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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • For the Appellant: C.P. Damodaran Nair D. Krishna Prasad
Judges
  • Radhakrishna Menon, J.
Acts
  • S. 11(2) and (3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act,
  • S. 11(4)(iv) of the Rent Control Act,
  • S. 20 of the Rent Control Act,
  • Rent Control Act,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • For the Appellant: C.P. Damodaran Nair D. Krishna Prasad
Judges
  • Radhakrishna Menon, J.
Acts
  • S. 11(2) and (3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act,
  • S. 11(4)(iv) of the Rent Control Act,
  • S. 20 of the Rent Control Act,
  • Rent Control Act,
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The revision petitioners are tenants; the respondent is the landlord (same landlord in all petitions). The landlord had filed applications under S. 11(2) and (3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (referred to in the opinion as the Rent Control Act) seeking eviction on the ground of bona fide need for his own occupation. The Rent Controller dismissed those applications. On appeal the appellate authority reversed the Rent Controller and allowed the landlord's petitions. In the interim, two tenants relinquished possession of rooms and the landlord took over those rooms.

The tenants filed revision petitions under S. 20 of the Rent Control Act challenging the appellate orders. The revisional authority concurred with the appellate authority, dismissing the revisions. The present opinion relates to the Civil Revision Petitions filed by the tenants under S. 20 seeking to set aside the revisional authority's dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the landlord has established a bona fide need under S. 11(3) of the Rent Control Act to recover possession for his own occupation, including where demolition and reconstruction is contemplated.
  2. Whether the landlord's claim should instead be treated as falling under S. 11(4)(iv) (a different ground) and thus rejected for want of proof.
  3. Whether developments occurring after institution of the proceedings (notably the surrender of possession by two tenants) should be taken into account and, if so, whether they fundamentally affect the landlord's bona fide need.
  4. Whether the appellate and revisional authorities erred in law or fact in arriving at and upholding the finding that the landlord bona fide needs the entire building for his occupation.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners (Tenants)

  • In their counter statements the tenants asserted that the bona fide need pleaded by the landlord was a ruse to evict them.
  • In the memorandum of revision they relied on subsequent developments: two tenants had surrendered possession and the landlord was already in possession of those portions; those surrendered rooms were sufficient to meet the landlord's bona fide requirement.
  • They contended that the appellate authority's findings were based on conjecture and surmise and that the landlord had not shown he could not carry on his business unless all premises were recovered or that the entire place was required for reconstruction.
  • They argued that the matter should be treated under S. 11(4)(iv) rather than S. 11(3), implying a stricter requirement of proof.
  • They relied on subsequent-events jurisprudence (P. Venkateswarlu) to urge that the court should take cognisance of post-institution developments affecting the right to relief.

Respondent (Landlord) / Appellate and Revisional Authorities (as recorded)

  • The landlord maintained that he bona fide needed the building for his own occupation and that this necessity could include demolition and reconstruction to make the place suitable for occupation.
  • The appellate authority found there was no case by the tenants that the landlord did not require the scheduled building for his own use or that the landlord owned another building in the same town; it allowed the eviction petitions.
  • The revisional authority concurred with the appellate authority and dismissed the revisions, concluding the landlord had established a bona fide need for the entire building.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mohammed Kannu v. Assnar Kunju (1965 1 KLR 32) For the purpose of occupation a landlord may have to demolish the building and reconstruct it; such a course does not mean the landlord's claim is not under S. 11(3). The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that demolition and reconstruction undertaken for owner-occupation falls within S. 11(3), and thus the landlord's claim was properly brought under that provision.
P.N. Shenoy v. B.V. Shenoy ((1970) 1 SCC 499 : AIR 1971 SC 942) Where a landlord seeks eviction for immediate demolition and rebuilding for own occupation he need not further prove that the condition of the building requires immediate demolition. The court cited this ruling to reject the submission that the landlord had to prove immediate necessity of demolition; it supported the finding that the eviction claim remained under S. 11(3).
R.P. Mehta v. I.A. Sheth (AIR 1964 SC 1676) The owner can occupy a place by making use of it in any manner. Used to reinforce that occupation need not be limited to the existing physical condition or mode of use; alterations to enable occupation do not take the claim outside S. 11(3).
P. Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders ((1975) 1 SCC 770 : AIR 1975 SC 1409) The court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to institution of the proceeding, provided fairness to both sides is observed. The court applied the principle to assess whether the surrender by two tenants after institution of proceedings fundamentally affected the landlord's right to relief; it concluded the subsequent events were not sufficiently impactful to alter the result.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by examining the pleadings, the memorandum of revision and the findings of the appellate and revisional authorities. Key points in its step-by-step analysis were:

