1. These two writ petitions are filed by one Bowramma who is the petitioner in W.P No. 3644/79 and the second petition is filed by a Firm Malaya Mahadeshwara Enterprises by its Managing Partner. The petitioners claim common interest to maintain these petitions.

2. The facts leading to the petitions are as follows. The 1st petitioner claims to be owner of lands in Survey Nos. 191.C and 241.A of Huthur village, Kollegal Taluk. The entire extent of 82 cents in S. No. 191.C and the extent of 5 acres and 30 cents in S. No. 241.A was sold by the petitioner in W.P No. 3644/79 to the petitioner in W.P No. 3645/79 by a registered sale deed dated 24-7-1977. However, it has to be made clear that part of the land in S. No. 191.C has been sold to four other persons who apparently have constituted the partnership which has filed the second of the petitions. It is stated that one Halegegowda-respondent-4 in both the petitions purchased the lands in the year 1937. These lands in S. Nos. 191.C and 241.A in Huthur village of Kollegal Taluk were in all 13 acres 86 cents. The petitioner in the 1st petition was married to one Chikkannappa who was one of the sons of Madamma who was the sister of the said Halegegowda-4th respondent. At this point, it is convenient to state that Halegegowda is no longer alive an the date of filing the petitions and is represented by his legal representatives in these proceedings and they are admittedly residents of Germala, Gobichettypalyam, Coimbatore District, Tamilnadu. The petitioner in the 1st petition has alleged that in the year 1944 late Halegegowda transferred his properties to the sons of Madamma his sister. According to the averment, the entire 82 cents in S. No. 191.C was in the exclusive possession and enjoyment of the husband of the petitioner in the 1st petition. Similarly portions in the other survey number were in the possession and enjoyment of other children of the said Madamma. It is further alleged by the petitioner-Bowramma that late Halegegowda received a total consideration of Rs. 1,000/- from her late husband and permitted them to enjoy the property for over a period of 20 years. It is also alleged that her family improved the property by spending large sums of money and having confidence in late, Halegogowda, the family did not ask for a formal sale deed in its favour. She has contended that she and her late husband have been in continuous possession from 1944 without any interruption. She has also stated that she has acquired title to the property in question by adverse possession.

3. On 6-12-1967, Bowramma made an application to the Deputy Tahsildar for Record of Rights, Kollegal. In the said application she prayed that her name should be substituted in place of Halegegowda in relation to S. Nos. 191.C and 241.A on account of her long and continued enjoyment by herself and her husband Chikkannappa. In the said proceedings under Sec. 129 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) late Halegegowda was made the respondent and he was a party to the proceedings before the Deputy Tahsildar (respondent-3). The Deputy Tahsildar came to accept her contentions and passed an order in spite of the denial of late Halegegowda that he had ever parted with the properties in question in favour of the petitioner and her late husband, ordering mutation of entries purporting to be in accordance with Sec. 129 of the Act. It is relevant to notice at this stage, Bowramma has not produced any documents to support her case before the respondents or before this Court.

4. Aggrieved by the order of the Deputy Tahsildar, late Halegegowda preferred an appeal against the order of the Deputy Tahsildar, to the Assistant Commissioner, Nanjangud (2nd respondent). The second respondent-Assistant Commissioner disposed of the appeal on 4-10-1971, affirming the order passed by the Deputy Tahsildar. Aggrieved by the appellate order, Halegegowda moved the Special Deputy Commissioner, Mysore District, in Revision Petition No. 7/1972 presented under Sec. 136(3) of the Act, praying for setting aside of the orders of the Deputy Tahsildar as well as the Assistant Commissioner, Nanjangud.

