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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • For the Appellant: V.M. Nayanar K.C. Sankaran
Judges
  • Bhaskaran, J.
Acts
  • sub-section (1) of S. 60 of the Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950 (Kerala Act 22 of 1950) as Ss. 5 and 14 of the 1963 Limitation Act
  • Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in comparison to Article 181 of the Limitation Act of 1908
  • S. 99 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969 (the Act).
  • Act, the provisions of S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908,
  • Rule 22(2) of the Kerala Land Reforms (Tenancy) Rules, 1970,
  • Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963,
  • Act, Art. 137 of the schedule to the Limitation Act
  • EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE ACT 1948
  • clause (b) of S. 2 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
  • S. 8(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act
  • S. 16(5) of the Indian Telegraphs Act, 1885,
  • Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act.7.
  • LIMITATION ACT 1963
  • INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
  • Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963
  • Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act
  • Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908,
  • Art. 181 of the Limitation Act of 1908.
  • S. 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1929,
  • Again, in S. 34 of the Telegraph Act
  • Art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
  • Art. 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act
  • S. 29(2) of the 1963 Limitation Act
  • S. 4 of the Limitation Act 1963,
  • Indian Limitation Act, 1963.
  • provision in sub-section (3)
  • S. 5 of the Limitation Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • For the Appellant: V.M. Nayanar K.C. Sankaran
Judges
  • Bhaskaran, J.
Acts
  • sub-section (1) of S. 60 of the Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950 (Kerala Act 22 of 1950) as Ss. 5 and 14 of the 1963 Limitation Act
  • Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in comparison to Article 181 of the Limitation Act of 1908
  • S. 99 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969 (the Act).
  • Act, the provisions of S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908,
  • Rule 22(2) of the Kerala Land Reforms (Tenancy) Rules, 1970,
  • Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963,
  • Act, Art. 137 of the schedule to the Limitation Act
  • EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE ACT 1948
  • clause (b) of S. 2 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
  • S. 8(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act
  • S. 16(5) of the Indian Telegraphs Act, 1885,
  • Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act.7.
  • LIMITATION ACT 1963
  • INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
  • Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963
  • Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act
  • Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908,
  • Art. 181 of the Limitation Act of 1908.
  • S. 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1929,
  • Again, in S. 34 of the Telegraph Act
  • Art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
  • Art. 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act
  • S. 29(2) of the 1963 Limitation Act
  • S. 4 of the Limitation Act 1963,
  • Indian Limitation Act, 1963.
  • provision in sub-section (3)
  • S. 5 of the Limitation Act
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

This writ petition concerned the question whether Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, applies to execution proceedings before the Land Tribunal constituted under S.99 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (Act 1 of 1964, as amended). The factual and procedural sequence set out in the opinion is as follows:

  • By order dated 4-4-1972 (Ext. P-1) the 2nd respondent (the Land Tribunal) allowed the petitioner's O.A. No. 73 of 1972 under S.77 of the Act, directing shifting of a kudikidappu (occupancy) of the 1st respondent from the A-schedule land to the B-schedule land in the petition.
  • The 1st respondent challenged Ext. P-1 by O.P. No. 4789 of 1972; this challenge was dismissed by this Court by judgment dated 26-2-1973 (Ext. P-2).
  • In May 1980 the petitioner filed I.A. No. 26 of 1980 before the Land Tribunal seeking implementation of Ext. P-1, i.e., possession of the A-schedule property by shifting the 1st respondent to the B-schedule property. The petitioner had executed a deed transferring the B-schedule land to the 1st respondent and deposited shifting charges with the Tribunal in compliance with Ext. P-1.
  • The 1st respondent resisted I.A. No. 26 of 1980 primarily on the ground that it was barred by limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Land Tribunal accepted that contention and dismissed the application by order dated 9-9-1980 (Ext. P-5).
  • The petitioner sought writ relief in this Court to quash Ext. P-5.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is applicable to execution proceedings before the Land Tribunal constituted under S.99 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (that is, whether Article 137 governs the time-bar and the Tribunal's power to entertain I.A. No. 26 of 1980).
  2. Whether the Land Tribunal constituted under S.99 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act is to be treated as a "court" for the purposes of the Limitation Act, 1963 (so that court-oriented provisions like Article 137 and S.5 can apply).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Land Tribunal committed an error of law in dismissing I.A. No. 26 of 1980 on the basis that the Limitation Act applied generally to proceedings under the Kerala Land Reforms Act.
  • Implicit in the petitioner's challenge is that the Tribunal could not treat Article 137 as applicable to the execution application under S.77/S.99 without there being specific statutory incorporation or a finding that the Tribunal is a "court" for the purposes of the Limitation Act.

