the Enquiring Judges acting within the scope of their jurisdiction, the punishment that has been imposed is fully warranted by that finding on Charge No. 1 alone. We should not be understood to have held that the finding of Charge No. 2 is not to be upheld. So long as there was some evidence before them, it was entirely within the competence of the Enquiring Judges to act on that evidence. The sufficiency of evidence is not a matter for investigation in the exercise of our jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

20. It was then contended by counsel that there was inconsistency in the evidence given by P.W 1 who spoke to charge No. 1. The minor inconsistencies, if any, in her evidence, as also the fact that she came forward with the complaint after the decision was rendered in her case, do not by themselves render the finding recorded by the Enquiring Judges perverse. The credibility of the witnesses was a matter which was entirely within their jurisdiction and it was open to them to rely upon that evidence. The Enquiring Judges have given reasons as to why they accepted that evidence, and we do not find anything therein which would warrant our holding otherwise.

21. It was also submitted by counsel that with regard to charge No. 2 the evidence given by counsel P.W 10 was only hearsay. Rules of evidence are not required to be applied strictly in domestic enquiries so long as broad rules of fairness are observed. Hearsay evidence, per se, is not required to be excluded, although it is required to be evaluated with great care. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh [1977 (2) L.L.N 50] (vide supra), and Central Bank of India v. P.C Jain [A.I.R 1969 S.C 983] (vide supra), has held that such hearsay evidence can be relied upon at the enquiry.

22. It was lastly contended that the petitioner had no opportunity to reply to the second show-cause notice. We do not find any merit in the submission. The dates speak for themselves. The show-cause notice was sent on 13 February 1996, but the order came to be made only on 24 July 1996, after repeatedly granting time to the petitioner to send his reply, which he did not send.

23. Though learned Additional Government Pleader has cited several decisions with regard to limitations on the power of this Court in interfering with the disciplinary matters as well as punishments as most of the cases relate to industrial disputes, we do not consider it necessary to refer to the same. We should however refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shirish Kumar Rangrao Patil [1997 (2) L.L.N 470], wherein their Lordships have made the following observation, in Para. 18, at page 481:

“… Yet, it being in the realm of appreciation of evidence, this Court cannot embark upon appreciation of evidence and reach its own conclusion on the sufficiency of evidence or on the correctness of the conclusion which is based on same evidence. Apart from this, during cross-examination, the omission was put to the advocate and he explained the reasons for the omission, i.e, he was not interested to have the respondent punished and was interested only in early orders. That explanation was accepted by the enquiry officer and he gave reasons in support thereof. The High Court also examined this contention and accepted the explanation. Under these circumstances, being in the realm of appreciation of evidence, this Court cannot by itself, appreciate evidence, and reach a conclusion different from that of the disciplinary authority…”

24. Counsel for the respondent also relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K Chopra Chopra [1999 (1) L.L.N 1067], wherein it has been held, inter alia that findings of fact recorded at the domestic enquiry are not to be interfered with by the Court of Tribunal.

25. Judicial officers, have to maintain absolute integrity and honesty while discharging their official duties and, inasmuch, as the charges levelled against the petitioner related to corruption and corrupt practices and they are serious in nature, we are of the view that on the facts of this case the punishment imposed on the petitioner is commensurate with the gravity of his proved misconduct, and the same cannot be characterised as excessive.

26. We do not find any merit in the writ petition. Consequently, the same is dismissed. No costs.