Usha, J.:— This revision petition is at the instance of respondents-tenants in R.C.P No. 190/92. Rent Control Petition was dismissed on 4-8-1994 on the failure of the petitioner to appear on that day. I.A 3175/94 was filed to restore rent control petition which was dismissed for default. The petition was allowed by the rent control authority by order dt. 7-2-1996 on payment of cost of Rs. 500/- to the respondents. Aggrieved by the above, respondents-tenants took up the matter in appeal before the rent control appellate authority as R.C.A 74/96. A reading of the above order would show that even though a contention had been taken in the memorandum of appeal that rent control court has no power for restoration since the provisions of Order 9 Rule 9 C.P.C is not applicable to rent control proceeding, that argument was not seriously pressed before the appellate authority. The appeal was argued on merits and, as mentioned above, the same was dismissed.

2. In this revision petition, petitioner has again taken up the contention that I.A 3175/94 filed under Order IX Rule 9 was not maintainable as this court has held that the provisions of Order IX, R. 9 are not applicable to rent control proceedings. Reliance was placed by learned counsel on a decision of a Single Judge of this court in K.P Pius v. Mrs. Albina Rozario & Another, 1989 (2) KLJ 643 in support of the above contention.

3. Order IX Rule 9(1) reads as follows:

“9. Decree against plaintiff by default bars fresh suit:—(1) Where a suit is wholly or partly dismissed under Rule 8, the plaintiff shall be precluded from bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action. But he may apply for an order to set the dismissal aside, and if he satisfied the court that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance when the suit was called on for hearing, the court shall make an order setting aside the dismissal upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.”

4. The question that came up for consideration before the learned single Judge was whether a second application for eviction is maintainable at the instance of the landlord whose first application was dismissed for default. Learned Judge took the view that the procedural provisions of the C.P.C may be applied to rent control proceedings in the absence of express provision to the contrary or in the absence of a conflict between the provisions of the C.P.C and provisions of the Kerala Buldings (Lease & Rent Control) Act or the Rules framed thereunder. Then the learned Judge took the view that the provisions under Order IX Rule 9 which creates a bar to a fresh suit or proceeding when an earlier suit stands dismissed for default depriving the plaintiff or the petitioner of a substantive right of suit is not a mere procedural provision, but a substantive provision barring a right which otherwise inheres in every person to approach the court for redressal of his grievance. The bar of fresh suit in Order IX Rule 9, according to the learned Judge, in the absence of an express provision in the Act will not be applicable to the rent control proceedings. On a reading of the entire judgment, it is very clear that what had been considered by the learned Judge was only that provision contained in Order IX, Rule 9 which created a bar of fresh suit and its application to the rent control proceedings. Therefore, the statement in para. 13 of the judgment that Order IX, Rule 9 C.P.C cannot therefore be invoked to preclude the landlady in that case from claiming relief, has to be understood in the light of the reasoning given by the learned Judge that the bar of a suit under Order IX Rule 9 cannot be made applicable to rent control proceedings, since it has the effect of taking away the substantive right of the party concerned. This decision cannot be taken as an authority for a proposition that the remedy given under Order IX Rule 9 to a plaintiff to make an application to set aside the dismissal of the suit is not applicable to the rent control proceedings.

5. A Bench of this court had occasion to consider the applicability of the provision contained under Order IX, Rule 9 C.P.C to proceedings under the Land Reforms Act, 1964, in Achutha Menon v. Narayanan, 1974 KLT 485. Rule 99 of the Kerala Land Reforms (Tenancy) Rules, 1964 provides that in all proceedings before the Land Tribunal and the Land Board, procedure prescribed as regards the applications in the Code of Civil Procedure or the Rules made thereunder shall, as far as can be made applicable; be followed except to the extent otherwise provided in the Act or in the Rules. It was held that Rule 99 attracts only the procedural provisions of C.P.C and not the substantive provision such as first part of Order IX Rule 9 which bars maintainability of an application. A Full Bench of this court in Kalyani Amma Bhargavi Amma v. Ouseph Varkey, 1967 KLT 317, took the view that the provisions of Order IX including those for dismissal for default, for decision ex parte and for setting aside such dismissals and decisions, are applicable to proceedings before the Land Board. In Thamukutty v. Athankutty, 1961 KLT 31, the question that came up for consideration was whether a second application under Sec. 16 of the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929 is maintainable, when the previous application u/s. 16 was dismissed for default and an application made for its restoration was also dismissed. It was argued that the provisions of C.P.C being made applicable to the hearing of an application under the Malabar Tenancy Act by the Rent Court by Sec. 15(2) and to proceedings relating to application under the Act by Sec. 49, the provisions of Order IX Rule 9 CPC would preclude a party from making a subsequent application for fixation of fair rent. Learned Judge took the view that the provisions of Order IX Rule 9 C.P.C cannot be wholly applied to the application under Rule 16. Therefore, it cannot be contended that dismissal of the application for restoration operates as bar to the second application under Sec. 16.