1st Respondent's Arguments

  • The Land Tribunal possesses the characteristics of an ordinary civil court and thus the Limitation Act should apply; in support reliance was placed on a Division Bench decision of this Court in Kunhayamma v. Munsiff Land Tribunal (1979 KLT 663).
  • The Land Tribunal's dismissal of I.A. No. 26/1980 as time-barred under Article 137 was therefore contended to be valid.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
Shal Mulehand & Co. Ltd. v. Jawahar Mills Ltd., Salem (AIR 1953 SC 98) Supports proposition that Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908 applied only to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. Used with other early decisions to establish the settled view regarding Article 181 (pre-1963) and to contrast the changed scope in the 1963 Act.
Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva (AIR 1964 SC 752) Same principle as above: Article 181 of 1908 applied only to applications under CPC. Cited as part of the string of decisions confirming the limited scope of Article 181 (1908).
Prativa Bose v. Rependra Deb Raikat (AIR 1965 SC 540) Also cited for the settled proposition on Article 181 of the 1908 Act. Used to support the historical foundation for comparing Article 181 (1908) with Article 137 (1963).
Athani Municipality v. Labour Court, Hubli ((1969) 1 SCC 873 : AIR 1969 SC 1335) Held Article 137 did not apply to applications under S.33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act; reasoned Article 137 contemplated applications to courts and the Labour Court was not a "court" within the Limitation Act. Discussed as an important Supreme Court view holding Article 137 not universally applicable to tribunals; the opinion distinguishes and then contrasts this view with later Supreme Court authority.
Nityanand v. L.I.C. of India ((1969) 2 SCC 199 : AIR 1970 SC 209) Indicated it might require serious consideration whether applications to courts under other provisions, apart from the CPC, were included within Article 137 of the 1963 Act. Quoted to show judicial hesitation and to introduce the later fuller consideration by the Supreme Court.
Sushila Devi v. Ramanandan Prasad ((1976) 1 SCC 361 : AIR 1976 SC 177) Explained S.5 of the Limitation Act applies to appeals/applications "to the Court" and observed that certain authorities (e.g., a Collector) were not "Court" for these purposes. Used to support the point that S.5 is framed with courts in mind and to illustrate that bodies vested with some CPC powers are not necessarily "courts" under the Limitation Act.
Mohd. Ashfaq v. S.T.A.T., U.P ((1976) 4 SCC 330 : AIR 1976 SC 2161) Considered applicability of S.5 and S.29(2) and held that where a statute expressly limits condonation (e.g., to 15 days) S.5 cannot be invoked beyond that limit. Applied to explain limits on S.5's applicability and that express statutory exclusions can prevent S.5 being used to condone delay.
Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma ((1976) 4 SCC 634 : AIR 1977 SC 282) Held that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act applies to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil court; thereby expanding the scope beyond CPC-only applications. Relied upon as the Supreme Court's conclusion that Article 137 applies to petitions/applications made to a civil court under any enactment; this serves as pivotal authority for the Court's analysis.
Kunhayamma v. Munsiff Land Tribunal (1979 KLT 663) Division Bench decision of this Court holding that the Limitation Act would apply to proceedings before the Land Tribunal (in context of execution application and condonation of delay). Cited by the 1st respondent; the present Court considered it but held it did not conclusively support the proposition that Article 137 applies to all proceedings before the Land Tribunal.
R.K. Kajaria v. C. Engineering (India) Ltd. (AIR 1972 Calcutta 381) Single Bench Calcutta High Court observation that Article 137's scope is wider than Article 181 (1908). Mentioned as a relied-upon authority by the Land Tribunal; the Court noted its observation but did not adopt broader conclusions from that case for the present facts.
Beeran v. Rajappan (1980 KLT 210) Division Bench held the Claims Tribunal under S.110 Motor Vehicles Act was not a "Court" to attract certain CPC jurisdiction. Used to demonstrate judicial views that specialized tribunals are not always "courts" for purposes of applying court-centric Limitation Act provisions.
E.S.I. Corporation v. Ramadas Raddiar (1980 KLT 425) Held the law of limitation had no scope for operation in respect of claims under S.45A of the Employees State Insurance Act, as those claims did not envisage action in a Court. Relied upon to show judicial tendency to exclude Limitation Act operation where statutes do not envisage court proceedings.
Commissioner of Agrl Income-Tax v. Thalayar Rubber Industries Ltd. (1981 KLT 398 : 1981 (2) ILR Kerala 113) Full Bench view that the Agricultural Income Tax Appellate Tribunal had no jurisdiction to condone delay because Ss.5 and 14 of the Limitation Act 1963 applied only to proceedings in a court, not before a Tribunal. Invoked to support the conclusion that tribunals (absent specific statutory provision) cannot rely on Limitation Act provisions intended for courts.
Cheru Ouseph v. Kunhipathumma (1981 KLT 495) Decision noted by the Court; the opinion states it has no bearing on the question of limitation in this case. Mentioned and expressly characterized as not bearing on the limitation issue under consideration.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a series of logical steps, grounded in both statutory text and precedent:

