Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • sub - sections (3), (4), (7), Or sub - section (8)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • sub - sections (3), (4), (7), Or sub - section (8)
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion — Paripoornan, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns an application under section 11(8) read with section 11(10) of the relevant Rent Control Act, by which a landlord sought eviction of a tenant to recover part of a building for the landlord's "personal use" (additional accommodation). The rent controller originally rejected the landlord's application. The appellate authority reversed that decision, finding the landlord's need for additional accommodation to be bona fide. A revision petition challenging the appellate authority's order was filed and considered by the court delivering this opinion (Paripoornan, J.).

Material factual points found in the opinion: the landlord has five children (three sons and two daughters); the tenant is a neighbour who admitted knowledge of the landlord's family composition and agreed that existing facilities were insufficient for the landlord's family's convenient residence. The appellate authority found the landlord's need genuine; the rent controller had earlier reached a contrary view. The present opinion addresses a revision arising from those conflicting findings and dismisses the revision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the landlord has proved that he "requires additional accommodation for his personal use" under section 11(8) and section 11(10) of the Act.
  2. Whether "personal use" in that statutory context is confined to use by the landlord personally, or whether it includes use by members of his family who wish to live with him.
  3. Whether the landlord's claim for additional accommodation is bona fide (i.e., whether he pleads an honest purpose rather than an excuse to obtain eviction), and whether the test of bona fides depends on whether the landlord could manage without the accommodation.
  4. Whether, under the first proviso to section 11(10), the hardship that would be caused to the tenant by granting the eviction outweighs the advantage to the landlord — and which party bears the burden of proof on matters relevant to that proviso.

Arguments of the Parties

Revision-Petitioner's (Counsel's) Arguments

  • First, that the requirement of additional accommodation must be for the landlord's personal use alone and not for members of his family.
  • Second, that the landlord sought additional accommodation as a convenience or facility for comfortable living rather than because he "required" it — i.e., the plea did not establish a genuine need.
  • Third, that under the first proviso to section 11(10) the burden was on the landlord to prove that the hardship caused to the tenant by granting eviction would not outweigh the landlord's advantage, and that the landlord had failed to discharge that burden; therefore the appellate order should be vitiated.

The opinion does not set out an extended, separate account of the landlord's counsel's arguments; the landlord's position is reflected in the appellate authority's findings and the facts admitted by the tenant, as discussed elsewhere in the opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, AIR 1979 SC 272 That "personal use" in the statutory context includes use by members of the landlord's family who want to live with him (interpretation of "personal use"). The court relied on this decision (cited at p. 277 para 16) to hold that the first point raised by the revision-petitioner — that "personal use" must be limited to the landlord himself — is without substance, and to support the appellate authority's conclusion that the landlord's need was bona fide.
S. Sivasubramanya Iyer v. S. H. Krishnaswamy, AIR 1981 Kerala 57 Explains the bona fides test under s. 11(8) and s. 11(10): bona fides relates to honest purpose rather than whether the landlord could manage without accommodation; "personal use" includes family members; court should not substitute its view on whether the landlord could live without the accommodation for assessing bona fides. The opinion quotes and follows this authority (including a passage attributed to Poti J.) to conclude that bona fides does not require absolute necessity and that "personal use" extends to family — supporting the appellate authority's finding that the landlord's claim was bona fide.
Sivasankaran v. Kacharlala Sowcar, 1984 (I) M.L.J. 155 Listed alongside other authorities for the principle that "personal use" includes family members and for the bona fides analysis. Used as supporting precedent for the interpretation of "personal use" and the bona fides test; the court grouped it with other authorities to validate the appellate authority's conclusion.
Lekshmana Naikan v. Gopalakrishna Filial, 1981 K.L.T. 167 Clarifies that even where additional accommodation may be a luxury or not strictly necessary, a landlord who can afford such accommodation is not to be denied relief so long as the claim is bona fide; bona fides concerns honesty of purpose not necessity. The court cited this authority to reinforce that the test of bona fides is whether the landlord pleads an honest purpose, not whether the accommodation is strictly necessary for survival; applied it to uphold the appellate authority's finding of bona fides.
P. B. Desai v. C. M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059 That both sides must adduce relevant evidence on hardships and availability of other accommodation; the landlord must show other reasonable accommodation was not available and the tenant must adduce evidence to the contrary; the decision on balance of hardship is to be formed after sifting such evidence. The court relied on this Supreme Court authority (cited at p. 1965, para 9) to state that both parties should lead evidence and that the final finding regarding greater hardship is a finding of fact; used it to consider whether the tenant had shown hardship sufficient to outweigh the landlord's advantage.
Chandler v. Strevett, (1974) 1 All E.R. 164 Earlier view that the balance of hardship was not necessarily a question of fact. The opinion notes this earlier view but then contrasts it with later English decisions, observing that subsequent authorities treat the balance of hardship as a factual question.
Coplans v. King, (1974) 2 All E.R. 393 One of the later decisions holding that the judge's decision on the balance of hardship is a question of fact. Adopted as part of the reasoning indicating that the trial judge's (or appellate authority's) finding on the balance of hardship is a finding of fact and entitled to deference absent illegality or irrationality.
Piper v. Harvey, (1958) 1 All E.R. 454 Also treats the decision on balance of hardship as a factual determination. Used to support the view that findings on balance of hardship are factual and that appellate interference requires demonstration that the factual finding was illegal, unfair or irrational.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in discrete steps that reflect statutory interpretation, evidentiary assessment, and application of precedent:

