Cases referred:

1. Anhia Mandalanin v. Bwjnath Mandal, A.I.R. 1974 Pat. 177.

2. Nanak Chand v. Chandra Kishore, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 446.

3. Ram Singh v. State, A.I.R. 1963 All. 355.

4. Mababir Agnrwalla v. Gita Roy, 1962 (2) Cri.L.J. 528 (Cal.).

5. Nalini Ranjan v. Kiran Rani, A.I.R. 1965 Pat. 442.

6. Mst. Jagir Kaur v. Jaswant Singh, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1521.

7. Bhagwan Dutt v. Smt. Kamla Devi, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 83.

8. Gulraj Singh v. Mota Singh, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 608.

9. Bhiku Krishna v. Keshav Ramji, A.I.R. 1924 Bom. 360.

10. Mallappa v. Shivappa, A.I.R. 1962 Mysore 140.

11. Bihta Co-operative Development and Cane Marketing Union Ltd. v. Bank of Bihar, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 389.

12. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh v. M/s. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1039.

13. Prem Nath L. Ganesh v. Piem Nath L. Ram Nath, A.I.R. 1963 Punj. 62.

Advocates appeared:

V.P. Salve, for applicant.

B.D. Kathale, for opponent No. 1.

M.B. Mor, Asstt. Govt. Pleader, for opponent No. 2.

DHARMADHIKARI C.S., J.-Applicant Smt. Ramabai, who is the widow of late Shri G. M. Balraj, filed an application against respondent Dinesh, under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, claiming maintenance at the rate of Rs. 500 per month from the date of the application. In the said application she has stated that she is the legally wedded wife of late Shri G. M. Balraj and non-applicant No. 1 Dinesh is the son of late Shri G. M. Balraj from his second wife Smt. Sushilabai. Shri Balraj died at Nagpur on 12-4-1974 and according to the applicant during the life-time of Shri Balraj she was receiving maintenance at Rs. 500 per month in cash from him. According to her, she has no source of income and, therefore, she is unable to maintain herself. She further stated that the whole property of Balraj is in possession of the non-applicant No. 1 by virtue of a will executed in his favour and, therefore, she is entitled to the maintenance at the rate of Rs. 500 per month from him. In the complaint she has also alleged that the alleged will was got executed by the respondent Dinesh and his mother Sushilabai by misrepresentation, fraud and by using undue influence.

2. The allegations made in this application were denied by respondent No. 1 Dinesh, though the fact that present applicant Ramabai is the wife of late Shri G. M. Balraj was not specifically denied by him. Before me, Shri Kathale, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 Dinesh, admitted that applicant Ramabai was legally married wife of late Shri G. M. Balraj. Thereafter it appears from the record that a preliminary objection was raised to the maintainability of the application itself by the present respondent No. 1 Dinesh vide his application dated 5-7-75. It was also contended before the Court below that applicant Ramabai has a natural son named Govind, from late Shri Balraj and he is under a legal obligation to maintain his mother. It was further contended that non-applicant No. 1 Dinesh being the stepson of applicant Ramabai, or applicant Ramabai being the stepmother of non-applicant No. 1 Dinesh, she is not entitled to claim any maintenance from him under section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, referred to hereinafter as the Code. According to non-applicant No. 1, under section 125 of the code only his mother is entitled to claim maintenance from him and not a stepmother and, therefore, according to non-applicant No. 1, the application itself was not maintainable.

3. It appears from record that arguments were heard by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nagpur on this preliminary issue and after hearing both the parties the learned Judicial Magistrate came to the conclusion that the applicant, who is the stepmother of non-applicant No. 1 Dinesh, cannot claim any relief against her step-son under section 125 of the code. In this view of the matter, the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, dismissed the application filed by applicant Ramabai vide his order dated 24-9-1975. Against this order the present revision application has been filed by applicant Ramabai.

4. Shri Salve, the learned counsel for the applicant, contended before me that the learned Judicial Magistrate committed an error in holding that under section 125 of the code a step-mother is not entitled to claim maintenance from her step son. According to Shri Salve, under the new Code of Criminal Procedure a mother who is unable to maintain herself is entitled to claim maintenance from her son. He further contended that for the first time the Legislature has made a provision in the Code providing maintenance to the parents, who are unable to maintain themselves. This provision has been made in the new Code with the sole object of doing a social justice to woman. According to the learned counsel, therefore, the provisions of section 125 of the Code should be interpreted and construed liberally having regard to the intention and object of the Legislation and if so construed the word mother will have to be given a wider and extended meaning. Shri Salve has further relied upon the provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and. Maintenance Act, 1956, referred to hereinafter as the Act, and particularly upon the provisions of section 20 of the said Act.