  1. The Court began by reciting the settled position under the earlier Limitation Act, 1908: Article 181 (the counterpart of Article 137 of 1963) was treated as applicable only to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure, as reflected in a line of Supreme Court decisions. This established the historical baseline.
  2. The 1963 Limitation Act, however, adopted an expanded definition of "application" (clause (b) of S.2), expressly including "petitions"; this enlargement indicated an intention that the Limitation Act, 1963, could apply beyond CPC proceedings.
  3. The Supreme Court's subsequent jurisprudence was examined in detail. The Court noted divergent and evolving views:
    • Athani Municipality v. Labour Court (Two-Judge Bench) held Article 137 did not apply to certain Labour Court applications because Article 137 was understood to contemplate applications to "courts" and the Labour Court was not a "court" within the scheme of the Limitation Act; that reasoning emphasized provisions like S.4 and S.5 that presuppose a court.
    • Nityanand observed reservations and suggested the point required fuller consideration.
    • Kerala State Electricity Board v. Kunhaliumma (a later Supreme Court decision) held that Article 137 applies to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil court — thus broadening the scope and overruling (in effect) the narrower reading of Athani in so far as applications made to courts are concerned.
  4. From these authorities the Court distilled the principle that Article 137 and the 1963 Limitation Act provisions apply to applications and petitions made to a court under other enactments, and are not confined to CPC applications — but this conclusion depended on whether the receiving body is a "court" for these purposes.
  5. The pivotal next question was whether the Land Tribunal under S.99 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act is a "court" within the meaning of the Limitation Act. The 1st respondent argued the Tribunal has court-like trappings (e.g., payment of court-fees, issue of processes) and relied on a Division Bench decision (Kunhayamma) holding Limitation Act applicable to Land Tribunal proceedings. The Court rejected the proposition that mere court-like characteristics (such as collection of court-fees or ability to issue processes) automatically confer the status of a "court" for the purpose of the Limitation Act.
  6. The Court observed that the legislature in the Kerala Land Reforms Act had specifically incorporated only certain provisions of the Limitation Act (by doctrine of incorporation) — in particular S.5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (as shown by S.108 of the Act, quoted in the opinion) — and had not incorporated Article 137 or the entire 1963 Limitation Act scheme for all proceedings. This selective incorporation indicated legislative intent that Article 137 would not automatically apply to all proceedings before the Land Tribunal.
  7. The Court contrasted the position of execution applications with other categories of proceedings (for example, recovery of arrears where Rule 22(2) specifically confers court-like recovery machinery), and concluded that for execution applications the legislature did not intend the Land Tribunal to be treated as a court for the full gamut of Limitation Act provisions.
  8. The Court surveyed parallel decisions (Claims Tribunal, Motor Vehicles Act; ESI claims; Agricultural Income Tax Appellate Tribunal) which supported the view that tribunals and specialized authorities are not necessarily "courts" for the purposes of S.5 or Article 137 unless statutes specifically provide; the preponderance of judicial opinion favored non-applicability of the Limitation Act to tribunals unless specifically provided otherwise.
  9. Applying this reasoning to the facts, the Court concluded that the Land Tribunal erred in holding I.A. No. 26 of 1980 barred by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Court therefore allowed the writ petition, quashed Ext. P-5, and directed restoration of the application for disposal according to law.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition was allowed. The Court held that the 2nd respondent Land Tribunal was in error in concluding that the petitioner's execution application (I.A. No. 26 of 1980) was barred by Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The impugned order (Ext. P-5) was quashed, and the Land Tribunal was directed to restore and decide the application according to law. There was no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: Ext. P-5 (the Land Tribunal's order dismissing the application as time-barred) was quashed; the application must be restored and dealt with on merits by the Land Tribunal.
  • Legal consequence indicated by the Court: Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, does not automatically apply to execution proceedings before the Land Tribunal under S.99 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act unless the Act itself specifically incorporates the relevant Limitation Act provisions or treats the Tribunal as a "court" for those purposes. The selective legislative incorporation of Limitation Act provisions (for example, S.5 in certain contexts) is determinative.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion aligns with authorities holding that tribunals are not ipso facto "courts" for purposes of the Limitation Act, and that applicability depends on statutory language and legislative intent; the Court declined to treat certain Division Bench authority (Kunhayamma) as conclusively supporting blanket application of Article 137 to all Land Tribunal proceedings.