  1. Pleadings and admissions: The court noted that the tenants, in their memorandum of revision, effectively conceded that the landlord bona fide required at least a portion of the building for his own occupation. The petitioners did not, in that memorandum, press the contention that the landlord's asserted bona fides were merely a ruse.
  2. Characterisation of the eviction claim: The court examined whether the eviction sought by the landlord should be treated as coming under S. 11(3) (personal requirement for occupation) or S. 11(4)(iv). Relying on precedent (Mohammed Kannu, P.N. Shenoy, R.P. Mehta), the court concluded demolition and reconstruction undertaken to enable owner-occupation remains within S. 11(3) and is not excluded by a narrow construction that would confine S. 11(3) to occupation without any alteration.
  3. Purpose and construction of S. 11: The court emphasized that S. 11 is structured to provide advantages to landlords; the enumerated grounds justify eviction consistent with the landlord's general right to recover possession. The court rejected the argument that additional restrictions should be read into S. 11(3) beyond what the statute provides.
  4. Subsequent events: The tenants argued that post-institution developments (surrender of two premises) should alter the outcome. The court accepted the governing principle from P. Venkateswarlu that courts can take notice of subsequent events where they have a fundamental impact on the right to relief, but held that the surrendered portions did not fundamentally affect the landlord's proven need for the entire building. The appellate authority had been aware of the surrender and its findings remained based on proved facts.
  5. Procedural sufficiency and relevance: The court observed that the tenants had not adequately framed before the revisional court the contention that the landlord had not pleaded a bona fide need for the entire building; affidavits filed later were of no relevance to the central question. The court therefore found no sustainable basis to hold that the appellate authority had misdirected itself.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Civil Revision Petitions are dismissed. The revisional court's concurrence with the appellate authority — that the landlord bona fide needs the entire building under S. 11(3) — is upheld.

Direct consequences and orders:

  • The Civil Revision Petitions were dismissed with no costs.
  • The tenants were granted four months' time to vacate and surrender the building pursuant to the Rent Controller's order.
  • The tenants were directed to file an undertaking to that effect within four weeks from the date of the decision before the Rent Control Court.

Implications beyond the parties: The opinion applies existing authorities to confirm that an eviction claim under S. 11(3) may encompass demolition and reconstruction for owner-occupation and that subsequent developments will be considered only if they fundamentally affect the right to relief. The opinion does not state that it establishes a new precedent beyond its application of the cited authorities.

Show full summary ...

    Devaky v. Krishnankutty

    1. The tenants are the revision petitioners. The landlord is same in all these petitions.

    2. The applications of the landlord under S. 11(2) and (3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, for short. The Rent Control Act, were dismissed by the Rent Control Court. On appeal the appellate authority reversed the orders and allowed the petitions. In the meantime there was a relinquishment of possession of rooms by two tenants and taking over possession by the landlord.