5. On the other hand it is contended by Shri Kathale, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 Dinesh, that the term mother as used in section 125 of the code should be given its natural meaning. According to the learned counsel, if so construed, a,mother means a woman who has given birth to a child and not the fathers wife. According to him, in no case the term mother can include a step-mother. He further contended that while interpreting the provisions of this sort, which are penal in nature, a strict construction will have to be put. So construed, according to him, in the absence of any definition or explanation in that behalf, the term mother cannot include in its import the step-mother. In this context he has also relied upon the provisions of section 20 of the Act and has contended that the Legislature, when it enacted section 125 of the code, was aware of the said provision. In section 20 of the Act by adding an Explanation the position is clarified by the Legislature by saying that in the said section the term parents will include a childless step-mother. According to the learned counsel, the applicant, who has a grown-up son of her own, aged about 36 years, is not even entitled to claim maintenance under section 20 of the Act. Therefore, it could not have been the intention of the Legislature to provide a distinct and separate forum to such a step-mother to claim maintenance from her step-son by taking recourse to the provisions of section 125 of the Code. According to him, the Legislature in its wisdom has not chosen to define or explain the term mother, though the expression wife is duly explained by adding an explanation. In support of his argument he has relied upon a decision of Patna High Court in (Anhia Mandalanin v. Bwjnath Mandal)1, A.I.R. 1974 Pat. 177.

6. Therefore, the short question which requires consideration in the present revision application is to find out as to whether the term mother as used in section 125 of the code includes a step-mother in its import.

7. For properly appreciating the controversy involved in this case it will be useful to refer to the provisions of section 125 of the Code which read as follows:

125 (1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain:-

(a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or

(b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself, or

(c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself, or

(d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself,

a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate not exceeding five hundred rupees in the whole, as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct:

Provided that the Magistrate may order the father of a minor female child referred to in clause (b) to make such allowance, until she attains her majority, if the Magistrate is satisfied that the husband of such minor female child, if married, is not possessed of sufficient means.

Explanation: For the purposes of this Chapter:-

(a) minor means a person who, under the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 is deemed not to have attained his majority (9 of 1875);

(b) wife includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from her husband and has not remarried.

(2) Such allowance shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application for maintenance.

(3) If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each months allowance remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made:

Provided that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under this section unless application be made to the Court to levy such amount within a period of one year from the date on which it became due:

Provided further that if such person offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him, and she refuses to live with him, such Magistrate may consider any ground of refusal stated by her, and may make an order under this section notwithstanding such offer, if he is satisfied that there is just grounds for so doing.

Explanation.-If a husband has contracted marriage with another woman or keeps a mistress, it shall be considered to be just ground for his wifes refusal to live with him.

(4) No wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance from her husband under this section if she is living in adultery or if, without any sufficient reason, she refused to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent.

(5) On proof that any wife in whose favour an order has been made under this section is living in adultery, or that without sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband, or that they are living separately by mutual consent, the Magistrate shall cancel the order.

Prima facie though section 125 of the Code corresponds to section 488 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure it is obvious that it has brought about major and substantial changes. It is further clear that the said section creates a statutory liability irrespective of personal law of the parties. As observed by the Supreme Court in (Nanak Chand v. Chandra Kishore)2, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 446 there is no inconsistency between the Maintenance Act and section 488, Criminal Procedure Code. While dealing with this aspect of the matter under the old Code of Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court observed as under:

The learned counsel says that section 488, Criminal Procedure Code, in so far as it provides for grant of maintenance to a Hindu, is inconsistent with Chapter III of the Maintenance Act, and in particular, section 20, which provides for maintenance to children. We are unable to see any inconsistency between the Maintenance Act and section 488, Criminal Proceduie Code. Both can stand together. The Maintenance Act is an Act to amend and modify the law relating to adoptions and maintenance among Hindus, The law was substantially similar before and nobody ever suggested that Hindu Law, as in force immediately before the commencement of this Act, in so far as it dealt with the maintenance of children was in any way inconsistent with section 488, Criminal Procedure Code. The scope of the two laws is different. section 488, Criminal Procedure Code, provides a summary remedy and is applicable to all persons belonging to all religions and has no relationship with the personal law of the parties. Recently the question came before the Allahabad High Court in (Ram Singh v. State)3, A.I.R. 1963 All. 355, before the Calcutta High Court in (Mababir Agnrwalla v. Gita Roy)4, 1962 (2) Cri.L.J. 528 (Cal.), and before the Patna High Court in (Nalini Ranjan v. Kiran Rani)5, A.I.R. 1965 Pat. 442. The three High Courts have, in our view, correctly come to the conclusion that section 4 (b) of the Maintenance Act does not repeal or affect in any manner the provisions contained in section 488, Criminal Procedure Code.