  1. Interpretation of "personal use": The court accepted authorities (including Bega Begum and S. Sivasubramanya Iyer) establishing that "personal use" in s. 11(8) is not confined to the landlord's sole personal use but includes use by members of his family who wish to live with him. On that basis the court rejected the revision-petitioner's submission that "personal use" must be limited to the landlord alone.
  2. Assessment of bona fides: The court explained and applied the settled test that bona fides concerns honest purpose rather than the landlord's absolute inability to manage without the additional accommodation. It relied on decisions (including S. Sivasubramanya Iyer and Lekshmana Naikan) which hold that even if the accommodation sought might be a convenience or a luxury, relief may not be denied so long as the claim is made in good faith (an honest purpose and not a pretext for eviction). The appellate authority had found the landlord's need to be genuine; the court concurred.
  3. Evidentiary findings as to family composition and local knowledge: The court noted that the landlord's petition did not enumerate family members but that the tenant (a neighbour) admitted knowledge of the landlord's family composition and agreed that existing facilities were inadequate. The court treated those admissions and the appellate authority's factual findings as supporting the bona fide requirement for additional accommodation.
  4. Burden and balance of hardship under the proviso to s. 11(10): The court cited P. B. Desai v. C. M. Patel to state that both parties must lead evidence relevant to the proviso (landlord to show other reasonable accommodation was not available; tenant to adduce evidence of hardship). After "sifting such evidence" the court must form its conclusion on whether great hardship would be caused by passing the decree. The court observed that the appellate authority had found that the tenant did not adduce material showing that hardship to the tenant would outweigh the landlord's advantage.
  5. Deference to findings of fact: The court emphasized that the question of balance of hardship is a finding of fact (supported by later English authorities such as Coplans v. King and Piper v. Harvey) and that the appellate authority's factual conclusion was not shown to be illegal, unfair or irrational on the material before the court. Because the tenant's own admission indicated insufficiency of facilities for the landlord's family, it was not established that granting eviction would cause greater hardship to the tenant than to the landlord.
  6. Conclusion on relief sought: Combining the interpretive points, the bona fides analysis, and the absence of evidence from the tenant showing overriding hardship, the court concluded that the appellate authority's order should not be disturbed.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The revision is dismissed; the order passed by the appellate authority is not interfered with.

Implications:

  • The appellate authority's determination that the landlord's requirement of additional accommodation for "personal use" (including use by family members) was bona fide is upheld.
  • On the evidence before this court, the tenant did not prove that hardship from eviction would outweigh the advantage to the landlord; the appellate authority's finding on that factual issue was not shown to be unlawful, unfair or irrational.
  • No new legal principle or precedent was established by this opinion; the court applied and followed existing authorities on (a) the meaning of "personal use", (b) the bona fides test, and (c) the evidentiary approach to the proviso in section 11(10). The direct effect is that the appellate order in favour of the landlord stands and the revision is dismissed.