    3. The revisional authority has concurred with the findings of the appellate authority and as a result of which the revisions, the tenants had filed under S. 20 of the Rent Control Act, were dismissed. These revisions challenging the said orders of the Revisional Authority under S. 20, have been filed by those tenants. The facts which are relevant and requisite to consider the questions arising for consideration in these revision petitions, briefly stated are: The petitions for eviction are brought under S. 11(3). That means the landlord has prayed for an order directing the petitioners-tenants, to put him in possession of the building in question, as he bonafide needs the same for his own occupation. In their respective counter statements, the tenants (identical contentions have been raised in all the counter statements) have stated thus:—

    4. The appellate court after considering the various aspects of these contentions, has found as follows:—

    “………There is no case for the tenants that the landlord does not require the petition schedule building for his own use………There is no case for the tenants that the land lord has got another building of his own in the same town”.

    5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the above findings of the appellate court and the specific case set up by the petitioner in his pleadings stand apart. In short the said findings are based on conjectures and surmises. He further submits that it has clearly been stated in the counter statement that the bocafide need pleaded in the petition for eviction is but a ruse adopted by the landlord to evict the petitioners. The above findings of the appellate authority therefore are liable to be vacated.

    6. On going through the memorandum of revision filed under S. 20 of the Rent Control Act, it is clear that the petitioners have no case that the bonafide need pleaded by the respondent is only a ruse adopted by the respondent to get them evicted. On the other hand, what is discernible from the memorandum of revision is, that the rooms already surrendered by some of the tenants are sufficient to meet the bonafide requirements of the landlord. I shall in this connection extract the grounds, the petitioners have taken in the memorandum of revision under S. 20.

    “2 The Appellate Authority failed to note the very significant circumstances which has developed after filing of the appeal that out of the stenant against whom eviction was claimed. 2 tenants have surrendered possession and the landlord is now in possession of those two premises.

    3. The Appellate Authority failed to note that the landlord has no case that he cannot carry on his business unless be gets eviction of all the premises and that the entire place is required for reconstruction. In the absence of such evidence, the Appellate Authority should have held against the bonafides of the landlord since be has already taken possession of portions of the premises viz. one shop-room in the ground floor and the entire first floor.

    4. Even otherwise the Appellate Authority should have held that there is no acceptable evidence on the side of the landlord, that he cannot carry on his business in the premises which is now in his possession and that he requires the petition schedule building for such purpose”.

    7. It can be seen from the above statements in the memorandum of revision that the petitioners have conceded that in any event, the landlord bonafide required a portion of the building, for his own occupation.

    8. The revisional court after considering the above case of the petitioners however, has held that the landlord has established his case that he bonafide needs the entire building for his own occupation. This is what the revisional court has expressed in this regard:—

    “9. Even otherwise the claim of the landlord is for eviction or all the tenants for reconstruction and bona fide occupation. The building is said to be in a very rotten and dilapidated state. The learned Rent Controller misconstrued this claim as one falling under S. 11(4)(iv) and rejected the claim for want of proof. II has been held in Mohammed Kannu v. Assnar Kunju (1965 1 KLR 32) that for the purpose of his occupation a landlord may have to demolish the building and reconstruct it and that does not mean that the landlord's claim is not under S. 11(3). In (1970) 1 SCC 499 : AIR 1971 SC 942 (P.N Shenoy v. B.V Shenoy) it is held that where a landlord seeks eviction for Immediate demolition and rebuilding for own occupation he need not further prove that the condition of the building is such that it requires immediate demolition. The owner can occupy a place by making use of it in any manner (R.P Mehta v. I.A Sheth, AIR 1964 SC. 1676). Therefore an eviction order on the ground of personal requirement can be passed where it is proved that the landlord wanted to pull down the building and build another one and then occupy it. Admittedly the landlord is now doing his trade in a rented building. The learned Rent Controller found that since the landlord has another building in his occupation the claim under S. 11(3) cannot be allowed. But as has been correctly distinguished by the Learned Appellate Authority such building must belong to the landlord. In these petitions there is no case for the tenants that the landlord any has other building of his own in that place; Hence the bonafides of the landlord cannot be questioned. The finding given by the appellate authority has only to be confirmed;”

    9. In the light of the rulings referred to in the above passage, the argument of she learned counsel for the petitioners that the eviction sought for, must be treated as one falling under S. 11(4)(iv) of the Rent Control Act, is liable to be rejected.