The Supreme Court had also an occasion to consider the scope of proceedings under section 488 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure in (Mst. Jagir Kaur v. Jaswant Singh)6, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1521. In this context the Supreme Court observed as follows:

The proceedings under this section are in the nature of civil, proceedings, the remedy is .a summary one and the person seeking that remedy, as we have pointed out, is ordinarily a helpless person. So the words should be liberally construed without doing any violence to the language.

To summaries: Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure providing for maintenance of wives and children intends to serve a social purpose. Section 488 prescribes alternative forums to enable a deserted wife or a helpless child, legitimate or illegitimate, to get urgent relief. Proceedings under the section can be taken against the husband or the father, as the case may be, in a place where he resides, permanently or temporarily, or where he last resided in any district in India or where he happens to be at the time the proceedings are initiated.

Therefore it is quite obvious that the object of the proceedings is to prevent vagrancy by compelling the husband or the father to support his wife or child unable to support itself. In a sense the provisions are not penal in nature, but are only intended for enforcement of a duty, a default of which is made penal. It is also clear that such a provision has been made to serve a social purpose for providing a speedy remedy in a summary manner to a person who is ordinarily helpless. Therefore, as observed by the Supreme Court in Mst. Jagir Kaurs case the words will have to be liberally construed without doing any violence to the language, of course within permissible limits. It is well settled that a word which is not defined in the Act, but which is a word of everyday use must be construed in its popular sense. While construing a Statute, which is secular in nature and dealing with the matter relating to general public, the Legislature is presumed to use the words used in the Statute in the popular sense as understood in common parlance and, therefore, normally they should be given their ordinary, natural and familiar meaning.

8. The term mother is not defined in the Act nor the said word is defined in the General Clauses Act, though we find that the expressions father and son are defined. Section 2 (20) and 2 (57) of the General Clauses Act define the terms father and son respectively as under:

2 (20) father, in the case of any one whose personal law permits adoption, shall include an adoptive father;

2 (57) son, in the case of any one whose personal law permits adoption, shall include an adopted son.

Therefore, in the absence of any definition or explanation of the said term mother what could be its natural import will have to be ascertained. In the Websters Third New International Dictionary the meaning of the word mother is given as under:

Mother-a woman who has given birth to a child.

In the Oxford English Dictionary the meaning given of the said word is as under:

Mother-A female parent, a woman who has given birth to a child. Correlative with son or daughter.

Similarly the dictionary meaning of the word step-father is the mothers husband, not ones own father. The word step affixed to term father or mother indicates holding of a nominal relationship. When the word step is used as prefix in conjunction with a degree of relationship, it is repugnant with blood relationship and is indicative of a relationship resulting from remarriage. Even from the definition of term father as given in the General Clauses Act, it is quite clear that though it includes adoptive father, it does not include the step-father. The term father as used in section 125 of the code will have to be understood in this context and as defined in the General Clauses Act. Therefore, it is obvious that in its import that term will not include the step-father. In my opinion, the same principle should apply to the term his mother as used in section 125 of the code. It is not possible to apply two different standards in this behalf. Therefore, in my opinion, the definition of the word father, as given in the General Clauses Act furnishes a clue for interpreting the term mother, though not specifically defined in the said Act. The dictionary meaning of the word Step-mother as given in Chambers Twentieth Century dictionary is as under:

Step-mother-the fathers wife, not ones own mother.

The step-father is the husband of ones mother by virtue of remarriage, whereas step-mother is the wife of ones father by virtue of the remarriage of the father. Thus it is quite clear that in common parlance step-mother is a separate and distinct entity and she cannot be equated with ones own mother. This is further clear from the terminology used in section 125 (1) (b), (c) of the Code. The expressions used indicate that even the child contemplated should be an offspring of the person concerned. The child might be legitimate, or illegitimate, but in either case he should be his child and not of somebody else. In my opinion the same principle should apply to the term his mother as used in section 125 (1) (d) of the Code.