5. The Deputy Commissioner heard the Counsel for the Revision Petitioner and proceeded to dispose of the case as the respondent (writ petitioner) and also her Counsel were absent though notified. He has, for reasons recorded by him allowed the Revision Petition of late Halegegowda and set aside the order and he has made clear in his order that the patta of the lands in S. Nos. 191.C and 241.A of Huthur village should be restored in favour of the Revision Petitioner. Aggrieved by the order, Bowramma has preferred the writ petition inter alia contending that the Deputy Commissioner (1st respondent) had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for revision much less decide in favour of late Halegegowda under Sec. 136(3) of the Act.

6. It is significant to note that all this transpired between the years 1944 and 1974. The order of the Deputy Commissioner, Mysore, is dated 31-10-1974. In para-19 of the petition, an attempt has been made to explain the delay in approaching this Court for redress against the said order and the explanation is not at all satisfactory and the ground of inordinate delay of over 4 years in approaching this Court is sufficient to reject the petition.

7. The sale in favour of the petitioner or petitioners in W.P No. 3645/79 has taken place long after the impugned order of the 1st respondent. There is no satisfactory explanation as to their locus standi to prosecute a writ petition against the impugned order to which they were not parties.

8. Learned Counsel Shri H.K Vasudeva Reddy, appearing for the petitioners has contended firstly that any order by the Assistant Commissioner under Sec. 136(2) of the Act is not an order made under Sec. 129 of the Act. Secondly, he has contended that having regard to the language of Sec. 136(2) of the Act that the order made in appeal by the Assistant Commissioner is final and therefore the Deputy Commissioner is diverted of his jurisdiction under Sec. 136(3) of the Act. This is the foundation laid by the learned Counsel to advance the argument that the impugned order is made without jurisdiction vested in the Deputy Commissioner. Alternatively, he has also contended that the Depute Commissioner was in error in holding that the Board's Standing Orders, Madras was not applicable to the facts of the case of the petitioner for that was one of the grounds urged before the Deputy Commissioner in the revision filed by late Halegegowda.

9. Secs. 127 to 136 are in Chapter XI of the Act. The Chapter deals with survey and settlement. Sec. 127 deals with the maintenance of Record of Rights prepared in the prescribed manner at the time of survey and settlement of any given village or villages in the State. Sec. 128 pertains to acquisition of rights in such suveyed and settled lands by parties by virtue of succession, survivorship, inheritance, partition, purchase, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise, any right as holder, occupant, owner mortgagee, landlord or tenant of the land or assignee of the rept or revenue thereof. These rights so acquired are to be reported orally or in writing to the prescribed officer of the village within three months from the date of such acquisition. The section further provides for the proper procedure to be followed when such reports are received within the prescribed period of time Sec. 129 deals with the manner in which the prescribed officer shall enter in the register of mutation the report received by him under Sec. 128. The section further prescribes holding of an enquiry in case a dispute is raised (in the instant case on hand, the dispute was so raised). Sec. 130 deals with the obligation of the persons to furnish information to officers performing their duties under this Chapter of the Act. Similarly, Sec. 131 deals with requisition of assistance in preparing of maps etc., subject to the Rules made in that behalf by the State Government. Sec. 132 deals with the need for attaching or annexing certified copies of the records of the extracts of Record of Rights to any plaint or application in proceedings in Civil Courts. The section further defines suit, application, execution of decree and other matters enumerated therein. Sec. 133 creates presumption in regard to the entries made in the Record of Rights. Sec. 134 provides for certified copies of the entries being issued to applicants by the prescribed officers. Sec. 135 bars Civil Suits except when a person is aggrieved by an entry made in the Record of Rights to the prejudice of his right, title and interest. Sec. 136 with which we are mainly concerned deals with appeal and revision and on account of its importance in these cases, it is set out below:

“136. Appeal and Revision:—(1) The provisions of Chapter V Shall not apply to any decision or order under this Chapter.

(2) Any person affected by an order made under Sub-sec. (4) or an entry certified under Sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 129 may within a period of sixty days from the date of communication of the order of the knowledge of the entry certified, appeal to such officer as may be prescribed by the State Government in this behalf and his decision shall be final.