Disposition: Allowed. (Writ petition allowed, Ext. P-5 quashed, application restored to the Land Tribunal; no order as to costs.)

Show full summary ...

    Raman v. Kunhipennu

    JUDGMENT

    1. The question of law that falls for decision in this writ petition is whether Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is applicable to execution proceedings before the Land Tribunal constituted under S. 99 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, Act 1 of 1964 as amended by Act 35 of 1969 (the Act). The 2nd respondent, the Land Tribunal, by its order dated 4-4-1972, a true copy of which is Ext. P-1, had allowed the petitioner's application O.A No. 73 of 1972 under S. 77 of the Act for shifting the kudikidappu in the occupation of the 1st respondent from the land described in the A schedule to the land described in the B Schedule to the petition. O.P No. 4789 of 1972 filed by the 1st respondent against Ext. P-1 order having been dismissed by this Court as per judgment dated 26-2-1973, a true copy of which is Ext. P-2, the petitioner in May 1980 filed I.A No. 26 of 1980 requesting the Land Tribunal to put the petitioner in possession of the A schedule property in implementation of its order Ex. P-1, by shifting the kudikidappu of the 1st respondent to the land described in the B schedule to the petition. The petitioner had in the meanwhile executed a deed of transfer of the land described in the B schedule to the petition in favour of the 1st respondent and had also deposited with the Land Tribunal the shifting charges in compliance with the directions contained in Ext. P-1 order. The petition I.A No. 26 of 1980 was resisted by the 1st respondent mainly on the ground that it was barred by Limitation under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Accepting the contention of the 1st respondent, the land Tribunal dismissed the application by its order dated 9-9-1980, a true copy of which is Ext. P-5: hence this writ petition for quashing Ext. P-5 order of the Land Tribunal.

    2. On behalf of the petitioner it was submitted that the Land Tribunal had committed a grave error of law in passing Ext. P-5 order on the assumption that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, applied generally to the proceedings under the Act. The counsel for the 1st respondent, however, sought to sustain the order contending that the Land Tribunal has all the taperings of an ordinary court of civil judicature, placing reliance on the ruling of a Division Bench of this Court in Kunhayamma v. Munsiff Land Tribunal (1979 KLT 663).