All content in this summary is derived exclusively from the provided opinion text authored by Paripoornan, J.; no outside facts or interpretations have been added.

    Arjunan v. Eranu

    Paripoornan, J.:-

    1i (10). - - the rent control court shall, If it is satisfied that the claim of the landlord under sub - sections (3), (4), (7), Or sub - section (8) is bona fide, Make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building on such date as may be specified by the rent control court, And if the court is not so satisfied, It shall make an order rejecting the application:

    provided that, In the case of an application made under sub - section (8), The rent control court shall reject the application if it is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord".

    the short question is whether the landlord has proved that he requires additional accommodation for his personal use, And even so, Is this a case where the hardship that will be caused to the tenant by granting the eviction, Will outweigh the advantage to the landlord?

    4. Admittedly, The landlord has five children, Three sons and two daughters. The details of the members of the family were not furnished in the petition filed before the rent controller. But, It is admitted and also found by the appellate authority, That the absence of mention of the details regarding the members of the family, Has not caused "a surprise to the tenant. The tenant is a neigh hour of the landlord. He knows 'the full details of the occupants of the landlord's unit. He admitted that the landlord has five children, Of which two are daughters and three sons. The tenant also admitted that according to the religious customs of the muslim community, To which the landlord belongs, The daughters, When they are given in marriage, Should be provided with separate self contained aras (suites). He agreed with the plea that the existing facilities of the landlord are not sufficient for the convenient residence of the members of the family of the landlord. It is true that the landlord is residing in one room and got possession of the middle room from another tenant, After the filing of the instant petition. Even so, He has got only two bed rooms and each unit has only one room, A verandah and a kitchen. It will not be sufficient for the petitioner and five children including 'the two daughters to sleep in the two bed rooms. On the above premises, The appellate authority held that the need mentioned by the landlord is quite genuine. The finding to the contrary by the rent controller was held to be unjustified and unreasonable. The very fact that the tenant has admitted that for the convenient residence of the members of the landlord's family, The existing facilities are not sufficient, Goes a long way to prove that the need mentioned by the landlord is quite genuine and the claim made bona fide. We concur with the appellate authority in his reasoning and conclusion, To hold that in the circumstances, The requirement of additional accommodation by the landlord is bona fide.

    5. Counsel for the revision - petitioner stressed three aspects before us. Firstly, It was contended that the requirements of additional accommodation should be for the landlord's personal use and not for the use of the members of his family. Secondly, It was submitted that the landlord sought additional accommodation as a facility for convenient living and this is not a case where he "requires" "additional accommodation" - - meaning that there is no need. Thirdly, It was contended, That under the first proviso to s. 11 (10) of the act, The hardship that will be caused to the tenant by granting an order of eviction, Will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. The burden is on the landlord to prove the ingredients of the first proviso to s. 11 (10) of the act. It has not been done. So, The order passed by the appellate authority is vitiated.

    6. We are of the view that the above pleas lack substance. Under s. 11 (8) of the act, The words "if he requires additional accommodation for his personal use" are not confined to the landlord alone, But will also include the use by. The members of his family, Who want to live with him. "personal use" in the context does not necessarily mean use by the landlord alone, But also includes use by the members of his family who want to live with him. - see - bega begum v. Abdul ahad khan (air 1979 s. C. 272, At p. 277 para 16) ; s. Sivasubramanya iyer v. S. H. Krishnaswamy (air 1981 kerala 57) and sivasankaran v. Kacharlala sowcar (1984 (i) m. L. J. 155 at pp. 160 & 161 para 12). So, The first point raised to the effect that the requirements of additional accommodation should be only for the landlord's personal use is without substance.