6. In Cheru Ouseph…Petitioner; v. Kimjipathumma…., 1981 KLT 495, M.P Menon, J. took the view that Rent Control Court has the power in appropriate cases to restore an application dismissed for default. In the above case, the revision petitioner sought reconsideration of the view taken by Janaki Amma, J. in Asher v. Raru, 1979 KLT 260 to the effect that the Rent Control Court has no power to restore a petition dismissed for default; but, at the same time, by exercising the power of review conferred under clause (k) of Sec. 23(1) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, the Rent Control Court can restore a petition dismissed for default. It was argued that the court's power under Sec. 114 and Order 47 of C.P.C is distinct and different from the power under Order IX Rule 9 and when Sec. 23(1)(k) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act confers only one of these powers on the Rent Control Court, the other should be deemed to have been denied. It was further contended that if the power under Cl.(k) of Sec. 23(1) to set aside ex parte orders is not substituted for the power under Order IX Rule 9 C.P.C, the same must be said about the power of review under Cl.(k) also. M.P Menon, J. approached the issue from a different angle and observed that in respect of procedural matters, all powers which are not specifically denied by the statute or the statutory rules, should be vouchsafed to a tribunal so that it may effectively exercise is judicial function. If the petition was happened to be dismissed on the failure of the petitioner to appear in time due to reasons beyond his control, the Rent Control Court has the power to restore the application. Sec. 23 of Act 2/65 is not designed to make the Tribunal powerless in such matters, but only to supplement its powers with some of the wellknown trappings of the court.

7. A similar view was taken in the matter of application of the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 22 of C.P.C to rent control proceedings by John Mathew, J. in Sukumaran v. Susy Issac, 1985 KLT 1128. It was held that there is no statutory provision enabling any party to the rent control proceeding to file a memorandum of cross-objection or cross appeal in an appeal filed by the opposite party. The provisions of Order XLI Rule 22 C.P.C are not inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act. Therefore, Order XLI Rule 22 or in any case the principles contained in that rule are applicable to proceedings before the appellate authority under the Rent Control Act also. In taking the above view, the learned Judge had relied on a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court by Chinnappa Reddy, J. (as he then was) in Bhagavatula Pullayya v. M. Anandam Chetti, AIR 1972 A.P 66. It was held therein as follows:

“I am of the opinion, that the provisions of Order 41 Rule 22 Civil P.C are not inconsistent with any of the provisions of the Act and are, therefore, applicable to proceeding before the appellate authority under the Act.

The petitioner, therefore, was entitled, both on general principles and on the application of Order 41, Rule 22 to sustain the order of the Rent Controller before the Appellate Authority on the grounds decided against him by the Rent Controller.”

8. We are in full agreement with the view taken by M.P Menon, J. that in the interest of justice, authorities under the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act should have the power in appropriate cases to restore an application dismissed for default. The procedure prescribed under Order IX Rule 9 C.P.C should therefore be made applicable to the proceedings under the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act to enable the rent control authority to restore an application dismissed for default. Neither Sec. 23 nor any other provision of the Act is contradictory to the procedural provisions contained under Order IX Rule 9 C.P.C There is no doubt that the first portion of Order IX Rule 9, which creates a bar to a fresh proceeding, cannot be made applicable to rent control proceedings, since it takes away substantive right available to the party and there is no statutory provision which either expressly or by necessary implication bars such right. But, as far as the later portion of the Rule is concerned, it is only a procedural provision and its principles can be applied in rent control proceedings also.

9. In the result, we affirm the judgment in R.C.A 74/96 and the order in I.A 3175/94 and dismiss the revision petition.