    3. It is a well accepted proposition that Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, applied only to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure-vide the decisions of the Supreme Court in Shal Mule hand & Co. Ltd. v. Jawahar Mills Ltd. Salem (AIR. 1953 SC. 98); Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiva (AIR. 1964 SC. 752); and Prativa Bose v. Rependra Deb Raikat (AIR. 1965 SC. 540). The further question to be decided is whether Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has been so widely worded as to include within its sphere applications other than those filed under the Code of Civil Procedure. The term ‘application’ as defined in clause (b) of S. 2 of the Limitation Act, 1963, includes petitions' and to that extent the scope of the Limitation Act stands enlarged. It would appear that the intention of the legislature was that the Limitation Act, 1963, should apply not only to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure, but also to applications and petitions under other enactments.

    4. The enlarged scope of the applicability of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in comparison to Article 181 of the Limitation Act of 1908 has been considered by the Supreme Court in Athani Municipality v. Labour Court, Hubli ((1969) 1 SCC 873 : AIR. 1969 SC. 1335); Nityanand v. L.I.C of India ((1969) 2 SCC 199 : AIR. 1970 SC. 209); Sushila Devi v. Ramanandan Prasad ((1976) 1 SCC 361 : AIR. 1976 SC 177); Mohd. Ashfaq v. S.T.A.T, U.P ((1976) 4 SCC 330 : AIR. 1976 SC 2161); and Kerala S.E Board v. T.P Kunhaliumma, 1976 KLT. 810 : ((1976) 4 SCC 634 : AIR. 1977 SC 282). The view expressed by the Supreme Court in Athani Municipality v. Labour Court Hubli ((1969) 1 SCC 873 : AIR. 1969 SC. 1335) was that Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, did not apply to applications under S. 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act—vide paragraphs 11 and 12 of the decision at pages 1343 and 1344 of the report. The view expressed was that Article 137 only contemplated applications to courts, the reason being that under the third division of the Limitation Act, 1963, all other applications mentioned in the various Articles were applications filed in a court; further, S. 4 of the Limitation Act 1963, provided for the contingency when the prescribed period for any application expired on a holiday and the only contingency contemplated was “when the court is closed”. It was pointed out therein that under S. 5 of the Limitation Act it was only the court which was enabled to admit an application after the prescribed period had expired if the court was satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the application on these reasons the Supreme Court held that the scheme of the Indian Limitation Act was that it only dealt with applications to courts, and that the Labour Court was not a court within the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. The Supreme Court, however, in Nityanand v. L.I.C of India ((1969) 2 SCC 199 : AIR. 1970 SC. 209) hastened to add in paragraph 4 of the decision, at page 210 of the report, that it was not necessary to express any view on the first ground given in that decision, and added that it seemed that it might require serious consideration whether applications to courts under other provisions, apart from the Code of Civil Procedure, were included within Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 or not. In Sushila Devi v. Ramanandan Prasad ((1976) 1 SCC 361 : AIR. 1976 SC. 177) in paragraph 6, at page 182 of the report, the Supreme Court held:

    “Under S. 5 of the Limitation Act an appeal or application ‘may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period’. The Collector to whom the application was made was not a Court, though S. 15 of the Act (Kosi Area (Restoration of Lands to Raiyats) Act (30 of 1951)) vested him with certain specified powers under the Code of Civil Procedure; also, the kind of application that was made had no time limit prescribed for it, and no question of extending the time could therefore arise”

    5. Thereafter came the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ashfaq v. S.T.A.T, U.P ((1976) 4 SCC 330 : AIR. 1976 S.C 2161) wherein in paragraph 8 of the decision, at page 2168 of the report, the Supreme Court observed as follows:—