9. However, a contention is raised before me by Shri Salve that the dictionary meaning of the said term mother is of no assistance while construing a social and beneficial legislation which was enacted by the Parliament to do social justice to women. Therefore, according to Shri Salve, the said term will have to be liberally construed and if so construed, it will obviously include a step-mother. According to Shri Salve, by providing an Explanation to section 20 of the Act, the Legislature has merely clarified the position and the said Explanation is added by way of abundant caution He further contended that but for the Explanation even a step-mother who is not childless but has children would have been entitled to claim the maintenance. As the legislation wanted, to restrict the said right only to the childless step-mother, the Explanation was added to section 20 of the Act. He further contended that the said legislation was before the Parliament when section 125 of the code was enacted. If this is so, it should be assumed that the Parliament was aware that the term mother includes in its import the step-mother, and therefore, the term mother has bean used in section 125 of the code in generic sense. He further contended that if the object of section 125 of the code is to prevent vagrancy and to provide summary remedy to needy persons, there is no compelling reason why the said term should be restricted to the natural mother only. In substance, therefore, he contended that the provisions of section 125 of the Code should be construed in the context of the provisions of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. In this context he has also drawn my attention towards the reasons and objects as well as the Report of the Law Commission as reproduced in A.I.R. Commentaries of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Vol. I, 7th Edition, p, 721. It is not possible for me to accept these contentions.

10. As already observed, the present legislation is secular in nature and is applicable to all persons belonging to all religions and has no relationship with the personal law of the parties. The Supreme Court had again an occasion to consider this aspect of the matter in (Bhagwan Dutt v. Smt. Kamla Devi)7, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 83. In the said decision a reference was also made to section 125 of the new Code and then it was observed by the Supreme Court as under:

The question therefore resolves itself into the issue whether there is anything in section 488 which is inconsistent with section 23 or any other provisions of the Act? This matter is no longer res integra. In Nanak Cland v. Chandra Kishore Aggarwal this Court held that there is no inconsistency between Act 78 of 1956 and section 488, Criminal Procedure Code. Both could stand together. The Act of 1956 is an Act to amend and modify the law relating to adoption and maintenance among Hindus. The law was substantially similar before when it was never suggested that there was any inconsistency with section 488, Criminal Procedure Code. The scope of the two laws is different. Section 488 provides a summary remedy and is applicable to all persons belonging to all religions and has no relationship with the personal law of the parties.

Therefore, it is quite obvious that the provisions of section 125 are neither inconsistent nor are controlled by the provisions of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. Thus, the provisions of section 125 of the Code will have to be construed having regard to the phraseology used in the section itself. In the old Code no provision was made for providing maintenance to the parents. Such a provision has been made for the first time by section 125 of the code. In view of the provisions of the new Code if any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain his father or mother unable to maintain himself or herself can be asked to pay maintenance upon the proof of neglect or refusal. In my opinion the word his which is prefixed to the word mother is very important. The obligation created by section 125 is a personal obligation. A person having sufficient means is made liable to pay maintenance if he neglects or refuses to maintain his father or his mother unable to maintain themselves. Therefore, it is quite obvious that the obligation, though statutory, is based on moral and social principles. A person having sufficient means is expected to maintain his father or his mother who are unable to maintain themselves. Therefore the word his assumes importance. The mother who is entitled to get maintenance should be his mother. If the said word is read in its context, it is obvious that the mother contemplated by the section is a natural mother. A step-mother is not his mother as contemplated by the said section. If a wider meaning is given to the term mother, as suggested by Shri Salve, then in spite of the fact that the stepmother is not childless, as is the case before me, the step-mother will be entitled to claim maintenance from the step-son and that too without claiming maintenance from her natural son. In that case this right could be exercised to harass the step-son. That does not seem to be the intention of the legislation. In the case before me the applicant has a son who is above 36 years. Instead of claiming any maintenance from him the applicant has filed an application under section 125 of the code against her step-son. Even under the personal law of the parties, namely the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, a mother who is not childless is not entitled to claim any maintenance under section 20 of the Act. Therefore, in my opinion, having regard to the object and intention of the legislation, the term mother will have to be given its natural meaning and so construed it will obviously not include a step-mother. The term mother as commonly understood clearly means the natural mother who has given birth to the person concerned.