“(3) The Deputy Commissioner may, on his own motion or an application of a party, call for and examine any records made under Sec. 127 and Sec. 129 and pass such orders as he may deem fit:

Provided that no order shall be passed except after hearing the party who would be adversely affected by such order.”

10. These provisions have been the subject matter of decisions by this Court on more than one occasion. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Payappa Nemanna Huded v. Chamu Appayya(1) held that an entry in the Record of Bights can be changed only by an order of Civil Court and a writ will not lie. Similarly, in a later decision in State of Mysore v. T.K Ramachandrachar(2) a Division Bench of this Court exhaustively analysed the scope and effect of Chapter XI with reference to the corresponding Rules framed for its implementation under the Act and held that once the entries in the Record of Rights achieved finality those entries are sacrosanct so far as the revenue authorities were concerned and could not be changed by the Deputy Commissioner or any authority superior to him except in accordance with the provisions of Secs. 132, 135 and under Sec. 136 in the light of the provisions of Secs. 128 and 129 of the Act.

11. As is apparent from the language of Sec. 136(2), the prescribed officer to decide the dispute is different from the appellate authority under that sub-section. Under Rule 43(3) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Rules, 1966, (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), the Assistant Commissioner is the prescribed appellate authority. It is learned Counsel's contention that since the appellate authority's decision is final, sub-sec. (3) of the very same section has no application to the orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner. Reliance was placed by the Counsel on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of South Asia Industries (P) Ltd. v. S.B Sarup Singh(3). In the said decision, Subba Rao, Acting C.J, as he then was, dealing with Sec. 43 of Delhi Rent Control Act (59 of 1958) held that:

“(17) The expression ‘final’ prima facie connotes that an order passed on appeal under the “Act is conclusive and no further appeal lies against it. The last sentence in S. 43 of the Act, in our view, does not restrict the scope of the said expression; indeed, the said sentence imposes a further bar. The expression ‘final’ in the first part of S. 43 of the Act puts an end to a further appeal and the words “shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceedings” bar collateral proceedings. The section imposes a total bar. The correctness of the judgment in appeal cannot be questioned by way of appeal or by way of collateral proceedings. It is true that the expression “final” may have a restrictive meaning in other contents, but in S. 43 of the Act such a restrictive meaning cannot be given, for Ch. VI of the Act provides for a hierachy of tribunals fox deciding disputes arising thereunder. The Act is a self-contained one and the intention of the Legislature was to provide an exhaustive code for disposing of the appeals arising under the Act.

12. I do not see how the learned Counsel can derive any assistance from the above ruling. Apart from the fact that the Supreme Court was dealing with a different enactment, the ruling in fact, supports the view that much importance should not attached to the word ‘final’ if within that statute a remedy is provided against such finality of an order. A reading of Sec. 136(3) makes it clear that the Deputy Commissioner of the District has revisional jurisdiction in respect of orders passed by officers subordinate to him in proceedings under Secs. 127 and 129 of the Act. It could not have been legislature's intention that finality intended in the order made by the Assistant Commissioner as in the instant case under Sec. 136(2) of the Act, should remain without a remedy within the framework of the statute. Sec. 136(3) clearly mantes a reference to Sec. 129. The Deputy Commissioner under Sec. 136(3) of the Act may on his own motion or on application of the party, call for and examine any records made under Secs. 127 and 129 and pass such orders as he may deem fit. Sec. 136 deals with appeal and revision. Appeal obviously has reference to the order passed under Sec. 136(2) and revision to the orders parsed in relation to the power exercised by subordinate authorities under Secs. 127 and 129. The fact that an officer subordinate has been prescribed as the appellate authority under Sec. 136(3), is, clear manifestation of the intention of Legislature that Sec. 136(3) itself is a remedy against the finality of the order of the appellate authority under Sec. 136(2). If the section is read as it is then there is no apparent contradiction between Sec. 136(2) and Sec. 136(3) and gives useful effect to the purpose, meaning and object of the whole of Sec. 136.