    “Now the question which arises is: does S. 5 of the Limitation, 1963 apply so as to empower the Regional Transport Authority, for sufficient cause, to entertain an application for renewal even where it is delayed by more than 15 days? S. 29, sub-section (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 makes S. 5 applicable in the case of an application for renewal unless its applicability can be said to be expressly excluded by any provision of the Act. The only provision of the Act sought to be pressed into service for this purpose was sub-section (3). Does sub-section (3) expressly exclude further extension of time under S. 5? If it does, then S. 5 cannot be availed of by the appellant for condonation of the delay. Sub-section (3) in so many terms says that the Regional Transport Authority may condone the delay in making of an application for renewal and entertain it on merits provided the delay is of not more than 15 days. This clearly means that if the application for renewal is beyond time by more than 15 days, the Regional Transport Authority shall not be entitled to entertain it or in other words, it shall have no power to condone the delay. There is thus an express provision in sub-section (3) that delay in making an application for renewal shall be condonable only if it is of not more than 15 days and that expressly excludes the applicability of S. 5 in cases where an application for renewal is delayed by more than 15 days.”

    6. It has already been noticed that in Nityanand v. L.I.C of India ((1969) 2 SCC 199 : AIR. 1970 S.C 209) the Supreme Court had observed that it might require serious consideration whether applications to courts under other provisions, apart from the Code of Civil Procedure, were included within Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, or not. The above indication given in that decision, came up for fuller consideration in Kerala S.E Board v. T.P Kunhaliumma, 1976 KLT. 810 : (1976) 4 SCC 634 : AIR. 1977 S.C 282). In that case the respondent before the Supreme Court had filed a petition before the District Judge, Tellicherry under S. 16(5) of the Indian Telegraphs Act, 1885, claiming enhanced compensation. The appellant Board raised a contention that the petition was barred by time under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The District Judge held that the application was governed by Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act and therefore the petition filed beyond three years was barred by time. In revision this Court set aside the order of the District Judge, condoning the delay in filing the application; and remitted the matter to the District court for disposal in accordance with law it is aggrieved by the decision of this Court that the appellant Board appealed to the Supreme Court. After elaborate consideration on the relevant provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, with particular emphasis to the impact of the changes brought about by Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, in paragraph 22 of the decision, at page 286 of the report, the Supreme Court held:

    “The conclusion we reach is that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act will apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil court. With respect we differ from the view taken by the two Judge Bench of this Court in Athani Municipal Council case ((1969) 1 SCC 873 : AIR. 1969 S.C 1335) (supra) and hold that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act is not confined to applications contemplated by or under the Code of Civil procedure. The petition in the present case was to the District Judge as a court. The petition was one contemplated by the Telegraphs Act for judicial decision. The petition is an application falling within the scope of Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act.”

    7. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court there could be no doubt that the provisions of the Limitation Act would apply not only to applications made to a court under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, but also to applications or petitions filed under any act to a civil court.

    8. Having noticed that the provisions of the Limitation Act would apply to applications under other enactments made to a court, it has to be examined whether the Land Tribunal constituted under S. 99 of the Act is a court The counsel for the 1st respondent submitted that the Land Tribunals have the characteristics of a court as indicated in paragraph 20 of the decision of the Supreme Court in Electricity Board's case, 1976 KLT. 810 : ((1976) 4 SCC 634 : AIR. 1977 SC 282.) which reads as follows:—

    “Again, in S. 34 of the Telegraph Act reference is made to payment of court-fees and issue of processes both of which suggest that the ordinary machinery of a court of civil jurisdiction is being made available for the settlement of these disputes.”

    9. This passage taken out of context may lead to a wrong appreciation of the spirit underlying the decision of the Supreme Court if the requirement of payment of court-fees and issue of processes by itself would confer the status of a court on a Tribunal, the Supreme Court in the earlier decision in Sushila Devi's case ((1969) 2 SCC 199 : AIR. 1970 SC. 209) would have held that the Labour Court was a court, and the applications or petitions made to it would be governed by Art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The counsel for the 1st respondent then submitted that a Division Bench of this Court in Kunhayamma v. Munsiff Land Tribunal (1979 KLT. 663) had held that the provisions of the Limitation Act would apply to the proceedings before the Land Tribunal; and therefore it has to be held in this case that the dismissal of the application I.A No. 26 of 1979 as tine barred by the Land Tribunal was perfectly valid. The specific question that was raised in the writ appeal which resulted in the decision in Kunhymma's case (1979 KLT 663) was whether in respect of an execution application filed before the Land Tribunal there was power in the Land Tribunal to excuse the delay in filing the said application. S. 108 of the Act provided:

    “Unless otherwise specifically provided in this Act, the provisions of S. 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, shall apply to all proceedings under this Act.”