11. The Supreme Court had an occasion to consider somewhat similar contention in (Gulraj Singh v. Mota Singh)8, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 608. In that case the words son or daughter which occurred in Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, as amended by Act 10 of 1960, came for consideration before the Supreme Court. It was contended therein that the expression son or daughter should be so construed so as to include illegitimate children also. A further contention was also raised before the Supreme Court that the Pre-emption Act must be read in conjunction with the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 which made a provision for devolution of the property. Negativing this contention the Supreme Court observed as under:

We have, therefore, to ascertain whether by the expression son or daughter only the legitimate issue of such female is comprehended or whether the words are wide enough to include illegitimate children also. That the normal rule of construction of the words child, son or daughter occurring in a statute would include only legitimate children, i. e. born in wedlock, is too elementary to require authority. No doubt, there might be express provision in the statute itself to give these words a more extended meaning as to include also illegitimate children and section 3 (j) of the Hindu Succession Act (ACT XXX of 1936) furnishes a good illustration of such a provision. It might even be that withoutan express provision in that regard the context might indicate that the words were used in a more comprehensive sense, as indicating merely a blood relationship apart from the question of legitimacy. Section 15 with which we are concerned contains no express provision and the context, so far as it goes, is not capable of lending any support to such a construction. In the first place, the words son or daughter occur more than once in that section. It was fairly conceded by Mr. Bishan Narain that were the son or daughter of a male vendor is referred .to as in section 15 (i), the words mean only the legitimate issue of the vendor. If so, it cannot be that in the case of a female vendor the words could have a different connotation. Even taking the case of a females vendor herself, there is a reference in section 15 (2) (a) (i) to the brothers son of such vendor. It could hardly be open to argument that a brothers illegitimate son is comprehended within those words. The matter appears to us to be too clear for argument that when section 15 (2) (b) (i) uses the words sort or daughter it meant only a legitimate son and legitimate daughter of the female vendor.

12. The Patna High Court had also an occasion to consider somewhat similar contention based on the provisions of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 in Anhia Mandalaniny. Baijnath Manclal. The precise question before the Patna High Court was as to whether the phrase used in section 15 (2) (a) of Hindu Succession Act, namely, heirs of the father includes the widowed step-mother who had remarried before coming into force of the Act. While repelling such a contention, a Division Bench of the Patna High Court, observed as follows:

There are obvious difficulties in accepting this argument as sound. Firstly, a stepmother is not a mother even under the Hindu law as it was in vogue before coming into force of the Act as is found mentioned at pages 107 of Mullas book, 13th Edition, Only a mother was entitled to get the property of her son or her daughter, as held in the case of (Bhiku Krishna v. Keshav Ramji)9, A.I.R. 1924 Bom. 360. Step-mother was not so entitled. Even at page 799 the passage to which our attention was drawn by Mr. Thakur Prasad states-

A step-mother is not entitled as mother to inherit xo her step son as one of the heirs in Class I but she can be an heir as fathers widow under Entry VI of Clause 11 of the Schedule.

Secondly, the term mother in clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 15 of the Act, in my opinion, will not cover the case of step-mother and, thirdly, even if it covers, as I have already stated sub-section (2) (a) of section 15 in this case will exclude clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1). Undisputedly the suit properties were Basias properties which she had inherited as a female Hindu from her father Chaitan.

Therefore, it is quite obvious that the term mother as was ordinarily understood even under Hindu law as it was in vogue before coming into force of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, in its import did not include the step-mother.

13. In (Mallappa v. Shivappa)10, A.I.R. 1962 Mysore 140 a question arose as to whether the term son as used in section 15(1) (a) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 will include step-son. In this context a Division Bench of the Mysore High Court observed as under:

In the absence of any definition or explanation to the effect that the word son would also include a step-son, that word should be given its natural meaning; if so, a son of a deceased female would mean a male issue of the body of that deceased female. (It may also include a boy taken in adoption, who, in law, stands on the same footing as a natural son; but, with this question we are not at present concerned). The position, therefore, is that the plaintiff who is a son of the step-son of the defendant No. 4, cannot claim to be a son of the deceased 4th defendant. As the son of a stepson, he may have the right to succeed under section 15 (!) (b) of the Hindu Succession Act, as the heir of the husband of the deceased defendant No. 4; but, defendant No. 1 being the son of the deceased No. 4, has the right to succeed under section 15 (i) (a) and would be the preferential heir. In the 12th Edition of Mullas Principles of Hindu Law, it is stated, with reference to section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, at page 984, as follows:

A stepson is not entitled as son to inherit to his step-mother as one of the heirs under this Entry. But he can succeed to her property as an heir of her husband under Entry (B).;

14. In my opinion, while construing section 125 of the code also in the absence of any definition or explanation to the effect that the word mother would also include a step-mother, that word will have to be given its natural meaning and if so construed, the mother will mean only a natural mother, namely, a woman who has given birth to the person from whom the maintenance is being claimed. The words used are his mother. Therefore, the mother who can claim maintenance should be the natural mother of the person from whom the maintenance is claimed. The said person should be the off-spring of her body and soul. Then alone she can be described as his mother. The stepmother is not his mother in the natural sense of the term. She becomes his stepmother because she is the wife of his father. Such a vicarious relationship is not contemplated by section 125 of the code.