13. In the view I have taken on the construction of Sec. 136(3), the argument of Shri H.K Vasudeva Reddy learned Counsel for the petitioners that the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner under Sec. 136(2) is not at all an order passed under Sec. 129 but is an independent order passed under Sec. 136(2) has to be considered. Having regard to Rule 43(3), the Assistant Commissioner can only hoax an appeal regarding a dispute raised under Sec. 129 of the Act. Therefor, any order passed in appeal can only be an order made under Sec. 129 of the Act and not anything else Sec. 136(2) cannot be so read as to give separate jurisdiction to the authority prescribed by the rule making process and confer on him special jurisdiction de-hors Sec. 129. Such a construction would lead not only to misreading the section but the Court will be committing an error in igniting the vice of excessive delegation in favour of the rule making authority. Delegation of power under Rule 43(3) should be understood in such a way that the Rule is intra-vires of the Act and not otherwise. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention advanced by the learned Counsel that the order of the Assistant Commissioner is not an order parsed under Sec. 129 of the Act.

14. As an alternative learned Counsel contended that the order of the Deputy Tahsildar has merged in the order of the appellate authority and therefore, there was no order whatsoever for the Deputy Commissioner to set aside. This again proceeds on the basis of the erroneous assumption that the order of the appellate authority is not an order under S. 129 of the Act. It is seen from the preamble of the impugned order that the prayer by the 4th respondent was to set aside both the orders which had gone against him. Mere failure to incorporate a sentence setting aside the order of the Assistant Commissioner also does not create infirmity of a nature which calls for interference from this Court when as already noticed earlier the impugned order clearly states in its conclusion that the patta must be restored to the applicant. That is proof of the finality of entry in favour of late Halegegowda and attracts the Ruling of this Court in Ramachandrachar's case to which reference has already been made. Therefore, it is manifest from the impugned order that it has dealt with both the orders i.e, of the Assistant Commissioner which merely confirmed the order of the Deputy Tahsildar, registering the petitioner as the pattadar in the Record of Rights.

15. Learned Counsel has cited two other decisions of the (1969) 2 SCC 74 : Supreme Court reported in AIR 1970, page 1 and 1958 SC page 868. I am unable to appreciate the relevance of the citations. In the first decision, Grover. J., as he then was, for the Court, merely expressed the nature of functions exercised by Superior Courts in relation to inferior Courts and in that context made the observation that superior Courts exercising such functions over the orders of the inferior Courts, would be functioning both as appellate and revisional Courts and in that capacity of the superior Courts there was not much difference between an appeal and a revision. It is not an authority in any way to assist in resolving the third question involved in this case. Similarly, in the other decision, Gajendragadnar, J., as he then was, reiterated the well settled principles of law that the Original order merged with the appellate order when the same was either confirmed or dissented from. This is a good authority for that proposition and no more. It is no authority to state that the order made by Assistant Commissioner in the instant case was not an order made under S. 129 of the Act. On the other hand, it supports the view, I have takin.

16. It remains for me to consider only the last question urged by Shri H.K Vasudeva Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioners. This argument is that Board Standing Orders of Madras, do apply to the facts of the case as S. 202 of the Act has saved all rights which had accrued in favour of a party before the commencement of the Act. But, what are these rights which had accrued before the commencement of the Act have not been made clear either in the pleadings or by submissions made by Counsel, except perhaps the reference passingly made in the petitions to the fact that the petitioner had acquired title by adverse possession. If this be the plea then that plea can only be settled by a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction and not before any of the revenue authorities. The argument also overlooks the fact that in 1967 when the application was made by Bowramma, right to retain the entry in the Record of Rights was in favour of the Haleigegowda and not in favour of the petitioner. For the above reasons, this writ petition is liable to be rejected. The 1st writ petition is so rejected. Second writ petition does not survive for the reason I have already given earlier in this order.

17. Petitions are accordingly dismissed.