    10. Though S. 29(2) of the 1963 Limitation Act in terms would no apply to the proceedings before the Land Tribunal, in the light of the rulings given by the Supreme Court already noticed, S. 5 of the Limitation Act nevertheless would apply to proceedings before the Land Tribunal unless specifically excluded by the provisions in the Act by the doctrine of incorporation. That the legislature in its wisdom has chosen not to incorporate all the provisions of the Limitation Act, but restricted application to S. 5 thereof, indicates that in the absence of any other provision in the Act, Art. 137 of the schedule to the Limitation Act would not be applicable to the proceedings before the Land Tribunal. As far as execution applications are concerned, the legislature did not consider the need to confer the status of a court on the Land Tribunal with respect to all the proceedings before it; and that is in contrast with the specific provisions made in Rule 22(2) of the Kerala Land Reforms (Tenancy) Rules, 1970, with respect to the application for recovery of arrears of rent determined under sub-section (2) of S. 26 of the Act. I am, therefore, of the view that the decision of the Division Bench in Kunhayamma's case (1979 KLT. 663) could not be considered to be an authority for the proposition that the Limitation Act would apply to all proceedings before the Land Tribunal. The Land Tribunal has placed reliance on the decision of a single Bench of the Calcutta High Court in R.K Kajaria v. C. Engineering (India) Ltd. (AIR. 1972 Calcutta 381). It is true, as observed in that judgment, the scope of Art. 137 of the 1963 Limitation Act is wider than that of Art. 181 of the Limitation Act of 1908. It is not necessary here to consider whether in that case the conclusion that Art. 137 applies to application for pre-emption by applicants under S. 8(1) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act is arrived at after being satisfied that the test laid down by the Supreme Court that such application should be made to a court, was fulfilled.

    11. The Division Bench of this Court has held in Beeran… v. Rajappan…. (1980 KLT. 210) that the Claims Tribunal constituted under S. 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1929, is not a Court to attract the jurisdiction under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure; another Division Bench of this court in E.S.I Corporation v. Ramadas Raddiar (1980 KLT. 425) has held that the law of limitation would have no scope for operation in respect of any claims arising under S. 45A of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948, as it does not envisage an action in court for enforcing a right A Full Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Agrl Income-Tax v. Thalayar Rubber Industries Ltd. 1981 KLT. 398 : 1981 (2) ILR. Kerala 113) has taken the view that the Agricultural Income Tax Appellate Tribunal has no jurisdiction to condone the delay in filing an application for reference under sub-section (1) of S. 60 of the Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950 (Kerala Act 22 of 1950) as Ss. 5 and 14 of the 1963 Limitation Act could be relied on for extension of time only in respect of a proceeding in court not before a Tribunal or other authority, under any local or special law. The position of the Land Tribunal except to the extent specifically provided for in the Act itself for the application of the provisions of the Limitation Act of 1963 is not, in my view, any way different from that of the Industrial Tribunal. Labour Court, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal or the Agricultural Income Tax Appellate Tribunal etc., and, therefore, the preponderance of judicial opinion is in favour of holding that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, unless there is a specific provision to the contrary in the Act itself, would not be applicable to the Land Tribunal The decision of this Court in Cheru Ouseph v. Kunhipathumma (1981 KLT. 495) has no bearing to the question of limitation. For the foregoing reasons I hold that the 2nd respondent Land Tribunal was clearly in error in holding that the petitioner's application to put the petitioner in possession of the A schedule property by shifting the 1st respondent to the B schedule property described in the schedule to the petition was barred under Art. 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed, the impugned order Ext. P-5 is quashed, and the 2nd respondent Land Tribunal is directed to restore the application to file and to deal with it according to law. There will be no order as to costs.

    12. Allowed.

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    Raman v. Kunhipennu
    (Sep 26, 1981)