15. Section 125 contemplates blood relationship which gives rise to moral and legal obligation to maintain a person. As initially no provision was made in the old Code for providing maintenance to the parents who were unable to maintain themselves, a specific provision in this behalf is made in the new Code, as the Legislature thought that the right of the parents not possessed of sufficient means to be maintained by their son should be recognised by making a provision in that behalf.

16. Before the framing of the new Code there was no general provision, irrespective of the personal law of the parties, providing for such a maintenance in case of parents. However, it cannot be forgotten that while making such a provision in the new Code, though the Legislature was aware of the Explanation added to section 20 of the Act, no such explanation is added to section 125 of the new Code, nor the term mother is defined in the said Code. Even otherwise it is really doubtful as to whether a childless step-mother would have been included in the term mother as used in the substantive part of the said section, in the absence of an Explanation in that bahalf. By the Explanation to section 20 of the Act, the position was clarified. This explanation cannot be construed so as to widen the ambit and the scope of the main section. It is well settled that the Explanation must be read so as to harmonies and clear up any ambiguity in the main section and it cannot be so construed as to widen the ambit of the section itself. (See (Bihta Co-operative Development and Cane Marketing Union Ltd. v. Bank of Bihar)11, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 389). In the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act the Legislature had took pains to clarify the matter by adding an Explanation. This Explanation only serves a purpose to clear up the doubts so far as childless step-mother is concerned. The purpose of the Explanation was not to enlarge the scope of the main section itself. In my opinion the inclusion of a childless stepmother in the Explanation to section 20 of the Act cannot have the effect of widening scope the section itself. Apart from this, as already observed, in the present case we are dealing with the Statute which is secular in nature and is not controlled by the provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and, Maintenance Act. It is obvious that the Legislature has willfully omitted either to define the said term or to give it an extended meaning by adding an Explanation to section 125 of the code though the provisions of section 20 with Explanation of the Act were already on the Statute book. The language used in section 125 of the code is plain and unambiguous. The word mother as used in section 125 must, therefore, be presumed to carry its plain literal meaning in the absence of any evidence that it was intended to mean something else. Therefore, it is not open to this Court to supply the omission by extending the meaning of the word mother in the guise of interpretation by analogy or implication only because this Court feels that it will be in conformity with the principle of social justice and equity. In this context a reference could usefully be made to the following observations of the Supreme Court in (Commissioner of Sales Tax, Uttar Pradesh v. M/s. Parson Tools and Plants, Kanpur)12, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1039.

If the Legislature willfully omits to incorporate something of an analogous law in a subsequent statute, or even if there is a casus omissus in a statute, the language of which is otherwise plain and unambiguous, the Court is not competent to supply the omission by engrafting on it or introducing in It, under the guise of interpretation by analogy or implication, something what it thinks to be a general prineiple of justice and equity. To do so (at p. 65 in (Prem Nath L. Ganesh v. Piem Nath L. Ram Nath)13, A.I.R. 1963 Punj. 62. Per Tek Chand J.) would be entrenching upon the preserves of legislature, the primary function of a Court of law being jus dicere and not jus dare.

Therefore, it is not possible for me to accept the contention of Shri Salve in this behalf. Further as already observed, in the present case the applicant is not even childless. She got her own son who is aged about 36 years. It is no doubt true that she had made an allegation in her application that the non-applicant No. 1 Dinesh is in possession of the property of her husband by virtue of a will which is under challenge. If this is so, the applicant is not without any remedy. If the contentions raised in the application are true, then it is open for her, if so advised, to approach the competent Court under section 22 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. However, I am not concerned with that aspect of the matter in this revision application nor I am concerned with the merits of her claim. That is a matter which the competent Court will have to decide in accordance with law if and when such an application is filed by the applicant under the provisions of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956.

17. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the learned Magistrate was right in coming to the conclusion that the application filed by the applicant under section 125 of the code was not maintainable.

18. In the result, the revision application fails and is dismissed.

Revision dismissed.

-----