Shiv Narayan Dhingra, J.:— By an order dated 5.3.2008, the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi allowed an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act in favour of the respondent in respect of property No. 123, First Floor, New Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi. The petitioner has challenged the legality of the order on the ground that the learned ARC went wrong in not considering other defence raised by petitioner on the ground that the leave to defend granted to the petitioner/respondent was limited to the question of bonafide requirement. The petitioner relied upon Precision Steel & Engineering Works v. Prem Deva, Niranjan Deva Tagal, AIR 1982 SC 1518 and S.K Dey… v. D.C Gagerna…. 1984 (2) RCR 615.
2. There is no doubt that the learned ARC in her order observed that the leave to defend granted to the petitioner was restricted to the question of bona fide necessity and she considered only this aspect. However, this Court can consider in view of the evidence led by the parties, if really any other issue arose.
3. I consider that where a frivolous challenge is made to the title of the landlord contrary to settled legal positron just to prolong the proceedings, such a challenge can be altogether ignored by the ARC. When a tenant takes a plea that the landlord, who had filed the eviction petition was not the owner of the premises, the tenant is obliged to disclose to the Court as to who was the owner of the premises and under whom he/she was tenant. In the present case, it is not disputed by the petitioner that the premises was purchased from erstwhile owner by Shri T.A Teckchandani and Shri T.A Teckchandani became the landlord owner of the premises. Smt. Aarti Teckchandani, the landlady who filed the eviction petition for bona fide requirement was daughter-in-law of Shri T.A Teckchandani and had been living at the ground floor House No. 124, New Rajinder Nagar. She claimed that the premises in question came to her by way of a Will left behind by Shri T.A Tekchandani.
4. The concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by the Delhi Rent Control Act, has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit. If the premises was let out by a person and after his death, the premises has come in the hands of beneficiary under a Will, the tenant has no right to challenge the title of such a beneficiary. If on the death of the original owner the tenant has any doubt as to who was the owner of the premises, he is supposed to file an interpleader suit impleading all the legal heirs of the deceased and ask the Court to decide as to who shall be the landlord/owner after the death of the original owner. Where no interpleader suit is filed by the tenant and the tenant continues in possession after death of the original owner without demur and without raising an objection against the person, who claims to have inherited the property under the Will, he later on cannot challenge the ownership of such a person. It is not the domain of the tenant to challenge the Will of the deceased landlord. If a landlord is able to show that there is a testament in his/her favour, he/she is deemed to have discharged his/her burden of proving the ownership under the Act. If the tenant takes a frivolous objection about ownership, such an objection cannot be entertained unless the tenant comes forward as to who was the landlord/owner of the premises and to whom he has been paying rent after the death of the original owner.
5. This Court in Ram Chander v. Ram Pyari, 109 (2004) DLT 388 : 2004 (72) DRJ 545 and Plashchemicals Company v. Ashit Chadha, 114 (2004) DLT 408 : 2004 (76) DRJ 654 have laid down the law that it was not for the tenant to challenge the Will of the landlord and any such challenge made by the tenant is a baseless and frivolous challenge. I, therefore, consider that even if the learned Additional Rent Controller did not dwell upon this point, such a challenge made by the tenant would not result into non suiting the landlord. Moreover, the evidence led by the landlady in this case makes it clear that she inherited the property, in question, on the basis of Will left by her father in law. There is no other person who has claimed ownership over the property and this objection was raised just for the sake of raising objection.
6. As far as issue of composite user is concerned, this issue has become redundant in view of judgment of Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India, 2008 (5) SCC 287 : 2008 (102) DRJ 393 [SC] wherein Supreme Court has held that Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India insofar as it discriminates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes when the same are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation. The Supreme Court struck down this difference & brought residential & commercial premises at par.
7. Now remains the issue of bona fide requirement of the landlady. The Trial Court has dwelled upon this issue at length. The landlady in this case is the owner of the premises which is in occupation of the tenant. The ground floor of property No. 124, New Rajinder Nagar is owned by her son and not by her. She wanted to live separate from her son and daughter-in-law. She also deposed that her married daughter often used to come to her and visit her. The contention of the tenant that the landlady being mother of the owner of Property No. 124, New Rajinder Nagar can stay with him, was found to be untenable. At the time when petition was filed, the petitioner's son was staying in Kolkata. In the petition she had specifically stated that her son was of marriageable age and he wanted to shift to Delhi and get married but was not able to shift to Delhi because of want of accommodation. During pendency of the petition, the son shifted to Delhi and also got married. He has a right to enjoy his property No. F-124 New Rajinder Nagar as per his own choice. The landlady, wanted to live in her own premises, in occupation of the tenant/petitioner and this was the only premises owned by her. The petitioner's contention that landlady should live with her son rightly did not find favour with the ARC.
8. Where a person is living in somebodyelse's accommodation even if this somebody else is related to him as son, father or mother, his desire and right to live in his own accommodation cannot be said to be unjustified in a similar way as the alternate accommodation acquired by son, mother or father is not considered as a ground available to the landlord under section 14(1)(h) to seek eviction of the tenant. Since, the landlady had no other accommodation except this one which was occupied by the tenant and the other accommodation where she was living, belonged to her son and not to her, I consider that the learned ARC committed no error of law or fact in passing the eviction order. The question of availability of sufficient accommodation in House No. 124 (Ground Floor), New Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi is irrelevant because this property does not belong to landlady. It is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how he or she should live and where to live. Where a landlady wants to live in her own accommodation and she has no other accommodation available with her, (she is living with her relative) the landlady has a right to get her property vacated for her bona fide necessity.
9. I find no force in the petition. The petition is hereby dismissed.