    10. It should be remembered that the provisions of S. 11 are for the advantage of the landlord and the grounds for ejectment enumerated thereunder are such which justify the eviction of the tenant by the landlord in the exercise of his general right to eject the tenant. And if that be so, why should more restrictions be read into those grounds? I cannot therefore agree with the argument of the learned counsel that S. 11(3) will apply only if the land-lord bonafide needs to occupy the building without any alteration. It therefore follows that once the landlord establishes that he bonafide requires the building for his occupation or the occupation of any member of his family, he can recover possession of the building from the tenant irrespective of the fact whether he would occupy the same with or without making any alterations.

    11. The tenants wanted the revisiooal court to take cognizance of certain events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceedings for eviction. The Revisional Court however rejected the said request entering the following findings:—

    “But there is no reason why this subsequent development had not been brought to the notice of the Appellate Authority when the appeals were actually heard. There is clear acqulesence on the part of the revision petitioners. They are therefore waived from raising such a contention at this very late stage”.

    12. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the above finding of the revisional court is not sustainable in the light of the ruling of the Supreme Court in P. Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders ((1975) 1 SCC 770 : AIR. 1975 SC. 1409). The Supreme Court has held thus:—

    “We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed”.

    13. With a view to make the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cogniz ance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of proceeding. But it should be shown that the developments or event, arising after the lis has come to the court, has a fundmental impact on the right to the relief. If there is no such impact the authority concerned can be blind to the subse quent events or developments. The appellate authority in the case on hand has held that the landlord bonafide needs the entire building for his own occupation. In arriving at the said finding it is not as if the appellate authority was not aware of the fact of surrender of the shop buildings by two of the tenants. This development arising after the dispute has come to the court, is not capable of making any impact on the case of the landlord that he needs the entire building for his own occupation. The findings of the appellate court that the landlord bonafide needs the entire building, are based on proved facts and hence unassailable. The revisional court has concurred with the said view. Subsequent development therefore has rightly been held to be irrelevant in considering the grant of the decretal remedy.

    14. From the facts stated above, it is clear that the allegation that the appellate authority has not approached the issue in the right perspective, is not sustainable. It is not the case of the petitioners (as is discernible from the memorandum of revision under S. 20) that the landlord has not pleaded the case that he bonafide needs the building for his own occupation. The case of the petitioners however, is that there is no specific pleading; and in the absence of the specific pleadings, the case should not have been considered by the appellate authority. As already stated, no such case has been put forward before the revisions court and that it is so can be seen from the memorandum of the revision filed before the revisional court. The learned counsel for the petitioners pressed into service the averments contained in an affidavit filed on 26-10-1986 in the revision petition before this court. For what purpose this affidavit has been filed, is not clear either from the affidavit or from the argument. The facts, highlighted by the averments in the affidavit, have no relevance to the issues arising for consideration. Whether the landlord can construct a new building on the property which is supposed to be owned by him, is not a fact relevant to consider the issue whether the landlord bonafide needed the building in dispute for his own occupation. The above argument is therefore rejected.

    15. For the reasons stated above the C.R Ps are liable to ba dismissed. Accordingly I dismiss the Civil Revision Petitions. No costs.

    16. The learned counsel for the petitioners then submitted that the petitioners may be given some time to vacate the premises. Taking into’ account the peculiar circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the petitioners must be given some reasonable time to vacate the buildings. I therefore grant four months time to the petitioners to surrender the building pursuant to the directions contained in the order of the Rent Controller, The petitioners will file an undertaking to the said effect within four weeks from today before the Rent Control Court.

    17. Dismissed.

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    Comments

    Devaky v. Krishnankutty
    (Nov 18, 1986)