    7. On the second point, On the basis of evidence, The appellate authority has held that the need mentioned by the landlord is quite genuine. Maybe he wants additional accommodation as inability for convenient living. But, It is difficult to say that what the landlord seeks is a me re luxury. Even in a case where an additional accommodation is sought as a luxury, It has been held that the relief under s. 11 (8) read with s. 11 (10) should not be denied to the landlord. Poti. J. (as he then was) stated the matter pithily thus, In s. Sivasubramanya iyer's case (air 1981 kerala 57) at page 59, Para. 3:

    "if the landlord feels that additional accommodation is necessary and if there are sufficient grounds or justification in support of it and therefore, If he seeks recovery of the part of the building jet out to a tenant under s. 11 (8) of 1 he act, Then. It is not for the court to find out whether even without such additional accommodation, The landlord could somehow manage to carry on. It may not be that if he could manage to carry on, His claim is not bona fide, If on the other hand he is intending to seek additional accommodation not to provide such additional accommodation to his own family members, And if the evidence indicates so, Then of course his claim under s. 11 (8) will not be bona fide. In other words, The bona fides of the claim does not normally depend upon the court being satisfied of the genuineness of the need of additional accommodation. Then, What has to be considered first is whether the additional accommodation is required for the personal use of the landlord. Personal use in this context is not necessary use by himself but by the members of his family who want to live with him"
    .

    again, The learned judge, In his illimitable style, Stated the law thus, In lekshmana naikan v. Gopalakrishna filial (1981 k. L. T. 167) at page 169, Paragraph 3:

    "may be that even without the additional accommodation the landlord may

    manage. If the question is one of dire need one may say he can do without it. In fact the additional accommodation which he seeks may even amount to a luxury for him. But there are many people who can afford luxuries. Those who can are entitled to them and there is no reason to deny that to them so long as law does not prohibit their enjoyment. Therefore, The test of bona fides under s. 11 (8) read with s. 11 (10) is not whether the landlord could very well afford to live without the additional accommodation, But whether in seeking the additional accommodation the landlord is pleading an honest purpose and not merely setting up an excuse to obtain eviction".

    we concur with the above decisions and hold that on the facts of this case, The landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, As rightly found by the appellate authority. The claim so made is bona fide.

    8. The third and the final point taken centres round the applicability of the proviso to s. 11 (10) of the act. It was contended that the burden of proof is on the landlord to substantiate that greater hardship will be caused to him, If the application is rejected. On this aspect, The supreme court has held in p. B. Desai v. C. M. Patel (air 1974 s. C 1059) at page 1965, Para 9, Thus:

    "in our opinion both sides must adduce all relevant evidence before the court;

    the landlord must show that other reasonable accommodation was not available to him and the tenant must also adduce evidence to that effect. It is only after sifting such evidence that the court must form its conclusion on consideration of all the circumstances of the case as to whether great hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it".

    the said decision was followed in sega begum v. Abdul ahad khan (air 1979 s. C. 272, At p. 277 para 14). It is evident from the above decisions that both sides should lead evidence substantiating the facts stated in the proviso to s. 11 (10) of the act. The final finding regarding the greater hardship, Appears to be a finding of fact - p. S. Desai's case (air 1974 s. C. 1059 at p. 1065). It is seen that at one time the question where lies the balance of hardship was opined to be not one of fact - see chandler v. Strevett (1974 (1) all. E. R. 164 - per scott, L. J.). But, The later decisions of the court of appeal in coplans v. King (1974 (2) all. E. R. 393) and piper v. Harvey (1958 (1) all. E. R. 454) have taken the view that the decision of the trial judge with regard to the balance of hardship is a question of fact.

    9. The appellate authority has stated that it has not been established that the hardship that will be caused to the tenant will outweigh the advantage to the landlord, If the eviction is implemented. Our attention was not invited to any material let in by the tenant to show that any hardship will be caused to him by granting the order of eviction. It is important to notice that the tenant himself stated that the existing facilities are not sufficient for the convenient residence of the members of the family of the landlord, But he is opposing eviction since he has difficulty in finding another accommodation for himself. In every case of eviction, There will certainly be difficulty for the tenant. But, What is required is something more. Even according to the tenant's own admission, The existing facilities are insufficient for the convenient residence of the members of the landlord's family. It is obvious, That if eviction is denied, It will cause greater hardship to the landlord. This not a case where by the grant of eviction greater hardship will be caused to the tenant. The finding entered on this score, By the appellate authority, Is a finding of fact. Our attention was not invited to any material to demonstrate that the said finding is illegal, Unfair or irrational.

    10. The order passed by the appellate authority does not merit interference in this revision. This revision is dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Arjunan v. Eranu
    (Jul 27, 1991)